Post-war reconstruction and livelihood revival among returnees and host communities in Twic East county, Southern Sudan.

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Declaration

I, Helga Einarsdottir, hereby declare that this is my original work. The thesis has not previously been published to any academic institution for a degree. Information used from other sources is duly acknowledged.

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Ås, 15th of May 2007
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Abstract

In Southern Sudan people are starting to repatriate after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army in January 2005. The repatriation process is a huge task and it demands resources and coordination from both the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and NGOs and the UN system. If the repatriation is not handled in a good way it may disturb the fragile peace in Southern Sudan.

The people returning to Southern Sudan are facing challenges both practically and psychologically. Many are returning empty handed and are received in local communities where the natural resources are already strained and the communities are facing major challenges because they lack basic services like health facilities, infrastructure, education beyond primary and job opportunities. They are also having problems with insecurity, flooding, pests and diseases.

This thesis is based on a 2 month fieldwork carried out in Southern Sudan with the help of Norwegian Peoples Aid. I interviewed returnees about their repatriation process, their experiences as displaced and how they were experiencing to be home. I also asked them about their livelihood activities and strategies. I interviewed residents about what they thought about all the people returning, what impact the returnees had on the communities and their livelihood strategies. I interviewed representatives for the NGOs in Twic East County about the repatriation process and what kind of challenges they were facing and what kind of assistance they were supplying for the population. I also talked to local leaders, women groups, and representatives for the local administration.

The repatriation process is moving slowly and the assistance provided upon peoples returning to their communities is insufficient to meet the needs of the population, because of lack of coordination among the NGOs and the slow implementation of the CPA by the GoSS. My findings show that the returnees are having a hard time reconstructing their livelihoods and they are doing worse than the residents. The motivation for return is important because those who decided themselves to go home and returned without assistance are doing much better than the ones that got support to repatriate.
List of abbreviations

CPA- Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DFID-Department for International Development
EPLF- Eritrean Peoples Revolutionary Front
EPRDF- Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
EU- European Union
GDP- Gross Domestic Product
GoS- Government of Sudan
GoSS- Government of Southern Sudan
GTZ- Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HRW- Human rights Watch
IDMC- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP- Internally Displaced Person
LF- Livelihood Framework
LWF- Lutheran World Federation
NGO- Non Governmental Organization
NIF- National Islamic Front
NPA- Norwegian Peoples Aid
OAU- Organization of African Unity
OLS- Operation Lifeline Sudan
PDF- Peoples Defense Forces
SLF- Sustainable Livelihood Framework
SPLM/A- Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army
STC- Save The Children
UN- United Nations
UNHCR- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF- United Nations International Children Emergency Fund
US- United States
WHO- World Health Organization
WFP- World Food Programme
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¹ All photos are taken by Helga Einarsdottir
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Chapter 1

Introduction and methodology

This study looks at the process of repatriation and resettlement, and livelihood establishment assisted by NGOs among the returnees and host communities in Southern Sudan. The study was carried out in Twic East County, North Bor, Jongulei State. This area was destroyed by the civil war and the communities are facing major challenges rebuilding their society.

1.1 Statement of the problem

After the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan’s People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) on January 9th 2005, some of the 5.3 million internally displaced people inside Sudan (IDMC 2006) and the 693,300 Sudanese refugees in neighboring countries (UNHCR 2005) are expected to start the process of returning home to Southern Sudan.²

After the cold war, the number of people uprooted by conflict has increased. Though more people are displaced, fewer are crossing international borders and the internally displaced globally outnumbers the refugees two to one. Internally displaced people have left their homes for the same reasons as the refugees, except that they have not crossed any international borders, this means that they are not protected by the same international conventions. Since they are often persecuted or under attack by their own governments, they are frequently in an even more desperate situation than the refugees (UNHCR 2006, Nachmias and Goldstein 2004). They are also harder to enumerate, define and identify and accessing them is often hard because they might be caught in a combat zone or hindered by the complexities of sovereignty. The reason why people get internally displaced instead of

² Ethnic cleansing and conflict continues in Darfur and Eastern Sudan, but issues concerning these conflict will not be addressed in this paper
becoming refugees might be natural obstacles like mountains or rivers, wanting to stay in familiar surroundings, lack of means and resources to get out of the country, hostilities on the way or rejection from the country that they are applying for asylum in. (UNHCR 2006).

Refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP) in Sudan have left their homes for the same reason, the civil war that has been going on since 1983. Both groups seek help from the international community but they are equipped with a totally different set of rules and international conventions. While the refugees are protected by the international convention for refugees from 1951 and the UN High Commission for Refugees, the internally displaced only have a set of guidelines for internal displacement and no UN High Commission to protect them. This results in that IDPs does not get the same protection from international framework as refugees.

**Repatriation as the solution**

The international community in general and especially UNHCR are increasingly promoting repatriation as the optimum and most feasible solution to the refugee crisis around the world (Harrel-Bond 1989). The increasing political interest in repatriation is closely connected to the soaring unwillingness to grant refugee status. Financial and political pressure exerted by donor states has resulted in UNHCR being perceived by many commentators as actively promoting the repatriation option in the short term, rather than facilitating voluntarily repatriation when the conditions allow this (Black and Koser 1999).

According to “Surveys of intentions” carried out by the UNHCR in refugee camps in neighboring countries and among the internally displaced, an overwhelming majority of the displaced are willing to return home to restart their lives and contribute to the development of Southern Sudan (Malik 2006). But if the optimal solution is voluntarily repatriation, the conditions which people are living under while displaced need to be considered, and if it is possible for them to settle in their country of displacement.

When people return they are often vulnerable and they have to share already strained resources with the local population. Even if returnees are supposed to be self reliant in the long run, they might even have bigger needs for support when they return home (Black and Koser 1999). The UNHCR (2006) states that the experiences of the first year of post-conflict, with a large number of spontaneous returns and with improved access to areas and presence
of UN and NGOs in remote areas, have shown that capacity and resource constrains are evident at all levels and in all sectors. The receiving communities are equally impoverished and have suffered extreme destruction because of years of conflict, neglect and drought (Malik 2006).

When people have returned, there is a need to pay close attention to prevent repatriation from leading to even bigger challenges and instability. The returnees come from different locations, have their individual sets of experience and have different needs when they return. Some might have benefited from being displaced while others lost everything.

The need for support to returnees is recognized by international agencies but is determined by many considerations such as the resources available, location and security, politics in the country concerned, international rates of return, resettlement and reintegration possibilities in the area. What is considered the right and best practice for development assistance is constantly evolving. The politics and priorities of non governmental organizations determine to a great extent who is going to get relief or development aid, when the aid is coming, which kind of practices that are used in the distribution and what kind of aid is going to be delivered.

1.2 Objective of the study and research questions

Objective
The objective of my study is to assess the processes of resettlement and post-war reconstruction among returnees and host communities in Twic East County, North Bor, Southern Sudan, focusing on household livelihood and the role of NGOs and Government.

Research Questions
1. Are the returnee households able to reestablish livelihoods in this area?
2. To what extent are the activities of Government and NGOs in the area contributing to the livelihoods for returnee and resident households?
1.3 Structure of the thesis

This thesis is organized in 6 chapters. In this introduction I present the problem and objectives of this study and the methodology. I provide a background to the study in Chapter 2. This chapter provides some background information on causes of displacement in Sudan and how the international community has responded to displacement in general. It also presents the legal rights of refugees and internally displaced people and issues concerning repatriation. Chapter 3 explains the analytical framework, and includes a presentation of the livelihoods framework. With this as a basis I explain the household-based framework, which I have applied in the following analysis. My findings and analysis/discussion are divided into two chapters. In Chapter 4 I present my findings concerning the institutional environment and livelihoods activities. In this chapter I analyze my finding using my modified livelihood framework/household livelihood framework with focus on households. In Chapter 5 I look at the role of government organizations and NGOs in resettlement. I present the payams that are the basis of this study and the NGOs working in that area. I also look at the motivations for repatriation and how these affect livelihood. Chapter 6 is summing up and conclusion, where I sum up my findings and the results of my analysis.

1.4 Methodology

My fieldwork in Southern Sudan was from October to December 2006. In the end of October I had a two-week field-break where I went to Kampala. The first period in the field was hard because I came in the end of the rain season and the roads were flooded. It was almost impossible to get around to do the things I had planned. During the rain season it cars are useless, so walking is the only mean of transportation. The temperature was extremely high and distances are long. The combination of all of these factors led me to not being able to do all the research I wanted, the first weeks in the field. The Norwegian Peoples Aid staff didn’t want me to walk because it was too dangerous and rough. After my field break, things went much better. It had stopped raining and it was possible to use the roads, I was more used to
the conditions in the field and people were more used to me. I was able to go out and speak to different representatives for the communities and the NGOs every day and I used a lot of time trying to explain why I was there and what my project was about. I became a local celebrity and people were always curious what the white girl was going to do next.

**Study Area**

Sudan has 41 million inhabitants (CIA fact book) and is the largest country in Africa. It has also had the longest running civil war in Africa and the biggest population of internally displaced people in the world (Phelnan & Wood 2006). Sudan is divided into 56 ethnic groups and 595 sub-ethnic groups who speak more than 115 languages (Deng 2002). Agriculture employs 80% of the population and contributes to 43% of the GDP (EU Courier 2003). Economic development in the country is uneven and concentrated in the north where most of the population is concentrated.

In 1956 the first and only ethnic census done showed that Arabs were 39%, and Africans 61%. Approximately 70% of the population is Muslim, mostly living in the northern parts of the country. The South is home to many pronounced theistic religions and Christians (HRW 2003). More people are converting to Christianity now because of the drive to Islamize the South, than all the colonial missionaries managed to convert during the first half of the twentieth century. Despite this, the indigenous religions still form ideas of ethical behavior, the moral community and political action (Johnson 2003).
Study Sites

The study was carried out in Twic East County, North Bor, one of the areas that were dilapidated by the civil war. Thus, it was currently receiving large amounts of returnees. Twic East County consists of five payams and I conducted my study in three of them. Neither local administration nor the NGOs did know the number of inhabitants of the payams because the place had been almost deserted during the war and people were continuously returning.
Institutional Affiliation

My study was done in cooperation with Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA). I wanted to cooperate with NPA because of their experience in Southern Sudan and because they collaborate with Noragric this was possible for me. Without the help of NPA this fieldwork would have been very difficult. They provided me with accommodation, transport and interpreters. During my stay in the field, I was aware of the fact that my close affiliation with NPA might influence my findings because people might give strategic answers.

3 On this map Jongulei payam is called Paliau
Research approach
In my study, the contents of an interview or an observation are more important than the number of people interviewed. The objective of the study is to assess the process of resettlement and livelihood establishment. I did household interviews, focus group discussions, key informant interviews with NGOs, residents, returnees, local leaders and women groups. I used the information from the local population to get an insight in how people perceived the work of the NGOs.

I used qualitative methods with semi-structured interviews with checklists. I had different checklists for the different groups interviewed. The interview settings were mostly quite informal and if the informant raised new topics they would also be included in the interview. Observations during my stay play an important role in this study. Participating in some of NPAs activities in the field like distribution of food, visiting farmers field schools, watching traditional wrestling and dancing, visiting the local health clinic, cattle camps, local governments and the compounds of many of the NGOs were things I prioritized during my stay. They gave me an insight to the local structures and the context that the local population was trying to make a living in.

Methods of data collection
This study examines the process of resettlement and livelihood establishment assisted by the NGOs, among returnees and residents in Twic East County. I am using a qualitative approach and both primary and secondary data have been collected. The qualitative strategy included interviews on attitudes and perceptions of local people and other actors involved in the returnee and reconstruction process.

Primary Data
I had key informant interviews with people in the local administration, community leaders such as chiefs and elders, and people working for NGOs in the area. I also did a number of household interviews, with residents and returnees, manly from Kongor and Nyuak payam because they were closest to the NPA compound. Some household interviews were done during the distributing of food among returnees from Panyagor /Mabior. All interviews that were done during distribution were done in such a way that none of the people waiting to get
their food would miss out from any information or miss their turn in the line. I would mainly talk to the ones that had already received their food but where still waiting for others. Focus group interviews were conducted with local leaders, returnees and women groups. The focus groups were open, I presented some topics for discussion, and people would also ask me things and demand answers often to things that I was unable to answer. But I was always open about the reason for my stay and explained the intensions of study. In many cases the expectations for what my study would bring to the community were unreasonably high, but I always explained that I was only a student. The interview checklists for the residents and returnees were loosely built on the framework for micro policy analyzing of rural livelihoods (Ellis 2000).

**Secondary Data**

I sought literature that was relevant to the objectives of the study. Books and journals and other literature including some reports from International Non Governmental Organizations and the United Nation have been used. Reports from Internet sources like the Department for International Development (DFID) site (www.dfid.gov.uk), Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) (www.internal-displacement.org), and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) (www.odi.org) are also used. I have also used government of Southern Sudan documents like the Joint Assessment Mission’s Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication (JAM 2005).

**Sampling**

The type of sampling used was a convenience sampling of snowball character. I talked to individuals that had the time, opportunity and desire to talk to me (Bryman 2004). In the beginning of my study it was very hard to get in touch with people that I wanted to talk to, but after a while I got some contacts and this got easier. Building a network of contacts made me find additional contacts that were relevant for the study, and that way I gained a larger sample of interviews. I wanted to get a representative sample when it came to gender and age, returnees and residents. Because I attended distributions of food to returnees I was able to easily access returnees, but there were only women coming to these distributions. This leveled out when I talked to other returnees that would turn up for focus groups because then only

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4 Figure 5 in chapter 3
men would show. All local leaders and representatives for NGOs were men, and obviously all the members of the women groups were women.

**Resident and returnee interviews**

I divided my informants into two groups, “Residents” and “Returnees”. All of the returnees that I talked to returned home less than two and a half year ago, the one who returned earliest returned in 2004. I interviewed 10 residents that all had returned before 1998 or had stayed there for the whole period. The typical resident from my sample was either an old man in his 70s or a woman in her 30s. This is because of their availability and time to talk to me. Visiting households I found mostly young women home and when I went to the payam center I found mostly old men sitting around under trees engaged in discussions or handling court cases.

From my data collection I have 32 interviews with returnees, 19 of these were returning from Kenya, 5 from Uganda and 8 had been internally displaced. The majority of the returnees I talked to came from the big refugee camp Kakuma in Kenya. This does not mean that most of the returnees in Southern Sudan are from there, but in my study area those were the people that were willing to speak to me and available for interviews. According to UN numbers the biggest part of the returnees have been internally displaced, but they are often not registered because they return on their own and settle independently. In many cases they do not get any assistance upon their return because they are not able to prove that they have been displaced.

**Local leaders**

I interviewed the local chiefs in three payams in Twic East County; Nyuak, Kongor and Jongulei. The local chief is elected by the village to represent them together with a Boma (village) administrator and the Government pays them both. The local leaders are supported by a council of elders and they are the ones that decide all cases that are to small to go to the county level, like conflicts over land, cattle or marriage issues. There are normally one head chief and some other chiefs. The chiefs are old and respected men in the village and they spend most of their time in the payam center talking to people and being available, in case someone is in need of their service.
The chiefs have normally stayed around for a while in order to get respected. I didn’t find any chiefs that were recent returnees. The chiefs are often more informed about the NGOs and the government than rest of the population. They are claiming their rights, and it was easy to get the impression that they would overemphasize on the negative, because if they really proved to me that things were horrible, there might be a chance that I would start a development program to help them.

**Women groups**

All the payams in Twic East County have women groups. Their contribution is caring for and providing food for soldiers, these groups were formed spontaneously from 1983 when the civil war started. Today the local communities elect the representatives for the women groups and their main responsibility is to welcome guests to the payam and make food if there is a local celebration. However, some of the women I talked to had higher aspirations than this and hoped that being a member of the women group would help them acquire knowledge that could lead them to a higher position in society. In some cultures, access to talk to women may be restricted because the women are supposed to be “seen but not heard”. This is also the situation to some degree in my study area, but I think since I was a woman and the community knew me, and knew what I was writing about I was allowed to meet with the women. The women would answer every question but when I started to talk about the women’s role in the Dinka society and their role in the family, some would react and start asking me about why I was asking them all of these questions.

**Non-Governmental Organizations**

All NGOs that I talked to had their compounds in Twic East County and had experience in working in Southern Sudan. I visited the NGOs in their compounds for the interviews and that would give me a chance to observe how the “inside” of the NGOs looked like. During my stay in the field I got interviews with representatives for Lutheran World Federation (LWF), Sudan Medical Care (SMC), CARE, World Food Programme (WFP), and Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA).
Data analysis

For the analysis of my data I have used the framework that is presented in chapter 3. In the discussion and findings I have used quotes to describe the views of my informants. I have presented the quotes anonymously to spare the individuals for sanctions of any kind.

Logistics and time

There were many logistical challenges during my stay and it was difficult to get around to the different communities. The period I was in the field was not the most active one for the NGOs and the people because it was in the end of the rainy season. The most active months for the NGOs are from January to April. The local people had finished harvesting and they were using a lot of time doing traditional ceremonies like weddings and traditional dancing, wrestling and court cases. People had more time and that was an advantage because then I didn’t interrupt as much. But on the other hand, I did not get the opportunity to see them during their normal activities. During my stay in the field there was a food shortage because of flooding that had destroyed the fields of the farmers. Normally there would have been a seasonal bias because it was in the dry season and the harvesting period so people might be having more food than normally, but this was not the case in my study area.

Ethics

When it comes to discussion about ethics in social research there are four issues formulated by Diener and Crandall (1978); whether there is harm to participants, whether there is a lack of informed consent, whether there is an invasion of privacy and whether deception is involved (Diener and Crandall 1978 in Bryman 2004).

Harm to the participants

The first issue is whether there is harm inflicted to the participants, I was very aware of the risk of this while I was in the field. The different NGOs that I talked to would in some cases express opinions that are not politically correct. In some cases, they talked badly of their fellow NGOs. I realize that the area is small and if I use that material, there is a big chance that these individuals might be identified. I would always present myself and have the interviews and the focus groups with the local leaders of the payams before I talked to any
other member of the community. This would make people know what I was there for and not suspect the individuals I was talking to. It is possible that the women that I interviewed might get negative sanctions from information they gave to me in interviews, but I tried to keep the information on a general level and not push them when I saw that they were getting uncomfortable. I realize that many of the answers that I have gotten in the field might have been exaggerated of the real situation because it is easy to imagine that if people thought that I was from a NGO, telling me that their food supply was secure would possibly end the food rations and then they would only harm themselves. I have made all quotes anonymous but I have indicated which payam the different people are from. This is because I wanted to shed some light on the local differences and similarities. When it comes to NGOs I have indicated which NGO the quote comes from but I have not indicated the name of the person. This is because there may be some negative consequences from a higher level in the organization.

Lack of informed consent

When it comes to the issue of lack of informed consent I think all the people that I talked to while in the field knew what I was doing and why I was there. The reason for this is that I was the only white person in the whole County and obviously I was very interesting to everybody. People would always stop me and ask me why I was there and I would always take time to sit and talk with my informants before the interview to explain to them why I was there. They knew that the things they told me would be a part of a study. Since I used the snowball method to find informants there may be the issue of some of the informants feeling obliged to answer my questions because they were “recommended” by somebody else.

Invasion of privacy

On the issue of invasion of privacy, I feel that the women in the women groups think that I went to far with their questions. The questions were not a part of my checklist and were certainly not going in to the study. They were asked after the interview was finished and they were asking me things and then I also asked them things that I was curious of. Some told me that I should not ask about certain things because they were “secrets of the Dinka women”. 
Deception

“Deception occurs when researchers represent their research as something other than what it is” (Bryman 2004: 514). In some cases I felt that the local people would perceive my research as something that it was not, but I would always try to explain that I was not representing a NGO that would start a programme to end their suffering.

Expectations aroused by research

Research carried out by outsiders may raise the local population’s expectations that their suffering is now over and that the research is going to lead to the solution of longstanding problems (Pratt and Lozios 1992). People might assume that the researcher will come back and bring money to spend locally in development projects and since the different people in the village have different interests it will create many different expectations of the research findings and the action these may lead to. Since it was not possible for me to involve the local population in the actual planning of the research due to my short stay in the field I always explained who I was and that I was not working for any of the NGOs in the area. I emphasized that I was only a student and that I was there to learn from them and that my research might not lead to immediate assistance to their problems. But I did not want to remove all importance from the research because people are using their time to talk to me and also obviously my hope is that my research might be to some help for agencies working with returnees and livelihood revival.

Language

I had to use an interpreter and after using a couple different ones I got one that was with me all the time. That was a big advantage because he got to know me, and he knew what kind of information I wanted. Using the same interpreter all the time decreased the amount of misunderstandings. However there are problems using an interpreter because you may loose some of the meaning of the answer in the course of the interpretation. Sometimes the interpreter does not translate things that he/she considers too obvious and the interpreter may also add things to the answer when he/she wants to explain things further.
1.5 The use of terms

The Household

I have chosen to use the household as the most appropriate unit for investigating livelihoods. The household can be hard to define because it differs between cultures but it is also an arena where people share and work together a lot and they are both socially and economically interdependent (Ellis 2000). The distribution of economic goods, food etc. might not be equal inside the household, but normally everybody contributes something. The household might be defined as people that share the same house and share the same meals. The household may sometimes have non-family members resident. Shark argues that the household is the idea that it presents a coalition of players committed by choice or custom to act vis-à-vis the rest of the world (Shark 1991 in Ellis 2000:18). This theory does not emphasize as much on co-residence and might be appropriate in the context of Southern Sudan where men might have several wives and families that he shares the time with. The large influx of returnees expands residents’ households since they have to accept friends and family members to live with them while they re-organize themselves.

