Institutions and Illusions: Community Based Wildlife Management in Kilosa District, Tanzania

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MSc Thesis in Development Studies

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Declaration

I, Line Helene Nilsen, declare that this thesis is the result of my research, investigations, and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Ås, August 15th, 2009

Signature: _____

To my mother,

for being an unfaltering source of

love, strength and inspiration.

May she rest in peace.

Acknowledgements

Abstract

In the colonial era, the colonial powers exercised territorialized control-strategies of nature conservation by setting aside large tracts of land for Protected Areas (PAs) such as National Parks and Game Reserves in the colonies. These types of protected areas have been the mainstay of biodiversity and species conservation in Sub-Saharan Africa since then, and have been prominent in the country which is the focus of this thesis, Tanzania. However, due to the increasing documentation of the adverse social impacts of these exclusionary protected areas, and the perceived "threat" local people posed to these areas (i.e. poaching, encroachment within protected area boundaries by agriculture or livestock in want of other alternatives), an alternative type of conservation paradigm surged in the 1980s, whose basic idea was that conservation should be done more in cooperation with local communities living around the PAs, and in a way that would benefit these people more.

In Tanzania, and in East Africa generally, these types of initiatives have largely taken the form of "protected area outreach" programmes, but another form of community based conservation emerged in Tanzania with the introduction of Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) in the late 1990s. These areas are envisaged to provide both wildlife conservation and community development through the sustainable use of wildlife on village lands, where the village council(s) make management decisions regarding the use of wildlife on their own land, according to the hunting quotas set for that particular area (by central government).

This study seeks to explain why community based conservation has not been significantly successful in neither of its two stated goals (conservation and development), in Tanzania generally, and in the case-study specifically. By using a case study of one Pilot Wildlife Management Area in Kilosa District, this study connects the experiences of local people to the wider institutional and policy frameworks of the Tanzanian state, and to discourses surrounding conservation and development on a global level. It uses a political ecology conceptual framework to explain the politics behind community based conservation in Tanzania, and thereby offers an explanation of why community based conservation has largely not been successful by concluding that a rights-based approach which takes into consideration the lack of power local people have over their resources will be more successful in identifying the problems, rather than blaming the failures on technical or managerial issues on a local level.

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List of abbreviations

AA	Authorized Association
ADMADE	Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (Zambia)
CAMPFIRE	Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (Zimbabwe)
CBC	Community Based Conservation
CBFM	Community Based Forestry Management
CBNRM	Community Based Natural Resource Management
CBWM	Community Based Wildlife Management
CBO	Community Based Organization
CC	Community Conservation
CCS	Community Conservation Service
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CWM	Community Wildlife Management
DC	District Council
DGO	District Game Officer
DNRO	District Natural Resource Officer
GCA	Game Controlled Area
GoT	Government of Tanzania
GR	Game Reserve
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for Technical Cooperation)
ICDP	Integrated Conservation and Development Program
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
LRRRI	Land Rights Research and Resources Institute (Hakiardhi)
MKUKUTA	Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kuondoa Umaskini Taifa (National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty)

MNRT   Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (URT)

NARCO   National Ranching Company

NCA   Ngorongoro Conservation Area

NCAA   Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority

NGO   Non Government Organization

NP   National Park

PA   Protected Area

PF   Policy Forum

SSA   Sub-Saharan Africa

TANAPA   Tanzania National Parks

TNRF   Tanzania National Resource Forum

UN   United Nations

UNESCO   United Nations' Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

URT   United Republic of Tanzania

VEO   Village Executive Officer

VFR   Village Forest Reserve

WEO   Ward Executive Officer

VC   Village Council

VGS   Village Game Scout

WCA   Wildlife Conservation Act

WD   Wildlife Division

WMA   Wildlife Management Area

WWF   World Wide Fund for Nature (former World Wildlife Fund)

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1   Introduction and background

Environmental sustainability and alleviation of poverty are two concepts that are at the forefront of the global development discourse in our times, especially in the context of rural development. Fostered by donor-led initiatives in the aftermath of the "Brundtland" rapport, published in 1987, which advocated for 'sustainable development'; many new development programs implemented in the Global South sought to combine these two goals, in so-called Integrated Development and Conservation Programs (IDCPs), co-management of natural resources, and Community-Based Natural Management (CBNRM) and Community Based Conservation (CBC)-programs.   These programs were constructed upon the notions of compatibility between sustainable use of natural resources and rural (often economic) development. The debates about how conservation and community development can be integrated successfully are broadly divided into two central questions: 1) to which extent community-based conservation entails extensive participation in decision-making, project implementation, management and monitoring and evaluation phases of such community-based conservation, and 2) to which extent communities receive benefits from such programs which can improve livelihoods and contribute towards poverty alleviation. The two questions are closely interrelated and one can hardly talk about one without the other. However, in this thesis the main focus is upon the first question.

With the new paradigm emerging in the 1980s, with increased emphasis on human development, human rights and livelihoods approaches, community based conservation grew up partly as an approach to try to compensate for earlier losses by introducing the idea that local communities living adjacent to protected areas and also on village lands or open lands far from such areas were to benefit more from the conservation business. It has also been argued that community based conservation has less noble aims for development and the livelihoods of poor people, and that the approach was developed as a way of 'making people cooperate' for the sake of conservation of wildlife, biodiversity, and nature in general. The paradigm change might also have come from "the self-interest of the conservation constituency, which, during the late 1970s, correctly recognized that fortress conservation would be difficult to maintain politically in the

face of objections by local people and their political leaders, in countries with renewed democracies" (Hutton et al. 2005, 343). The argument is that by giving people economic incentives for preserving their environment, conservation can be an alternative form of land use and conservation will work better. However, numerous evaluation reports of these programs have documented a number of obstacles and varying degrees of successfulness, where there has been a tendency to less successful outcomes. There seems to be a consensus about the general unsuccessfulness of these initiatives, by scholars of both the natural and social sciences (Baldus et al. 2001, 7). What there is disagreement upon however are the reasons for these failures. In this thesis I argue that the major problem of most of the current community based conservation initiatives, based on my fieldwork in Tanzania, is political factors and that in order to understand the dynamics and results of CBC one has to analyze power structures on local, national and global level, and how they are interlinked.

The main CBC approach in the selected country for this study, Tanzania, is Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs)[1], introduced in Tanzania with the 1998 National Wildlife Policy as an approach to combine wildlife conservation and rural development. This thesis is based on an in-depth case study of one of the designated Pilot WMAs; Twatwatwa WMA in Kilosa District. As we will see, out of the 16 originally designated pilot management areas there are few which have actually been established, and Twatwatwa pilot WMA was one of the few which did not reach further than initial stages of establishment. The main objectives of the study were to find out why it had not succeeded, how the process of decision making had happened, and then, based on local people's perceptions and opinions about the proposed WMA, together with an analysis of the national policy and legislative framework, assess the prospects for successful community based conservation in Kilosa District and Tanzania more generally.

This first chapter gives an introduction to the concept of CBC, discusses some of the main occupations of the critical CBC literature, and then introduces the WMA approach. A description of the study area and the contextual background follows, before the problem statement and justification for the study.

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[1] In addition to Community Based Forest Management.

Chapter two gives definitions of central concepts and introduces the theoretical approaches used, while chapter three outlines the methodology and research methods employed in the collection and analysis of data. Chapter four analyses and discusses the findings from the fieldwork and chapter five contains the conclusions.

1.1 The evolution of the Community Based Conservation (CBC) concept

I largely follow Murphree (2001) in conceptualizing the various stages of evolution from the strict "fortress approaches" which excluded people from protected areas, up until today's community based approaches. As he claims, the idea of integrating communities development needs with the sustainable use and management of natural resources is not new; "one has only to examine [the] colonial histories to find instances, such as the records of Maasai-Mara, Amboseli and the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, to realize that these notions have, in principle, if not in practice, a long pedigree" (Murphree 2001, 5). However, the idea started gaining significant influence in the global conservation discourse in the 1980s when it merged with the surging theories of sustainable development, as mentioned.

The "fortress" approach, which was the main colonial conservation strategy, Murphree calls conservation *against* the people (Murphree 2001). While many conservationists still maintain that protected areas in the form of strictly state controlled national parks and game reserves is the only viable option for preservation of nature and biodiversity (Brandon et al. 1998; Duraiappah 2004; Kramer et al. 1997; Oates 1999; Terborgh 1999), there is no doubt that a great deal of these establishments create considerable social impacts (Ghimire & Pimbert 1997; Igoe 2006; Schmidt-Soltau & Brockington 2004; West et al. 2006). These include discrimination against indigenous peoples, displacement of people, changes in land-use rights – most notably denial of access to resources previously held, leading to reduced livelihood security and impoverishment of local communities, deepening inequalities and creating conflicts between local people and wildlife management.

The recognition of these social costs to local people resulted in the creation of conservation agencies to provide extension services. Tanzania National Parks (TANAPA) developed during the 1980s and 1990s its Community Conservation Service (CCS) (Bergin

2001). This is a type of "Protected Area outreach" programme, which has been the most prominent form of community approach to conservation in Tanzania and in East Africa generally (Hulme & Murphree 2001). These programs were predominantly occupied with enforcing good practice, keeping "good neighbourliness" and providing benefits to local people in terms of sharing of revenue from park fees. This can be called conservation *for* the people (Murphree 2001, 5). All management decisions were still in the hands of the management institutions (park leadership or facilitating NGOs). These types of programmes were largely seen as unable to improve the situation and new approaches emerged which involved collaborative management. This was termed 'Community Conservation' and involved conservation with some rural livelihood benefit (Barrow & Murphree 2001). This can be called conservation *with* the people (Murphree 2001, 5). Eight years ago Murphree concluded that this type of Community Conservation was generally the status quo in Tanzania at the time, and that the higher stage of conservation *by* the people; i.e. true Community Based Conservation, had not been reached (see table 1 for an overview of the different community approaches). This thesis argues that this is largely still the case, after a decade of attempts to implement the so-called Community Based Conservation approach – *Wildlife Management Areas* – in Tanzania.

Table 1: Main features of various community approaches to conservation

	Protected area outreach	**Collaborative management**	**Community Based Conservation**
Objectives	Conservation of ecosystems, bio-diversity and species	Conservation with some rural livelihood benefit	Sustainable rural livelihoods
Ownership/tenure status	State-owned land and resources (e.g. national parks, forests and game reserves)	State-owned land with mechanisms for collaborative management of certain resources with the community. Complex tenure and ownership arrangements	Local resource users own land and resources either *de jure* or *de facto*. State may have some control of last resort
Management characteristics	State determines all decisions about resource management	Agreement between state and user groups about managing some resource(s) which are state owned. Management arrangement critical	Conservation as an element of land use. An emphasis on developing the rural economy

Source: Adapted from Barrow and Murphree 2001

1.2 Prominent themes in the CBC literature

Building upon Adams et al (2001), four broad discourses can be found in how to view the relationship between conservation and poverty alleviation. The first is the 'strict conservationist approach', which sees protection of wildlife as not commensurable with human use of the resources. Conservation in this approach requires large-scale protection of whole landscapes (habitats), with minimal human use; usually only restricted to non-consumptive tourism or in some instances also tourist hunting. Most national parks and game reserves apply this kind of policy which is the legacy of the "fortress conservation" approach that has been employed since colonial times in Tanzania and large parts of Africa. Some authors, as mentioned above, still retain the view that this is the only feasible approach to wildlife conservation (Brandon et al. 1998; Duraiappah 2004; Kramer et al. 1997; Oates 1999; Terborgh 1999). These arguments represent the view that "poverty elimination and conservation [are] quite different problems comprising distinct sectors of policy concern. Thus, conservation is a legitimate objective that can be pursued independently of any benefits in poverty reduction (and vice versa)" (Adams et al. 2004, 1147). This re-emerging paradigm has been largely criticized for not taking into account the consequences for local people (Wilshusen et al. 2002).

Secondly, there are the claims that community 'participation' is crucial for the success of protection of nature, because without the consent of local people, conservation will not be sustainable (Western 2001). This has been one of the strongest imperatives for community involvement in conservation, and indeed the main motivation behind the establishment of CBC in Tanzania. The approach has been criticized for ignoring the fact that inequality might be politically sustainable, as Brockington argue (Brockington 2003; Brockington 2004). His argument is that it might be possible (even profitable) to maintain conservation without the consent and participation of local communities.

The third position holds that conservation should not adversely affect poverty alleviation. Similar to the previous one, conservation is still the main goal, but it should not be conducted with costs to people surrounding conservation areas. It does not, however, believe that poverty is a constraint on biological conservation, "rather it reflects independent moral and political obligations on conservation agencies to take account of human poverty" (Adams et al. 2004, 1148).

