

## **Attitudes as Personal and Subpersonal Dispositions**

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On many accounts, free will requires that the agent has the capacity for reflective control over the dispositions that give rise to their behavioural inclinations. I have recently argued for a model of behavioural cognition that allows for such control. On this view, behavioural cognition is driven by attitudes, as these are understood by social psychologists, and these attitudes are habituated through deliberation and action. This model casts attitudes as powers or tendencies continually exerting pressure towards some outcome, but also describes them as consisting in clusters of nodes in a connectionist network. Since nodes in a connectionist network exert their influence only when activated by input from other nodes, this gives rise to a puzzle: how can attitudes consist in clusters of such nodes, yet be powers rather than reactive dispositions? In this talk, I argue that the puzzle arises because the term 'attitude' is used in two senses. It names a property of the whole person, which we should understand as a power. But it also names a property of the person's cognitive system, and when that system is functionally characterised as a connectionist network this property is cast as a reactive disposition. I argue that there is no contradiction in this idea of a subpersonal functional reactive disposition underpinning a personal power.