Resident

In my study, the term resident refers to people who have stayed in Southern Sudan during the civil war and people who returned to their villages before 2004. The people that have returned before 2004 are considered residents by the NGOs distributing food in the communities.

Returnee

The returnees are individuals that returned home after 2004 after being either internally displaced or refugees in neighboring countries.

Repatriation

The term repatriation is in the context of this study used to describe the process of returning and at the same time transforming yourself from being a refugee or a IDP to being a returnee and eventually becoming a resident.
Resettlement

In my study I have used the term resettlement about people that are returning from displacement. Resettlement includes the ones that return to their areas of origin and the ones who choose to settle in the area different from that they are originally came from.

Reconstruction

I have used the term reconstruction to describe both the process of physically reconstructing e.g. infrastructure and schools that have been destroyed during the war in Southern Sudan, but also to describe people reconstructing their lives and adjusting to the new/old ways of life that is meeting them when they return.
Chapter 2

War, displacement and return: Sudan in the larger African context

The purpose of this chapter is to provide some background information about the causes for displacement in Southern Sudan. I also provide an insight on the international response to this displacement. A description of the international responses and tactics when it comes to Internally displaced persons and refugee is also provided.

2.1 Context

Independence

Sudan was the first of the British colonies in Africa to get independence but this was not a result of a strong nationalist movement but rather international diplomacy. The first elections were held in Sudan in 1956 and representatives from the south obtained only 6 out of 800 positions while the northerners dominated the senior positions in Southern Sudan (Johnson 2003). The lack of political representation, northern domination, suppression and exploitation under shifting colonial rule as well as under Arab rule, initiated the first period of civil war, from 1955 to 1972. That war ended with signing of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which granted the south regional autonomy (Cohen and Deng 1998a).

My findings do not focus much on the differences between refugees and IDPs, because I treat all as returnees. I still found it necessary to provide some background on the IDPs as a group because they represent the biggest group of returnees, even though that is not reflected in this study.
The second civil war

In 1983 the Sudanese government split the South administratively into three regions and the power that the South had enjoyed in the years after the Addis Ababa Agreement was weakened. The southerners felt that they were again robbed for the autonomy they fought for during the first civil war. The government announced that all of Sudan was to be under Shari’a law, and that lead some officers, including John Garang and his Bor battalion to brake with Khartoum and leave for the Ethiopian border. This marked the beginning of both the SPLM and the second civil war (Cohen and Deng 1998a). After the first civil war and the Addis Ababa agreement over a million people returned from displacement only to become displaced again when the second civil war started in 1983. This war lasted for 21 years, over 2 million people were killed, over 5 million displaced inside their own country (IDMC 2006) and 700.000 became refugees (UNHCR 2005).

The conflict in Sudan was complex and had deep historical roots. It was regional; North (including the east and west) versus South, religious; Muslims against Christians, and racial, ethnical and cultural; northern “Arabs” against the black Africans. The conflict was also about political and economic power, the southerners wanted influence and to stop the political domination of the North, and the robbing of their natural resources, like oil and water. During the years of war there were many factions participating but the two main parties were the military of the Sudanese government and the Southern Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing, the Southern Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA). The main political party in the North is the National Islamic Front (NIF), a Muslim fundamentalist party.

2.2 Displacement in Sudan

Oil and displacement

According to Human Rights Watch, oil has been the principle cause and main objective of the war since 1999 (HRW 2003). The government of Sudan has forcibly displaced the local populations from the oil rich areas, and the exploitation of oil by foreign companies in Southern Sudan has increased human rights abuses (HRW 2003). During the civil war, the Government considered the agro-pastoralist southerners living near the oilfields as the enemy.
SPLM/A and the Government official were fighting over control and ownership of the natural resources in the South, and the northern army perceived the pastoral people as sympathetic to the rebels. The government of Sudan didn’t intend for the locals to participate in the decisions concerning their land, or share the benefits of oil development (HRW 2003).

**Drought and displacement**

Drought has struck Sudan regularly since 1963 and has resulted in countless deaths and the displacement of hundreds of thousand others, not only in the South but also in the west and the north (Johnson 2003). The displacement obviously also lead to people not being able to farm their land, which in turn lead to a devastating famine in 1988, that left tens of thousands dead and hundreds of thousands displaced. Southern Sudan was not prone to famine before the 2nd civil war, but suffered from two major famines in 1988 and 1998. There has been an increase in the occurrence of famine in Sudan and they have had famines in 1984, 1988, 1991 and 1998 (Deng 2002). “*People, especially children, died in masses within easy reach of government and international relief services simply because the government identified them as southerners and therefore a part of the enemy camp*” (Deng and Minear 1992: 15). Even though the international response increased and the WFP, USAID, OFDA and the EU got involved, the relief remained sporadic. More than 250,000 southern Sudanese died as a result of the famine in 1988. Many of these could have been saved if the international community had been willing to take action despite the objections of the government (Cohen and Deng 1998a).

**Displaced families in Sudan**

When it comes to Southern Sudan, their major problem is that the internally displaced people that have been living in Khartoum, other major cities in Sudan and also other rural areas they do not originate from (Salam and de Waal 2001). Even though these people have been living in their home country all along, they have been facing discrimination both by the Government and their host communities and are often in a more vulnerable situation than the refugees (UNHCR 2006).
Although the displaced people in Sudan count several millions they are practically invisible when it comes to politics and have been neglected by the governments. Most of the displaced families consists of women and children and they have been experiencing widespread racism from the government and town residents that have considered them to be intruders. Racism has not only been a problem in the North but the situation for the displaced around the Northern cities might have been the most crucial. “Under successive governments, but particularly since 1991, displaced people have seen their modest homes violently destroyed, and have been removed by force to new places in the desert. Some have been killed. They work in the most menial occupations. They live in places with no facilities like water supplies, electricity, access to health services, education etc” (Salam and de Waal 2001: 95).

The displaced women are the most vulnerable of the displaced, the lack of income forces many to brew alcohol, which is against the law and might result in their imprisonment. Many displaced children have to wander the streets looking for food or a job, many resort to crime and some use glue or gasoline as drugs. Some of these children are caught and brought to camps were they are stripped for their religion and culture and given training to become soldiers (Salam and de Waal 2001). Another issue is the lack of political representation for the displaced in Sudan. The Khartoum government have allowed the internally displaced in the camps to elect chiefs to negotiate on their behalf, but according to Salam and de Waal these chiefs are often corrupted and fail to truly represent the demands of the people they were supposed to represent (2001). The displaced have not been allowed to vote because they are so many and town people have feared that they would swing the political balance in the urban areas. The displaced have also had no option of going home to vote, in effect, the IDPs were disenfranchised in their own country.

**Internally displaced Dinka**

Mark Duffield finished a case study in 1999 on internally displaced Dinka in government-controlled areas where he contests the conventional belief that humanitarian help can create dependency and even fuel the war itself. He says that during the war the displaced Dinka was only offered the aid that is advocated by the proponents of developmental or goal oriented relief and the new humanitarianism, which involves targeted rather than general food aid, seeds and tools to improve on food security and micro credit schemes and loans to improve on the economic self-management. The problem was that neither of these initiatives showed
any success and the Dinka did not improve on their health, economic well-being or political security (Duffield 2001).

The problem with the support of the internally displaced and especially the Dinka was that the humanitarian agencies did not consider the wider context and the political economy of Sudan. They “de-ethicized” the Dinka and others by putting everyone in to one category of internally displaced. Duffield argues that you can’t take ethnicity out of the displacement and in the case of the Dinka they are experiencing problems not only because they are strangers but mainly because they are Dinka (Duffield 2001). The Dinka had occupied a subordinate place in the political economy of Sudan and the aid organizations have reinforced this oppression in the transition zone (ibid). When you give someone the identity of an Internally Displaced there is a confirmation of the view that this is a temporary condition. Since displacement includes problems involved with being in your home area you would expect these problems to lessen and eventually disappear. But if you are experiencing problems because of your ethnicity these problems are not going to lessen over time.

In 2001 the UN estimated that Southern Sudan had about 4 million internally displaced people (IMDC 2006). 1.8 million were thought to be in and around the capital Khartoum, while the remaining 2.2 million were in the “transition zone”, the border region between Northern and Southern Sudan.

**Operation Lifeline Sudan**

OLS was initiated as a short time relief operation in 1989 as a reaction to the government of Sudan not allowing any humanitarian aid outside their area, despite the growing needs among the populations in SPLM/A controlled areas (Johnson 2003).

The growing displacement in Southern Sudan did not seem to be a problem that the government was interested in dealing with. In 1986 the only relief in the south was provided by the humanitarian arm of the SPLM, the Sudanese Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) provided food to 20,000 IDPs in the Equatoria region (Cohen and Deng 1998a). The SPLA requested UN to assist the displaced under SPLA control and not only bring relief to

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6 The number of IDPs and refugee vary extremely after what sources you look at. The displacement numbers have also varied during the war.

7 Later the Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC).
the areas under government control. The severe famine in 1988 and the inadequate response resulted in a UN sponsored conference on relief operations held in Khartoum and the result of the conference was to launch Operation Lifeline Sudan I (Cohen and Deng 1998a). The original goal of the OLS was to avert an anticipated famine in the south. The main strategy involved distribution of grain and the establishment of feeding centers for vulnerable populations (Johnson 2000).

Operation Lifeline Sudan has been an important factor when it comes to the ability of humanitarian agencies to provide help in Sudan. It was formed from UN agencies and NGOs and the Government of Sudan and SPLA. Under the OLS, the agencies operating in Southern Sudan did enjoy greater access and freedom of movement in the war zone. In exchange for access and control in the non-government areas (OLS Southern Sector) the state got full control over the remainder (OLS Northern Sector). The situation was hard for the NGOs working in the northern parts and government areas because of great control and restrictions. The northern and the Southern sector of the OLS were two distinct management and coordination regime without much contact. On top of the problems experienced in the northern sector of the OLS, accessibility, rather than reported needs, determined the initial food distribution by the OLS agencies in the Southern Sector. The food allocation of the south was decided by UNICEF and the government of Khartoum before undertaking any field reports (Johnson 2000). The government demanded that 85% of the aid of the OLS would go to the government areas even thought only 29% of the displaced population was in the government held areas (Cohen and Deng 1998a). This became apparent in e.g. Bahr-el-Ghazal State, where the government controlled the towns and the rural areas were controlled by SPLM/A. There was no contact between the OLS Southern and the OLS northern sector even thought they were working within miles from each other. They did not have information about what the other sector was doing; they had very different management structures and operated according to a different set of policies, principles and security procedures (Levine 1997).

The first general survey carried out on OLS South in 1990 documented the undermining of the subsistence economy during the first years of war and the population had to rely on their own networks of kinship and exchange to recover. OLS had not reached the areas experiencing the worst food shortages (Johnson 2003).
The international humanitarian agencies that were participating in OLS were confronted with a dilemma. Their job was to alleviate the effects on the population that the war between Government of Sudan and SPLA was causing and at the same time cooperating with them. In the areas that were directly affected by fighting, the civilian populations were targeted by the Sudanese army, the PDF (Peoples Defense Forces), the southern factions and armed militias (Johnson 2003). In the early years of the war (1984-8) these attacks were mainly carried out to deny the opposite side supplies and the rural populace became the primary target as livestock was captured, houses were burned and wells destroyed. After the split of SPLM/A in 1991 these raids intensified and asset stripping, where food stores and standing crops became seized or burned, relief inputs captured and relief centers attacked, lead to widespread displacement (Johnson 2003). A minority of displaced Sudanese has received limited assistance from the United Nations through OLS or international and local NGOs. Most of the displaced people, especially in the government-controlled areas have been left to fend for themselves (Cohen and Deng 1998a).

The General Survey in 1990 recommended a shift from food aid to more sustained support for local production and distribution but the growing famine crisis in the north diverted the attention from the OLS (Johnson 2003). According to Johnson the World Food Programme in Khartoum got eager to get in control of this huge relief operation in the north and in negotiations with the government they confirmed the ban on WFP convoys into the south and even agreed on not distributing WFP stocks that were already in the South. They also diverted food stocks that were still in the north and supposed to go to the South. The result was that OLS Southern Sector and especially the WFP was unprepared for the crisis that came in May 1991 as a result of evacuation of southern Sudanese from refugee camps in Ethiopia.

The SPLM/A split

In 1991 the SPLM/A split among the ethnic Nuer-Dinka lines, because of the growing discontent among the Nuer with John Garang’s leadership of the movement. Riek Marchar, a member of the Nuer, and his followers split in to what has been called the Nasir-faction and Marchar declared that he had overthrown Garang as the leader of SPLM/A. After the split in SPLA in August 1991 the government permitted relief to Riek’s SPLA-Nasir areas but

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8 John Garang was a Bor-Dinka
restricted access to the much larger SPLA-Torit territory. The inter factional fighting and the
government advances on the ground after 1992 further complicated the planning and
implementation of the relief, and left it increasingly open to political and military
manipulation. The Sudanese government did not allow many foreign NGOs in the
government controlled areas and the local organizations had tight bonds to the government
and in some cases used relief food as a way to Islamize people (Petterson 1999). The local
NGOs were uncoordinated and without the ability of dealing with the problems assigned to
them. The Sudanese official downplayed the extent of the suffering of the people and did not
see the use for International NGOs (Petterson 1999). The inter-factional fighting led to bloody
attacks and massacres of civilians in Bor, Ayod and elsewhere. The fighting was the
beginning of a major humanitarian crisis, especially in the “hunger triangle” (Figure 1) of
Bor, Ayod and Waat and also led to massive displacement.

Figure 3: Hunger and displacement in North-Bor:

US Aid reported from the area in 1992 that in Ayod, Upper Nile, “about ten people were
dying every day and there were few children under five years of age still alive”. In the nearby
town of Kongor, the approximately 300 people there “were all suffering from severe
malnutrition. There is little hope that those remaining in Kongor can survive unless an
intensive feeding program is established right away”.

Kim Murphy for the “Los Angeles Times” wrote a plight for the people of Bor, about 100
miles south of Kongor. After floods and cattle disease had left them destitute, “in December
last year, the raids began-vicious fighting between rival tribal factions that lead to the theft of
the rest of the cattle and the slaughter of most of Bor’s remaining men. The women, children
and elders remaining were walking bones, people on the brink of starvation” (Petterson
1999:58).

Attacks on civilians intensified during the inter-factional fighting from 1991 and
concentrations of civilians became significant targets, especially in the areas of Jonglei, Lakes
and northern Bahr al-Ghazal (Johnson 2000). “Fighting the enemy, whether the government
or another rebel fraction, took precedence, and neither Garang nor Riek saw anything wrong
with taking relief food meant for starving civilians using it to feed soldiers and officials”
(Petterson 1999:53).
2.3 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement

In January 2005 the two parties of the civil war signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which marked the official end of the conflict. The agreement gave the South autonomy and its own constitution, government and armed forces. Also in the agreement is a referendum scheduled for 2011 to determine whether the South should be independent or a part of a united Sudan.

Signing of the comprehensive peace agreement laid the foundation for the drafting of a constitution for the south. The CPA also provided for three layers of government: the Government of National Unity (GNU) headed by the President of Sudan, the government of South Sudan (GoSS) headed by the vice president of Sudan and the state administration headed by a Governor (IDMC 2006).

The agreement provided for the inclusion of SPLM/A in the Government of National Unity, and also the inclusion of representatives from the North in the new government of Southern Sudan. More than two years after the signing of the agreement, there are still unresolved issues like the distribution of oil income and a border area between the South and the North that is believed to contain huge oil reserves. Southern Sudan has no means of controlling the accuracy of their oil share that they agreed to divide 50-50 with the government of the North under the CPA (IDMC 2006).

With the peace agreement as the starting point, the Government of Sudan and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), together with development partners and civil society outlined the “Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication”. The Framework says: “Providing basic security and human rights protection, and ensuring the safe return and reintegration of the world’s largest displaced population will be a fundamental pre-condition to rebuilding social capital and putting the country on a solid footing for development” (JAM 2005).
2.4 Internally displaced people and refugees

Today internal conflicts are more common than inter-state wars and in many ways the international humanitarian system has not responded fast enough to this change. Internal conflicts often divide countries along ethnic, linguistic or religious lines. They produce not only refugees that flee across borders, but also large numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs). Globally today the number of IDPs is estimated to be 25 million, and the numbers of refugees have decreased to an estimated 12 million (Nachmias and Goldstein 2004). In Southern Sudan 80% of the population has been displaced during the last 15 years (Phelnan and Wood 2006). The displacement has been involuntary and the displaced are robbed of their most essential protection mechanisms, their land, their freedom to move and their social networks. Because the Internally displaced people do not cross any state borders, they are supposed to be supported and protected by their own government and enjoy the same rights as the rest of the population. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, there are several reasons that the IDPs are especially vulnerable. They are often in transit from one place to another, hiding or forced to stay in very inhospitable environments. Families may have been separated and women have to step up and assume nontraditional roles. Schooling for children is often disturbed and the internally displaced are often caught between fighting groups and may get abused. To be removed from income and livelihood might also cause physical and psychosocial stress (www.internal-displacement.com).

Most displaced people never go through the official system or are registered and therefore they tend to be more or less invisible to outsiders. This also creates problems for the IDPs when they are returning home from displacement because it is hard for them to document that they have been displaced in order to receive humanitarian aid when they return. The majority of forced migrants have not received any assistance from humanitarian agencies and if they were to be genuinely dependent on relief they would not survive for long (Allen 1996).

Refugees’ vs. internally displaced people

Labeling people as returnees and giving them special treatment might widen the division between those who went into exile and those who didn’t (Phelnan & Wood 2006). Labeling is supposed to be a tool to identify and recognize a class of people to be able to handle their
special needs. If it is manipulated, it might be used to marginalize and jeopardize the people who they are supposed to help.

Labeling people as refugees is a process of stereotyping and it can be an instrument for promoting non-participation and control (Allen 1996). But in many cases, being labeled, as a refugee is something that will help you and is a status that many people strive to get. Being a refugee might help you to get material relief, asylum and permanent resettlement (Shackove 1985:19 in Allen 1996: 25). Because of lack of formal rights and international conventions securing their protection being labeled, as an IDP might not be the same, but in the process of return it is crucial to have some kind of label or be on a list to be able to receive support upon your return.

Roberta Cohen (1998) argues that keeping the distinction between refugees and IDPs makes perfect sense because of the central role state sovereignty plays in the international system, but on the operational level the distinction is more or less meaningless because both groups need protection and assistance (Cohen and Deng 1998). Especially when it comes to repatriation, separation of IDPs and refugees does not make much sense and today most humanitarian actors use the term returnees to cover both groups.

Rights to prevent displacement

Freedom of residence and movement is expressly recognized as a basic human right in Article 13(1) of the Universal Human Rights Declaration. This freedom is also guaranteed in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights\(^9\), article 12, states: “everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence” (Cohen and Deng 1998b: 104). They state that you have the right to choose your residence in the country and this implies that you have the right to stay in your home and not be displaced. Even though there is an exception to this right if your

\(^9\) United Nations treaty based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, created in 1966 and entered into force on 23 March 1976. Because the Universal Declaration of Human Rights contained both first-generation civil and political rights and second-generation economic, social, and cultural rights, it could not garner the international consensus necessary to become a binding treaty. Particularly, a divide developed between capitalist nations such as the USA, which favoured civil and political rights, and communist nations, which favoured economic, social and cultural rights. To solve this problem, two binding Covenants were created instead of one: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
staying there is “restricted by law and are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or the rights and freedoms of others”, this could be a safeguard to the internally displaced (Cohen and Deng 1998b: 105). When there is an internal conflict, the civilians are protected by the Geneva Convention\(^{10}\) Part IV, Article 17 that states “civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected to the conflict”. But there is an exception to this one also; “unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand” (1949)\(^{11}\). If displacement occurs the party responsible for the displacement has to take “all possible measures…in order that the civilian population may be received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition (ibid).

Most universal and regional human rights instruments permit states to place restrictions on freedom of residence and movement during situations of tensions and disturbances, disasters and in times of public emergency.

**Legal framework for refugees and the UNHCR**

In 1951 the United States lead the United Nations in formulating a new treaty; “*The UN Convention relating to the status of refugees*” and the office of the UN High Commission of Refugees was established. The convention added new elements in the perception of refugees that came to have almost universal international support and application. According to the convention a refugee is a person that is not in his/her own country. By defining it this way they excluded all those displaced by fighting, social tension or disastrous governmental policies but had not crossed any international borders (Nachmias and Goldstein 2004). The convention also states that refugees were persons who had “…a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion…” This would include refugees from communism and remaining displaced persons from World War II, which was the main group that the UNHCR supporting at that time, and it clearly indicated individual treatment. In the beginning the scope of UNHCR was limited to Europe, but in 1967 it was extended to the also include the rest of the world except the Palestinians. Another important point in the convention is that it forbids the repatriation of a person that claims refugee status back in to danger. This is normally referred to using the French term *non-refoulement*. When the convention was made they did by no means expect

\(^{10}\) A series of international agreements first signed in 1906 to provide for the humane treatment of the wounded, prisoners of war, and civilians in time of war.