The fourth one argues that people depend on natural resources for survival and that the conservation and sustainable use of these resources would improve their livelihoods. This position is very critical of the "fortress conservation" model, and argues that communities should be empowered to control and access resources in combination with social development, education and poverty alleviation (Brockington et al. 2006; Igoe 2005; Wilshusen et al. 2002). This study contributes towards this last position.

This thesis argues that in order to understand the seeming failure of establishing a Wildlife Management Area in Twatwatwa village in Kilosa District, one has to analyze the context in which the people interpret and assign meaning to the interventions and happenings in their every-day life. One also has to look at the political and historical context of the area, and especially the history of land use. Considering the history of conflict in this particular study area, this has important implications for the prospects of cooperation between the respective villagers in the Wildlife Management Area. Furthermore, the study analyses the national policy and legal framework and assess the major obstacles to Community Based Conservation posed by delimitating national wildlife legislation. Thereafter, the thesis explains the reasons behind this slow process of advancing Community Based approaches to conservation in Tanzania by analyzing the power structures behind decision making and the Tanzanian state's interest in keeping centralized control of the valuable resource which wildlife represents.

1.3 CBC in Tanzania: Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs)

As mentioned, the official 1998 Wildlife Policy of Tanzania declared the establishment of Wildlife Management Areas as a country-wide "Community Based Conservation" approach (Baldus et al 2001). The Wildlife Management Areas were to be implemented outside of already established Protected Areas, in areas with significant wildlife populations, such as migratory routes and buffer zones. A Protected Area is defined according to the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) as "a clearly defined geographical space, recognised, dedicated and managed, through legal or other effective means, to achieve long-term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values" (Dudley 2008).

WMAs are thus not a type of community based conservation attached to already established Protected Areas in Tanzania (see table 2 for an overview of protected areas already established; where WMAs are not included), but an additional form of Protected Area.

Table 2: Overview of Protected Areas in Tanzania

Type of Protected Area	Number	Area coverage (in percentage of total land surface of Tanzania)
National Parks (NPs)	14	~ 4, 38 %
Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA)	1	~ 0, 88 %
Game Reserves (GRs)	34	~ 12, 98 %
Game Controlled Areas (GCAs)	38	~ 5, 54 %
Forest Reserves (FRs)	570	~ 15 %*
Wetland Reserves/Wetland Areas	4	~ 5, 5 %**
Total	**661**	**~ 38, 33 %**

*3 % of which overlaps with Pas set aside for wildlife conservation

*Of which almost all overlaps with other types of Pas (mostly Game Controlled Areas)

Source: Based on data from National Wildlife Policy (United Republic of Tanzania (URT) 2007).

The total of 38, 33 % of Tanzania's land surface under protection accounts for the types of Protected Areas which are not community based, such as Village Land Forest Reserves (VLFRs) and WMAs. Some of these Protected Areas contributes to poverty alleviation through predominantly TANAPAs CCS; however, the majority of these PAs put severe restrictions on use of the resources within them. 17 % of the total land cover consists of National Parks and Game Reserves, which totally prohibits settlements *and* any human use except for non-consumptive tourism. This means that only 6, 4 % of the total area set aside for Protected Areas allow for humans to use the resources or settle within the areas. However, this is not including the open areas and village lands, where wildlife also co-exists with human, and it is in these areas WMAs were planned to be established. It is estimated that 75 % of the total land area of Tanzania is uninhabited, including Protected Areas, mountains, lakes and rivers[2]. Of Tanzania's

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[2] Maganga, F. (2009). *Tanzania's New Wildlife Law and its Implications for Rural Livelihoods*. Presentation at Departement of International Environment and Development Studies (Noragric), Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB), April 23rd, 2009.

population of 41 million, most live in rural areas and about 75 % depend on agriculture (Nelson & Blomley forthcoming).

The following map (Figure 1) shows the protected area network in Tanzania, where WMAs are represented in this way: "[Y]ellow squares represent gazetted pilot WMAs; red circles represent pilot sites that have not been gazetted; black circles represent the two pilot WMA sites which are no longer monitored and inactive" (Nelson et al. 2006, 12). Two more pilot WMAs have been gazetted since then.

Figure 1: Map over the Protected Areas network in Tanzania

Source: Adopted from Nelson et al. 2006

Of the 16 pilot WMAs which were designated by the Tanzanian government in 1998, only six have been gazetted to date. The business agreements they have obtained within these

WMAs are benefiting about 600 000 people[3]. The AA collects the money, whereas the revenue is divided between the District and the AA and the part kept by the AA is then distributed to the villages cooperating about managing the WMA. The rent for a hunting block is between USD 45 000 and 50 000 a year, and about 25 % of the money collected from renting out hunting blocks is directed back to the AA[4].

1.4   Study area

The study was conducted primarily in the four villages of Twatwatwa Pilot Wildlife Management Area: Twatwatwa, Mbwade, Rudewa Mbuyuni and Msowero in Kilosa District. The villages fall under the jurisdiction of three different wards; Chanzuru, Rudewa and Msowero, while they all belong to Kimamba Division. Interviews were carried out in the villages, with random villagers, village council members and leaders and ward officials, in Kilosa at the District Council Offices and in Dar es Salaam.

1.4.1   Geographical location

Kilosa District is one of the six districts of the Morogoro region in East-Central Tanzania. The Morogoro region is host to Africa's biggest game reserve, the Selous, which stretches over almost 50 000 km². Mikumi National Park, which borders the Selous, lies within the borders of Kilosa District and is Tanzania's fourth largest park with its area of 3 230km². Udzungwa National Park (1 990 km²) to the west of Selous is another protected area in the region.

Twatwatwa Pilot WMA is a demarcated area within the village of Twatwatwa, which lies about 36 km from Kilosa Town. The other three villages are located close to the area (see map, figure 2). The Twatwatwa village area measures about 30 380 hectares and the entire area is demarcated as a Pilot Wildlife Management Area with 18 signposts (see map, figure 3).

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[3] Interview, Dr. H. Sosovele, Institute of Research Assessment (IRA)/Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), Dar es Salaam, 31.10.08.
[4] Interview, Dr. H. Sosovele, Institute of Research Assessment (IRA)/Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), Dar es Salaam, 31.10.08. The data was taken from the last hunting season before the time of the interview.

Figure 2: Kilosa District

Legend
* **Sisal estate**
* **Rivers**
* **Twatwatwa village land**
* **District boundary**

0   30 Km

N

Source: Adapted from Benjaminsen et al. 2009

Figure 3: Twatwatwa pilot WMA

Source: Adopted from Kalimba 2009[5]

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[5] Original map sketch from Kilosa District Council is attached (appendix 1).

1.4.2 Population

Kilosa District has a population of about 500 000, with a population density of about 35/km² (Benjaminsen et al. 2009). The District has a number of different ethnic groups including the Kaguru, Sagara, Vidunda, Parakuyo Maasai, Barabaig, Gogo and Sukuma.

Twatwatwa village is inhabited by a Parakuyo Maasai community of about 3500 people (Benjaminsen et al. 2009), while the population numbers in the other villages are about 2715 in Rudewa Mbuyuni, 1460 in Mbwade, and 5874 in Msowero, respectively[6].

1.4.3 Wildlife

The Twatwatwa village and surrounding areas lie within an important wildlife migration route for wild animals from Mikumi National Park. Several animals, especially elephants, from migrates north in search of water and fodder in the dry season, where the Mkata and Wami rivers meet and make up the Mkata floodplains and constitute important water sources[7]. The village of Twatwatwa, and the pilot WMA, is situated partly on this floodplain and is therefore in the middle of the migration route (see map, figure 4).

According to a "Field Progressive Report of Proposed Twatwatwa Wildlife Management Area" from April 1998, "the area has high diversity and abundance of [w]ildlife species including birds, animals, reptiles and insects"[8]. The report identified 22 different animal species including elephant (*Loxodonta africana*), lion (*Panthera leo*), giraffe (*Giraffa camelopardalis*), buffalo (*Syncerus caffer caffer*), wildebeest (*Connochaetes taurinus*), leopard (*Panthera pardus*), impala (*Aepyceros melampus*), zebra (*Equus bruchelli*), crocodile (*Crocodylus niloticus*), eland (*Taurotragus oryx*), hunting dog (*Lycaon pictus*), southern reedbuck (*Redunca arundinum*), warthog (*Phacochoenus aethipicus*), common waterbuck (*Kobus ellipsiprypmnus*), caracal (*Felis caracal*), vervet monkey (*Cercopithecus aethiops*), yellow baboon (*Papio cynocephalus*), africa hare (*Lepus capensis*), ardvaak (*Orycteropus afer*), porcupine (*Hystrix galeata*), striped jackal (*Canis adustus*) and golden jackal (*Canis aureus*), in addition to 39 different bird species within the area.

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[6] Data collected from Rudewa Ward Office, Kilosa District, November 2008.
[7] Interview with District Game Officer (DGO) and District Natural Resources Officer (DNRO), Kilosa District Council, 20.10.2008; interviews with representative from World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 31.10.08 and 26.11.08.
[8] Kilosa District Council, 30 April 1998.

1.4.4 Vegetation and climate

The proposed WMA area (and Twatwatwa village) is located partly on the Mkata plains, a large savanna area dominated by *Acacia* woodland species with scattered *Dalbergia* species. Other prominent features are open grassland and riverine vegetation[9].

The climate of Kilosa District is of a typical tropical semi-arid, bimodal type with an average temperature of 25^0C (Kizosa 2007). The area receives rainfall in two periods of the year; the short rains from November through December and the long rains from mid-February through April, and annual rainfall varies considerably (Benjaminsen et al. 2009). (Kizosa 2007)(Kizosa 2007)(Kizosa 2007)(Kizosa 2007)(Kizosa 2007)(Kizosa 2007)

Figure 4: Map of major migration routes in the Twatwatwa area

Source: Reconstructed map of original sketch map from Natural Resources Office, Kilosa District Council[10].

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[9] Kilosa District Council (1998), "Field Progressive Report of Proposed Twatwatwa Wildlife Management Area", 30 April 1998.

1.4.5 Levels of local government authority

Village Councils were established in Tanzania in 1975, as part of the 'villagisation' operation (*Operation Vijiji*) of the 1970s, where rural people were forcefully resettled into concentrated villages. The 1975 Villages Act provided for the establishment of Village Councils which were to be elected by the Village Assembly (all resident villagers above the age of 18). Village Councils did however not have much authority in decision making at the time, but were rather mere recipients of development plans from central government (Brockington 2008).

Decentralization policies in the 1980s, however, sought to improve and strengthen local level government institutions, and the 1982 Local Government (District Authorities) Act (no. 7) provided for the current two-tiered local government consisting of Village Council and District Council (Kizosa 2007). The members of the Village Council is elected from the Village Assembly every five years (United Republic of Tanzania (URT) 1999d), and the District Councils consist of elected members from each ward in the area (District Councilors) in addition to the Member/Members of Parliament representing constituencies within the area, three members appointed by the Minister and elected members from the Village chairmen within the area of the District Council (the latter number should however not exceed one-third of the total number of elected members in the District Council) (United Republic of Tanzania (URT) 1982).

The Ward is a collection of several villages, and the village chairpersons along with the Village Executive Officers (appointed by the District) of each village make up the Ward Development Committee. The Ward Executive Officer (also appointed by the District) is the secretary and executive officer of the Committee. The Committee functions as a means of communicating the concerns of the villages to the District Councilor (the chair of the Committee) and has the responsibility for implementing the decisions and policies of the District council (United Republic of Tanzania (URT) 1999b). See figure 5 for an overview of the administrative structure of local government authorities.

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[10] The original sketch map is attached (appendix 2).

Figure 5: Administrative structure of local government authorities in Tanzania

Source: Adopted from Brockington 2008

The 1999 revision of the 1982 Local Government Act (The Local Government Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, no. 6) called for a strengthening of the decentralization process by adding several subsections, where two of the most relevant for the analysis of local level decision making power are the following:

> "The Minister shall (…) be guided and bound by the need to promote decentralization and the devolution of functions, *powers* and services from the central government system to local government and within the local government system from district council level to lower level of local government" (United Republic of Tanzania (URT) 1999b, section 4(3), my emphasis)

> "The Minister shall endeavour to ensure that the local government authorities are strong and effective institutions and that are more and more *autonomous in managing their own affairs* and they operate in a more transparent and democratic manner" (United Republic of Tanzania (URT) 1999b, section 4(5b), my emphasis)

1999 was also the year for the publication of the acts Land Act (no. 4) and Village Land Act (no. 5). The Land Act provided for the categorization of public land into three categories; general land, village land and reserved land (United Republic of Tanzania (URT) 1999a). The Village

Land Act provided for the Village Council to be responsible for the management of Village Land (United Republic of Tanzania (URT) 1999c).

