

# On mental dispositions, abilities and free will

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Free will is *prima facie* incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism. If one wants to stick with the idea that there is something as free will and it is the result of our abilities, then it seems that is better to consider the compatibility of free will with determinism, for it would preserve an internal relation. Among the compatibilists, many argue that freedom can be either considered as the ability to do otherwise if one had wanted to or, if a deeper notion of freedom is invoked, as the ability to decide or choose differently.

Recently, the notion of ability has received a renovated dispositional interpretation. The ability to decide or choose would be some disposition or other to decide or choose, and the dual ability to do or not to do something would be analogously dispositional. Consequently, the problem is: if having an ability / dual ability is having a disposition, is *this* very disposition compatible with determinism? In this paper I shall contrast the dispositional reading of abilities with a purely ability reading and I shall argue that it is possible to give an analysis of the ability to choose as the ability to select one among many ordered options. Having the ability to choose is to have some property such that given some stimulus condition C (a choice) one controls the selection of one or another option; similarly, one has the ability to decide or want if one controls the relevant dispositions.