\(^{11}\) Additional protocol relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflict 1949, (protocol II).
the refugee problem to escalate the way it has, they estimated that the number of refugees that would need services as very low (Nachmias and Goldstein 2004). In 1967 the UN extended the convention for refugees to also incorporate the definition of “refugee” to also be someone who has fled their homeland owing to a well-founded fear of persecution. Initially UNHCR’s mandate was to run for three years but after it first expired, the mandate has been extended by the UN general assembly every five years (Collins 1996).

The principle or non-refoulement is supposed to provide individual refugees with the choice of repatriating when they want. But in reality, when governments and NGOs make arrangements for official repatriation programs, refugees are often not consulted about their concern about the security in their home areas. “Once governments have decided that it is safe for the refugees to return, the agendas of the authorities frequently over-ride those of the refugees or the conventions of international law” (Collins 1996: 21).

**Legal Framework IDPs**

Africa is the continent with most IDPs (10 million) and Sudan has over five million IDPs, the largest number of any single nation in the world (IDMC 2006). But the numbers do not reflect the attention that the different groups are receiving in the international system. The refugees of the world have since 1951 benefited from a legally binding convention and a specific agency, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which has a staff of 5000 and a budget of nearly $1 billion. For the IDPs the UN secretary general created a voluntary position in 1992, while no operational agency has been given a global mandate for IDPs. This lack of an operational UN agency results in that every case is dealt with on an ad hoc basis, under the coordination of the UN’s Emergency Relief Coordinator. In 2002, an IDP unit was created at the UN, that will become an Inter-Agency Division but the staff were expected to be no more than 15 people (Nachmias and Goldstein 2004). This shows that there is a great inconsistency and inequality in the way forced migrants are being dealt with. The result of this is that in the world today internally displaced people receive far too little assistance, protection, reintegration and development support from the international community (ibid).

International organizations have been expanding their mandate and today the UNHCR count 5 million IDPs as of concern to the organization. The fact that the UNHCR is now also
concerned about IDPs marks a clear expansion of their mandate. Legally they are not supposed to be under the convention but the UN general assembly and many governments agree that UNHCR should react if for no other reason than humanitarian solidarity (Nachmias and Goldstein 2004). In the cases where the UNHCR has assumed or been given concern over internally displaced people the mandate has often become uncertain. In most cases the IDPs have left their homes because of fighting, guerilla action or even genocide in places were the state has broken down or has become incompetent (ibid).

Unlike refugees and the convention on status of refugees from 1951, IDPs are not recognized as a group under international law. In 1998 there was developed 30 principles that are concerned with the rights of the internally displaced and the obligations of governments and insurgent groups towards these populations (Cohen and Deng 1998). The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement is today the authoritative international document and is supposed to “identify rights and guarantees relevant to the protection of persons from forced displacement and to their protection and assistance during displacement, as well as during return or resettlement and reintegration”. According to the Guiding principles IDPs are; “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border” (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Introduction; paragraph 1 and 2, 1998). Many internally displaced people do not get protected by their governments and like the refugees they turn to the international community for support. The global IDP Survey from 2000 states that there are 13 million internally displaced in Africa, 5-6 million in Asia (including the Middle East), 3 million in Europe and 3-4 million in the Americas (UNHCR 2006).

The right to relief

There has been a shift towards that people in need of humanitarian assistance has certain rights and claims on the international community and that the international community has a duty to provide needed relief and protection to populations at risk. This has not prevented the UN and other major powers in being slow to act or not act at all when it comes to preventing
mass killings, ethnic cleansing or to exercise force to gain access and protect displaced populations (Nachmias and Goldstein 2004).

Effective protection of internally displaced people would benefit from an expanded and updated concept of being a refugee. Not all states are willing to extend their concept of a refugee since the convention itself only recognizes people fleeing specifically stated persecutions, instead of fear of armed conflict or violence in general. Some are also using the argument that securing the right of IDPs might undermine the rights to asylum (Nachmias and Goldstein 2004).

2.5 When does the displacement end?

The refugee act states clearly when a refugees stops being a refugee, but when people are fleeing from armed conflict governments have a lot to say about when if is time for people to return. When it comes to internally displaced people they have no mechanism to determine when and how displacement ends. The problem of forced migration is not mainly a humanitarian or human rights problem and in the absence of political solutions will only promote dependency in the long run and even prolong conflicts (Nachmias and Goldstein 2004). Some governments might find it useful to keep people displaced in order to achieve political goals. IDPs are kept in a state of limbo waiting for a peace settlement that never comes and equally unable to integrate into the localities where they fled (Nachmias and Goldstein 2004). Displacement is used as a war strategy, host government and guerilla movements have learned that by keeping the displaced visible and accessible to humanitarian agencies they can become useful means of attracting international funding (UNRISD 1993).

It is important to integrate the political effects to resolve the crisis and inequality that have caused the displacement in the first place to be able to resolve it. In Nachmias and Goldstein it is argued that on the national level, partnerships among national authorities, non-governmental groups and civil society should be encouraged for working out solutions for displacement (2004).
Repatriation politics

There are different views on what is the best way of handling the continuously growing number of IDPs and refugees in the world. The UNHCR official view is that the best for the IDP/refugee is to return to the area they originate from. This view leads to less emphasis on social integration in the safe they area of displacement, while they wait until the situation for them to return is safe. Even if the case of repatriation is made on the grounds that it is the best for the displaced, it may also be chosen because it is the easiest solution, especially for the host government. For the displaced population in Africa the chances of substantial resettlement outside Africa are minimal and African countries are reluctant to encourage the permanent integration of large numbers of refugees by offering them citizenships (Black and Koser 1999). The increased and accelerated rates of repatriation during this decade has been a result of the popular legitimacy to a discourse that has come to dominate refugee policy, namely that repatriation is the optimum and most feasible “durable solution” to the refugee crisis (Harrel-Bond 1989).

When refugees return to their home areas, the reason is not always that the conflict ended and the circumstances for returning are there. Many decide to return home because their lives as refugees are hard and they believe things might be better at home. This can result in refugees returning home at the same time as others decide to become refugees. In Sudan the migration flows are going back and forth in and the issue of cyclical returns is likely to be a significant one. Reports from the northern part of Sudan suggest that many southerners that repatriated ended up returning to the north (Phelan & Wood 2006). Returning can be a response to political upheavals spreading to the places of exile instead of being the end of fighting and oppression in the displaced home area (Allen 1996). The assumption that returning to your home area is the most desirable solution is deeply embedded in the European political theory of nationalism. According to this theory there is a strong connection between people and places and the world is built up on clear boundary national states (Allen 1996).

Repatriation in Africa

The existence of so many refugees and refugee flows in Africa might indicate some systematic failure in modern African society. The fact that so many African refugees seem to be good at adapting and surviving their time in exile indicates some unseen ability that does not match with the common perception on what a refugee is (Collins 1996). Repatriation has
become a preferred solution in many African states, as they have begun to pull away from the level of protection of refugees guaranteed by the 1951 Geneva Convention, and more particularly the organization of African unity convention on refugees (Black and Koser 1999).

During the 1960-70 relatively few organized repatriation movements took place in Africa. Those who did not return were often integrated in the host societies and in some cases they even received full citizenship (ibid). In the years following the formation of the Organization for African Unity (OAU), many African people were trying to achieve liberation from colonial powers. To show solidarity to people fleeing from colonial domination the OAU established its own refugee policy. In the 1969 OAU Protocol for refugees they incorporated the 1951 UN Convention on refugees, but expanded the refugee definition (Collins 1996). The included that: “…Through aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events gravely disturbing public order in part, or in all of his country of origin, or the country of which he has nationality, is obliged to leave his usual place or residence to seek refugee outside his country” (OAU 1969, Article 1).

When the numbers of refugees are considered to be manageable and return seems impossible even today some African states can consider integrating the refugees especially if they get support from the international community. But if the numbers are big and if they impact negatively on resources that are already constrained and where social and political tensions seem to be aggravated by the presence of the refugees, a political push for the returning of refugees have often evolved (Black and Koser 1999).

Today refugees are normally not welcomed in to exile; they may face persecution and are being used as scapegoats in the communities by host governments. Land has increased in value in Africa and traditional land systems have declined, resulting in buying and selling land is more and more common. Refugees who attempt spontaneous settlement in Africa find themselves in an unwelcome competition for land, jobs and food (Collins 1996). Because of the reduced access to land by refugees UNHCR have had to organize settlements for refugees and many of these camps have little or no opportunity for self-support. UNHCR keep refugees in these camps that are not offering the inhabitants little in service or economic opportunities (Collins 1996). The focus of UNHCR has shifted from long term organized settlement to short time emergency relief and this has implications for the voluntarily repatriation. “Refugees who are without hope in relief camps are increasingly taking risks, or
are forced into talking risks and are returning home. The voluntary nature of these return migrations thus becomes very questionable “(Collins 1996: 30).

The UN convention emphasizes on individual protection while the OAU definition also incorporate on groups of people who are at risk during a conflict (Collins 1996). The AOU convention like the UN convention also considers voluntarily repatriation as the ultimate solution for the African refugees, and they do not provide recognition for internally displaced people (Collins 1996).

Home governments can push host government to force refugees to repatriate. One example of this is that between 1977-1983 the Ethiopian government pressured the government of Djibouti to repatriate Ethiopians in Djibouti because their absence was damaging to the legitimacy of the state in Ethiopia (Black and Koser 1999). The refugees were a source of information about what was happening in the country and some were using their time in the asylum states to attack the Ethiopian Government. In order to get the refugees to return the Ethiopian Government in 1980 declared amnesty for all refugees and invited them to come home without fear of reprisal (Collins 1996). The Ethiopians living in Djibouti were confined in camps where they were continuously harassed and made feel unwelcome. The UNHCR the Government of Ethiopia entered a Tripartite agreement that was supposed to facilitate for the safe, orderly and voluntarily return of the refugees. In spite of many disturbing events and obvious sign that the repatriation was not moving orderly the UNHCR was determined to continue because it had become a test-case for them and the successful implementation would become a new paradigm of repatriation in Africa (Harrell-Bond 1989). Only a fraction of the refugee population in Djibouti returned home during this repatriation exercise, but the case had widespread effect. The case provided for an academic interest in refugee repatriation and especially on the case of voluntariness (Collins 1996).

Sometimes it is the UNHCR that push for repatriation. In December 2002 the UNHCR ended the refugee status of all Eritrean refugees in Sudan and refugees, some had stayed in Sudan since the 1960s, were expected to go home. However, one big group of refugees refused to repatriate, but staying in the camp was apparently no alternative for the former refugees. In order to get them out of the camp, UNHCR closed the water pump and the schools and hospitals were closed (Le Houérou 2003). According to the Geneva Convention states that
receive refugees shall facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees, but in many cases the efforts in naturalizing is overshadowed with the will to bring people home (ibid).

**Humanitarian politics**

Today just nine donors provide over 90% of the resources that drive the international humanitarian system. The largest donor is the US that provide approximately one third of global humanitarian assistance resources annually, and whose internal structures and policies largely affect how and to whom aid resources is programmed (Nachmias and Goldstein 1998b). The other countries are UK, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Germany. The international humanitarian assistance structures have reinforced the separated and unequal aid efforts (ibid).

In any large-scale displacement that gets organized international treatment, UNHCR is only one of many involved institutions. If there were a large-scale disaster that needs relief WFP would be one of the UN agencies expected to arrive in the location among with UNICEF and WHO. These organizations normally have a supervisory role and do not have big operational capacities. “Actual distribution is often left to the local governing authorities that may be overwhelmed, corrupt or even destroyed, and to some of the 500 NGOs with which UNHCR has worked; yet more may on their own initiative turn up on the spot” (Nachmias and Goldstein 2004: 77). The international organization for migration (not part of the UN system) might be called to transport refugees to permanent resettlement or to their own countries. All the organizations have different methods and policies and this might give rise to friction and difficulties in coordinating their operations (ibid).

According to DeMars 2005 NGOs are getting more and more powerful, leading to the NGOs organizational form being almost irresistible. “NGOs work in mysterious ways. While they sometimes achieve much more than promised, frequently they accomplish much less. Their real significance is that NGOs often create inadvertent political consequences whose impact is more important than either success or failure in reaching official goals” (DeMars 2005: 2). International responses to mass displacement are constrained by the attitudes and capacities of the staff in the field, the political and economical priorities of the major aid donors and the nature of the news coverage by the international media (Allen 1996).
The relationship between the humanitarian agencies and refugees and forced migrants this is highly unbalanced. The humanitarian personnel have to deal with conflicts on an everyday basis that involves the declared policies and principles of their organizations and the realities that they actually have to face in the field. In any type of humanitarian relationship there is the same problem of the giver having ultimate power and the receivers are in a supplicant position (Le Houérou 2003). “Charity can be violent and insulting in terms of human dignity. Authority and charity are very tightly linked: one hand dictates while the other hand gives.” (Le Houérou 2003: 31)

Le Houérou uses examples from his fieldwork in Sudan and he noted that the staff of the humanitarian organizations normally agreed on getting “heroized” and accepted a parental type of authority. Many humanitarian workers see themselves as one family and “mother” and “father” are words refugees often use when identifying the institutions dealing with them. Refugees become the “babies” of the institutions and place total trust in them (2003). “They assume that the HO (Humanitarian Organizations) staff will chose what is best for them, just as children trust their parents. As institutions remain, after all, institutions and therefore theoretical bodies and power organizations, these roles inevitably lead to abuse” (Le Houérou 2003:33).

The language used by the humanitarian organizations has helped create the image of the refugee or IDP as a “victim.” Refugees and IDPs are seen as the recipients of action, rather than as actors themselves. “They are poor people whose lot is to be counted, registered, studied, surveyed on and, in due course, hopefully “returned”, at which point they become “ordinary people” again (UNRISD 1993:5).

**Voluntarily return**

Voluntary return of refugees is seen by the UNHCR as the best solution to the refugee phenomenon and facilitating return is one of UNHCR principal functions (Allen 1996). In the case of Southern Sudan it is crucial to support the masses that are voluntarily returning to prevent secondary displacement, migration to urban areas, local conflicts and pressure on services and natural resources (UNHCR 2006).
According to UNHCR some 200,000 refugees and the same number of IDPs returned to the areas under their responsibility in Southern Sudan in 2005 (UNHCR 2006). They claim that the returnees have given the social capital a real boost and have contributed to peace building, security and development. However, UNHCR also states that “reintegration of spontaneous returns and any further large scale return at this stage could be unsustainable if large scale recovery and development does not start soon” (UNHCR 2006: 5).

UNHCR's role and responsibility in regard to voluntarily repatriation have developed from ending when the refugees cross the boarder in to their home country into a broader involvement with regard to securing protection and providing assistance to returnees in their countries of origin. The principle of voluntariness is a cornerstone with respect to the return of the refugees. Voluntariness needs to be viewed in relation to conditions in the country of origin and the conditions in the country of asylum. A voluntarily repatriation require an absence of any psychological, physical, or material pressure to return. If the refugees are legally recognized and allowed to settle in their country of asylum, their choice to repatriate is probably voluntarily. If they are without rights, experiencing pressure, restrictions and confined to closed camps, they may choose to return, but it is not a result of their free will (UNHCR 1996).

There is a need to look closely at the motivation of host and home governments, the international community in general, and specifically of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which have become a major player in repatriation as well as refugee protection and assistance (Nachmias and Goldstein 2004). There is also the need to find out the needs of refugees in exile for whom returning is may not be the most desired outcome. Even when return have occurred there is a need to pay much closer attention after return and recognize that even thought repatriation is the end of the displacement problem it might be the beginning of another cycle which can expose some returnees to vulnerability (Black and Koser 1999).

Even though it is seen as a human right to return to your home area, mass voluntary returning has been a failure in integration and resettlement policies. “In any given year, less than one per cent of the world’s refugees escape the limbo of refugee status either by resettling in a third country or by obtaining citizenship in the country of asylum” (Allen 1996: 23).
Chapter 3

Analytical Framework

In this chapter I describe the livelihoods framework and then I develop my own version of the model to analyze my findings.

3.1 The livelihoods framework

The livelihoods framework is not only a tool to describe the micro context of people’s livelihoods but also to understand the bigger context including the impact of international and national politics. The framework will not necessarily lead to development, but it is a tool for analyzing livelihoods. Ellis (2000:10) defines livelihood as the following: “A livelihood comprises the assets (natural, physical, human, financial and social), the activities, and the access to these (mediated by institutions and social relations) that together determine the living gained by the individual or household” (2000:10).

The livelihoods approach looks at the actual livelihoods strategies of people and instead of starting with a grand theory, it looks at “where people are, what they have and what their needs and interests are” (Chambers 1988:1 in Shafer 2002). The approach regards the assets status of poor individuals or households as fundamental to understanding the options open to them, the strategies they adopt for survival, and their vulnerability to adverse trends and events. The focus is on raising the assets of the poor or enabling existing assets that are idle or under-employed to be used more productively. The framework attempts to identify what the poor have rather than what they do not have, and thus identify means to strengthen people’s own solutions (Ellis 2000). The framework can be applied on different levels from household and village level to national level, with sustainable livelihood outcomes assessed at different levels (Scoones 1998). For my analysis I will use a modified and simplified combination of
DFID’s sustainable livelihoods framework (Figure 4) and Ellis sustainable livelihood framework (Figure 5).

**History of livelihoods**

In the 1980s, Robert Chambers became a prominent critic of the “*top-down*” and “*core-periphery*” direction of research and practice in development and introduced the livelihood concept to counter the “*unavoidable paternalism*” of the top down approach to development (Chambers 1983).

Development theory after the Second World War and until the late 1970s, focused on economic strategies at the nation-state level. In the 1980s the notion of having a national development strategy was challenged by international capital crossing borders, which was not supposed to be controlled by states (Shafer 2002). Many argued that the national development strategies had failed because the state was inadequate. The response to these conditions was to look at the market for solutions instead of the state. In that way the developing countries would benefit by “*adjusting*” their economies to the liberalization model (Shafer 2002). While the international community was busy deciding what was best for the poor, Chambers felt that the livelihoods approach and increased participation by the poor were means of correcting the inevitable biases introduced by outsiders. Even though the livelihood framework was developed during the eighties, there was an explosion of interest in the livelihoods concept around the year 2000 (Ellis 2000).

The concept of livelihood has spread through most development domains: poverty reduction, environmental and natural resource management, local economic development, land and tenure reform, disaster risk reduction and post-conflict recovery strategies (de Sategé 2004). Since the users are many and diverse it makes sense to talk about “*livelihoods frameworks/approaches*” and not “*the livelihood framework*”. 
3.2 The DFID framework

DFID’s sustainable livelihoods framework (Figure 1) is one of these livelihoods approaches and is widely used to analyze people’s livelihoods.

Figure 4: DFID’s livelihood framework:

The key elements of a livelihoods framework include livelihood assets, livelihood strategies, and livelihood outcomes. There is a need to analyze these elements in a broader environmental, social, political and economic context even though these are mostly household and micro level phenomena. The ability to convert one’s assets into something else, like working for wages (human capital into financial capital), is influenced by legal restrictions, markets, quality of human capabilities and empowerment. The livelihood framework analyzes the institutions and structures that influence how the individual, households and communities utilize their assets and how they gain and maintain access and control over them (DFID1998).

The UK Department for International Development (DFID) sustainable livelihoods framework include five capitals in the livelihoods assets; human; such as education, skills and capacities or health and ability to work, natural; such as land, water, forest, financial; such as savings in money or other stores in wealth, social; such as kinship, community participation,
trust and reciprocity or physical; housing, infrastructure, livestock or durable goods (Carney 1998). These capitals or assets are also referred to as livelihood resources and they can be both tangible and intangible (Shafer 2002).

The Livelihood framework is built around capital assets but there is also a need to understand the vulnerability context and the structures and procedures that define people’s livelihood. The vulnerability context is the trends, shocks and local cultural practices which affect livelihoods for rural people. Structures are the organizations, from levels of government through to the private sector and the processes are the policies, laws, rules of the game and incentives (DFID 1998).

Livelihood strategies are what people do e.g. agriculture, waged labour, migration etc and the livelihood outcomes are the goals that people are pursuing, what they achieve from the activities they are doing for a living (Shafer 2002).

The framework does not state that there is a direct link from people’s assets and the sustainability of their livelihoods but it suggests that there is a close connection between people’s overall asset status and their robustness. This robustness could be displayed in being able to rise out of poverty and by increasing one’s ability to influence the policies and institutions that determine your access to assets and livelihood options. Getting empowered means knowing about your rights, being able to take part in decision-making that involves your surroundings and being able to make a difference. Building up assets is in other words an important component of getting empowered (DFID 1998).

A livelihood comprises the capabilities, activities and assets required for a living (Ellis 2000). The assets are the stores, claims and access and resources you have. Capabilities are the abilities of individuals to realize their potential as human beings. There is potential to be realized in the sense of being, in the meaning of being adequately nourished, free of illness etc. and doing, to be able to exercise choices, develop skills and experience and participate socially (Sen 1993 in Ellis 2000: 7).

The definition of access is the rules and social norms that determine the different abilities of people in rural areas to own, control or otherwise “claim”, or make use of resources such as land and common property. Different people have different access to different livelihood
resources, it is therefore important to have a socially differentiated view on analyzing livelihoods (Scoones 1998). Access is to be able to participate in, and get benefits from, social and public services such as education, health services, roads and water provided by the state (Ellis 2000).