1.5   Contextual background of study area

As mentioned, this study's main focus is the perceptions of the people closest to the issue at hand: The people living in the villages in the pilot WMA. In order to understand their viewpoints it is important to situate them within the historical, social and political context of the study area.

1.5.1   Local conflicts and land use

Kilosa District has a history of conflicts, especially between farmers and livestock keepers. The District is known nationally for the tensions between these two producer groups, and the conflicts have been portrayed as fights over the scarce resources of pasture and water (Benjaminsen et al. 2009). The reality, however, is much more complex than that, and we need to look at the history of land use and conflicts in the area to be able to understand present relations and perceptions, which might have major implications for the establishment of a Wildlife Management Area. One of the most tragic results of conflicts between farmers and herders in the area was the killing of 38 farmers and many more wounded from Rudewa Mbuyuni village in December 2000, by attack from Maasai warriors allegedly from Twatwatwa village (Benjaminsen et al. 2009). Very recently another incident happened in the District, in another conflict area on the border between Mabwegere village, including Mambegwa sub-village (inhabited by a pastoralist community), and Kikenge village (a farmers' village). The incident took place on October 27th 2008, and resulted in the death of six people, in addition to the destruction of property such as burnt down houses, which created internal displacement of people within the area (Baha et al. 2008). These villages are administered under Msowero ward, which Msowero village is also administered under. The time of interviews and focus group discussions in Msowero village concerning the pilot WMA were held shortly after this incident had happened and influenced the discussions (see chapter 4.1.3.)

The history of conflicts in the district can be traced back to the colonial era when European settlers set up large sisal estates in the area, of which a few remnants are still to be

found in the District today, although only four of them are still operating (Benjaminsen et al. 2009). Most of them were shut down in the 1970s and 1980s, and there has been confusion over who has the right to use the land on these former estate sites. This might be one source of conflict in the area, along with several other policy developments (Benjaminsen et al. 2009).

In 1964 Mikumi National Park was established in the south of the district, covering 3230 km² or 22, 7 % of the land area. Combined with forest reserves (7, 4 %), conservation areas cover almost 1/3 of the total land surface of the district. Developments in other areas of Tanzania, for example the establishment of the Basuto Wheat Scheme in Hanang District to the north of Kilosa and the mentioned evictions from the Ihefu wetland area in Mbeya region to the west have led to in-migrations of pastoralists (Baha et al. 2008; Benjaminsen et al. forthcoming). The district also has rich natural resources, "that support both pastoralism and agricultural activities; fertility of land, rivers that flow throughout the year and presence of grazing areas and valleys that are evergreen throughout the year constitute the reason for the influx of people in the area" (Baha et al. 2008, 3).

1.5.2 Wildlife tourism in Tanzania

Tanzania is the country in Africa with the largest national population of lions and buffalo, the second highest population of elephants and the fourth largest number of mammals[11]. Wildlife tourism has grown rapidly in the last two decades, resulting partly from political unrest in Kenya whereby Tanzania got an increasingly larger share of the wildlife tourism. Annual revenues from tourism in total were US $60 million in 1990, grew to nearly US $750 million in 2004 and had reached $ 1 billion by 2007 (Haller et al. 2008; Nelson 2007; World Tourism Organization (WTO) 2006). Tourism has a growth rate of 30 % a year compared to a growth rate of 7,5 % in 2000, providing the single largest contribution to the GDP, and 75 % of the tourism in the country is wildlife-based[12]. Furthermore, wildlife live exports provide revenues of about Ths (Tanzanian shillings) 165 million a year.

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[11] Maganga, Faustin. Presentation at Noragric, UMB, 23.04.09: "Tanzania's New Wildlife Law and its Implications for Rural Livelihoods", Nelson (2007) and Tanzania National Resource Forum (2008).
[12] Maganga, Faustin. Presentation at Noragric, UMB, 23.04.09: "Tanzania's New Wildlife Law and its Implications for Rural Livelihoods" and Haller, Galvin et al. (2008), 130.

Facing the general national decline in wildlife populations since the late 1980s (Tanzania National Resource Forum (TNRF) 2008), new policies and legislation aims to revert the trends of this loss and protect this economically crucial resource.

1.6   Problem statement and justification

The main object of the thesis is to explore the politics behind community-based conservation (CBC) in Tanzania, through the study of one of the pilot Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) which were introduced as Tanzania's main CBC strategy in the late 1990s. Over a decade after introduction, only six out of the sixteen proposed WMAs have been gazetted, while the rest are in various other stages of establishment. Twatwatwa pilot WMA is one of three (where the other two are Loliondo pilot WMA in Ngorongoro District and Tarime pilot WMA in Tarime District on the border with Kenya) which has not reached further than early stages of development (Maganga et al. 2007). This thesis seeks to explain the reasons behind this failure, of Twatwatwa pilot WMA specifically and WMAs in Tanzania generally through an investigation of the establishment process in this specific area, together with an analysis of the political and institutional context of wildlife management in Tanzania and wider political issues. The need to explain the divergence between policy and practice in the field of community-based conservation provides the justification for this study; where the global discourse of community-based conservation often claims it to be the win-win solution providing both protection of the environment and human development at the same time, while these objectives are rarely achieved in reality. Such "neoliberalization of African conservation, leading to the privatization of African states, has led to a situation in which it is extremely difficult to promote human rights via conservation and vice versa" (Igoe 2007, 241).

In this thesis I examine the institutions of community based conservation in Tanzania, and find that the gap is wide between the promised performance of CBC and the actual reality of implementing it, or in other words that the illusions are many. The most crucial aspect is what I call the *institutionalized illusions* of CBC, the narratives which can be broadly grouped into two categories: The 'win-win' narratives, which claims the easy commensurability of conservation

and community development, and the 'no win' narratives; which speak of the failure of CBC and blame it on the lacking capacity of local communities to manage conservation programs, or on the institutional design. While the real reasons behind the failures, as we shall see demonstrated by my fieldwork and analysis, are the structures of power which determines decision making and hinders real devolution of power to local people so they will be able to make management decisions over natural resources which will benefit both nature and people. I thereby argue that the largest impediments for success in community based natural resource management in Tanzania are political and institutional factors. As Alcorn, Kajuni et al (2002) puts it, in Tanzania "(…) central government continues to retain the lion's share of power and revenues from natural resources, and has proved reluctant to redistribute the revenue and to clearly and firmly transfer resource ownership from the State to its citizens, or to devolve rights and authority for managing resources to local communities" (Alcorn et al. 2002, 10). This can largely be seen to still be the case, maybe even more considering recent policy developments in the wildlife sector. The new Wildlife Policy of 2007 and the recently passed Wildlife Act, 2009, is even vaguer on transferring rights and authority to local communities over wildlife management (see chapter 4.2.1.).

2 Theoretical approaches

This chapter gives a review of the conceptual framework which guided the fieldwork, analysis and conclusions of this thesis, whereby first a discussion of key concepts is provided; such as 'wildlife management', 'community', 'community-based conservation', 'participation', 'empowerment' and 'power'. Thereby follows a brief introduction to the 'political ecology' approach and the analytical tools which were applied to the analysis of the case study.

2.1 Definitions of key concepts

2.1.1 Wildlife management
The definition of wildlife management depends on whether we talk about Community Based Wildlife Management (CBWM) or Protected Area (PA) management in terms of such Protected

Areas as national parks and game reserves. However, for the purpose of this thesis, which is concerned with CBWM, this definition of sustainable wildlife management is useful:

> *"Wildlife management* is the process of keeping certain wildlife populations, including endangered species, at desirable levels on the basis of scientific, technical and traditional knowledge. *Sustainable* wildlife management adds to this objective the aim of balancing the economic, ecological and social values of wildlife, with a view to protecting the interests of present and future generations. Thus, this concept goes beyond the protection of interests related to hunting and protection for individual species, and rather focuses on wildlife as a renewable natural resource in a holistic way." (Morgera & Wingard 2008, 1)

This definition corresponds closely with the aims of sustainable development, and this is also how wildlife management is defined in the literature describing WMAs (Nelson et al. 2006).

2.1.2 Communities and community based approaches

The notion of a homogenous 'community' has been discussed widely and largely denounced in the critical literature on community based conservation (see for example Agrawal 1997; Cooke & Kothari 2001; Goldman 2003; Hickey & Mohan 2004; Murphree 2001).

Communities can be defined as "small-scale human groupings socially bound by a common cultural identity, living within defined spatial boundaries, interacting on a personal rather than bureaucratic basis and having an economic interest in the common pool interests of the area" (Murphree 2001, 7). In discourses about community based conservation and development, it is assumed, and in many instances taken for granted, that such entities exist in reality and most often that they correspond neatly with village boundaries or 'management area' boundaries. This creates CBC outcomes which overlooks local power relations and conflicts. As Murphree (2001, 7) puts it: "(…) to rest CBC on some fixed construct of "community" is to risk the danger of mythologizing its essence".

2.1.3 The concepts of participation and empowerment

The concept which are often most central in discussions about community based conservation, and also other types of 'community based' development initiatives, are that of 'participation', which in turn should lead to 'empowerment' of marginalized people. The concepts are widely discussed in the literature, where different types of typologies or levels of participation are found

which ranks types of participation on a scale (see for example Agarwal 2001; Barrow & Murphree 2001; Junge 2002; Mannigel 2008; Pimbert & Pretty 1997), where the lowest level of participation is usually a passive one where the local people only receives information about decisions already made, and do not have any power to change that decision, while the top level is self-mobilization or empowerment (see table 3).Furthermore, the distinction has been made between participation as a *means* to improve efficiency and sustainability of development interventions and as an *end* in itself, seen as the way to empowerment and equity for marginalized groups (Cleaver 1999, Mannigel 2008).

Table 3: Different typologies of participation

Participatory typology *(Roles of managing institution)*	Roles of local people	Participation characteristics
Nominal participation *(Minimal)*	Nominal; for example as members of a group. Information belongs to external professionals, and local people might not even be informed about decisions	Almost no interaction between local stakeholders and managing institutions
Passive participation *(Informing)*	Passive; being informed of decisions *ex post facto*; or attending meetings and listening in on decision-making, without being able to influence the decisions	Information received is a unilateral action
Consultative participation *(Information seeking)*	Information giving; answering questions from extractive researchers	Canvassing of local stakeholders for factual information by the institution
Actual consultation *(Consulting)*	Being consulted; asked to give their opinions/views, without guarantee of influencing decisions	Usually externally defined problems and solutions, decisions made by the managing institutions alone
Active/functional participation *(Negotiating)*	Active; expressing opinions, whether or not solicited, forming groups to meet predetermined objectives, might become self-dependent	Usually done after major project decisions are made
Interactive participation *(Sharing of authority)*	Interactive; having voice and influence in decisions, participate in analysis and actions	Formalized decision-making structures involve local stakeholders and meet on a regular basis, use of local

		institutions
Self-mobilization/ empowerment *(Transferring authority)*	Taking responsibility; taking decisions independent of external institutions, may challenge existing arrangements and structures	Local stakeholders assume primary management responsibility

Source: Based on Agarwal 2001, Barrow and Murphree 2001, and Mannigel 2008

However, we need to go beyond these scales and dichotomies and engage in a broader understanding of the complex inter-linkages of social relationships and especially power structures at all levels. The discussion of participation and case studies from participatory approaches have shown that often what is termed as 'participation of the community' is the voices of elites in the communities, and social exclusion still exists.

This narrative is related to the community based conservation discourse and how community-based conservation or development programs (or both) claim to "listen to" the voices of communities or local people and incorporating the "local" or "traditional" knowledge in the programs. However, as Blaikie (2006) notes, even if such programs do "listen" to the voices of the indigenous or local, they still decide which parts of this information they want to put into the basis for decisions (baseline surveys etc.):

> "(...) there are many instances where local knowledge has not been able to negotiate on an equal basis with official scientific knowledge, but has instead been shaped by what is offered by outsiders, who make strategic choices about which "local knowledge" is heard and conformable to their scientifically given environmental goals, and then ventriloquised as the voice of the community" (Blaikie 2006, 1944).

So, even though the community-based conservation narrative says that it works only if people are heard, it does not always operate like that in practice. While the "concept of social inclusion emphasizes involvement in the structures and institutions of society" (Cleaver 1999, 599).