**Sustainable Livelihoods**

Sustainability has been added to the concept of livelihoods and without radically changing anything the concept of sustainable livelihoods framework has in many cases replaced the livelihoods framework. Chambers and Conway write about environmental and social sustainability and according to them “livelihoods are environmentally unsustainable if they have a net negative effect on the claims and access needed by others“ (1992:13). A household is socially sustainable if it gains and maintains a decent livelihood both coping with stress and shocks and exercising their capabilities to create change and assure continuity (Chambers and Conway 1992).

Ellis argues that difficulties with the concept of sustainability arise from its: "*objectives (what is it that is deemed desirable to sustain?), the level or scale to which it applies (species, ecosystems, biological zones, social systems, the planet?) and its objectives or subjective character (does it describe the objective conditions for the persistence of certain attributes, or desirable outcomes that ought to be promoted according to widely agreed subjective goals?*)" (ELLIS 2000:124). A livelihood is sustainable when it is able to cope with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihoods opportunities for the next generation (Chambers and Conway 1992). If the point of departure is human needs, sustainability means sustaining outputs available for human consumption, and therefore the capacity of a resource or a system to keep up the same or increase its contribution to human welfare and wellbeing (Ellis 2000).

**Diversification**

Poor or vulnerable people have complex strategies for diversifying their sources of income and to minimize risk, and there is a need to understand these strategies for NGOs to be able to intervene effectively. A livelihood approach uses the actual livelihood assets and the strategies households use to get the outcome they seek as the starting point. The approach
started with a food security perspective, but it is based on the observation that food is just one important need among several (Longley and Maxwell 2003). Some diversification may be in order to accumulate resources and reinvest while normally it is done to cope with temporary or permanent adaptation of livelihoods. Therefore diversification might involve development of a wide income portfolio, or of responses to handle particular types of common shock or stress situations (Scoones 1998). The degree of diversification relates to the resources available and the level of risk involved with alternative options. Scoones (1998) identifies five alternative ways of dealing with such risks: “By accumulating resources in order to have reserves and buffers when the shock is felt, different livelihood strategies may be spread over space and time so that a particular risk does not affect all the livelihood strategies, the mix of activities may be changed to reduce covariance among different sources of stress or shock, insurance may be employed, and, finally, the resilience of the system may be enhanced so that the impacts of stress and shocks are less dramatically felt” (Scoones 1998: 10).

3.3 Ellis’ livelihoods model

Ellis’s framework, like the DFID framework, focuses on access to assets and how organizations, social relations and institutions influence access. There is a link between the different types of assets and what kind of options they provide for people to pursue alternatives to secure the necessities of life. Ellis framework is linear and does not include feedback. According to Ellis’ framework for livelihoods analysis (figure 2) organizations, social relations and institutions modify access to assets in the context of trends and shocks. The assets that they can obtain provide the basis of their livelihood strategies, which are composed of natural and non-natural resource based activities. These activities will again affect their livelihood security and the environmental sustainability of the household.
Social relations are e.g. gender, family, ethnicity, belief system or class, have an impact on peoples ability to access resources. “Social relations, institutions and organizations are critical mediating factors for livelihoods because they encompass the agencies that inhibit or facilitate the exercise of capabilities and choices by individuals or households” (Ellis 2000: 41).

Institutions are formal and regularized patterns of behavior. Institutions can be formal or informal and they are usually subject to multiple interpretations by different actors. Institutions are dynamic and constantly changing over time, therefore they are a process of social negotiation, rather than fixed “objects” or “bounded social systems” (Scoones 1998). There can be local, national and international institutions and local institutions may be in conflict with those operating on the national level. Organizations are groups of people that are bound together by a common goal to achieve an objective.

Shocks represent a challenge to the livelihood sustainability (Ellis 2000), they are events that influence the household and the community, (depending on which level you do the livelihood analysis) climatic issues that will determine the size of the harvest, like rainfall variability or climatic disasters, or conflicts; resource conflicts or civil conflicts (DFID 1998). Shocks can also be animal, crop or human diseases and can be individual as well as social in scope (Ellis 2000).
Trends can represent changes in terms of availability of different types of resources or in terms of access. There can also be trends in depleting or accumulation of assets and if new livelihood resources are being created through environmental, economic and social change (Scoones 1998). The concept of trends refers to trends in resource stocks, population density, technology, politics and economics. The importance of these trends to the community varies tremendously (Ellis 2000).

The livelihood strategies depend upon the assets that the household is able to obtain in the context of social factors and external trends and shocks. Livelihood strategies are dynamic and are composed of the activities that generate the means of household survival. When households face a shock, they adopt coping strategies that might result in totally different livelihood mixes (Ellis 2000).

The livelihood strategies are composed of natural resource based activities and non-natural resource based activities. The natural resource based activities are e.g. collecting, gathering, food cultivation, non food cultivation, livestock keeping and pastoralism and other non farm activities such as brick making, weaving, thatching and so on. The non-natural resource based activities are rural trade, other rural services, rural manufacture, remittances, and other things such as pensions (Ellis 2000).

Livelihood security contains a “combination of attributes related to income level, income stability, reduction in adverse seasonal effects, and reduction in the overall risk profile of the income portfolio” (Ellis 2000: 42).

Ellis argues that the livelihoods framework does not give any recipes on how to solve problems of causes and effects in rural poverty reduction. However, it does suggest a way of organizing a policy analysis of livelihoods that identifies main components, encourages thinking about critical links between them, and emphasizes finding the constrains to be able to make policies to avoid them together with those concerned and allow assets to be used productively (Ellis 2000).
3.4 Weaknesses of the livelihoods framework

As there has been an increasing interest for the livelihood framework there is a rising fear that the framework is going to be used routinely and eventually stagnate and loose its meaning (De Satgé 2004). The framework has been heavily identified with the institutions it originated from. Sometimes it may seem that there is put more energy in defending particular frameworks instead of using the frameworks for what they were meant to do. People refer to the “DFID framework” as if “these conceptual creations were brands in some intellectual marketplace, in competition with one another” (Satgé 2004: 57).

According to Murray there are some weaknesses in the framework, such as that elements of the vulnerability context such as macro economic trends, inflation, civil conflict and mass redundancy are underplayed (2001) There is also an implicit assumption that peoples assets can be expanded in a generalized and increment fashion and the inequalities of power and conflicts of interests are not sufficiently acknowledged. Murray argues that the notion of participation may disguise that the enhancement of the livelihoods of one group may undermine those of another (2001).

Another critical point of the livelihood framework is the continuing vagueness of the concept of “livelihood sustainability”. This concept is hard to measure this over time and it needs to be decided who you are measuring the sustainability of. The criteria used for measuring the sustainability and if the sustainability is measured in the long term or in the short term will determine the result (Murray 2001). Rick de Sategé argues that the biggest weakness of the framework is the impracticability of it. Even though it is reasonably clear conceptually, there still seems to be confusion about what kind of clear, practical interventions that can make a tangible difference to the security of local livelihoods (Sategé 2004). The framework concentrates on “what people have, rather than what they do not have” (Ellis 2000). However, there is also important to recognize what poor people do not have in order to establish what their needs are.
3.5 Modified livelihoods framework/household livelihood framework

I have constructed my own tool by modifying the livelihoods approach to meet the analytical needs of this study. This model describes the dynamics between the household, institutions and the humanitarian assistance, and shows the main variables that affect the household’s choice of livelihood strategies. The institutions (B) are in a box outside the model because they influence all parts of the model, maybe except the natural conditions. These strategies in turn determine the income and food security of the household. The framework (Figure 6) is adopted to the situation in Southern Sudan and to the context of my study. It is a simplification but illustrates the main indicators that are relevant for my analysis and how they affect each other.

Using the livelihood approach you are supposed to analyze on a variety of levels in order to capture all information. The analysis should also be done on different groups of people because there are great variations within the population and even within the households. To capture the dynamics of change, livelihoods analysis should be done over time (Shafer 2002).

Figure 6: Modified livelihood framework/Household livelihood framework

![Diagram of livelihood framework](image-url)
The starting point is the household; the main actor in this model.

A household can be one person living alone or living with others or a group of people living together. They can consist of family members and relatives but this is not a must. The household is the base of many NGO and governmental models for distribution. According to an anthropological definition the household are people that regularly eat together (Eriksen 1995). The use of this term household is not unproblematic, and the researcher has to be attentive to the conflicts and cooperation that take place inside the household. The power relations between the different members of the household are also an important point and needs to be taken into consideration.

The household is influenced by external factors, but there are also several internal factors that differentiate the households. These are the context that the household operates in and it influences their daily lives. The internal factors are also the characters of the household and they are as many different households as there are households. There are also differences in the household itself. In the framework I have illustrated variables that may influence the household, but how much each household is influenced by each or if it is influenced at all differs. Culture and religion is one of these; in what way does the culture affect how people manage their assets and the livelihood choices they make. Culture affects how people work, how much time they spend working, how people see themselves, when they get married and have children, it affects what kind of work a man is supposed to do and what kind of work a woman is supposed to do. Religion and tradition influence the choices of the household, for instance when the family has lived in an area for many generations and when they are returning from displacement they want to return to the land of their forefathers. Religion influences whether it is acceptable for a woman to leave home for work, and if she can move freely in the community without a male member of her family present.

Gender, family, kin, class, age and ethnicity may shape social relations. These factors conditions determine what kind of role you play in the community and how much power and influence you are able to apply playing that role. The size of the family will influence how vulnerable you are concerning e.g. food shortage or natural “shocks” like flooding or drought. If you have a big and strong family, your family will take care of you if you face food shortage and vice versa. Ethnicity is a sensitive issue in the case of Southern Sudan because the South has so many ethnic groups and some of them have a long history of ethnic rivalries.
Age is also important, an old person might have grown-up children that will support her/him and bring resources to the home. A young person may be newly married and still struggling to feed the family. However, this variable might be influenced by displacement, because the people who have been displaced often lost everything they owned. Young returnees with education may be in a much better position than an old person so these things are not static.

(B) Institutions: I have divided them into local and non-local institutions. The most important local institutions are the family and the local administration. Here I have included the traditional authorities and local leaders and customary law, which are the set of local rules, and regulations by which the traditional courts and local leaders rule by, for instance rules that decide how land resources are divided among people. Another local institution is the market and the private sector. The market is influenced by the infrastructure, security, national and international politics and the availability of humanitarian aid.

The non-local institutions are the Government and the NGOs and both of them are powerful in the case of Southern Sudan. In some cases the NGOs are in fact more influential institutions than the Government, because they have more resources and capital and they have experience. The distinction between the local and the non-local institutions are fluent and in many cases the local institutions are also non-local. For the NGOs they are non-local in a sense that they have national and international headquarters but they are also operating on a local level.

The national legislation is also an important institution that is supposed to be followed by everyone both on the local and national level. The Government in Southern Sudan is fresh and inexperienced. They have started to build up state institutions and appoint people for governmental positions, both nationally and in the districts, but still there is a lot that needs to be done when it comes to building a well functioning state apparatus. They are heavily influenced by the humanitarian organizations that have interests in Southern Sudan. But even international organizations have to follow the national legislation. The legislation is there to protect the people and against abuses from the state. It is important for Southern Sudan to have a human rights focus to avoid that the population again becomes a victim of abuse from the state in the name of political instability.

12 The market is also a non-local institution, but I will only use it in the local context during my analysis
The army is an important institution in the nation state. In Sudan today there are 3 armies, one for the North (Peoples Defense Forces) one for the South (Sudan Peoples Liberation Army) and one joint defense force existing at least on paper.

Land tenure: according to the GoS, all land belongs to the State, but on the operational level in the local communities, local leaders distribute land to the people. SPLM/A and GoS incorporated the establishment of a land tenure group in the CPA, but still this has not resulted in a common platform for land tenure. With more and more people returning, lack of good land may become a problem. The indigenous land tenure system is communal in the sense that it belongs to the community and you have to be a member of the community to access the land (Sundnes and Shanmugaratnam 2007).

There is a risk of conflicts between different tribes when people have been able to restock their livestock, and there will be increased need for grazing land. The institutions, on the national as well as on the local level are depending on humanitarian aid and NGOs, but in a different degree. While some of them are heavily dependent on NGOs, other institutions are almost independent.

(C) Possibilities and Limitations are generalizations representing a wide range of variables that affect the household. Included in possibilities are resources, technology, infrastructure, power structures and empowerment. In the case of Southern Sudan many of these things may represent a possibility/opportunity and a limitation at the same time. The lack of infrastructure limits the flow of resources into Southern Sudan, limits the populations’ ability to move around freely, slows down the return process and restricts the work of the Government and the NGOs. Construction of better roads will thus represent a big positive possibility for the population. The land mines are a limiting factor for the populations’ movement.

Resources contain a wide range of items, including livestock, land and other renewable resources but also schools and education possibilities, employment and health services. There are also non-renewable resources like oil in Southern Sudan, but they have little relevance for household livelihood today. At this time we do not know if the oil will contribute in either a positive or a negative way for the local households. Rights and access to resources determine to what degree the individual households are able to utilize the resources. A limitation for the
people of Southern Sudan when it comes to returning is the availability of good land. People who are returning want to stay close to a community center to be able to access e.g. clean water and a school, to avoid insecurity and also because most of the NGOs operate close to the centers. When people gather in the centers there will be a shortage of good soil for cultivation and the soil might get depleted.

Another possibility/limitation is what kind of technology is available and how it benefits the people of the area. In the context of Southern Sudan water pumps are the technological devices that are most needed, so that people can get clean water and become less vulnerable to diseases. Other relevant technological items are the ox plough and the hand hoe, which will make cultivation easier and make people able to cultivate bigger areas. For development of agriculture, there is a need for pesticides, fertilizers and veterinary drugs. The economic trends both on a local, national and international level influence the livelihood of the people in Southern Sudan. How much of the local goods that are sold, the season and the availability of goods influence the prices of goods in the village. International price fluctuations determine the income potential for people who cultivate cash crops for export. Prices are high in Southern Sudan, because of shortage of goods, insecurity and poor infrastructure. Power relations are important to consider because they play a big role in access to assets.

Power/empowerment; in the context of my study it is important to consider gender issues, the local chief system and the role of cattle and size of herds. The chiefs are the most powerful actors in the local communities in Southern Sudan and their power needs to be acknowledged. How they are able to control the natural resources in the areas they are chiefs is vital. There is also a power relationship between the Government and the NGOs and also between the different NGOs.

(D) Another generalized factor that influences the households is risk and insecurity, which is especially relevant in war affected areas like Southern Sudan. Insecurity influences the households and restricts the options open to them. Risk is also reflected in how secure people feel and insecurity obviously affects people mentally. If they are able to send their kinds and women off alone without fearing for them being kidnapped by hostile tribes, or fearing that young boys will be forcibly recruited in to the army or guerilla groups it also influences how much time the household is willing to spend in the field, and the households willingness to invest money in buying livestock. Under threat of insecurity households may be reluctant to
invest their time in the field, because they might have to run away and leave it. In an unstable situation people may not want to buy livestock because it might get stolen or they may have to leave them behind. It also prevents NGOs from establishing projects because they fear for the security of the staff. In conflict environments where NGOs actually have intervened, the tendency is that they provide more emergency relief than support towards development. Insecurity and conflict makes people vulnerable because they are not able to plan their future.

Displacement makes people vulnerable, because they leave their homes and social networks and have to cope in new and not always welcoming surroundings. Becoming displaced also makes families vulnerable because they might be forced to split up, the old and sick and in some cases children have to stay behind because they can’t make the trip. Women also have to take up untraditional responsibilities in many cases. Returning from displacement may also make them vulnerable. Even though some have gained education and skills from being displaced, most left with nothing and are returning with nothing. According to my findings the people returning from displacement have fewer assets and are more dependent on relief food and support from friends and family to survive than residents.

Conflicts may occur in the villages between residents and returnees, between different tribes/ethnicities or on the national level such as a civil war. Some places there are tensions between the returnees and the residents because they are from different tribes and while people have been displaced others may have taken their land and houses. In my study area this was not the case; the north Bor area is ethnically quite homogenous.

(E) Households are also influenced by natural conditions and shocks such as climate change, drought, floods and pests. Households have to consider the climate of the area when they decide what kind of strategies they want to invest their time in. If there are problems with pests, it is important for the households to not only put their efforts into one crop, because then everything will be destroyed if a pest strikes. Drought and flooding are threats to households, and they have to try to find crops that are drought and flood resistant to diversify their sources of income so that in case of a drought or flood they will have some alternative/additional sources of income.
The strategies and choices that the household makes influence what kind of income it will obtain. The strategies may be influenced by NGOs and humanitarian aid because they decide what kind of relief is available to people. Some NGOs have obligations to donors that may make them offer services or projects that are not necessarily what people want or what is best for them but what looks good in reports that are going back to the donor. In some cases people that have access to food aid may not want to grow their own crops, but in most cases the food aid represent a rather small part of their overall food consumption. NGOs may also try to influence peoples livelihood activities by e.g. bringing in new technology like the ox plough and try to get people to emphasize more on growing crops instead of having livestock. Humanitarian assistance and NGOs can also influence people’s choices by offering training and education to people. Education influences peoples choices and strategies as well as natural conditions like drought or flooding. During e.g. a drought people have to adjust and find other ways of feeding their families because they can’t rely on the harvest.

Income, food security, health and education are influenced by the choices and strategies that a household takes, NGOs and humanitarian aid and institutions. It is important not to consider the household to be a passive actor who only acts because it is being pushed here and there by external forces outside its control. The household can also make choices that enable them to get a higher income and improve their food security. NGOs may influence the income by providing micro finance or training and market skills. They can influence the food security by helping the farmers develop new technology like the ox plough and veterinary services or by introducing new species. In my study area Twic East County in Southern Sudan, poor rural farmers are known for having a diversified income because they have been through hard times before. Displaced people that are returning to their villages and have been dependent on UNHCR or other NGOs while they have been displaced may not have such a well-developed way of diversifying their income. That makes them more vulnerable than the residents. The state is supposed to offer services to people like education for children and health services. In most of Southern Sudan these services are poor or non-existent and often the NGOs have to provide them. The institutions influence the education and health of the people.

Other frameworks talk about organizations as a part of institutions (DFID 2002) or look at institutions as the “rules” and organizations as the “players” of the game (Ellis 2000). Since I have differentiated between the local and non-local institutions, I have chosen to make
Humanitarian assistance and NGOs as variables that influence the institutions, the strategies and choices of the household and the income, food security and health status of the household. NGOs and humanitarian assistance all community based organizations and international non-governmental organizations are included. I have added the term humanitarian assistance, to include the influence of bilateral assistance that the Government of Southern Sudan is receiving from foreign governments.

As shown in figure 7 there are several things that influence the NGOs and the humanitarian assistance. There are many external factors like politics, funding and feedback but the internal factors are important for the final result of the actions or operations that they initiate and what kind of priorities they have in the field.

**Figure 7: Influence on NGOs and Humanitarian assistance**

(A) International politics and international public opinion is crucial for humanitarian organizations. The funding goes to where the public eye rests and there is a constant battle to get the attention of the international community to make the money flow. This is also connected to donor funds and donor priorities. One year there may be a special attention towards female genital mutilation and then donors will want to prioritize NGOs that work in that field. In some cases donor governments are obliged by international and political deals to
support special projects like e.g. to rebuild Iraq or Afghanistan. Never knowing if funding is
going to be secured for the projects in one or two years is not a good working environment for
the NGOs and it certainly does not promote sustainability.

**Assessments** and **feedback** are variables that may change the way the NGOs think about
themselves and how it they operate. **Assessments** may be done by the NGOs themselves or by
an external consultant, and they may reveal the benefits that the communities are getting from
the projects. **Feedback** might be from the local community, the Government or other NGOs.

Government and local priorities are also important when it comes to humanitarian aid. The
Government can stop humanitarian organizations from intervening and it can control the
humanitarian organizations so much that they only can deliver aid where it benefits the
Government, e.g. in civil wars. **Local priorities** can also contribute to the decision making of
the NGOs. Local leaders can try to attract the attention of NGOs and persuade them to come
to their area, if there is no NGO there, or when there is already an NGO in the location, they
can tell the NGOs what they want and need. Other NGOs can change the works of
humanitarian assistance in the way that if there are many NGOs in one location that might
draw others to the same location. Some NGOs do not want to cooperate with others so they
prefer to be in a location without other NGOs.

(B) There are also some internal factors that determine how the NGOs operate. The level of
**understanding**, the will to learn new things and understand new situations are important
factors determining the **knowledge**, **skills** and **motivation** of the staff of the organization. It is
crucial when it comes to the way they interact with the local population on the ground (Allen
1996). How the locals perceive the employees of the NGO will also contribute to how
successful the NGO is. If NGOs have expatriate staff that is far away from their homes,
without any connection to the area, the motivation for being there is basically money, and the
results in terms of relations with the local population may be poor. By hiring local people who
have more to lose, and are willing to invest more in the local context, the NGOs can improve
their relationship with the local population. It is important to have educated and skillful staff
so that the locals can see that the NGO is serious. **Policies**, **traditions** and **framework** of the
organizations is important. The framework model should reveal what kind of approach and
motivation the NGO has towards humanitarian aid and development, for instance if they have
a bottom up or a top down approach. Coordination with other NGOs both on an international
and local level is important to make the ones that are supposed to benefit do that in the best
way possible. On the local level this makes a big difference to maximize the results of the efforts that are put in. Experience and knowledge of the local context can go both ways. A lot of experience is generally an asset, but the organization might be hard to change. If you have good knowledge of the local situation you might avoid some traps that ignorance will get you into.

(C) The strategies of the NGOs are determined by all the external and internal factors. The strategies are the way the NGOs decide to intervene to a specific crisis or needs. The choices and priorities they make during the project determine the sustainability and success of it. The NGOs also finally have to decide when and why they are going to withdraw from the area. When they leave the real test is if the positive influence of the project continues. Reasons for leaving may be that the donor does not want to fund the project anymore that there are other areas that need support more than the current area, that the project is fulfilled or that other NGOs from competing organizations have arrived.
Chapter 4

Institutional environment and livelihood activities

I will use my modified livelihood framework/household livelihood framework\(^{13}\) to organize my data and to analyze my findings. The findings are divided into two chapters where the first is about institutional environment and livelihood activities while the second is about the role of government organizations and the NGOs in the resettlement. My framework is a good tool to combine the household analysis with the analysis of the NGOs in the area, as it visualizes the relationship between the NGO activities and livelihoods on household, community and national level. The subtitles in chapter 4 and 5 correspond to the elements in the model/framework. The framework represents the major determinants/variables that impact upon the situation of households. A number of these variables are affected by NGO activities in the area. I have emphasized the elements of the framework that I find most relevant for my case. This results in some topics being more thoroughly discussed than others.

Even though the variable “National and world economic trends” is a part of the framework used for this analysis and is an important issue, but when it comes to my location I will not discuss it except for the role of the donors which is being discussed under the section 4.8; Aid input and humanitarian assistance. I supplement my findings with other background information from reports from NGOs to get a more complete picture of the situation. I use quotes from my interviews to personalize the data and to integrate the voices of my informants more in the findings.

There are many reasons for my study area being hard to return to, but there are also things that make people want to return. Among the reasons for people wanting to return, are that the places they have stayed while displaced have had bad conditions with little possibility to plan

\(^{13}\) Figure 6 chapter 3
for the future. Other factors, like reuniting with your relatives and friends, and being able to practice your culture and traditions and take up the traditional way of life are also important reasons for returning.

Because of long displacement, the cultural practices of the returnees may have changed when the come back, but many things will stay the same, and some aspects of the Dinka culture have even been strengthened by the displacement, because it is more important for people to connect with their roots when they are far away from home.

### 4.1 Dinka culture and society

#### The Household

My study area is ethnically homogenous and the inhabitants belong to the Bor-Dinka, a section of the Dinka tribe, which is the biggest ethnic group in Southern Sudan.

For the NGOs to be able to deliver the best possible relief or development aid, it is important to understand the dynamics in the Dinka household. The fact that the Dinka society is polygamous makes it hard to define the household. A family consisting of a man, several wives and a lot of children can either be counted as one household, or as a bundle of households, one for each wife. When NGOs make and distribute food rations, it makes little sense to give fixed rations to each family or household, considering the huge variation in household size and capabilities. It is also normal for a household to consist of more than two adult members, and this also needs to be considered because more adults means that more labor can be done. Therefore households with more than two adults have a better possibility to get food secure than for instance a household with only one adult. The age and the health of the adults in the household are also important for the work the household is able to do, and needs to be considered. Many households are in a real sense lead by women, since the men have more wives and are constantly shifting between the wives.
The family and the cattle

The family bonds are strong and the bigger the family, the stronger you are. Children are among the most valuable assets in the society and are a responsibility of the whole community. The children are the ones who are going to bring prosperity and wealth back home, especially the girls when they marry, and they are the pride of their parents. Second to the children and the family, the cattle are the most valuable assets among the Dinka. The cattle are the money, the bank, a status symbol and a sign of wealth in the community. If a Dinka gets killed, the family of the deceased gets compensated with cows, and when a girl is getting married, the family of the husband to be has to pay the girl’s family an agreed amount of cattle. The Dinka use their animals for milk and security, but normally not so much for food, unless there is serious food shortage.\textsuperscript{14} If there is a special occasion like a wedding, a funeral or other ceremonies the slaughtering of a bull is essential.

The Dinka in my study area were Christians. Christianity has become stronger in Southern Sudan because of the civil war against the Muslim north, and the villagers often arrange church meetings where they pray and dance all night. In this society where there are not many leisure activities, the church is a meeting place and gives people the opportunity to celebrate life and arrange big meetings where people from other payams show up.

Dinka Society

The Dinka society is patriarchal and polygamist and it is normal for a man to have more than one wife. It is status for women to give birth to as many children as possible. It is important to produce children, so that there is somebody to remember you after you are gone. The Dinka are conscious and proud about their history and ancestors. Small boys have to learn the names and histories of the grandfathers, great grandfathers and great-great grandfathers. To get married you need to have cattle and the price for the girl is negotiated between the family of the bride and the family of the groom. If he has the cows and the father agrees, a very young girl may get married to an old man. The girls know that they can’t refuse because of traditions and that they often are bringing valuable resources to the home with the bride price.

\textsuperscript{14} The Dinka are agro pastoralists and both grow crops and have livestock. The livelihood activities are discussed more in section 4.6
It is a tradition that wife and husband have to live separately during the pregnancy, and as long as the wife breastfeeds the baby. During that time the husband is welcome to get another wife. If husband and wife spend time together during the pregnancy or the breastfeeding period, that will bring bad luck, not only to your baby but also to other babies in the community. If the husband dies, the brother of the late husband or somebody else in his family will inherit the widow. This is a way to take care of widows who are in a difficult situation, but this practice is also a way for the men to get control of the assets (cows) that the late brother is leaving behind. The practice with inheritance of widows also depends on the age of the widow and if she has children or not. If she does not have children she has to be inherited or get remarried. If a woman is inherited, the children she produces with the new man are still going to be considered the children of the late husband and they will call their father uncle. If a very old man has the resources to marry, even if he is too old to father more children, he may marry a young girl and give her to one of his sons. The bride price increases if the woman has education.

The custom of paying for the bride is common in East Africa and it is seen as payment to the bride’s family because they have provided for food, maybe education and clothing while she was growing up. Bride price can also be seen as paying in advance for the services the wife will bring to the family of the bridegroom. The whole family contributes when a man is getting married so in a way the whole family is involved in buying the bride. Consequently, other people in the groom’s family might want services from the young wife. It is normal for the wife to come from another area and have to start from scratch when it comes to social network, but it is often a relief for a woman to get married because it means that she finally is considered a grown up and becomes the owner of her home. While she is still living at home she will be considered to be a kid\(^\text{15}\).

In Dinka culture old people are respected and all local leaders and chiefs are old men. Traditionally old people would be provided for but in a war torn society they may not have the same close family ties, social networks and access to assets and therefore there is no value

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\(^{15}\) Power relations in the Dinka community and between Dinka and the various institutions is being further discussed later in the chapter (4.3)
in being old in itself. However, according to my findings, old people often stayed instead of fleeing and the residents that stayed are generally better off than the returnees.

The Dinka culture determines the labour division between the sexes. The women stay at home digging in the gardens, fetching water, looking after the children and cooking while the men move with the cows and stay with the cows in the cattle camp. The men will also do the hunting and fishing when that is needed. Women will collect firewood and men will attend the local courts. However, these things are not static and they are changing as new technology is introduced in the community. For instance, returnees and NGOs have introduced the ox plough, and there is a training program for learning how to use it. The men are dominating the training and they are also the ones that will till the fields using the plough.

Households vary in size, many members can represent strength in the sense that there are many members who are able to provide labour, but also more mouths to feed. For a man to have many wives is a sign of wealth, but it can also become hard to sustain all of them in case of an external shock like insecurity, displacement, drought, floods or famine.

**Dynamic Traditions**

The Dinka have strong traditions, but even the strongest culture and traditions would suffer from more than 20 years of civil war and displacement. A large part of the young generation is more or less alienated from their own culture and traditions because they have been living abroad, or just away from home for 10-20 years. They know about the traditions and respect them, but they do not practice them or they do not know how to practice them. An example of this is the traditional wrestling and dancing that the young Dinka men do. Before, all the young men had to go through traditional rites and ceremonies of initiation to become men, and during this time they would learn how to wrestle and dance. But today many of the young men who are returning do not know how to wrestle or dance. They have gotten some formal education during their time in the camps, but they have lost out on this important part of the Dinka culture.

Another example is that the young girls, who have been living in displacement camps for most of their lives, are starting to refuse to marry the men that the families pick for them and want to choose a man for themselves. Some girls give this as a reason for not wanting to
return home to their villages (LWF representative). They know that the moment they step in the village their fathers are going to try to get them married, preferably to an old man, to get as many cows as possible. Girls in the villages see nothing wrong with a man having many wives, but since now there appears to be a trend of the young girls refusing, there might be a change in these practices in the future. The women I spoke to told me that it is impossible to refuse to marry, because then you refuse all your family. It was in their culture to marry the man who their father picked for them. However the women are not totally powerless when it comes to marriage. In some cases she is allowed to pick out the men that she wants to present to the father and in some cases she has some sort of influence on the choice of a husband. It is getting more and more normal that young people are allowed to marry their boyfriend and girlfriends, but they still have to go through the traditions with the families sitting together and negotiating the bride price.

When the NGOs are implementing projects like this they should also consider the gender issues. The Dinka women are strong but their men and their families are to a high degree controlling them. The returnees are opposing these rules e.g. young women are now moving around in the village with men that are not in her family.

4.2 Local and national institutions

Local government and administration

North Bor County has seven payams and each payam has several Bomas (villages). The Bomas power is split between the traditional chief and the Boma administrator. The local village community chooses the traditional chief and his (it is always a man) primary task is to resolve disputes between community members. The Boma administrator is appointed by the commissioner to serve as the representative for the Government in the village. The Payam is the next level where the Payam administrator is the highest authority that oversees the legislative, executive and judicial bodies (Branch and Mampilly 2005). Under the Payam administrator there is the Payam chairman that deals with political issues and an elected legislative that deals with legal cases. There is also an Executive administrator that is appointed and deals with administrative matters. In each Payam there is also a Women’s Association that elects their women affairs secretary. Disputes over land are handled on the
Payam level by the legislative and goes on to a body of elders or traditional leaders for appeal. The County administration is headed by a Commissioner appointed by the Government. The County level is responsible for setting and collecting taxes but the income level of the population suggests that there is not much to collect (Branch and Mampilly 2005).

**The Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission**

The Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) was the relief wing of the SPLM/A and used to be in charge of coordinating and supervising the work of the non-governmental organizations during the war, but now the Government has taken over that responsibility. The NGOs that deal with health issues are under the Ministry of Health and if you are doing an agricultural project, you have to report to the Ministry of Agriculture. The problem with this is that since the ministries and the Government are new they have little routine with dealing with the NGOs (like SSRRC used to have) and the NGOs therefore have another “advantage” on top of the already existing power imbalance. The NGOs are the ones with the resources and extended political legitimacy internationally and they are able to operate in the country without much control or supervision. The SSRRC is both a national and local institution but in this paper I will only consider the local department in Twic East County.

**Customary Law**

The customary law system is incorporated in the structures of SPLM/A and also the new Government of Southern Sudan. The customary laws have a high degree of legitimacy on the community level in the South and most court cases on the local level are solved through this traditional system. If one of the parts in a court case is not happy about the decisions taken by the local leaders in the court case he or she can appeal to the county level, and get the case retried with new judges.

Customary law is a very important institution, because it defines what is acceptable and what is not in the community. For instance, if a man impregnates a girl, or kills someone in a car accident, he will have to pay the affected family in cows. The customary laws domination in the South is revolving mostly around conflict-resolution, arbitration, compensation and

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16 This will be more discussed in section 4.3 and 5.3
rehabilitation rather than punishment (IDMC 2006). A system needs to be built that can deal with the customary laws that are not in line with the human rights, the overall objective is to “empower national stakeholders to actively engage in eliminations of violations of international standards, restoring confidence in informal and formal law enforcement, judiciary and civil administration units, and gradually building a culture of justice and peace” (JAM 2005: 46).

National Institutions

Government of Southern Sudan
The Government is newly established and they are still struggling to get routines going and making changes in the interests of local communities. The Government is dependent on the goodwill of the international community and the donors that are supporting the reconstruction of Southern Sudan. The fact that not much development has taken place in the communities in Southern Sudan since the signing of the peace agreement, breeds a sentiment among the people that the Government has failed them. My general impression from my interviews was that the population was still positive to the Government. They believed that it would start working soon, and then the situation would improve.

Legislation
After the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, a new constitution was developed for the South. Since Southern Sudan has had excessive problems with human rights abuses, it is important that these rights are emphasized in the new constitution. To be able to enforce human rights you need a constitution that is based on international conventions and agreements with respect for the rule of law, and sets out no uncertain terms on the fundamental human rights and freedoms. The Constitution of Southern Sudan says; “Southern Sudan is founded on justice, equality and respect for human dignity, and advancement of human rights and fundamental freedoms...” (Constitution of Southern Sudan 2005: 13).
The Constitution has a separate chapter about the establishment of a Human Rights Commission that will monitor the application and enforcement of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the constitution and to investigate any complaint from persons or groups about violations of Human Rights. Sudan as a country has yet to ratify the “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” (1948), the “Convention on the Political Rights of Women” (1952), the “Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women” (1979) and the “Convention against Torture” (1984) (Salam and de Waal 2001). The constitution also has a chapter about how they expect the NGOs to behave in their country, and which states that the Government can check their projects and budgets.

Army

After the civil war between North and South Sudan and the following demobilization, some of the former soldiers are offered positions from the Government, e.g. as police officers. By offering them jobs the government is securing itself against them joining other rebel groups. However, there are a lot of soldiers that after the war are left without any work or income.

Most households are connected to the army in the sense that they have someone in the family who is a previous soldier, or that they are still soldiers, or have some other connection to the army. There is a need to create job opportunities for demobilized soldiers, and since security is a problem, hiring former soldiers as police officers seems to be a good idea. The narrative that I am presenting is one of the happy endings and he is an example of an individual that adapted very well to his new reality and is doing good in the community. Deng is a 24 year old resident man from Nyuak payam working as a police officer. He is married and has one daughter who is 1 year old (Figure 8).

During my fieldwork I also did see many examples of stories not ending so well, and it is normal to observe drunk ex-soldiers roaming around with their AK47 in the villages. One told me something that I think describes their situation very well: “I don’t know how to read and I don’t know how to write but I’m an expert in driving a tank”.

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04. December 2006:

My family and me stayed when everybody else left in the time of the Nuer in 1991-1992. During those times we were struggling and it was not easy to survive. When I was 12 years old, I decided to join the army and contribute to our struggle. This was in 1996. It did not feel like an advantage to stay in this area during the war, but now I can see that we who stayed actually have an advantage to the ones returning, because we have our houses and a few cows. During the time of war, it was hard to stay behind because we had to fight. Me, I have 3 cows and my turkuls and I also get my salary from my job as a police officer. I got that job because I’m a former soldier, but I don’t have any education except my skills as a soldier. I don’t even speak English.

My wife is healthy and she is the one that maintains the garden and looks after the cows, even though we have some money, we still have to share with the extended family so in the end we are not getting much. But I feel that we are doing relatively well. Life has really changed since before the war because now we have medicine and education for the kids, while before we only had our cows. We are so happy now that people are returning, because they are our relatives and friends and we have been missing them. But when it is hunger like now, people might start to fight over food.

**Land tenure**

When it comes to land tenure, the SPLM/A have the same position as when it comes to the customary laws; they want to use the already existing traditional structures. The former Government did not share this opinion on how to distribute land. Under their rule, all land belonged to the State, and this is still an issue on which the northern and the southern parts of the new Government have yet to develop a common policy. Since land in Southern Sudan can be potentially very valuable because of the oil, this is a critical point for the new Government. There are also other issues that have not been developed policies on yet like water and where to draw the border in some oil rich states bordering the North.

Under the existing customary structures the land belongs to the people, and the chiefs are the ones who distribute the land to the villagers. According to Dinka land rights you have to be a member of the community to be able to access land. This may turn out to become a problem
in urban areas, where people that are not originating from that area return. At this time in my study area the people returning are the ones originating from that area. According to my informants, the ones who are returning to the area will get some land from the chief upon their return. The problem is that everybody wants to live close to the center because of security and access to services such as schools, water and NGOs. Many of the returnees that have returned recently and wanted to live in the center have been able to get some land. However, they are just given a small piece to build a tukul, and not enough to establish a garden. People who want to can grow crops further from the village, but they are discouraged by insecurity, the fact that they will not be able to look after their crops, and the risk that cows come and eat or destroy it. None of my respondents had been denied land, but sometimes the land they were offered were very far away from the center. This is influencing people’s livelihood because people that might have had gardens do not grow because they do not have land close to the homestead.

People are directly connected to the national level by the legislation and the Government policy on land tenure. At the moment on the ground the land still belongs to the community. But as the population pressure increases and the good land becomes occupied, land will get scarce and the value of the desirable land will increase. There is a possibility that the local leaders might take advantage of the customary land tenure system and give poor land to the returnees and keep the good land or demand money for the good land. If GoS forces through their land policy, all land will belong to the state and then people might have to buy land from the state. It is important that people are able to get land titles as a proof that they own the land, because that will help them if the land policy changes radically. The traditional land tenure system may develop into a more market based system and then the prices of land are going to increase. It may be an incentive for the people to return home if they are getting land titles upon return. Land speculation by powerful actors needs to be addressed and prevented (Malik 2006). According to the CPA the parties have agreed to “create a process to resolve conflict on land issues by developing and amending legislation to reflect customary laws and practices, local heritage, and international trends” (CPA, a summary booklet 2005: 7). This process has not shown any results yet, and the future land policy of Sudan is still uncertain. International donors have become actively engaged in the post-war development projects of the Government and land tenure issues related to land use for resettlement and rehabilitation are on the agenda of the donors (Sundnes and Shanmugaratnam 2007).
4.3 Possibilities and limitations

Infrastructure

Bad infrastructure is one of the main problems in my study area and it was also one that I could really feel while staying in Southern Sudan. All the NGOs listed the poor infrastructure as the biggest restriction for them doing their work, because it was difficult for them to move around, and hard to get supplies into the area. The poor infrastructure is obviously also slowing down the process of return because it is only possible to return in the dry season (December to April) and even then the bad roads makes the trip hard. Those who have not returned by April have to wait until next year.

Resources; Water

According to many of the NGOs and the Commissioner of Twic East County, water is one of the biggest resources in this part of Southern Sudan, but according to them the problem is that the local population does not know how to utilize it. The water brings fish and gives the animals a drinking source but since the communities are unable to control it they find themselves in a situation where all the fields and even the homesteads are flooded so that it is almost un-livable. The heavy rains lasts from June to September but flooding in some cases occurs from May and all the way to October. Normally it would have been one of the tasks of the Government to provide land and water infrastructure to conserve and manage the water. World Food Programme is building dikes to prevent the water to reach the communities and maybe that will improve on the situation for the population. But since the area is a swamp area, leading all the water away can possibly change the ecosystem radically, and maybe creating more problems for the community in the long run. The area is very fertile and the easy access to water makes good conditions for agriculture, however, the irregular rainfall makes it difficult and unstable.

Technology

With technology I mean water pumps, ox ploughs and hand hoes, pesticides and medicines. None of the returnees, residents or local leaders mentioned anything about the communities
lacking new technology except for medicine for humans and animals and water pumps. “There are so many waterborne diseases. Water and health are marching together. If we don’t have clean water we can’t be healthy” (Jongulei local leader). Many of the NGOs are promoting ox ploughs so that people can cultivate new land. This is still not so prevalent in my study area, because to participate in the training you need oxen and even though the plough is subsidized the investment is to big for most of the local communities. None of my informants used the ox-plough for cultivation and all of them had relatively small gardens.

**Power Structures**

Even though the Dinka society is homogenous they have different classes that are based on wealth and power. The local chiefs have both wealth and power and people in the community would like their daughters to be married to someone from the chief clan. Many NGOs have practiced distribution of food through the local chiefs and in many cases the chiefs have used this as an opportunity to further increase their wealth and power. One of the NPA workers told me that this had been the case in Twic East County before. The residents were more influential than the returnees in the communities because all the local leaders and all the members of the women’s groups are residents. But the returnees will probably become more prominent in time, when they get more established in the community.

The women of Kongor complained that the NGOs did not consider the women when they were implementing their projects. “The NGOs are not considering women, a one day workshop is not enough. Sometimes we send a representative to those workshops and she arrives home with nothing” (Kongor women’s group). The women also told me that one of the biggest problems for them was that when they got married, they were taken away from their communities and put in to a new community where they did not know anyone. “But this is our tradition, our fathers sell us”. The women feel that they are kept in the dark and that they are segregated in the community because men and women are not the same. None of the representatives for the women’s groups had any formal education. “We are behind but if our husbands get education that is enough as long as we have food we don’t worry about that” (Kongor women’s group).

There is a difference in power between the NGOs and the local government. Formally the local government is the representatives of the state and therefore they are supposed to be
supreme to the NGOs because they are supposed to control what they do and if they are not happy about their work the NGOs can get expelled. However, the situation on the ground is that the local government does not have access to as many resources as the NGOs, and they do not have the same experience. The local Government relies on the NGOs for support and help e.g. when it comes to transport. Many of the international NGOs also have backing from million dollar organizations with long traditions of humanitarian work, and that influences their self-esteem and confidence, about that the decisions they make are the right ones. This also affects the relations between the NGOs. The fact that some of them are so big and full of resources may make it hard for the smaller ones to object to, or criticize or even cooperate with the bigger ones.