2.1.4 Views of power

The concepts of community, participation and empowerment are all closely interlinked with the concept of power. In fact, the structures of power which governs the management decisions of community based conservation programs has to be seen in the context of power relations in order

to be analyzed fruitfully. Or as Raik et al. (2008) puts it: "The concept of power is central to understanding the processes and structures associated with decentralization of natural resource governance". The concept of "decentralization" however, has also been used to denote transfer of management responsibility from central levels of government to lower levels, without necessarily transferring authority to make decisions at the same time (Murphree 2001). See an elaborated discussion of this in the context of Community Based Wildlife Management in Tanzania in chapter 4.2.5.

Power can be defined in many ways, and following Raik et al. (2008) the main views can be grouped into three; the agent-centred view, the structural view and the realist view. The agent-centred view focuses on power as coercion or power as constraint. Power excercised as coercion is defined as "when A has the ability to make B do something B would not otherwise do" (Raik et al. 2008, 731), or in other words when decision making results in forcing people to action. A prime example of this would be the forced resettlement of rural people into centralized villages as happened during "*Operation Vijiji*" in Tanzania in the 1970s, or the numerous displacement of people from Protected Areas in Tanzania, as for example the eviction of herders from the Usangu plains in 2006 which is described in chapter 4.2.4.

Power functions as a constraint when A constrains the actions or possible actions of B, and in this dimension of power the importance of *nondecision making* is made clear (Raik et al. 2008, 733). What is important to understand about politics is that it is the legitimate exercise of power, and what legitimizes certain coercive or constraining uses of power. As we will see, some discourses also masque and legitimize the otherwise illegitimate, illegal exercise of power, such as human rights abuses done in the name of conservation (Igoe 2007). The actor-oriented view of power as constraint is closely related to the power of institutions; how certain institutions create constraints for actors. The relative power of actors within and independent of institutions however, is the concern of the structural view of power. This notion of power holds that "[i]ndividuals exercise power over others because of their position in social structure" (Raik et al. 2008, 734). An individual's position in the social structure is determined by different types of social capital, which again be discerned from a variety of factors (wealth, status, age, gender, race etc). Power is also found in the existence and continuous production and reproduction of societal or institutional values, norms and practices, and in knowledge production:

"Power is (…) found in the creation of norms and social and cultural practices at all levels. Within much participatory development discourse, 'people's knowledge' or 'local knowledge' is seen as a fixed commodity that people intrinsically have and own. Instead, as is argued here, knowledge is culturally, socially and politically produced and is continuously reformulated as a powerful normative construct. Knowledge is thus an accumulation of social norms, rituals and practices that, far from being constructed in isolation from power relations, is embedded in them (or against them)" (Kothari 2001, 141).

The realist view introduces the element of interaction between individual agency and structures and holds that "power is (...) the capacity to act within preconditioned, structured social relations" (Raik et al. 2008, 736). This view emphasizes the existence of social structures but how they do not determine individual actions, although they might do so. The powerful individual has the ability to change the present situation while the powerless has not.

2.2   Political ecology

This study has a theoretical framework rooted in political ecology. Political ecology focuses on the power relations in natural resource management and environmental governance, and this is achieved in this study through a policy analysis and also by identifying the different actors which might have conflicting interests and the implications this has for the prospects of community based conservation, wildlife management and development. On the other hand, political ecology concerns itself with discourse analysis and narratives, and this study also looks at which narratives can be found in the statements from the participants in the study. Through the research strategy of a case study (see chapter 3), I have been able to see what is actually happening on the ground and search for the discrepancies between the discourses, policies, laws and regulations and what is actually being implemented in reality. What is important here is to identify the reasons for why these discrepancies exist.

Also, it is important to focus on the implications of both certain power relations, institutional set-ups, and the role of actors within and outside of these to influence and propagate changes which have consequences for the people who do not have the equal opportunities to influence these networks, structures and processes themselves.

The conceptual framework in this study is employed in the belief that it is important to try to avoid simplified representations of reality and reducing a complex, many-faceted picture to simplified representations. The importance of time and scales are emphasized in political ecology.

Political ecology is a multidisciplinary approach to the study of management of natural resources and environmental issues. The importance of multidisciplinarity in researching issues of environment and development becomes clear when we look at how these issues have complex inter-linkages and factors influencing decision making power on various levels. Certain understandings about how humans interact with nature and what should be done to improve these interactions guide policy and in turn have effect on interactions with nature.

3 Methodology and methods

This section describes the methods employed in the data collection and data analysis. It gives the reasons for choosing the particular research design and the various methods used, along with the sampling methods used. It also explains the validity and reliability aspects of the study and discusses the possible limitations to the methods used.

3.1 Research strategy and design

3.1.1 Qualitative research strategy

The study employs a qualitative research strategy, because of the ontological position of constructionism and the epistemological position of interpretivism (Bryman 2004). Constructionism gives a greater emphasis to negotiation and agreed-upon patterns of interaction, and thereby points to power relations more than objectivism, which sees social entities as outside of the domain of human influence. This corresponds with the thinking of political ecology and systems thinking, which focus on framings and values, and how different interests shape different understandings of social phenomena.

3.1.2 Case study

The research design is a case-study of one particular pilot WMA, and this design was chosen because the aim of the study was to give a rich description of the case in point in order to have as broad an understanding of the issues involved as possible (Bryman 2004). The focus on one case was however not limited to only conducting research within one geographical area, although the main focus was in the villages constituting the pilot WMA. According to the political ecology approach, the case was analyzed from the local to the global level as outlined in the conceptual framework chapter. As will be discussed in later chapters, the findings together with the analysis of the wider framework of national policy and law, shows the crucial importance of rich, detailed case studies in order to avoid "blueprints" which have been a common approach in designing development projects, and at the same time avoiding the pitfall of limiting the research to the singularity of one case only from which no valid general claims can be made as to contributing towards understanding the problem or suggesting solutions outside of the specific study case. Considering the fact that discourse production which in turn guides policy and law making

happen at larger scales (global and national), applied research should strive to guide these processes and thereby necessarily has to operate within the same scale. Therefore I find useful the analytical tools advocated by the political ecology approach which analyze a single case while at the same time drawing connections to local, regional, national and global politics, institutions, actors, interests and power.

3.2   Objectives and research questions

3.2.1   Overall objective

The overall objective of the study was to find out why the proposed Twatwatwa Pilot WMA had not been established successfully after ten years had passed since initiation. This objective arose out of a general overall aim of seeking reasons as to why community-based conservation largely has been unsuccessful, as outlined in the introduction.

3.2.2   Specific objectives

Thereafter, the first specific objective was to assess the level of participation by the people living in and affected by the community-based wildlife management area, in the decision making process. The second specific objective was then to, based on the villagers' perceptions, experiences and opinions, assess whether the proposed area would be a feasible, viable and sustainable option for community based conservation (which seeks to combine conservation and sustainable use of natural resources, with community development and poverty alleviation) in the area. Through mapping the history of decision making and implementation of the pilot WMA, with the methods of qualitative interviews, focus group discussions, oral histories from key informants and document studies, a description of the process from initiation to its abrupt collapse was established. The specific research questions relating to each objective are outlined below[13]:

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[13] The objectives and research questions are subjective to changes, especially since I employ a qualitative, inductive research strategy and grounded theory as data collection/analysis method, which means that further research is shaped by initial stages of collection and analysis of data (Bryman 2004).

Objective 1: To describe the establishment process of Twatwatwa Pilot Wildlife Management Area.

Research questions

1. What kind of information did the people in the four villages (Twatwatwa, Mbwade, Rudewa Mbuyuni and Msowero) receive prior to, during and after the establishment of a Pilot Wildlife Management Area in Twatwatwa village?
2. What do the village communities know about Community Based Organisations, the various processes of application for authorization, application for user rights, application for a hunting block and the policies and regulations pertaining to the governance of the WMA?
3. How was the decision about establishing a pilot WMA made?
4. How were the people in the villages involved in the process of deciding to establish a pilot WMA?
5. Who participated in the decision-making process?
6. In what way did participation take place?
7. Who did *not* participate?
8. How do the people in the different villages perceive the decision-making and establishment process?

Objective 2: To assess whether a Wildlife Management Area as it is proposed, will be a viable, feasible and sustainable option for the development and improvement of livelihoods in the villages within the WMA.

Research questions

1. How are the community members' perceptions in relation to perceived benefits of a WMA?
2. How are the community members' perceptions in relation to possible disadvantages with a WMA?

3. What are their previous experiences with Community Based Organisations, conservation projects/programmes and/or wildlife and protected area management in the area?

4. Do they have access to generating income through sale of wildlife quotas to resident hunters?

5. Have they previously entered into agreements with private tourist hunting and photographic safari companies who provide development support to adjacent communities?

6. Do they see any future possibilities for entering into such agreements?

3.3   Methods of data collection and analysis

The collection of data was carried out using several different qualitative research methods (see below). In order to analyse the qualitative data, I used the grounded theory approach, which is described by Bryman (2004) as the most common approach in social research. This approach can be seen as both a method for data collection and data analysis, since these two stages of research are closely interlinked, in comparison with quantitative research strategies, where data collection and data analysis are two separate exercises. With the grounded theory approach, analysis is carried out shortly after initial data collection, and this analysis shapes the direction for further data collection, and in this way theory is generated.

3.3.1   Semi-structured interviews and oral history interviews

In order to realize the first objective of the study; to find out why the WMA process collapsed in the specific study area, I conducted semi-structured interviews with key persons assumed to possess this information at local, district and national level, in addition to conducting document analysis of project related documents collected from local and central government (see section 3.3.3.) The people chosen for these interviews were based on a mixture of strategic and "snowball" sampling (see section 3.4.), where certain individuals ("key informants") within the village communities were expected to possess particular information about the issue based on their involvement, such as village chairpersons, village executive officers, leaders and members

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of the natural resource committees and land use planning committees, people who had participated in game scout training and the village leaders at the time when the WMA concept was formally introduced in the villages. The interviews also sought elicit the involved individuals and groups' perceptions about the decision-making process and especially considering their feelings of level of participation and decision making power.

Furthermore, I made use of oral history interviews from key persons involved in the process to establish the decision-making process of the project. These interviews contained open-ended questions with the aim of eliciting information about the process, in the involved individuals' own words, from the beginning of WMA activities, based on their knowledge and memory. The study included semi-structured interviews/conversations using an interview guide with village leaders, village elders and previous village leadership in the villages of Twatwatwa, Mbwade, Rudewa Mbuyuni and Msowero in Kilosa District. Interviews were also conducted with random villagers in all four of the villages, and one focus group discussion was held in each village. The study also included conversations with District Council officials, Ward and Division officials (for cross-checking of information and additional information), and the Community-Based Conservation (CBC) officer in the Wildlife Division of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. In addition, interviews were held with a range of other actors who were involved in the process of establishing or were expected to have information about the issue: A representative from The Irish Development Cooperation (previously known as Irish Aid), the Manager at the Mkata Ranch in Kilosa District, the General Manager for the National Ranching Company (NARCO), a representative from the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), a representative from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) in Tanzania, a representative from Hakiardhi/the Land Rights Research and Resources Institute (LRRRI), and the Ministry of Land.

The conversations with key informants were conducted using a checklist (see appendix 3). They did not follow a strict format and were construed as conversations. The interviews with villagers were focused on their knowledge of the proposed WMA, how they experienced the decision-making process and their own ability to influence decisions, and their perceptions of development needs in their community. The participants in interviews and focus group discussions were encouraged to ask the researcher questions and provide additional comments.

3.3.2   Focus group discussions and participant observation

Focus groups were conducted with the aim of finding out how members of such a group would discuss the issue. The participants were selected (in addition of course to their own willingness to participate in the discussions) on the basis of their alleged involvement in the implementation process of WMA or management of wildlife and/or natural resources in some way, or, as for some of the participants in the groups (particularly women), their alleged *non*-involvement in the same issues.

The aim of the focus group discussions was to understand how people collectively perceive and understand the concept of WMA and community-based conservation and also functioned as crosschecking of information (triangulation). The differences between the semi-structured group interviews and the focus group discussions are not very evident, but the essence lies in the purpose (Bryman 2004). Group interviews were conducted in the same way as individual semi-structured interviews, as a conversation, exchange of information between the researcher and the participant(s), where the checklist for the key informants provided a guide for the conversation and the participants provided information and opinions as responses to the questions. Whereas in a focus group discussion the aim is to have a more open discussion between the participants without the researcher intervening too much, only providing the framework for the discussion. Therefore a tape recorder was meticulously used for all the focus group discussions, since the interpreter took over the role as a moderator of the discussion, only keeping the discussion on track, not translating too much during the actual discussion. The whole conversations were then translated and transcribed afterwards.