4.4 Risk and Insecurity

“The war has produced criminals and a lot of people have been killed” (Kongor local leader). The statement that the war has produced criminals is one that I heard over and over again. Insecurity is a big problem in my study area and during my stay there, more than 5000 people were displaced because of cattle raiding, looting and killing and kidnapping of children (Commissioner of Twic East County). Today the Dinka of North Bor mostly have had problems with the Murle tribe, that have been raiding their cattle and there have also been incidents of kidnapping children, especially baby girls. This is “normal” in these communities but for many of the returnees the experience is specially traumatizing since they have just returned, and these incidents reminds them of the war. This adds on the general frustration among the returnees because they feel that things are not like what they expected upon their return. The commissioner of Twic East County stated that the security for the people was the biggest issue in this area, and that it was the issue that needed to be dealt with first and foremost. “People don’t feel safe in their own home and it reminds them of the war. The Government says that there is now peace, but the people on the ground are still experiencing wartime conditions. The Government and the NGOs don’t understand that” (Commissioner of Twic East County). He also said that the insecurity made people unable to

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invest because they had to be able to leave everything behind. Before the war there used to be a lot of internal clan fighting but that is not so significant anymore.

“When it comes to the insecurity and the cattle raiders, the organizations (NGOs) can’t do anything but the government will follow up on that” (Jongulei local leader). The local communities expect that the Government will handle the security situation, because after all there is peace. They are happy that they finally have peace, but they also say that they have fought for a cause and if they do not see the results they will have to keep fighting. “We have fought for long because we don’t want the Arabs here, but if the peace doesn’t come we will continue fighting” (Nyuak local leaders). The local government and the different payams are trying to mobilize people to patrol villagers that are prone to attacks from neighboring tribes but they do not have resources. Since they are demobilized, the communities do not have weapons, they are an easy target for other tribes that still have their guns.

“The insecurity restricts movement and freedom, and makes people congest in one area and they are not growing crops. We have to fight against the insecurity. UN forces are supposed to be monitoring the insecurity but they are not doing anything. We showed them our problems but they are not doing anything about it” (Nyuak local leader). Usually the Dinka move their cattle around according to the season and every family used to have their own cattle camp where they would keep the cattle in the night. Now, as there has been a lot of insecurity and killings over cattle, the villagers like to keep their cattle close to their homestead so that they can watch over them. In the night they put all the cattle together in large cattle camps that can contain several thousand animals so that they can help each other protect the animals. When all the animals are kept in the village the grazing opportunities are limited, and grazing land gets depleted faster. The cattle are not able to get all the nutrition that it needs and it is more prone to getting diseases. The land near the center is not fertile, and it is not enough for all the people in the centers that reduces the food security of the population. The insecurity affects peoples livelihood severely because it reduces the grazing area for the cattle and as mentioned before; the area used for cultivation. The insecurity can also create local conflicts when the cattle is kept close to the village because they may destroy crops and cattle camps that have traditionally belonged to one clan may be intruded by others that are also looking for safety for their cattle.
Local conflicts

Because my study area is ethnically homogenous, people are not experiencing the same conflicts between returnees and residents as in other parts of Southern Sudan, which are less ethnically homogenous. Few of the returnees and residents that I talked to would admit that there were any local conflicts arising between the residents and the returnees. However, the local leaders of the three payams that I interviewed said that there had been some conflicts between residents and returnees. They explained that the conflicts were not major because all of them were relatives, but sometimes when people return, others had taken their land, even though Dinka normally do not settle on other peoples land.

Displacement now and during the war

Insecurity in my study area produces displaced people, who even though they do not get displaced so far from their homes, are in a more vulnerable position than the people that are not under this threat. When they are away from their homes their belongings and food storages might get looted and their livestock stolen. This kind of displacement obviously influences the household, but the displacement that took place during the war also influenced the household very seriously.

Returnees and residents

According to my findings most of the people that have been displaced and are now returning are more vulnerable than the residents who have stayed in the area for a while. The residents have more assets and are more food secure than the returnees. One example of this is a 40 year old returnee that I interviewed in Kongor Payam. Machar is married with 2 wives and 10 children and he left Kongor during the time of the Nuer conflict in 1991. He arrived back from Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya with the help of UNHCR in March 2006 (Figure 9). However, some of the returnees have been able to get education while displaced, and even though they may not have assets now, their education can benefit them in the future.
Figure 9: Machar, 40 years old returnee, living in Kongor with two wives and 10 children.

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When we were displaced all our needs were met. Food, medicine, building materials, carpets. The UN told us that all of these things would be provided for us when we go back to Sudan if we choose to return. When people heard this they wanted to return but we were deceived into coming back, because we have not been getting any of these things when we returned. My family and me are staying with relatives but our relatives don’t have anything to share with us. We are having problems with the mosquitoes because we don’t have nets. When it rains it is too cold because we don’t have blankets. All of us from Kakuma arrived in March but we did not get any food until September, and there was also some confusion with the lists; so many of the ones who were supposed to get food did not get anything! This place is much worse than staying in the camp because we don’t have food and many of those we returned with have decided to move to other places already. But at least when we are back we are free and we are able to use the land and grow as much as we want. I think the returnees have now exceeded the residents in number so it is impossible for them to feed us. We don’t have any income; we just depend on the food that we get from NPA. The residents are better off than us because at least they have their structures and their livestock. When the UN brought us here we did not get any information and we don’t even know if we are supposed to get anything from the NGOs, or which NGO we are supposed to get it from. I hope that I will be able to take care of my family, but before we can even plant anything there is a gap of hunger and it is not easy to achieve anything when you are starving.

In my findings I also see a tendency of difference among the returnees. The returnees who arrived by themselves, without assistance, are generally better off, and have come further in rebuilding their lives than the ones who have arrived by UN convoys or other forms of assisted repatriation. The returnees returning without assistance are doing better because they took a conscious decision to go home while the ones repatriation with the help of UN and others might not have returned if it wasn’t for the assistance. Many of the returnees that arrived home in convoys stated that they had been convinced by the UNHCR that the best thing for them to do was to return home. Those who returned by themselves had some resources so they could support their own return and also something to start with for
reconstructing their livelihoods. They were highly motivated to return and that has affected their success upon the return.

The returnees are facing big challenges both practically and psychologically. The practical challenges I have mentioned before, and the psychological challenges come from them being displaced for so many years and having the constant hope and wish to go home. When they return home things may not be as they had imagined, and for many people it is a shock to come back to the heat, flies and flooding, when they have been living in small towns or in refugee camps while displaced.

Returnee households and resident households face the same problems in the community, but on individual level, there are differences between the residents and the returnees. The returnees may not have all the networks, social capital, local knowledge and natural capital (land, houses etc) that the residents have, but they may have acquired skills and education (human capital), financial capital and in some cases even some political capital by their experiences and staying outside Southern Sudan. Some have lived in refugee or internally displaced camps for a long time and are used to dealing with NGOs and they know about their rights. The residents with their local knowledge have a variety of strategies for survival when they are facing external shocks and general food shortage. These are e.g. collecting firewood for sale, fishing or selling livestock. All of the residents had little or no formal education. The residents that I interviewed did not have any financial capital like money but they had natural capital like land (gardens), livestock and physical capital like their turkuls and tools.

All of the residents claimed to be very happy that people have started to return. They were certain that the situation would now start to improve because of all the new people. They recognized several good things about the returnees and the one that all mentioned was that they were happy to see their old friends and family again because during the years of war they have had no idea about if people were alive or dead. Another thing that was often mentioned by the residents was that the returnees were educated and the residents believed in that it might help develop the community. As yet, the community has not seen the benefits of this education because few of the displaced who have obtained education have yet returned. They may return when the development has reached further or they will choose to settle in urban areas. One mentioned that with the returnees coming there had been an increase in trade.
“Now there are a lot of good things happening because of the returnees, they are bringing medicine and food and they have education” (Resident Nyuak, 1). Four of the ten residents that I talked to had returnees staying in their homes, and they shared the harvest from the garden with them and then the returnees shared the food and other help from NGOs with them. “We don’t have any conflicts with them because these people are our relatives, but when people are starving they might start to fight over food” (Resident Nyuak, 2).

All of the returnees that I spoke to claimed that distribution of food was the most important thing that the NGOs could provide for them, and that the biggest problem of the community was hunger. But they also mentioned that they needed more boreholes with safe water\textsuperscript{18}, a better school and a secondary school (complaints about the school building and that the teachers were not good) lack of hospital or health services and that people do not have mosquito nets, blankets and cooking pots.

There is a difference between the residents and returnees when it comes to the kinds of “capital” and knowledge they possess. The returnees and residents compliment each other, and there are big opportunities for exchange of information and knowledge. While local knowledge can pass from the residents to the returnees, formal knowledge like reading, writing, new farm practices and sanitation practices, like making pit latrines, can pass on from the returnees to the residents (Phelan and Wood 2006). My findings show that the resident’s look at how the returnees are building pit latrines and they also want to have them when they see the positive impact they have on health and sanitation. If a higher number of the returnees that arrive in Twic East County are educated, they may encourage their children to get an education and this will maybe also make the residents see the value of education. There have not been any major conflicts between these groups yet but if the returnee flow keeps up or increases, the resources are going to be even more strained and that might result in resource conflicts. Since there is no ethnic divide in the community there is no risk of that becoming a major conflict, but the continuous cattle raiding by the Murle and old grievances to the Nuer might create tension.

Many of the young people are alienated from their own culture and are having a hard time adapting to the in many ways strict Dinka society. The fact that the society is still so bound to

\textsuperscript{18} Especially in Jongulei payam.
the old values and traditions may prevent many young people that have been living almost all their lives displaced from returning. This is especially relevant when it comes to young girls that have been experiencing relatively more freedom in the refugee/displacement camps.

4.5 Natural Conditions

Climate

The local leaders in Kongor Payam stated that the water and the flooding was a big problem for the local communities. “There is a lot of diseases in the water and both humans and cows get sick and die from them” (Kongor local leader). People drink from unsafe water because there are not enough boreholes, and the boreholes around are few and especially in the dry season there is a lot of queuing to get water. But the few boreholes around are new because before the war they did not have any boreholes. The irregular rainfall also poses a big challenge and in recent years there have been either drought or like 2006 where they had flooding.

Pests/diseases

“We are cattle keepers, when the cow falls sick it can not produce, we need veterinary services” (Jongulei local leader). The lack of veterinary services and cattle raiding makes investing your money in cattle a risky business, but because it is an important part of Dinka culture most people want to invest in cattle if they have the opportunity. When a disease strikes it may wipe out a few animals and when they only have a few it makes it critical. Before the war the Bor Dinka were known for their big herds of cattle and it was normal to have more than 300 cattle and the bride price would be 100 cattle. Foot and mouth disease is the main livestock disease in Bor County. There is an inadequate coverage of veterinary service; none of the NGOs in Twic East County have implemented animal health services (WFP 2004). During the nineties and the intra-factional fighting in the SPLM/A many of the Bor Dinka lost their cattle. Today some of the residents have cattle, but only a few of the returnees have been able to buy cattle.

19 The present size of the herds is provided in section 4.6, cattle and livestock.
4.6 Strategies and choices

Livelihood activities – livelihood strategies
The livelihood activities that I have identified are livestock herding, cultivation, fishing, hunting, wild food collection, trading and receiving food rations or other forms of aid from NGOs. Waged labor only exists as Government (e.g. police, soldiers) or NGO positions. Cultivation in gardens, fishing, hunting and wild food collection is mainly for household subsistence. The households combine these activities in different ways, dependent on their resources, capabilities etc. These combinations of livelihood activities make up different livelihood strategies.

Cattle and livestock
The Dinka in my study area are considered to be agro-pastoralists, but some would claim that they in real sense are more pastoralists, at least when you measure the commitment. A big herd is a sign of status and will give them respect and influence in the community. If you have daughters you will be sure to get a lot of cows when they get married. These cows can be used to pay the bride price of your sons. In this way, marriages contribute to a continuous redistribution of wealth in the community.

World Food Program has made an assessment among the different socio-economic groups in Bor County and found that in 2004 the ones ranked in the socio-economic group as “poor” had 0-2 cattle, the “middle” had 5-10 cattle and the “better off” had 10-15 cattle. The middle wealth households only consume meat during the hunger gap from April to July, while those better off consume livestock products throughout the year. Livestock products contribute 0-5% to the annual food basket for the poor households, 15-20% for the middle group and 20-25% for the better off (WFP 2004). It brings bad luck for the Dinka to tell anybody how many cows they have, if you ask, there is a good chance you might get an understatement or no answer at all. According to my data nine out of my ten residents had cattle and the one who did not have cattle had some goats. In a wealth ranking discussion with the local leaders in Nyuak they told me that you are rich if you have 5 cows, medium if you have 2 cows and
some goats and poor if you do not have cows and only goats. These numbers differ drastically from the numbers from the WFP assessment of socio-economic groups in 2004. This difference may indicate either that the population of Bor was worse off in terms of food security in 2006 than in 2004, or that the population of Twic East County is less food secure than Bor County in general. Another possible explanation might be that the local leaders gave me low numbers for tactical reasons.

According to my findings, only 4 out of the 32 returnee households in my sample had livestock and only two of these had cattle. The two who had cattle had returned in 2004, so they have had time to restock, while most of the returnees stated that they had just arrived and that was why they didn’t have any livestock. All the returnees except 3 had arrived in 2006.

If the two who returned in 2004 are left out, only 5 of 32 returnees, had built tukuls. The ones that had managed to build houses had all been formally internally displaced. All the other 25 were living in houses of relatives, except one who stated that the family didn’t have any relatives in the area to live with, so they were living under trees.
Cultivation and crops
In my study area the conditions for growing crops are hard, and made difficult by droughts and flooding. The crops grown in Twic East County include sorghum, maize, groundnuts, sesame, beans, tobacco and a variety of vegetables. Sorghum is the major crop and makes up 50-60% of the food sources in a good/normal year (WFP 2003). According to Norwegian Peoples Aid, the Dinka in my study area only plant their sorghum once a year, in May and harvest in August.

Several NGOs (NPA, LWF) are promoting use of ox plough, which would make it possible to cultivate larger areas, and reduce the time used in the fields. People who are used to a life with insecurity are reluctant to invest a lot of time in the fields because they might have to run and leave everything behind. The continuous flooding and sporadic drought has discouraged people from cultivating big areas, because the risk of loosing everything is too high. A “root cause analysis” performed by CARE in 2003 found several challenges to grain production (CARE 2003). Lack of close and clean water sources made people use a lot of time and energy looking for water. My findings support this analysis, and one of the main challenges of my study area is to provide safe water to the population. In my study area they did not only have a long way to the water pumps some did not access clean water and it made them more prone to getting waterborne diseases, especially during the flooding season. When people get sick it reduces the food security of the household because it reduces the labour power for cultivation.

All of the residents that I interviewed had their gardens where they grow sorghum, maize, okra and tobacco. All of them complained that the harvest had been bad this year (2006) because of flooding. Among the returnees, only three out of 32 had gardens.

Fishing, hunting and wild foods
Fishing, hunting and collecting of wild foods are seasonal activities that are closely connected with the general food security of the household. All of these activities are practiced in the dry season from December to April. Normally only the vulnerable that do not own livestock practice these activities, but since the harvest in 2006 was affected by flooding, more people have to use one of these activities as a supplement.
Fishing is an income-generating activity for Bor communities, and contributes significantly to the annual food needs (STARBASE 2005). All of the residents that I talked to said that they would use fishing to feed the family. The fish is not only in the river but also in lakes, swamps, pools and small ponds. During the rainy season people use fishing as a way to feed the family. The fish comes with the floodwater and children catch the mudfish in pools, ponds and even in small ditches. Some dry the fish they do not use themselves and sell it on the local market. Since Twic-East County is relatively far from the river, people practice fishing more in the local pools but if there is a food shortage in the dry season, people may take the children to the river and live from fish so that they do not get malnourished.

During the dry season the wild animals also move closer to people’s settlements to get water, so there are hunting possibilities. From February to April, hunting of antelope, gazelle and buffalo is common (STARBASE 2005). People also eat water lilies (gor) and the desert date (lalop thaau). The lalop is harvested in December to January and consumed during the hunger gap period from April-June. The lalop is also used as traditional medicine against malaria. The gor is available in rivers or swamps throughout the year. The World Food Program projected that most households in Bor will continue to expand their wild food collection during January to August (2005) to cope with the food scarcity situation (WFP 2004).

**Trading**

In the payams where I did my study, trading is very restricted but there are some small shops around where you can get the most essentials, like salt and cooking oil and some clothes. In cases of serious food shortage for the family there are several things you can do to get money to buy some food. According to my findings, residents will gather firewood for sale, sell fish or gather straws for building materials and sell it on the local market. If they have some livestock, they can sell a goat or a cow to obtain money to by sorghum for the family. While all the residents mentioned one of these strategies, none of the returnees who I interviewed had used trading to deal with food shortages.
Relief food
Getting relief food from NGOs is an important component of the main livelihood strategies in my study area, especially for the returnees. My findings show that almost all of the returnees who have been in the area for less than a year rely on relief food for survival.

From the returnees who I interviewed, although everybody reported that the food they were receiving was too little, especially the ones from Kakuma (Kenya) were disappointed with the help they had received upon their return. They had been promised support if they returned, like building materials, tools, seeds and food, and they were not satisfied with the support they have been given.

Six of my resident respondents got household rations from WFP, but all of them complained that the food was too little and that the distribution was sporadic. Three of the four that did not receive anything from WFP had waged jobs in addition to their gardens and livestock (one was in the police and two in the local payam administration). One of my respondents told me that he used to get food from WFP but now even the WFP had food shortages. This matches the information I got from the interview with WFP staff, where they told me that this area was not prioritized anymore because they needed their resources in Darfur. One of the residents had also received tools and seeds from CARE.
**4.7 Income, Food Security, Health and Education**

**Income**
In the local economy of my study area the role of money is not so important. Most of the population relies on relief, sharing among the community and subsistence farming. Therefore there is hard to get good data on income.

Income is everything that you obtain with your livelihood strategies, and in my case this might be harvest from agriculture, income from selling livestock, firewood or building materials or other kinds of trade or income from waged labour. The incomes vary dependent on the choices and livelihood strategies that you apply. The influence of cash income is very limited because few have jobs, but the ones who have it, are either hired by the local government or NGOs. People who have jobs are doing very well in the community and are able to obtain cash. People without waged labour may be able to obtain some cash with selling surplus grain or livestock.

Because of lack of monetary income access to the market is not so relevant for the people at this time but it may become more important in time. Now, the market consists of people having enough money to fill a truck with whatever and drive it to Southern Sudan. Because there is not much of anything, prices are generally high. There are 4 different currencies in Southern Sudan; Kenyan Shilling, Uganda Shilling, US dollars and Sudanese Dinar.

**Food security**
The returnees have been integrated in the communities where they share the already strained food resources while awaiting to settle down and produce their own food. The result is often that there is a need for food aid in the county, not only to meet the needs of the returnees, but the needs of the vulnerable resident population as well (STARBASE 2005). Both returnees and residents have been experiencing food shortages in the recent years, due to insecurity, floods, drought, difficult market access and the influx of returnees. Flooding has destroyed crops and led to seasonal displacement, that also reduces the crop production.
Two of the ten residents in my sample said that they did not produce enough to feed their families, and that they experienced food shortage during the year. The rest of them did produce enough food and when the harvest failed they had alternative ways of getting income to feed the family. This would be fishing or hunting, collecting firewood or building materials for sale. One of the old residents that were not doing so well was Chol. He is a 70 year man that I interviewed in Kongor Payam (Figure 10). He has two wives and 12 children. Some of the children are in school in refugee camps, some are still small and some are soldiers.

Figure 10: Chol, 70 year resident living in Kongor payam and have two wives and 12 children.

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You are asking me about income but I don’t have any income except my three cows. I have some land but this year my harvest was destroyed because of flooding, so there is not much food. During the war the UN used to give us some food and now the World Food Programme are also giving us some food rations, but now even the WFP are having food shortage. We have access to water, but the girls have to walk far to get it, but that is normal for us, many people don’t live close to the boreholes. I’m sick, I have some trouble with my leg but I don’t know what it is, so I can’t work at all, but thank God for the kids that are helping me. Me and my family always have too little food, but the worst period is from December to April, because then everybody is low on food. But we are used to this and we normally try to fish. The only problem for me is that you have to walk far to get to the good fishing places.

I decided that we would stay during the time of the Nuer because we had nowhere to run. If I was going to be killed I wanted to be killed from my home! I think we who stayed have an advantage compared to the ones that left. At least for my family and me, we are alive and we have a turkul. The ones who are arriving now don’t have anything. I think the NGOs are good; there is just so many people that it is hard for them to help everybody. Everything they do is too little. And some NGOs don’t even implement the things they say they are going to do. I think that things were better before the war because we would all have a lot of cows. But now that the returnees are coming back they are bringing with them a lot of good things like medicine and food and also they have education and can contribute in a good way in the community.
Only one of the returnees said that he did produce enough for the family. The other 31 reported to have constant shortage of food. When I asked the returnees about if they had any strategies to face the food shortage very few of them had any. This is a big contrast to the residents, where all knew about at least one strategy to face food shortage.

According to representatives from the Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) some of the problem with food shortage is also because there is a delay in the distribution of food. From the returnees arrive, until they receive the first food rations there may be six months of waiting. This was also confirmed through my returnee interviews. NPA only distributes food every 3 months and sometimes people that are returning are not able to enter the lists of the returnees because they are having a hard time documenting that they are actually returning. This is especially a problem for the former internally displaced people. The returnees that are arriving from refugee camps are used to getting food rations every 15 days and are having problems with only receiving food every 3 months. Almost all of the returnees are dependent on the relief food they get and do not have any garden or livestock while the residents produce enough food to feed their families without getting support.

All the women groups I interviewed emphasized that the biggest problem of the community was the lack of food. “The NGOs do so many different things, some deal with education and some deal with health, but the first priority for us is food” (Jongulei women group). The local leaders in Kongor claimed that if they didn’t have a problem with drought of flooding next year they would have no problem to survive on their own without relief food because the Dinka had always enjoyed to work and it did not matter if many had been receiving food aid for many years.

Education

The lack of good teachers and schools is one thing that all the people I talked to did agree on was a big problem in the community. The returnees would say that this also was a big problem because others who were supposed to return might not do it because of lack of good educational possibilities for the children.

None of the returnees I interviewed, who had returned with the organized repatriation programs, had any education. According to my data, one can assume that the ones with
education do not want to come back to the rural areas because there are not many employment opportunities. They will rather go to the cities or return later when the area is more developed.

Even though if people are getting education or not is dependent of the facilities to be put in place by the government or NGOs, there are also other things that influence it. My data shows that natural conditions like drought or flooding exert a direct influence on the ability for girls to obtain education, since when there is food shortage/hunger, the adults in the household have to leave the home to search for employment or food, and then they normally take a girl out of school so that she can take care of the home and the smaller children. There is a lower threshold for taking a girl out of school than a boy.

The education of the parents also influences the schooling of their children. There are many things that need to be done in the home, for the parents to send their children to school they have to prioritize it, because they are sacrificing the work power of the children. Girls are also often taken out of school early because they are getting married.

There are still few educated people that have returned, but some of them have been able to get employment and opportunity because of their education. One example is one returnee from Nyuak payam who is 25 years, married and has a baby girl (Figure 11). He left in 1988 to Ethiopia as one of the many children that fled to Ethiopia, some as a part of SPLA policies to recruit new soldiers, and others just as orphaned refugees ("The Lost Boys"). He was only 9 years old when he had to walk to Ethiopia with thousands of other children his own age. They walked to Ethiopia where they organized themselves in to groups, sharing daily tasks like cooking and cleaning and combining these tasks with military training and schooling. He returned to Southern Sudan in 2004 and got a job with an NGO.
1 December 2006

In Ethiopia we divided ourselves into groups and we took care of each other, which was the only way to survive. We also got some military training. We would have school in the morning and then military training after lunch. My parents wanted me to go because they believed that I would get opportunities in Ethiopia, because there was no school in my village. After some years in Ethiopia we were forced to leave because they were dropping bombs on our heads. We went back to Sudan but the situation was so bad here that we could not stay. Eventually we went to Kenya and Kakuma refugee camp. There things were hard, but at least I got schooling and since I was a good student I got to continue in school and finished secondary school. Can you believe that during my time in Kakuma I didn’t know anything about my family that stayed behind in Sudan? When I finished secondary school in 2004 I decided to go back to Sudan to try to get a job. I went back to my own village only to find that my whole family was killed or died of hunger except one younger sister. I now live together with my sister and my wife. I wanted to start a family right away; I want many kids so that I can rebuild my family. I have a house and some cows and I’m expecting more cows when my sister gets married. I also get some money from my job.

Health care

Lack of good health care is also another issue that the representatives for the women’s groups would talk strongly about, and also all the local leaders I talked to mentioned this as a big problem. “We can only pray when we give birth that nothing happens because we don’t have a hospital” (Kongor women group).

The NGOs would not emphasize on this problem and especially the ones that were situated in Panyagor central because there is a clinic there that is supposed to be working. CARE (which is funding the clinic) claimed that the clinic was working, but representatives from other NGOs said that reality was otherwise. Also when I visited the clinic myself it seemed to be in a poor condition, with very few staff and medicine. There are no doctors there because all the doctors are needed in the hospitals. To work in a clinic like this you have to have one year of “community health training”. The staff also told me that they had very limited knowledge...
when it came to treating people (they only knew about the most common diseases) and they had a very limited amount of drugs. If they could not treat a case that came to them, they would tell the patient to go to the hospital in Bor, but there is no means of transport so normally people didn’t have the opportunity to go there.

4.8 Aid input and humanitarian assistance

“We knew that if we won the war, people would come to support us” (Jongulei Local Leader). In Southern Sudan the NGOs have been so strongly present in the war torn communities that people are used to them and when I would ask people about NGOs it was clear that the general knowledge about the NGOs was good. All people that had been in the community for a while were able to mention several NGOs and what kind of services they were providing to the communities. But there was also some skepticism because of the long lasting presence of NGOs and the lack of visible development in the communities. Many local leaders were starting to question the motivation and the real commitment of the NGOs. “The organizations are bringing what they think is best for us and not what we tell them” (Jongulei local leader).

The returnees and residents are two different groups in the eyes of the NGOs and they have been receiving different services. The returnees reported that Norwegian Peoples Aid has been distributing food, building materials, tools and seeds to the returnees. Lutheran World Federation has been distributing non-food items such as blankets, cooking pots and mosquito nets, but they just started their project in this area and none of the returnees that I talked to had received anything from them yet. Care has also distributed non-food items like tools and seeds and some of the residents have received this.

The returnees are the ones that are able to access most aid when it comes to relief food in my study area. They are receiving food rations from NPA and also non-food items from LWF. The residents have to be considered “vulnerable” by the WFP to get food rations but they are able to access other services that are more concerned with capacity building like farmers training, youth training to become e.g. builders and ox plough training. According to my findings the returnees are also able to access these services but they are limited by their access
to other assets in the first place. E.g. to get ox plough training you have to have an ox, which most of the returnees do not have.

The NGOs are today the actors who some might claim have the most influence in Southern Sudan. NGOs are drawn towards war, famine, extreme poverty and general suffering. They use a lot of resources on programs that might or might not make a difference before they move on to new areas, where “they are more needed” (CARE representative).

The local communities would always tell me to go home and write about their suffering so that they would get more help. “You are not the first person to come and this is not the first questionnaire, but we see no impact at all” (Jongulei local leader). NGOs retracting from the area, while there are still so many problems among the population, are a confusing signal to send to the population. CARE is one of the NGOs that seem to have more of a short time commitment to the communities. They left Jongulei payam a year ago and they are now also going to close their other project in Panyagor. “CARE has delivered nothing to this community. Care had some structures but they were very bad and now they have left, but the structures are falling down and we can’t use them for anything” (Jongulei local leader).

When Care left Jongulei payam they were the only NGO in the payam and now they are left with none. CARE is now terminating all its projects in Twic East County. They didn’t get further funding to continue their operations, because the donors did not accept their proposals. What was different this year compared to other years? Donors possess a lot of power, and how much is determined by international politics and the interests of the home countries of the NGOs. World Food Programme is also leaving Twic East County and are preparing with transforming their relief from food distribution to food-for-work. The internal structures and politics (Kilman and Thurow 2005) of United States humanitarian priorities largely affects how and to who aid resources will be programmed (Nachamias and Goldstein 2004).

All the NGOs that I visited during my stay except Norwegian Peoples Aid and Lutheran World Federation had very poor structures, with only the traditional tukuls for offices and accommodation for the employees. A frequent comment was that the NGOs are not finishing the things they have in their plans. “It seems strange that some of the NGOs don’t construct concrete buildings, only build these poor tukuls, and that is not because they don’t have money. Only NPA has good buildings that they can leave for us when they leave. Now when
Care is leaving they are not leaving anything\textsuperscript{20} for us. Care was good, we don’t know why they are leaving “ (Nyuak local leader).

The many NGOs working in Southern Sudan bring the international community to the villages, while their decisions and priorities are made in their headquarters far away. Their decisions made there are directly influencing what kind of humanitarian aid is offered, where it is offered and who is going to receive it. These decisions affect the geographical distribution of aid, and contribute to uneven development within the country. Resources and empowerment are influenced by the NGOs because at this point they and the returnees are the ones that are in a position to develop the communities. NGOs are promoting that people should start planting a second season instead of only having one crop a year. They can also empower people by offering training and education, especially for women, so that they become more able to take control and influence their lives. There are no forms of telecommunication except satellite phones. There is no access to any form of media or information except the limited Internet access of the NGOs and the few radios in the community.

\textsuperscript{20} In form of structures and buildings.
Chapter 5

The role of Government organizations and NGOs in resettlement

In this chapter I will present and discuss my findings concerning the role of the Government organizations and NGOs in resettlement. I will discuss local, national and international problems and challenges that influence the repatriation process. To describe the context that the NGOs and the Government operate in on the local level, I will give a short presentation of the payams that my study was carried out in. My analysis/discussion of the NGOs’ position, priorities and limitations, corresponds to the NGO-model (figure 7), presented in chapter 3.

5.1 Local conditions, variations between payams

Massive repatriation has been scheduled for Southern Sudan in the years to come. Though it has not moved at the speed that UNHCR and other international NGOs have hoped, if the security situation does not worsen the number of people returning is going to increase in the next few years. The UNHCR sees repatriation to their countries of origin as the optimal solution to the refugee problem, and host governments are also pushing for refugees to return home (Harrel-Bond 1989, Black and Koser 1999).

Variations in local conditions

When people return, the pattern of settlement is often a bit different from the pattern people used to stay in before. Before the war, Twic East County had more people, but people were far more scattered than they are today. When people are returning, they prefer to settle in the villages, preferable in the centre or close to the centre. The reason for this is that the centre might have services like school, clinic and water pumps that you might not find in the
outskirts and also that the aid agencies often establish their compounds in the centers. If you live far away you will have to walk for long distances to claim the support that you are entitled to. People that have been displaced for a long time e.g in Kenya and Uganda might have become adapted to a more modern type of life, and they want to live close to people and commodities.

When it comes to regional differences, all the different payams were experiencing more or less the same problems that I have touched upon earlier in the chapter. But I still want to give a short presentation of the different payams so that they can keep their voice and are not being reduced into general problems. However, the differences are there, at least when it comes to services and humanitarian aid.

**Kongor payam**

Kongor is the payam that is closest to the County center, which is Panyagor/Mabior. Kongor has two NGOs situated in their payam. That is Save the Children and Lutheran World Federation. LWF has their offices there and STC has a youth training centre and has their offices in the county centre, Panyagor/Mabior.

They have had a large number of returnees arriving in their payam in 2005 and 2006 and the numbers are expected to be even higher in 2007. According to the local leaders of Kongor, people who are returning are not bringing anything home. “*They left with nothing and they are returning with nothing*”. They are facing big challenges when it comes to providing safe water for their people. The boreholes are too few and some are not functioning the way they are supposed to. When people have to walk too far to reach a working borehole with safe water, they tend to rather get water from ponds and other unsafe places were both human and animals might contaminate the water and that results in people and animals getting sick.

The local leaders think that the returnees will go back when they see that there is no medicine or schools for the children. They said that the NGOs provided them with some good things, but they are not doing enough and that the food they were provided with was too little.
**Nyuak payam**

Nyuak is the payam where the compound of NPA is situated. The local leaders claim that hunger is the biggest problem in the payam, but the reason for the hunger is the insecurity and that people were clustered in the center and not cultivating the soil in the east, which is the most fertile soil in the area. They are also experiencing overgrazing since all the returnees want to stay in the center, because of the security issues. The infrastructure is a big problem, in the rainy season they are totally isolated and if they want to get anywhere they have to walk on their feet, it is impossible to drive.

There is no health service in the area but they said that if somebody got sick, NPA would help them with transport to the clinic in Panyagor. The people of Nyuak payam are not happy about the school, it is too small, the different classes have to share the days of the week among them and the structures are really bad; there is only a roof and no walls. They do not have chairs or tables or books and the teachers do not have good training. The last thing they mentioned was that there are no veterinary services to help them with medicine if their animals fall sick. *“The residents are better off than the returnees because at least they have some cows and houses and the returnees come empty handed. After the war they have got trading and shops, before they just used to follow the cattle. But people don’t have any money because there is no employment for people. The people that got rich abroad are not returning”* (Nyuak local leader).

**Jongulei payam**

Jongulei is much farther away than the other two payams that I visited. Currently, there are no NGOs operating in the payam, even though NPA and WFP are delivering food to the people there. They are closer to the Nile so they have more problems with Cholera. It is easy to see that the farther away from the county center you are, the less you are prioritized, because everybody seems to be even more desperate and disillusioned, and the infrastructure is even worse than in the other payams.

When I asked them about the biggest problems in the community, the one they listed first was that they did not have enough food. Then they mentioned that they did not have proper education to offer the children, they needed better schools and teachers, and the complete lack of health services in the payam. Then also mentioned the infrastructure, the roads are
extremely bad, and they hardly have any marked because it is impossible to transport goods there. You could clearly see that the few local shops there had even fewer things to sell than the shops in the other payams. “The government is not providing us anything because they are still weak. For the last 21 years the communities have been supporting the SPLM/A and now it is time for them to start supporting us” (Jongulei local leader). A lot of people there are vulnerable and can’t work, and therefore they need special attention and care. The local leaders reported that there is a lot of orphans who need to be taken care of, and there is a general need for food, clothing and other things.

5.2 The role of the governmental organizations in the repatriation

The local governments in the payams are left with scarce resources and a lot of responsibility. The NGOs are supposed to help them implement their projects and mend the resource gap but in many cases the NGOs prefer to do what they consider to be the best and most effective projects, rather than considering the wishes of the local governments and the population. The local governments in the vast Counties of Southern Sudan are the representatives of the national Government, but they will need resources and autonomy to be able to meet the most pressing needs of the population.

The government is a product of the struggle of the people and even though the progress of implementing the CPA has been slow, people seem to be generally optimistic about the Government. People are happy that they won the war and that they have their autonomy. They want peace, they are tired of fighting and they have big expectations for the future. However, many of the things that caused the civil war in the first place are still there (IDMC 2006). There is still underdevelopment, lack of basic services and representation of the people.

The people, who have struggled for freedom for such a long time, may have unrealistic expectations to the Government, but it has to start performing soon, to prevent the population from starting seriously protesting against its inactivity. The fact that there are many ex-soldiers around in the villages with nothing to do increases the risk of violent unrest, if or when the support for the SPLM/A Government weakens among the population. SPLM/A is committed to take control over militias in the South after the signing of the peace agreement.
but militias supporting SPLM/A are still fighting militias supporting GoS in Upper Nile where the militia feels specially marginalized by the peace process (IDMC 2006).

Many of the non-Dinka ethnic groups feel that the SPLAM/A and now the Government are owned and dominated by Dinka. This represents a risk that non-Dinka might take up armed resistance, or join already existing rebel groups, because they are not happy with the peace deal that has been presented to them. They have not been incorporated in the peace process and they are afraid that they will not be heard in the Government of Southern Sudan.

According to the annual report from LWF, representatives from the Government of Southern Sudan have been informing the refugees in Kakuma refugee camp, Kenya about the possibilities to return. They stressed that they would not force anybody to go home because it was supposed to be a voluntarily repatriation, but stressed that there is “nowhere like home”. They also warned the refugees about the conditions in their home country because many of the basic services were not in place yet. Even though it has been warned about the conditions in Southern Sudan, the LWF still reports that the information to the refugees about the conditions in their home areas has been inadequate (LWF 2006).

The Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) is built on the CPA and it is a plan for post-war reconstruction in Southern Sudan that has been “developed jointly between development partners and civil society organizations” (JAM 2005). According to the JAM the strategic focus of the GoSS is supporting the SPLM’s vision of decentralized development. It also includes “policies and interventions designed to consolidate peace and deliver tangible benefits to the populations on a broad basis” (JAM 2005:38). Basic education, infrastructure, capacity building and efficient, decentralized and transparent governance are the foremost objectives in the immediate term for the GoSS. They are also focusing on enabling safe return and reintegration of returnees (JAM 2005).

Bringing education and infrastructure are things that need to be provided right now while building transparent governance structures is a long term goal. It is important to look at both issues at the same without having to wait until the governance structures are solid and transparent before there is provided infrastructure to the people. The lack of infrastructure is not only restricting the NGOs but also the returning process in general. De-mining and development of better roads is essential to continue and increase the rates of repatriation.
The Government of Southern Sudan wants people to return so that they can be counted in the population census in 2007 and eventually vote in the referendum about independence in 2011.

The communities are affected by the national development policies of the Government and the fact that the Government of Southern Sudan has been slow in implementing projects that show results on the ground, the population of Southern Sudan has not been able to feel the peace dividends. If people are not able to feel the dividends of peace it will be a setback for both development and peace affecting the whole of Southern Sudan (Malik 2006). It is important to prevent a funding gap just when communities are expecting to see the material benefits of peace (IRC 2007).

While the attention of the world is on Darfur the implementation of the CPA has slipped heavily behind schedule (IRC 2007). The peace in Southern Sudan is fragile and there are possibilities that there will be an upsurge in violence. In November 2006 there was fighting between SPLA troops and forces aligned to the Government of Khartoum, killing 150 people and injuring more than 400 (IRC 2007). The slow implementation of the CPA by the Sudanese governments has left many issues still not decided on e.g. what kind of land policy Southern Sudan is going to implement (IDMC 2006). Land tenure is a diffuse issue, because according to GoS all land belongs to the government/state while according to SPLM/A the lands belongs to the communities and it is for the local leaders to distribute among the people.

5.3 The role of NGOs in the repatriation

Operating a NGO in Southern Sudan has never been easy and there are still big challenges facing the NGOs in implementation of their projects. NGOs are facing heavy restrictions by the Government, but their activity is also restricted by the natural conditions of Southern Sudan and the state of the infrastructure in the country. In August 2005 president Bashir of GoS presented a decree that made a lot of the NGOs protest in international media. The decree was on the organization of humanitarian and voluntary work and it affects some fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of association protected in the CPA, the constitution and the international human rights (IDMC 2006). Former security issues and
convenience have made all the big NGOs in my study area establish their compounds in the County center, literally around the airstrip. This policy of localization is directly affecting the repatriation process in the way that the people who want to be close to the good services will also establish themselves close to the center. This puts the natural resources in the center area at risk of depletion, and consequently, food security is reduced. Infrastructure and technology are to a large degree determined by the NGOs rather than the government. In such cases, it is imperative that NGOs should not compete with the government but play a complimentary role to the Government.

Despite UNHCR considering repatriation as the solution many problems are arising in the communities that are now welcoming back their long lost friends and families. Much of the relief and development projects initiated among the Dinka during the war was not very successful (Duffield 2001). Already strained natural resources and humanitarian projects are hosting this massive influx of people (Phelan and Wood 2006), and my findings shows that at this time when they are much needed to create a safe and stable environment for the returnees, many of the big NGOs are now leaving for other areas where they are “more needed”. The NGOs are often driven by donor agendas and are unable to coordinate or cooperate with other NGOs in the field.

Some of the returnees have also received help to return from their places of displacement. Thirteen of my refugee respondents that arrived from Kakuma (Kenya) came by themselves, with no assistance, while the other five came in an UN convoy that arrived in July 2006. Out of the five respondents that had been displaced in Uganda, two had got support to return, one by UN and one by NPA. Among the eight people who had been internally displaced, six had arrived on their own, while one came in a UN convoy and another returned with the help of NPA. All of the people who came back with the help of UN or NPA arrived in 2006, while the people arriving earlier have all come by themselves. Seven of the 24 refugees that I met got support, while two of the eight people who were internally displaced got support to return home. All the returnees that have been in camps in Uganda and Kenya have been displaced a minimum of twelve years, and have been totally dependent on food rations from UNHCR. According to my data, nine out of the sample of thirty-two returnees got help from NGOs to return.
In my study area there are many ways of entering the County and there is no center for registration of returnees. When Norwegian Peoples Aid registers returnees they get a list of names from SSRRC which they bring to the local leaders who have been receiving the returnees for them to approve and add or subtract people that they mean should or should not have been on the list. After the local leaders have adjusted the number of people, NPA sends out a Relief Assessment Team (RAT team) to double count the returnees. There is always a disagreement about the actual number of returnees, and the tendency is that the SSRRC have the highest numbers, and that the local leaders and the NGOs are adjusting these down.

Both of the local and the national level, there is a lack of a common vision among the NGOs (Nachmias and Goldstein 1998, LWF 2005). However, a minimum of coordination and cooperation to establish basic services for the returnees is crucial for the repatriation process to continue. If the local communities had been known in Southern Sudan for having well functioning schools or health services, that would reinforce people’s motivation for returning. People might return not just because they had to, but also because they wanted to. Repatriating people should feel that returning is a right and good decision to make considering their future livelihoods.

Instead, the NGOs spread their efforts without much coordination. According to my findings there is lack of cooperation and all the NGOs have their own agenda. In my study area many projects are half done and some never get finished. My opinion is that there is a need to strengthen the universal services for the population like health and schooling. There is a need to have low threshold options for the weakest, instead of building the capacity of the ones who are already doing well.