In addition there is another category of interviews which might be considered something in between group interview and focus-group discussion; the village meetings where the issue was discussed and I asked questions which in turn were answered by different people; village leaders and villagers alike. The issues of conservation of wildlife and community development were issues which the village communities were very much engaged with and therefore often when group interviews were requested a village meeting was called, where large parts of the village council and large numbers of other villagers were present. These were held, in addition to group interviews and focus group discussions, in Parakuyo sub-village and Twatwatwa sub-village in

Twatwatwa village, and in Makulunge sub-village in Rudewa Mbuyuni village. In Mbwade village and Msowero village, group interviews and focus group discussions were held. Particular care was taken to ensure women's participation in the study. In one of the village meetings (in Twatwatwa sub-village) I encouraged the women in the meeting to express their opinions. Group or individual interviews with only women were held in Twatwatwa, Mbwade and Rudewa Mbuyuni; in Msowero the women participating in the focus group discussion were specifically encouraged to speak their minds. A voice recorder was used for the focus groups and village meetings, and some of the group interviews. For the interviews conducted in Swahili, an interpreter was used.

By spending time in the study area, speaking to many different people both in scheduled interviews and focus group discussion and in other social settings, where the village members shared their stories, experiences and opinions, and by observing how long discussions took place among village members, the insights gained also contributed towards my understanding of the issue.

3.3.3   Qualitative content analysis and document analysis

After having collected data in the field sites, I coded all of the material using memos, and used a computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (Weft QDA) to categorize information according to emerging themes. Thereafter qualitative content analysis and some elements of narrative analysis provided the basis for the conclusions drawn from the findings.

The study also made use of document analysis, by analyzing the relevant policies, laws and regulations, such as the wildlife policy and legislation and other relevant official documents such as environment laws and land laws. All relevant documents concerning the establishment of Twatwatwa pilot Wildlife Management Area were collected, including minutes of Village Council and District Council meetings, letter correspondence between the involved actors (Village Council, District Council, Wildlife Division and sponsors) and other project files over

the period from 1997 until 2007[14]. Maps of the area were also collected at Kilosa District Council (see appendices).

3.4   Sampling methods

3.4.1   Strategic sampling

Purposive sampling was the method employed in the research. This is a non-probability sampling method, which is common in qualitative research. The justification for this choice lies in the nature of the research questions (Robbins 2004, 334). The focus was not to identify any traits which could be transferred statistically to the whole population. Specific target subgroups, which were identified during the early stages of the fieldwork, were sought out. In the early stages of the fieldwork four subgroups and the corresponding research questions were identified: 1) women (participation, decision-making, access to natural resources, perceptions of conservation), 2) sub-villages far away from administrative centres (access to information, decision-making power) 3) people living close to wildlife corridors/areas (wildlife-human conflicts, perceptions, access to information and decision making power), and 4) (former) Village Game Scouts (conservation training, operations/implementation, technical and financial support).

In total 30 individual and group interviews of between 30 minutes and two hours each were conducted, involving about 45 individuals, before reaching the stage of what we can call *theoretical saturation* (Bryman 2004, page?). The type of sampling used, "is concerned with the refinement of ideas, rather than boosting sample size" (Charmaz 2000, 519).

In all the focus group discussions there were both women and men participating and the numbers of participants varied from four to eleven.

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[14] The majority of these documents were collected from the archive at the District Natural Resources Office, sorted under a folder titled "Twatwatwa Wildlife Management Area". It is unknown whether the folder contained a complete record of project documents and letter correspondence. A few documents (mainly minutes of meetings) were also collected at the respective Village Councils; however, they proved difficult to obtain at all villages. Due to the long period since WMA activities commenced and the lack of recent activity, and with a change of village administrations in between (2005), these documents were not readily available at Village Council Offices. At one village the present chairperson directed us to the previous chairperson whom he claimed had the documents relating to the WMA at his home. Upon consulting this person, however, he could not provide us with any other relevant documents than a copy of the WMA regulations (2002).

3.4.2 Snowball sampling

'Snowball' sampling was used to a certain extent; by establishing initial contact with a few selected persons within these categories, these individuals helped direct me to other individuals who were involved in the process.

3.5 Reliability and validity

3.5.1 Respondent validation

One of the most important aspects of participatory research approaches is that the participants also take part in the findings and conclusions of the researcher. "Respondent validation (…) is a process whereby a researcher provides the people on whom he or she has conducted research with an account of his or her findings" (Robbins 2004, 274). I ensured respondent validation in this study by returning to the fieldwork area and presenting to the participants of the study the findings and conclusions, six months after the initial field visit, and my participants were aware of this from the outset. The respondent validation took shape in form of focus group discussions with many of the same participants as the initial focus group discussions; where the results of the research was presented and the issue discussed with the participants. I also intend to provide for a translation of an abridged version of the thesis in Swahili to share with the people who contributed with information and opinions in this research.

3.5.2 Triangulation

As mentioned, the focus group discussions were used as a method of triangulation of information. Also the parallel analysis of interview data and documents is a form of triangulation of information (Bryman 2004).

3.6 Limitations and challenges

One of the major challenges to a qualitative study which employs the epistemology of interpretivism is the question of how to interpret data and how to understand others' interpretations of certain issues. This means that it is very important to be aware of one's own perceptions and the way in which the researcher's engagement with the subjects of research will in itself affect research (Long & Long 1992). Here I present some of the challenges and possible limitations to my study.

3.6.1 Language limitations and the role of the researcher

Language is a considerable challenge. All interviews and focus group discussions in the four villages were carried out in Swahili, with the help of an interpreter. A few of the participants in one of the village meetings did not speak neither English nor Swahili, only Maa, and in this case it was one of the other participants who functioned as a translator, and then the Swahili version was again translated into English. This opens up for loss of information and/or misinterpretation.

In the semi-structured interviews with key informants, questions and responses were translated directly and clarifications were instantly sought where needed. Meticulous research notes were recorded during interviews. The interviews were then transcribed at the soonest possible time.

In the focus group discussions a tape recorder was used. A checklist with central questions sought answered provided the guide for the discussions, and to avoid unnecessary interruption, the interpreter functioned as the facilitator, with abbreviated translations of key information, and then later translated the whole conversation from the tape. For some of the quotations used in the analysis, a second transcription of the original Swahili sections, word for word, was carried out, in order to ensure quotations as correct as possible.

Still, notwithstanding all these measures to seek a correct a translation as possible, one can never escape the danger of misinterpretation or loss of details. This coupled with cultural differences and the fact that the identity of the researcher might produce certain responses, might contribute towards the fact that data can be misinterpreted. However, through conducting a

second field visit where my findings were discussed and commented before final submission, I provided for a sort of approval of my interpretations and analysis, although there were fewer village members participating in the second focus group discussions than in the first field visit. Furthermore I plan to arrange for a translation of an abridged version of the end-result of my thesis and share with the respective communities in the study area. The same will be done for any prospective articles produced in the future where the data collected will be used.

3.6.2 Considerations of time, processes and scales

The short time in which the field study took place (a little under three months), must be considered a limitation of this study. In such a short time it is only possible to give a limited view of the reality of the everyday lives of the people who live and struggle there. However, with great humbleness and respect for the participating communities' views and the information they have shared with me, with this study I strive to give a truthful picture of the situation as possible, based on the information I collected during a short, but intensive fieldwork period. It is also important to always keep in mind the temporal and spatial aspects of any portrayal of reality, and that communities are dynamic entities involved in many different processes across scales.

4   Findings, analysis and discussion

4.1   Decision-making, power and participation in Twatwatwa WMA

This chapter outlines the history of Twatwatwa Pilot WMA. Oral history interviews were conducted with key informants in the four villages, such as present village chairpersons, village chairpersons at the time of initiation (the year 2003, and years 1997-1998 for Twatwatwa), village executive officers, and present and previous natural resource or land use committee members and game scouts. The aim of the interviews was to find out about the process of decision-making; when decisions were made, how they were made and who made them. At the same time, the present knowledge and perceptions about the pilot WMA were identified. Focus group discussions were also conducted to gain deeper knowledge of how the members of a group view the issue. Various documents, such as project plans and proposals, letters and maps collected from the Natural Resources office at Kilosa District Council were also conducted, in order to compare and complement the information obtained in the interviews and focus group discussions.

This chapter will first give a descriptive overview of the history of establishment; thereafter evaluate the way in which people from the villages influenced and/or participated in the decision making process, according to the concepts of participation as outlined in chapter 2.

4.1.1   History of decision-making

The decision making process of Twatwatwa WMA happened through the following timeline of events (see figure 5):

The origins of Twatwatwa WMA can be found in the decision by the villagers of Twatwatwa village during a meeting of May 13th 1997 where they decided to form a "special committee of sixteen people to conserve/manage the environment of Twatwatwa village and the natural resources therein"[15].

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[15] Twatwatwa Village Council (1997): Environmental Management Programme (Plan) 1998 – 1999. (Translation from Kiswahili.) June 1997.

Figure 6: Timeline of decision making for Twatwatwa WMA

Date	Event
13th May 1997	• General village meeting in Twatwatwa; decision reached among the villagers to preserve the environment within the village
June 1997	• Publication of the "Environmental Management Programme Plan 1998-1999" (Village Council, Twatwatwa)
March 1998	• The Wildlife Policy of Tanzania was published, introducing the WMA concept
30th April 1998	• KDC Natural Resources Office carried out a "Field Progressive Report of Twatwatwa WMA". The area had already been demarcated with 18 signboards by this time.
23rd March 2000	• DGO wrote to WD "on behalf of the villagers of Twatwatwa", requesting for the area to be legally recognized as a WMA
27th April 2000	• Village meeting in Twatwatwa where the villagers accepted the WMA proposal
11th Aug 2000	• Funding of Tshs 5 100 000 from TWPF for development of the Twatwatwa WMA was allocated to KDC
Aug - Dec 2000	• By-laws were passed and enacted, six local village game scouts were sponsored for training in Songea, and a total of Tshs 2 100 000 00 in fines were collected within the area
8th Dec 2000	• Severe conflict between farmers and herders; 38 people killed in Rudewa Mbuyuni. The incident promted KDC to request WD to stop WMA activities until conflicts were resolved
2002	• The WMA regulations were released and the 16 pilot WMAs were declared by the Government of Tanzania
20th Sept 2002	• Approval of funding of Tshs 3 730 000 from TWPF for the continuation of the Twatwatwa pilot WMA
23rd Jan 2003	• Seminar in DSM where all village chairpersons of the respective participating villages of WMAs attended (WMA regulations 2002 were introduced)
2004	• Request from KDC to the WD to stop the WMA activities until after the Mkata State Ranch was privatized
2005	• The WMA regulations 2002 revised edition were released and the pilot phase was extended from 36 months till 44 months starting Jan 2003 (until Sept 2006)
2006	• KDC requested WD to resume WMA activities after the conflicts between livestock keepers from Twatwatwa and farmers from Rudewa had been resolved

KDC = Kilosa District Council   DGO = District Game Officer   WD = Wildlife Division

TWPF = Tanzania Wildlife Protection Fund   DSM = Dar es Salaam

Source: Based on written data sources from Kilosa District Council and interview with Community Based Conservation Officer, Wildlife Division, Dar es Salaam, 11.12.08.

The Environmental Management Programme (Plan) 1998 – 1999 proposed nine main projects including woodland management and tree planting, sustainable utilization of land (land use planning), awareness and training, sustainable farming, beekeeping and fish harvesting, sustainable wildlife and vermin harvesting and prevention of destructive harvesting. The land use planning included a proposal to divide the village area into four land use zones: settlement, agriculture, pastoralism and conservation. The total budget for the plan was set to Tshs 82.8 million, equal to about USD 188,000 at the time, whereas the contributions provided by the people of Twatwatwa were expected to amount to Tshs 20 million (through tree planting, office construction, beekeeping and fishing projects) while Tshs 62.8 million (about USD 104,667) were to be requested from donors. To ensure the sustainability of the project after withdrawal of donors, awareness and training campaigns were intended to make villagers realize the importance of the continuation of the project and a special fund for environmental conservation was to be set up. Income generation for this fund was expected to come from revenue from licence fees for hunting, fishing and milala palm (*phoenix reclinata*) harvesting, beekeeping and the sale of game meat and trophy.

Irish Aid provided funding of this program from the start, through their financial assistance to Kilosa District Council. This funding ceased in 2000 (although Irish Aid provided direct funding to Kilosa District up until 2003[16]), however, and thereafter the process was funded by the Tanzania Wildlife Protection Fund (TWPF). After the WMA concept was introduced in the Wildlife Policy of 1998, the District Game Officer (DGO) in Kilosa District Council wrote a letter to the Wildlife Division (WD) in March 2000, proposing the Twatwatwa village to be a WMA. He referred to the meeting of May 13th 1997, where the village decided to conserve the resources within the village.