The local population should be involved in the planning and implementation of projects to create local ownership and sustainability. There needs to be developed a common sense of responsibility instead of competition spirit about who is getting the biggest contracts and submitting the best proposals for mobilization of donor funds. I suggest that a recommendations system should be developed between the NGOs, in order to reduce the problems of getting good employees. The NGOs should also start paying the local employees a decent salary, which means that it needs to be higher than the payments offered by the army, so they can get and keep the good employees. Many of the educated Southern Sudanese are
hesitating to go home because of the conditions in their home country. Some of these people would fit perfectly in some of the positions that need to be filled by the NGOs, they just need an extra push (e.g. a good salary and good conditions) to return. By getting the educated people back to Southern Sudan, the NGOs would indirectly support the development more than they could have done alone on the ground.

The NGOs need to consider spreading their compounds, rather than establishing them in clusters in the centers, close to each other and close to the airstrips. The compounds need to be moved to the payams so that all the payams get their NGOs, because having an NGO in the payam offers options to the people. The government is pushing the NGOs to hire local people, and obviously the NGOs should cooperate with the Government about this and train locals for their positions.

There is a need for long-term commitment, and there is need to establish a better system for releasing funds for the projects in Southern Sudan on time. It should not be easy to get a short time contract to work with development in Southern Sudan because there are very few projects that are benefiting communities that take short time. The things that benefit the communities take long time, much commitment, coordination, resources, involvement of the local community and trust.

When NGOs leave an area, they need to explain why they are leaving. When they are not continuing their projects they should have some results to show, and something to leave behind. When a NGO enters an area, it should be made clear what its mission is, so that people will also feel that when the NGO is leaving they know why they are leaving and that is because the mission is accomplished. Donor funding needs to be given for a longer term than one year at a time, so that the NGOs in Southern Sudan can access their areas at the very moment the ground gets dry enough for allowing transport.

Some NGOs are big and strong, while others are small. The example with CARE and SMC 21 shows that if a big organization is unhappy with a small one, it can force the small one out of the system and block its efforts to get donor contracts again. These uneven power relations may discourage small NGOs from cooperating with bigger ones. This development is not

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21 This example is described in the presentation of CARE and SMC.
good because there needs to be close cooperation between the international NGOs and the local community organizations and NGOs. There are big potentials for learning from each other experience and knowledge.

5.4 Presentation of some of the NGOs in Twic East County

Lutheran World Federation (LWF)

Lutheran World Federation came to Twic East County in 2005. They are working with refugees in Kakuma refugee camp and many people from Kakuma are returning to Twic East County so that is why they decided to come to this area.

LWF have three main focuses: education, health/sanitation and providing clean water for returnees and residents. They are constructing a secondary school, and they have built eight primary schools. They are equipping these schools and then handing them over to the government for them to run. They also dig boreholes for the schools and the communities and they are planning to build centers for the returnees. These centers are supposed to provide shelter and clean water for people in transit and for people that have just arrived; they will be able to stay there before they integrate in the local communities. They have been providing non-food items for returnees that have just arrived, like blankets, basins, cooking pots, seeds and tools. During these distributions they have been cooperating with NPA. NPA gives the food and LWF gives the non-food items. They are also going to cooperate with NPA for promoting the ox-plough; LWF will supply ox-ploughs for NPAs farmers training.

LWF have the problem with donors restricting the objectives of their programs. They used to have a peace building programme were they dealt with conflicts among the local people e.g. in the cattle camps (conflicts over guns, raiding or pregnant girls or competing over grazing land). This project is now ended because they do not have funding for it anymore. LWF got a plot from the government in Kongor payam where they built their compound. They have built solid brick buildings, and their presence in Kongor makes them closer to the population than if they had chosen to locate close to the other NGOs.
LWF and also the other NGOs are having problems with the fact that movement and transportation is restricted by flooding so everything that is to be brought into the area has to be brought there from January to April. But the donors do not always release the funds on time, and that delays the process, and that is often critical when the time is so limited. In their annual report, LWF also states that they are having problems finding skilled and qualified Sudanese personnel to work for them (LWF 2005).

**Save The Children (STC)**

Save the children have been in southern Sudan for 12 years and their main priority is children’s rights. The operations in Panyagor/Mabior started in 2001. They have projects with family reunification, child protection, training of youth, discouragement of adultery marriages and domestic violence, and for promoting good governance. They want to build capacities in the population and create awareness about these issues.

They have children’s clubs, they distribute school material and they have also been supplying material for primary schools. They have been cooperating with WFP and Care. They also arrange workshops for community leaders and governmental officials and they have community mobilizers that sensitize the communities. These community mobilizers arrange workshops for community members where they inform them about children rights, and other issues that they feel are relevant for the communities. They cooperate with the local chiefs and they do not demand immediate results, their concern is about the process of becoming a better society. The projections that they operate with for returnees for 2007 are 25.000 refugees and 10.000 IDPs.

STC has as a part of their capacity building objective established a youth training center where they train youth in carpeting and building etc. But other NGOs claim that the training that is offered is poor, and that the youth does not build anything real during the course, so they question what they have actually learned. In other words, in their opinion the training is not good enough. STC wants the other NGOs to hire the youth that they have been training. They are annoyed with NPA, because NPA uses carpenters who they themselves have already trained in other locations when they want to improve on their structures. STC feels that NPA should rather use their local youth.
STC are dealing mostly with capacity building and awareness making and not so much with providing assets for the population. However, they do provide a lot of gadgets like t-shirts and cap’s so they are one of the most visible NGOs in the area. Some of the slogans they operate with are a bit out of place in the Southern Sudanese context like; “stop the sexual abuse of children”, since culturally that is forbidden among the Dinka, and if you were caught you would be expelled from the village or even killed.

**World Food Programme (WFP)**

WFP is a part of the UN system and therefore not formally a NGO. However, the impression from the field is that they are more playing the role of a NGO rather than a part of a multilateral system. This impression is strengthening by the fact that they are mainly funded by the US.

WFP have been in Southern Sudan since 1989 and in Panyagor/Mabior since 99/00. World Food Programme is operating in all the counties in Jonglei State. The head office is in Bor and they have three field offices and one of them is in Panyagor/Mabior. They help the most vulnerable, the returnees and the IDPs. WFP is mainly concerned with food distribution. They are changing the policy for Southern Sudan because there is peace now and WFP need the resource in Darfur. In 2007 they are going to shift from distribution of food to food-for-work, and they are planning to retract from the area. They have been distributing household rations that assume that each household consists of 6 people. The number of members in the household does not matter; all the households receive the same amount of food. WFP are financing the building of dikes to prevent the water from the Nile to enter the communities during the rainy season. The dikes are not finished and they are experiencing problems because the machines used for building the dikes use a lot of fuel, which is hard to get to the area.

WFP have a way station for returnees in Bor and people returning to North Bor relax and get food rations for 15 days before they continue to their final destination. When they arrive in Twic East County, NPA gives them food for 6 months and after that WFP will evaluate if
there is need for more support. WFP expects 50949 returnees to Twic East County next year, which are more than 15000 more than the numbers STC are using.  

**CARE**

CARE came to Twic East County in 1997 and then they were mostly working with emergency relief. In 2000 they started with supplies of inputs (tools and seeds) and agricultural extension services. Today they have 20 contact farmers in each payam and they are extension agents in their bomas. They have three multi-sector projects and those are concerning primary health, livestock and emergency relief. They distribute non-food items to returnees, promote right- awareness, and monitor early warning indicators. CARE has been helping the communities to construct roads, using the locals as workers. Their main priority is to help vulnerable people e.g. people that have been affected by floods or conflicts. They have been working with food security, and there they have been cooperating with NPA, WFP and the country health department/ministry of health. On livelihood projects they have been cooperating with GTZ (German construction company), SRRC and the communities. The proposals for further prolonging their projects in Twic East County for 2007 did not get funding, and therefore they won’t continue working in this area. The representative from Care says that they do not want to move, but they think that they are more needed elsewhere.

In 05/06 they have been funded by OFDA and USAID. They have built 7 primary health care centers and operate 2 primary health care units. A problem that they have in the clinic is that the staff leaves to join the army, 99% of the health workers are former soldiers and the army pays better (Care representative Dec. 2006).

CARE has been doing projects concerning distribution of seeds and tools agricultural extension and health. They have among other things been responsible together with Sudan Medical Care (SMC) for running the local clinic in the payam center (Panyagor/Mabior). They only managed to cooperate for 3 months before CARE accused SMC of

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22 Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission in Twic East County are estimating 100.000 returnees in 2007, which is much higher than both WFP and LWF.

23 The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is the office within USAID responsible for facilitating and coordinating U.S. Government emergency assistance overseas. As part of USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), OFDA provides humanitarian assistance to save lives, alleviate human suffering, and reduce the social and economic impact of humanitarian emergencies worldwide

(http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/).
mismanagement and corruption. This led to a total replacement of the SMC leadership, and also that the clinic that was supposed to be managed by SMC fell apart.\footnote{According to CARE’s international homepage they are still cooperating with SMC in Twic East County.} Because SMC was accused of corruption, CARE wouldn’t continue the cooperation and they did not find anyone else that was willing to take responsibility for the clinic. There is confusion about who is running the clinic or if it is functioning at all. The clinic is today almost empty with almost no patients and even less medicine. CARE claims that the clinic is still receiving supplies and that the people working there are still getting wages, but that the real problem is that many of the people they employ are running away to join the army because they pay better. They are moving away from the area to a place were they are more needed. Other NGOs claim that CARE does not like staying in an area where they have competition.

**Sudan Medical Care (SMC)**

Sudan Medical Care has been operating in Mabior for 7 years and they were the first NGO to deliver health services to Duk and Twic East County. They used to work in partnership with CARE but the partnership was terminated because CARE accused them of mismanagement and corruption. As demanded by CARE, the management of SMC is now replaced. SMC have been applying to get funding to run several clinics in Southern Sudan, but CARE is telling the donors that they should not fund SMC. They are suffering with the bad reputation after the accusations for corruption. The organization is currently not running any projects and the employees have not been paid for over a year. The representative for SMC told me that they have tried to apply to get funding for new projects, but since they had that conflict with CARE, nobody wants to cooperate with them. But since they meet all qualifications to run medical and health services in Southern Sudan, and since health services are so badly needed, they hope to regain trust from donors.

**Norwegian Peoples Aid**

The Wangulei NPA compound was started in 2004 with relief food distribution to returnees and agricultural development projects. They concentrate four payams and their goal is to train 100 farmers in each payam each year. Their objective is also to train 10 pairs of oxen each year from each payam. In the Agricultural part they train farmers in crop husbandry and ox
plough technique. The training is free of charge and NPA provides food and shelter for the people that come and stay at the Farmers Training Centre. They also have mobile farmers training in the communities. They have had problems with the ox plough training because of lack of moldboards and spare parts and in 2006 the farmers training was also affected by an outbreak of cholera that prevented people to attend the training. They do not have a veterinary component, but because of capacity problems they were hoping that another NGO would cover that.

NPA has been operating in Southern Sudan since 1986 and is involved in both relief and development projects and over the years the three main areas have been food security, health and community development. NPA is one of few NGOs in Southern Sudan that tries to move beyond short-term relief aid toward local development with focus on human capacity building to enhance food security. They integrate relief and development and operate in collaboration with local partners (Shanmugaratnam et al. 2002).

NPA built its compound in Nyuak payam in 2004 and even though the area also gets support from World Food Programme, NPA is the only NGO that has structures in that payam. They have a Farmers Training Center where they teach farmers animal and crop husbandry and nutrition. NPA distributes relief food, which they get from US Aid, for returnees. The rations for the returnees are only 75% of the calculated average food need for an adult person. It is supposed to be a pain killer so that people can be able to work for themselves and reestablish their lives. They also have community development projects. They are very popular in the communities because they supported SPLM/A during the civil war.

5.5 Motivation for repatriation

The motivation behind the push for repatriation needs to be examined. The government needs people to go back so they can start rebuilding their country. They need the manpower, and they need people to be back for the census that will be held in 2007, and even more so for the referendum that will be held in 2011 about the independence of Southern Sudan. The UNHCR do not like keeping refugee or displaced camps running when the crisis that brought
the displaced there is over (Le Houérou 2003) so it is possible that camps with Southern Sudanese will close down in the near future. There is also a possibility that the host government are going to start pushing for repatriation of the refugees (Black and Koser 1999, Collins 1996). So far, the returning process has been slow, people have not rushed to go home; they are waiting for more security. My findings show that the ones that have repatriated with the help of UNHCR have to some degree been pushed in to returning. This is because they would not have chosen to return if it was not for UNHCR.

Many people feel that they have returned under false premises. They were tricked in to returning home. I did not hear about anyone who felt that they were forced to repatriate, but such cases may still come, because the big “Sudanese” refugee camps in Kenya, Uganda and other countries are not going to be kept open indefinitely, because the UNHCR will need their resources elsewhere. There are still 693,300 refugees in Sudan’s neighboring countries (UNHCR 2005).

There are several reasons for the repatriation process moving slowly in its first years. Coordination and capacity problems both with UNHCR and international NGOs are one of the reasons. Slow implementation of the CPA by the Government of Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan as well as capacity problems in the south has also influenced the repatriation process (IDMC 2006). Another factor is that refugees abroad do not have enough information about the situation in their home areas and they are awaiting the situation because they do not want to risk having to flee the country a second time. The general underdevelopment in the rural areas of Southern Sudan where people are aspiring to return to is making people wait for better times. For the UNHCR to be able to call the return operation “voluntary repatriation” people have to be able to take informed decisions if they want to return or not and also to have a realistic option to stay in the area they are displaced (UNHCR 1996).

All of the returnees who I interviewed returned because they wanted to get home and start establishing their lives and rebuild their broken country. But some had extra incentives for returning, especially those who have been displaced in hostile and insecure environments. The internally displaced complained about fear and insecurity while they were displaced, and gave
this as a reason for returning as soon they could. A representative from CARE told me that
the people who have resided in Kakuma have been living under extremely bad conditions. Others gave as explanation for their return that they had got an offer to be transported home. In some of these cases, one can certainly question the voluntariness of this repatriation, since people may have been leaving because the situation where they were displaced was bad.

During the anti-colonial era in Africa, refugees were often welcomed in exile because they were fighting a common war against European colonialists. When the refugees started becoming a major problem to the states, there have been placed limitations on the land available for the refugees and the assistance they receive. This has also affected the voluntariness of the repatriation process (Collins 1996).

The fact that people have been living in camps without any activities or possibilities to make a living (Collins 1996) is creating dependency. By not taking responsibly for vulnerable people while they are displaced UNHCR and the international community are also creating problems for themselves and the people who are returning. UNHCR and the UN in general need to see their responsibility when it comes to the way these people have been living. When the international community has chosen to keep refugees in a state of limbo without allowing them to establish roots in their host communities, they can’t expect that they will act all independently and rationally when they return.

Lack of strong leadership and deep budget cuts make UNHCR struggle to establish a strong field presence in Southern Sudan. They can no longer blame the difficult logistical environment and the weakness of UNHCR is affecting the entire repatriation system (IDMC 2006). A report by IDMC states that there are two reasons for UNHCR’s leadership problems; they are lacking experienced, knowledgably staff in the field in Sudan and there is a lack of appropriate engagement from the headquarters in Geneva (2006).

Kakuma camp in Kenya is one of the oldest and largest refugee camps in the world. The inhabitants of the camp suffer from poor relations with the local population, a near total lack of economic opportunity, frequent instances of gender-based violence, crime, and recurrent food shortages.
Chapter 6

Summing up and conclusion

6.1 Who are the returnees?

At this time the people who are returning to Southern Sudan are people from refugee camps in neighboring countries and internally displaced people from other places in Sudan. They are generally not educated except a few who are working for NGOs or as teachers in the communities. Educated people or other people with resources are not returning to the rural areas yet, because of the lack of services, employment and opportunities. The people who have skills and capabilities are the ones who are most needed to help rebuild the country, but they are not going to return before the basic services are in place. The ones returning now are people that might not have better options and would rather return home than stay under bad conditions in refugee camps or as internally displaced. Even though they were staying under bad conditions while displaced, many stated to me during interviews that those conditions were better than what they had to deal with once they were home.

6.2 Challenges in the community

There are no functioning health services in my study area and the school does not have good enough quality. The NGOs are doing what they think are best for the people, but that is not always what people wanted. Returning refugees and internally displaced people need more information when it comes to repatriation and the services they are entitled to upon their return. They also need more information in order to be able to make informed decisions about returning or not. According to my findings, people do not know what services they are entitled to when they return, and they feel that they have been promised more than they actually are receiving.

26 Especially Khartoum
Returnees and vulnerable residents get food rations from NGOs and WFP. Since returnees normally are staying with residents, they share the food rations among each other. Residents are generally doing better and have a more diversified livelihood income, which makes them less vulnerable than the returnees. While the returnees are staying in the homes of resident relatives they are depleting their food storages, and as a result, all of them become vulnerable. The returnees then share the food rations with the residents, and everybody gets too little. The food rations are supposed to be pain killer, so that people are able to work and grow their own crops.

The returnees and the residents are facing many of the same challenges but some are different for the two groups. The returnees are having problems rebuilding their lives and becoming food secure. The insecurity is affecting them because it prevents them from returning into safe and stable environments, and discourages people from investing time in the fields. The difference between the returnees arriving by themselves and the returnees arriving with assistance is that the latter are most dependent on food aid and are using more time on rebuilding their lives. Natural conditions are restricting the residents, with flooding, unpredictable and low rainfall, pests and diseases as the biggest challenges. The Dinka are agro-pastoralists but the war has made the herds smaller and many households do not have any cattle. Insecurity and cattle-diseases are making owning cattle a risky business and many NGOs in Twic East county are discouraging the communities from relying too much on the cattle as a livelihood strategy. The NGOs are encouraging people to grow bigger gardens, and promoting the ox plough, as means to improve food security. During food shortages more people rely on fishing, hunting and wild foods. However only the residents answered that they used these strategies when asked what they did during food shortages. The returnees said that they had no strategies to face food shortage.

6.3 NGOs’ and Government’s impact on peoples livelihood

People are disappointed by the NGOs, but at the same time they are dependent on them. Local variations are influencing the community because the services are very un-evenly distributed and it creates differences in the service level depending on how far from the center and NGOs people are living. The Government has tried to push the NGOs to provide their services more evenly and establish their compounds in all the different payams, because they want to use the
NGOs as a tool to develop their country. But the NGOs have their own agenda and sometimes is does not correspond with the agenda of the Government.

The local government has the formal responsibility and power in the local communities in Southern Sudan. But to access that power they will have to restrict or prevent the NGOs from exercising their power, which they have built on for over twenty years of civil war where they were both state and government in Southern Sudan. If the NGOs are pushed, it is easy for them to reduce their projects or even retract from the country. With this alternative in mind, it is understandable that the Government is not pushing them too hard.

Customary laws and land tenure are strong institutions in Southern Sudan, and at present, local leaders according to customary law distribute the land. On Government level however, the question of land ownership is unresolved. Insecurity in the local communities is affecting the livelihoods of the returnees and the residents. The Government needs to show that they are considering the concerns of the local population and employ measures to make the communities more secure.

There are many different things that determine degree of success of the returnees, and very few of them are possible to detect after only 2 months in the field. But based on my data, I have found some variables that will influence how long time the returnees use to reconstruct their lives when they return back to Southern Sudan. These are; local conditions, security, time, access to land, water, health services and availability of humanitarian assistance both as in relief food and other services provided by NGOs. Age, health and labor capabilities of household members are also important determinants for success in the repatriation and reconstruction process. Some of these things like security, access to land and water and humanitarian assistance may be more influential than the others but all of them have an impact on the wellbeing of the returnees.

Even though the harvest failed this season, and the residents and the ones who arrived earlier also experienced food shortage, all my respondents agree that the longer you have been back, the better off you are. My interviews also clearly show that time is a variable for success. Those who have been in the location during the war are the ones who are best off. Those who have been back for a while have established themselves with a garden and a house and have
started restocking livestock. All of those who arrived a couple of years ago arrived on their own initiative and with their own help and thus had the right motivation for return.

6.4 The “durable solution”

Those who returned voluntarily some years ago are the ones who are doing best today. This may indicate that returning with the right motivation has a better chance of success than returning with assistance. The ones who returned early stated that they wanted to come back to the villages to help the people already there to rebuild the communities, because many of those who decided to stay were old. These people are the real “voluntarily returnees”. Even though many people are disappointed with the services offered to them when they return and feel that they have returned under wrong premises, there are many people who are generally happy and relieved to be home.

The Government, the UN system with UNHCR in front and the NGOs are pushing for repatriation of refugees and IDPs back to their home areas in Southern Sudan. The post-war reconstruction depends on people returning and rebuilding the country. It is important to acknowledge that the problem of displacement does not end just because the people have returned to their villagers. The people who are returning had international conventions supporting their rights while they were still displaced, but when they return they are depending on the goodwill of the international community and the NGOs that are acting on their behalf. The UNHCR has extended its services to also include a secure return and help to reintegrate, but lack of strong leadership and reliability from the office in Geneva have so far prevented the exercise of these services (IDMC 2006). The fact that power relations between the NGOs and the local population are very unequal may make local people accept things they would not have done if power were more equally distributed (Le Houérou 2003).

The Government of Southern Sudan, as well as the humanitarian NGOs is facing difficult challenges and some of the problems I have mentioned earlier may be difficult to solve, as they are more or less consequences of the way humanitarian aid is organized on world basis. Other problems however, should be solvable, even within the budgets available. Improving the capacity and skills of Government institutions in Southern Sudan could probably solve the lack of coordination in the field, and in the long run, these institutions will need to take over the responsibility for providing the population with services that are now provided by NGOs.
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