The meeting between District Natural Resources Officials, including the DGO, and the villagers of Twatwatwa about requesting to be gazetted as a WMA, however, did not take place before a month after this, in April 2000. The villagers did then during this meeting agree to the WMA proposal. Within the end of the year, six local game scouts had been trained and wildlife

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[16] In 2003 Irish Aid changed the funding modalities for their development assistance and joined the central government funding through the Local Government Reform Programme (personal email correspondence with Irish Aid representative involved in development activities in Kilosa District, April 2009).

conservation by-laws had been passed and administered[17]. In December 2000, conflicts between farmers and livestock-keepers caused a tragic event in Rudewa Mbuyuni where at least 35 people were killed, allegedly by Maasai from Twatwatwa village. The District Council asked for the WMA activities to be stopped until the conflict had been resolved[18]. Even though the District formally requested the Wildlife Division for the WMA activities to be resumed in 2006, the District received funding from TWPF in 2002 in order to continue developing Twatwatwa WMA[19].

In January 2003, a Wildlife Management Area information meeting was held in Dar es Salaam, facilitated and funded by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, where all Village Chairpersons of the respective 16 chosen WMA pilot sites were invited. The Wildlife Management Area regulations of 2002 were introduced and Village Chairpersons were requested to inform their respective villagers about the issue. Since the village of Twatwatwa had already carried out a number of conservation enhancing activities before this time, it was now the time for the other three villages in the pilot WMA to be involved. Mbwade village had also had one or two village game scout sent for training together with the ones from Twatwatwa, and the previous chairperson participated in the Irish Aid sponsored survey trips to different community based initiatives around National Parks such as Serengeti NP (Tanzania) and Amboseli NP (Kenya). According to the District Game Officer the decision to include the remaining two villages; Rudewa Mbuyuni and Msowero, was made through discussions with the leadership in Twatwatwa and Mbwade village. The decision was based on the fact that poachers easily access the wildlife area through these villages and by including them cooperation on anti-poaching could be achieved[20]. In a focus group discussion in Mbwade the representatives told me that they agreed to join the Twatwatwa WMA with the hope that they later would be able to establish their own wildlife management area within their village boundaries:

> "The Twatwatwa WMA was established as a trial project in 1997. In 2003 it was put into effect. If the project was successful, Mbwade would also have its own WMA established within our

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[17] Letter from District Natural Resources Office to Administrative Secretary, Tanzania Wildlife Protection Fund (28.12.2000), titled "Twatwatwa Work Report for August – December 2000".

[18] Interview with CBC officer, Wildlife Division, 11.12.08, Wildlife Division (2008): Assessment and Evaluation of the Wildlife Management Areas in Tanzania (assessment carried out by Institute of Resource Assessment (IRA), University of Dar es Salaam).

[19] Letters from TWPF to Kilosa District Natural Resources Office, dated 20.09.2002 and 28.11.2002.

[20] Interview with District Game Officer, Kilosa, 07.11.08.

village boundaries, we were told. We therefore agreed to cooperate about the Twatwatwa WMA under the condition that we would later get our own area. We prepared a plan for the WMA in Mbwade with a map over the designated area and planned writing a proposal for getting it approved.”[21]

Furthermore, some of the people interviewed in Mbwade expressed discontent with the fact that they had not seen any benefits from the wildlife in the management area, or how in their view "Twatwatwa village benefits from the conservation of wild animals, while we have never seen any of the money"[22]. They did however gain some income from timber harvesting, but "after 2004 there has been no harvesting since the forest got degraded because of poachers with fake permits, and thereby the government prohibited issuing of permits for harvesting of timber."[23] Therefore, they sent a letter to the District in 2007 requesting for their village to be considered as a WMA. At the time of the field work they had still not received any response from the District on the issue[24]. The members of the Natural Resource Committee believed, however, that the villagers of Mbwade would prefer this solution rather than cooperate with Twatwatwa[25].

In Rudewa Mbuyuni, the village chairperson at the time of introduction of WMA in their village (2003); informed me that at the time, the majority of the village assembly present during the meeting where the WMA proposal was presented were against the proposal because they did not believe it would succeed. He claimed however, "this was due to the villagers' poor knowledge. It is important that experts from the District and the Ministry to participate in the awareness creation among villagers".

In 2004, the District Council wrote a letter to the Wildlife Division, asking for the WMA activities to be stopped once again, until after the land issues relating to Mkata ranch had been resolved. The Mkata ranch is a former NARCO (National Ranching Company) State ranch, and NARCO was privatized in 2005. The former State ranch is situated partly in Kilosa District and partly in Mvomero District, and in 2004 the part of the ranch in Kilosa District was divided into 11 blocks of between 3000 and 4000 each, and subleased to private individuals and livestock

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[21] Interview, Natural Resource Committee members, Mbwade, 08.11.08.
[22] Focus group discussion, Mbwade, 18.10.08.
[23] Focus group discussion, Mbwade, 18.10.08.
[24] Focus Group Discussion, Mbwade, 18.10.08, interview with Natural Resource Committee members 08.11.08, Focus Group Discussion, Mbwade 21.07.09.
[25] Interview, Natural Resource Committee members, 08.11.08.

associations. Four of these blocks were allocated to the Twatwatwa village. The village is situated on some of the land that originally belonged to the NARCO ranch, and while NARCO has a title deed to this land from 1969, Twatwatwa village has a village certificate from 1994 (Benjaminsen et al. forthcoming). NARCO is still claiming that the village is supposed to sublease this land on the same terms as other individuals and organisations (at 200 Tsh per acre, for 33 years)[26] and does not recognize this land as village land, although they state that "it might be possible that Twatwatwa land might be transferred to village land eventually"[27]. In 2004, a representative from the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit; GTZ) went to survey the area and adviced the Wildlife Division that the Twatwatwa WMA could be continued, but only after conflicts had been resolved[28]. In April 2006, the District Council wrote a letter to the Ministry asking for the WMA to be reintroduced into the original 16 pilot WMAs[29]. At that time, however, it was too late, since the pilot phase for WMAs were already over[30]. The Wildlife Division was considering removing Twatwatwa WMA from the list of WMAs, but decided to wait until the evaluation of all the pilot sites had been carried out[31]. At the time of the interview with the Community-Based Conservation Officer at the Wildlife Division (December 2008), the WD had still not reached a decision on the matter.

4.1.2 Level of local participation and influence

Considering the issue of decision-making and participation in the WMA process, one should expect that villagers are involved in the process, since it is a community based conservation program. However, based on the investigation of the history of WMA establishment, and an analysis of the institutional framework, and especially based on the villagers own experiences of how they were involved in the decision making, I will in this section demonstrate how participation in the establishment of Twatwatwa was quite limited.

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[26] Interview with manager, Mkata Ranch, 09.11.08, interview with General Manager, NARCO, Dar es Salaam, 25.11.08.
[27] Interview, General Manager, NARCO, Dar es Salaam, 25.11.08.
[28] Interview, CBC officer, Wildlife Divison, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 11.12.08.
[29] Letter, dated 21.04.06. Archive at Kilosa District Council.
[30] Interview, CBC officer, Wildlife Division, 11.12.08.
[31] Interview, CBC officer, Wildlife Division, 11.12.08.

Even though the initial decision to establish a conservation area within their village, came from the residents of Twatwatwa themselves, referring to the village meeting of May 13th 1997, this was before the WMA concept was introduced to them, or if it had been introduced at the time, it was before the regulatory framework for WMAs had been developed, and therefore they did not know the extent of control which would still be retained by central government through accepting a WMA. Even at the village meeting with District Officials in 2000, the importance of the villagers having ownership the resources in the area was emphasized:

> *"[The Village Executive Officer] told the representatives that the main aim was to openly emphasize how critically important it was for the representatives and the people themselves to own the preservation area, so that they derive funds and benefits for the whole village. The government on its part will facilitate the process by providing weapons, bullets, identity cards, and training to youths in every sub-district."[32]*

This was also emphasized in the focus group discussion in Twatwatwa village during my fieldwork. At the beginning of my fieldwork, in a focus group discussion, which actually turned out to be a village meeting involving about 40 people, the representatives expressed in strong terms how they were not ready to agree to any cooperation on wildlife management which did not guarantee that the power would be in their own hands:

> *"(...) the training about conservation should be better than what has been done before, since what has been done before was not enough, it was not powerful. We would like to get training, assistance on how to conserve. Now there are a lot of poachers. When we get training, we would know how to practice sustainable harvesting, not like now, where there is no proper harvesting. But we have a worry; it should be the property of the village, so as not any top leader could grab a share, or would want to take over investments. In Asia, Europe, and America conservation is a big issue (...) People are asked to plant trees here, and people from outside might be interested in investing. Here we are very concerned with protecting the environment. We have heard about other places where problems have arisen because of destruction of the environment. (...) Just because we are poor, we are not ready to accept each and everything. (...) We are afraid that there is a hidden agenda, (...) but if it is training for our own benefit and we are responsible ourselves, than we agree."[33]*

When we look at the regulatory framework for WMAs, however, it is clear that villages are not vested with full ownership of the resource, and the process in itself is also directed from above. Especially the District Council has a central role in WMA facilitation, proved by the findings in my fieldwork where all funding of the WMA goes through the District and meetings about WMAs were initiated by the District Game Officer, while the meeting where the village accepted

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[32] Minutes of meeting, Twatwatwa village, 27.04.00.
[33] Focus Group Discussion (village meeting), Parakuyo, 16.10.08.

the proposal actually happened after the DGO had requested "on behalf of Twatwatwa village" to have a WMA in their village.

Furthermore, when it comes to the distribution of information and decision making power within the villages, the people living far away from the administrative centre (village council and village executive office) have a feeling of not receiving as much information as the people living close to where the main village meetings are held:

> "The WMA regulations and guidelines have not been presented to us in any way. Most of the issues centre at Parakuyo, and because the sub-village is too far from the centre[34], we do not get this information. There is a need to have an information centre with more interaction with the main village council so as we can receive the same type of information as people close to Parakuyo."[35]

In the same meeting, one woman expressed how they feel their position is, as women:

> "We do not know anything about conservation. We just see the people in the wild poaching animals and milala. Even if the men are receiving some money for it, the women would not know about it, because it is in the hands of the men as decision makers."[36]

Another woman I interviewed (a random villager), said that she had not been invited to any meetings about WMA or Land Use Planning, or even heard about them, and "if I had, it would anyway be meetings held in Parakuyo, too far away for me to attend"[37]. She furthermore stated that she would like to attend these meetings, in order to participate in the development of the village. This interview was facilitated by a man, a key person, who took us to the particular woman's house, on our request for talking to some random villagers, especially women. He was also present during the interview and several times responded to our questions on behalf of the woman[38]. When I asked whether women were invited to these meetings, the man responded that "(...) they have not been included yet. The meetings at this stage are only for selected decision makers in the village. After a consensus has been reached, all the village members will be invited, including women"[39].

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[34] Twatwatwa sub-village is located at the periphery of the village boundary
[35] Village meeting, Twatwatwa sub-village, Twatwatwa, 21.10.08.
[36] Village meeting, Twatwatwa sub-village, Twatwatwa, 21.10.08.
[37] Interview, Twatwatwa sub-village, Twatwatwa 16.10.08.
[38] Her relation to the man is unknown.
[39] Interview, Twatwatwa sub-village, 16.10.08.

I also conducted an interview with one of the female members in the Land Use Plan Committee, where there are three women and four men, including the Village Executive Officer. She said that there are no women in the leading positions (leader and secretary). "I was proposed for the secretary position," she told me, "but I was rejected by the VEO" (the VEO is the leader of the committee). She did not know the reasons for disqualifying her, but when I met her later that day, she had asked the VEO and got the reply that it was because she lacked writing and reading skills. There are no women in leading positions in the village, and all the village council members are men. Women are only involved in committees[40].

4.1.3 Land access issues and conflicts

One of the central issues emerging from the fieldwork was the issue of ownership of land. Two of the villages in the proposed pilot WMA have had and still have a relationship mired by conflicts, as mentioned before, something which affects their perceptions of the proposed WMA. A representative from an NGO who has been heavily involved in policy formulation processes of WMAs in Tanzania, claimed that Twatwatwa WMA had been established in order to solve and prevent future conflicts in the area, based on "information that someone intimated to him from the Wildlife Department"[41]. Twatwatwa was, according to him, one of two pilot WMA areas in Tanzania which had not had any experiences with community based conservation before and it "is therefore remarkable that Twatwatwa was selected"[42]. Furthermore, he claimed that "the government had not been to the area to talk to the communities or to sensitize people on the issue, it was just decided in the government"[43]. This statement corresponded with statements from people in the villages, especially in the village of Rudewa Mbuyuni. Here, a young member of the village council, who was not part of the village leadership at the time of initiation, stated this about the project:

> To be honest I have not heard that we were supposed to cooperate about this project. We have not known that. Maybe after they were here[44], they went to other villages and talked to them about it. People were just coming and gave information to the administration. They did not tell us

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[40] Interview, female Land Use Committee member, 16.10.08.
[41] Interviews, Dar es Salaam, 31.10.08 and 26.11.08.
[42] Interview, Dar es Salaam, 26.11.08.
[43] Interview, Dar es Salaam, 26.11.08.
[44] "They" here refers to the ones introducing the pilot WMA, which most likely means leaders from the District Council.

what to do and what not to do. An administration is not a good administration when they delay to give us that information (…). We villagers, because we did not know about it, could not discuss this issue. [45]

He also expressed that the decision had been taken without full participation of the villagers:

At the time of the previous administration they were concerned with this issue. And we as villagers did indeed agree to the proposal. (…) After being influenced, you know, the villagers respond positively. (…) These people come and implement their plans and the villagers just accept, because they know they cannot go against them and the government thinks that the villagers do not have the capacity to take care of these matters themselves. This is an advantage for the government. [46]

Several of the people I talked to in Rudewa Mbuyuni and Msowero villages told me that there had not been any other meeting since the first one in 2003 where the chairpersons introduced the issue to their respective villages for the first time.

The issue of benefit sharing was also prominent in the discussions concerning Twatwatwa WMA. In none of the villages they knew how the benefits would be shared. Regarding the issue of which of the villages contribute with conservation land, there are varying answers from the people interviewed. According to the WMA documents obtained at the Kilosa District Council, the proposed WMA corresponds with the village boundaries of Twatwatwa. However, in Mbwade they informed me that "the people of Mbwade participated because we are close to Twatwatwa, and we also had an area prepared which has wildlife, and that is why also young people from Mbwade were taken to go to game scout training".[47]

Furthermore, in Mbwade the leadership informed me as mentioned, that their main motivation for agreeing to cooperate about wildlife management with Twatwatwa, was to see "if the WMA of Twatwatwa village was successful, to see if they would benefit and then to see if they would decide to start a WMA in their own village"[48]. They therefore agreed to the proposal in 2003, and two game scouts were sent to training. They cooperated with Twatwatwa about poaching control, but were frustrated that "Twatwatwa village benefits from the conservation of wild animals, but Mbwade does not. We have never seen any of the money."[49] Therefore,

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[45] Interview, Rudewa Mbuyuni, 07.11.08.
[46] Interview, Rudewa Mbuyuni, 07.11.08.
[47] Interview, Village Natural Resource Committee members, Mbwade, 08.11.08.
[48] Interview, Village Natural Resource Committee members, Mbwade, 08.11.08.
[49] Interview, Village Natural Resource Committee members, Mbwade, 08.11.08.

"we sent a request to the District last year for the establishment of a WMA encompassing only Mbwade village, due to the fact that we never saw any benefit from the cooperation with Twatwatwa. We still have not received any response to this request."[50]

In Rudewa Mbuyuni, there was also confusion regarding about where exactly the area set aside for conservation of wildlife should be. One of the members of the village council told me this:

At first the area was chosen to be at the boundary with the livestock keepers. Now we are surprised, because last year, or the year before, I am not sure, the area was shifted to be within the village of Twatwatwa. We had a map of the village from the District, with the boundaries, but the boundaries the leaders have shown us are different. The dam that was built last year or the year before is being regarded as a boundary, but according to the map, it is not. [51]

In addition, several people that I talked to in both individual interviews and the focus group discussion in Rudewa Mbuyuni village referred to the fact that in the 1970s the boundaries of Rudewa Mbuyuni were shifted. They probably referred to the "*Operation Vijiji*", the villagization programme which was initiated in the late 1960s, which aimed at concentrating rural people in so-called "Ujamaa" villages and thereby modernizing agriculture (Benjaminsen et al. 2009). In the conversations about the proposed Wildlife Management Area, several of the respondents (independent of each other) referred to this, because they claimed that since the boundary was shifted in the 1970s, they do not have any area with wildlife anymore:

"(…) Rudewa Mbuyuni originally had a conservation area for wildlife. (…) the large area with forest was inside Rudewa Mbuyuni. But then, there was an operation passing through our village, in 1973 or 1974. We were given a specific area.(…) After that change we realized that our area had been reduced by the District leadership without our knowledge. Today this means that an area for wildlife is not there, but we had a good area set aside (…) and we wished to have it. (…) But we did not understand that our leaders took away something from us; we did not know how much that area was worth."[52]

Furthermore, there were several villagers who claimed that the boundaries had been moved further back into the land of Rudewa Mbuyuni, in the late 1990s. There were two different accounts of this happening:

"(…) the District Councilor and the Village Executive Officer were Maasai. It is not known what they did; which technique they used, to get that area, without consulting the villagers, although they claimed to have consulted us. They did ask us, but, as you know, the ones who have power nowadays are the ones who have money. We didn't make it, and until this day we have left that issue behind because we have realized we have failed. The District councilor and the Village Executive Officer were Maasai up until 1998. (…) These people arrived at our village like they

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[50] Focus Group Discussion, Mbwade, 18.10.08.
[51] Interview, Rudewa Mbuyuni, 07.11.08.
[52] Focus Group Discussion, Rudewa Mbuyuni, 03.12.09.

were our leaders, even though they were employed by the government. Indeed, the District Councilor was elected by the villagers, but not the Village Executive Officer. And the Village Executive Officer is the main authority in the whole village; he will not fail to do anything in his power. He can write any information and sign it, and various people can come to him and get their plans approved, whether they are good or bad. After the departure of this District Councilor, the present administration came (…). They told us about these new boundaries, which had already been agreed upon. This is still confusing us, because that area had been selected for conservation. (…) The new boundaries have been shifted five kilometers, from the original boundaries towards our village.[53]

Another villager gave this account:

"Even at the map, if you look at it, you will see that Rudewa Mbuyuni has an area with wildlife. Even the government recognized that. But some people have changed it. Now they give us troubles and it is a loss for the nation. Future leaders are being killed. Farmers are not comfortable with farming, we merely live in uncertainty. An area has been taken by force. They brought us a Village Executive Officer that was Maasai, and he changed the livestock route. Later, they made an agreement that this was the new border, without our knowledge. And if you are not careful, you will get hit by the Maasais' spears."[54]

Msowero village is located further away from Twatwatwa and does not border directly. In both the focus group discussion and interviews with leadership, the participants expressed negative opinions about cooperating on wildlife management with Twatwatwa village. They also claimed that

"(…) the borders of Msowero were shifted from before the Maasai came. So now we do not have any land in the area with wildlife, which we used to have. (…) We fear the conflicts between pastoralists and farmers and this scares us from cooperating with Twatwatwa. We think it is a good idea, but we don't know how we could participate in this (…)"[55]

The focus group discussion and interviews in Msowero were held shortly after the mentioned violent episode in a nearby village, where in a conflict area on the border between Mabwegere village, including Mambegwa sub-village (inhabited by a pastoralist community), and Kikenge village (a farmers' village), violence broke out on October 27th 2008, and six people were killed. The Focus Group Discussion in Msowero eventually turned into a quite heated collective expression of frustration over this incident, where one of their comrades had been killed. They reached the consensus that it would me much better to have a WMA within their own village, and they told about their large areas of forest which is in need of conservation. This idea was

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[53] Interview, villager, Rudewa Mbuyuni, 07.11.08.
[54] Focus Group Discussion, Rudewa Mbuyuni, 07.11.08.
[55] Interview, village leader, Msowero, 06.11.08 and Focus Group Discussion, Msowero, 04.12.08.

more developed when I returned for the second time after six months. They then had a full list of the (six) villages they proposed to be involved (although they had not made any formal request yet), in a big conservation area involving three different wards, but with only farmers' villages.

4.1.4   Villagers' perceptions and opinions about the prospect of the WMA

The Twatwatwa WMA has not been established in the way that was envisaged. In this section I focus on the community members' perceptions concerning what would be necessary for a WMA to be successful. The most prominent answer among all the participants, were the issue of *ownership*. If the WMA was to be successful, the whole process ought to be owned and be fully in the hands of the communities, and not in outsiders' hands, in order to be sustainable, and not only that, but in order to be well received at all. This was especially prominent in one of the village meetings, where it was expressed great concern about the issue of conservation and displacement of people, as mentioned before (Twatwatwa village). In a sub-village meeting in Rudewa Mbuyuni this opinion was also expressed clearly. They argued that it was paramount to the success of the WMA because they said they knew that "if we will not have the rights to these resources, we know others will grab the benefits"[56]. They have been informed about the benefits they could obtain through partnerships with hunting companies or by selling wildlife quotas to resident hunters and tourist hunters, but they have not been given the user rights. So the area is still used as an open area, where the revenues from hunting licenses are paid at the District level and thereby remains with the government. This causes a lot of frustration.

It is also important, considering the history of 'land grabbing' in Tanzania, and especially the anti-pastoralist policies which have limited pastoralist rights for decades, that people are involved and fully informed during the whole decision-making process, so that people will not believe that their land is taken away from them. This opinion was expressed in Rudewa Mbuyuni by the previous village chairperson who was village chairperson at the time of initiation of the WMA. This was exactly what happened at the time, the majority of the village council in Rudewa Mbuyuni actually voted against the proposition of joining the Twatwatwa WMA[57]. Only Twatwatwa, and at a later stage Mbwade, participated in the decision making process to some

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[56] Village meeting, Makulunge sub-village, Rudewa Mbuyuni, 05.11.08.
[57] Interview with previous village chairperson, Rudewa Mbuyuni village, 07.11.08.

degree, while the other two villages, Rudewa Mbuyuni and Msowero, were merely included to prevent poaching and to promote good relations.

4.2   Policy analysis and power relations

4.2.1   National wildlife policy and legislation

A roundtable discussion on the Wildlife Policy (1998) concluded that "the very definition of a Wildlife Management Area is contradictory and reflects a colonial conservation mentality" (Sosovele et al. 1999, 11). A WMA is defined in the Wildlife Policy (1998) as: "an area *declared by the Minister to be so* and set aside by village government for the purpose of biological natural resource conservation' (URT, 1998: 35, emphasis added)." The definition is adopted directly from the Wildlife Conservation Act of 1974 which was indeed mired by colonial conservation mentality, since that was the prevalent approach at the time (the socialist government of post-colonial times was also "highly interested in the control of protected areas" because it believed "conservation would bring revenues from tourism" (Haller et al. 2008, 129)). In the Wildlife Policy (2007) the definition had been changed to "an area set aside by Village Council for the purpose of conservation of wildlife and other biological natural resources, under the Wildlife Act" (United Republic of Tanzania (URT) 2007), but in the Wildlife Conservation Act, 2008, Bill Supplement no. 2[58], the definition is again "an area declared *by the Minister*" (United Republic of Tanzania (URT) 2008, 15). Furthermore, it still says that "any authorized associations managing a Wildlife Management Area shall (…) have the right to negotiate and sign agreements with potential investors, provided that a representative of the Wildlife Division and the District Council *shall be involved in the process* of negotiation and the signing of such agreements" (United Republic of Tanzania (URT) 2008, 29, emphasis added). When it comes to decisions regarding benefit sharing the decision making role of villagers are also limited: "Benefit sharing in the Wildlife Management Areas shall comply with guidelines issued by the Government from time to time" (United Republic of Tanzania (URT) 2008, 28). The top-down approach to conservation is still evident in these statements. Even the provision stating that "The Minister shall, in the making regulations under this section, ensure that the local community is

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[58] The Wildlife Conservation Act (2009) was still awaiting the signature of the President at the time of writing.

properly *consulted and informed* on how such community shall benefit from the Wildlife Management Areas" (United Republic of Tanzania (URT) 2008, 28, emphasis added), represents a limited or weak form of participation and does not vest communities with autonomy regarding wildlife management decisions (merely the management responsibility). Furthermore, the establishment process for WMAs consists of a series of complicated and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures (see figure 7). These complicated and cumbersome procedure steps are in itself a sign that the Tanzanian government "does not want the boat to sail"[59]. The fact that new institutions (CBOs) are required before management responsibilities are transferred is also slowing down and complicating the process even further. As Nelson (2007, 16) argues, "creating new institutions is inevitably difficult, time-consuming and laden with risks", and that "developing downward accountability to the constituency takes time; village councils have been working on this for over thirty years already and still remains weak in many instances".

These two central characteristics of the establishment of WMAs; the cumbersome bureaucratic procedures and demanding pre-requisites, and the creation of new institutions to be vested with power rather than already existing elected village councils, "are widely observed strategies used by central agencies to resist or undermine reform" (Nelson 2007, 22; Ribot 1999).

The importance of explaining the divergence between rhetoric and reality then becomes clear: People with power deliberately employ certain narratives, which are easily reproduced and rarely questioned by often uncritical and efficiency-, action- and result-oriented actors such as conservation NGOs. The crucial entry-point to understand failures of community based conservation lies in the incentives which hinder devolutionary reform, and how the power functions, in order to know where civil society and academia should start exercising pressure in order to propagate change.

The WMA Regulations of 2002 were crafted under the Wildlife Conservation Act, 1974 (sections 19 and 84), because a new Act which would be more in line with the liberal ideas of the 1998 Wildlife Policy had not been passed yet. The regulations did however "not place any real control of the WMAs in the hands of the communities as was first envisaged when the [1998] Wildlife Policy was compiled" (Baldus & Caldwell 2004, 31).

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[59] Dr. George Jambyia, Department of Geography, University of Dar es Salaam, speech at Policy Forum debate, Dar es Salaam, 31.10.2008.

Figure 7: Procedural and bureaucratic steps of WMA establishment

1. Village Assembly(-ies) agrees to form a WMA based on Village Council(s)' recommendations
2. Village(s) form a Community Based Organization (CBO) and register it at the Ministry of Home Affairs
3. The CBO prepares a Strategic Plan
4. Village(s) prepare Land Use Plans, which must be surveyed and registered
5. Land Use Plans are subjected to Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
6. Village(s) prepare(s) by-laws to support the Land Use Plans
7. CBO prepares Resource Management Zone Plan (or General Management Plan)
8. CBO applies to Director of Wildlife for AA status (sends WMA gazettement proposal)
9. The Director of Wildlife sends the proposal to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT)
10. The MNRT drafts the Government Notice (GN)
11. The Draft GN is sent to the Parliamentary Draughtsman at the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs
12. The Parliamentary Draughtsman scrutinizes the GN before approving (or rejecting) it
13. If approved, the GN goes back to the MNRT for the Minister's signature
14. The GN is sent back to the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs
15. Ministry of Justice forwards the GN to President's Office (Public Service Management) to get the GN number
16. The GN is sent to the Government Printer, where it joins the queue waiting to be printed
17. **WMA is gazetted**
18. CBO/AA applies for user rights
19. User rights approved
20. CBO/AA applies to the Director for a hunting block (if the CBO/AA wishes to conduct tourist hunting in the WMA)
21. Hunting block approved
22. CBO/AA enters into investment agreements
23. Investments in WMAs subjected to EIA

Source: Based on Maganga et al. 2007 and Nelson et al. 2006

The new Wildlife Act which was proposed in 2008 was not passed before February 2009, and based on a different policy, namely the Wildlife Policy of 2007 which was drafted in a non-participatory way[60]. The draft bill received extensive reactions from civil society and was heavily debated in the Parliamentary session of November 2008, and was thus postponed until the Parliamentary session of January-February 2009.

One of the major drawbacks of Tanzanian Wildlife policy and legislation is that wildlife is still owned by the Tanzanian state, and only provides local people with temporary management and user rights over this resource. Furthermore, the creation of new authorities for the purpose of managing the WMAs in Tanzania has been cited as a problem, for several reasons. Establishing new institutions is time-consuming and costly, and conflicts can emerge when newly established AAs are vested with power over issuing hunting concessions, but have little accountability towards village councils (Maganga et al. 2007; Nelson 2007). This could be solved by making village councils into AAs themselves: "The 1974 wildlife conservation legislation gives the minister responsible for wildlife discretionary powers to designate village councils as authorized associations, in order to allocate hunting concessions to them" (Shauri 1999, 5).

Another main challenge with wildlife management in Tanzania is the fact that the National Wildlife Policy of 1998 existed nine years without having a Wildlife Act which could provide the legal basis for implementing the policy. Many of the ideas put forth in the Policy had no provisions in the Wildlife Conservation Act from 1974, which focused mainly on protected areas and conservation techniques which excluded local communities from benefiting from the wildlife or being able to participate in management decisions. One innovative way around this problem has been the establishment of the WMA regulations of 2002, which were revised in 2005, as a legal tool aiding the WMA establishment process. However, even though the WMA regulations provide local communities with the possibility to enter into contractual agreements with tourist hunting or non-consumptive tourism companies, their agreements must still be approved by the Wildlife Division and principles for benefit sharing agreement is not clearly

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[60] Edward Porokwa, representative for The Pastoralists Indigenous NGOs (PINGOS Forum), speech at debate arranged by the Policy Forum: "Do Current Wildlife Conservation Policy and Law Address Economic and Livelihood Issues for All Tanzanians? A Debate on the Wildlife Act, 2008", British Council, Dar es Salaam, 31.10.08; interview with Dr. H. Sosovele, IRA/WWF, 31.10.08.

spelled out in the regulations. Therefore, the regulations need revision, to become more in line with the concept of WMAs as it was put forth in the National Wildlife Policy of 1998. However, since the Wildlife Policy was revised and passed anew in 2007 with a return towards more protectionist ideas of conservation, it has been a great challenge for advocacy groups and the civil society to make sure the new Wildlife Conservation Act will contain the right provisions for community based conservation. It was heavily debated in the Parliamentary session of the last week of October and the first week of November 2008, and considerable pressure was made from NGOs and advocacy groups such as Tanzania National Resource Forum and the Policy Forum, and passing of the Act was postponed until the session of January 2009, where it also went through considerable discussion before it was finally passed in an amended form February 3rd, 2009.

In the Wildlife Policy of 2007 wetlands management is also included in the policy. In 2005 there was considerable discussions considering the fact that wetlands was not needed in the Wildlife policy considering that the Environmental Management Act (2004) already has provisions for this[61], including that "the Minister shall, after consultation with the Minister responsible for land, declare any area of land to be a protected wetland under this Act" (United Republic of Tanzania (URT) 2004, 48). But the passing of the Wildlife Law was postponed in 2005 and in 2007 the Wildlife Policy was revised in a hurry to include wetlands management and then passed[62]. For example, the new Wildlife Law states that one of its objectives is to "protect, conserve and administer areas with great biological diversity, including wetlands which are representative of the major wildlife habitats" (United Republic of Tanzania (URT) 2008, 16). Furthermore, it aims to "support, strengthen and *enlarge* the wildlife protected areas network as the core of conservation activities" (United Republic of Tanzania (URT) 2008, 16, emphasis added). The implications for rural people considering new restrictions in wetlands are several and severe. The law states that "any person shall not graze any livestock in a game reserve or wetlands reserve" (United Republic of Tanzania (URT) 2008, 22), and that "a person shall not, save with permission in writing from the Director, hunt, burn, capture, kill, wound or molest any

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[61] Interview with Dr. H. Sosovele, coordinator for the Natural Resource Management Program in World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and researcher/consultant at the Institute for Resource Assessment (IRA), University of Dar es Salaam, 28.10.2008.

[62] Interview with Dr. H. Sosovele, coordinator for the Natural Resource Management Program in World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and researcher/consultant at the Institute for Resource Assessment (IRA), University of Dar es Salaam, 28.10.2008.

animal or fish in any game reserve, game controlled area or wetlands reserve" (United Republic of Tanzania (URT) 2008, 23). Wetlands provide 95 % of all domestic, irrigation, industrial and livestock water in Tanzania, 95 % of all vegetables and 95 % of all rice in Tanzania is grown in or watered from wetlands[63]. Further restrictions and the new Wildlife Act's objectives of enlarging the protected areas network and establishing more protected wetland areas and wetlands reserves will likely have consequences for people dependent on these wetland resources for their livelihoods. Wetlands are defined according to article 1 of the Ramsar Convention as "areas of marsh, fen, peatland or water, whether natural or artificial, permanent or temporary, with water that is static or flowing, fresh, brackish or salt, including areas of marine water the depth of which at low tide does not exceed six metres" (Morgera & Wingard 2008).

In the end of October 2008 the Policy Forum (PF) together with Tanzania National Resource Forum (TNRF) arranged an open forum debate on the proposed wildlife bill. Specific recommendations for the Wildlife Act no. 9 of 2008 had been compiled based on inputs from PINGOS forum, Fred Nelson and TNRF. Some of the sections for which changes were recommended were the following:

In part IV, section 13 (1) it is stated that: "The President may, after consultation with relevant local government authorities, by order in the Gazette declare any area of Tanzania to be a game reserve". The recommendations claimed that this subsection is not clear on local government authority, and that local government consultation does not necessarily mean involvement of local communities. They proposed the subsection should be changed to include "(…) after consultation with relevant local communities (village community and Village Assembly)", but the provision remained unchanged in the Act which was passed in the National Assembly February 3rd 2009 (United Republic of Tanzania (URT) 2009).

Section 17 (1) stated that "Any person shall not graze any livestock in a game reserve or wetland reserves", a provision which remained unchanged. The recommendations proposed to change it to "Any person shall not graze any livestock, farm or burn charcoal in a game reserve.", because these restrictions in wetland reserves will interfere with those reserves which fall on village land and are under village conservation and utilization mechanisms. In addition

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[63] Maganga, F. Presentation at Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB), 'Tanzania's New Wildlife Law and Its Implications for Rural Livelihoods', date?

this will pose unnecessary restriction to wetlands depended upon by villages as water sources for domestic and other livelihood processes.

Section 20 stated that "Any person shall not, save with the written permission of the director previously sought and obtained, graze any livestock in any Game Controlled Area". This provision, in the words of the authors of the specific recommendations: "marks the end of pastoralism in Tanzania, most of which is undertaken within the current setup of Game Controlled Areas, which overlap with village lands", and furthermore that "This section is in direct interference with the Village Land Act of 1999 and customary rights to occupy land." This section remained unchanged and is still present in the final version which was passed in the National Assembly.

In part V Wildlife Management Areas, section 31 (4) "The Minister shall in consultation with the Minister responsible for local government authorities prepare model by-laws to be adopted by the village authorities which shall apply in the respective Wildlife Management Area", was changed to "The Minister shall in consultation with the Minister responsible for local government authorities prepare model by-laws to be adopted *with such necessary changes* by the village authorities which shall apply in the respective Wildlife Management Area". This still does not allow for village communities to fully participate in preparing by-laws themselves. This contradicts with the provisions in the original WMA regulations, it was stated under Part 5 "Administration of Wildlife Management Areas", section 21 that; "Any Village council shall have the following responsibilities in the management of Wildlife Management Areas:

a) providing land for the designation of a Wildlife Management Area;
b) coordinating natural resource activities at village level;
c) preparing a Land Use Plan;
d) *formulating natural resources management by-laws;*
e) approving mechanism for benefit sharing, among the villages which form the Wildlife Management Area, developed by Authorized Association;
f) monitoring the activities of the Authorized Association and report to the Village Assembly and the District Council;
g) ensuring that there exists a secure and favorable business environment in the Wildlife Management Area; and

h) ensuring that Authorized Association implement sector policies while entering into agreement with the Authorized Association on the management of a Wildlife Management Area

(*emphasis added*)

The original 1982 Local Government Act gave the Village Council the power to make by-laws agreed upon in the Village Assembly and subject to approval of the District Council (United Republic of Tanzania (URT) 1982). Although the 1999 amendment specified that the Village Council is not allowed to "make any by-law which is inconsistent with any by-laws made by a district or other local government organ above the village council for the time being in force in relation to that Village Council" (United Republic of Tanzania (URT) 1999b, section 164(3)), there is a long way from there to the very centralized provision in the recent 2009 Wildlife Conservation Act.

With the revised Wildlife Conservation Act passed; what still remains is to see if and how the WMA regulatory framework will be revised.

4.2.2 Privatization and neo-liberal strategies

One of the most prominent discourses surrounding community-based conservation is the win-win discourse which claims that this type of conservation benefits local people at the same time as conservation interests are maintained. One of the ways in which such CBC programs can be successful, the discourse claims, is by introducing private-public partnerships and providing for rural people to enter into wildlife-based enterprises, such as is the idea behind WMAs in Tanzania. There are various actors and interests behind this type of conservation:

> "(…) neoliberal conservation moves beyond a world of win-win solutions to a world of win-win-win-win-win-win-win (or win[7] if you like) solutions that benefit: corporate investors, national economies, biodiversity, local people, western consumers, development agencies and the conservation organisations that receive funding from those agencies to undertake large interventions" (Igoe & Brockington 2007, 435).

Conservation can then be seen as a continuation of the neo-liberal program: Nature, wildlife and even cultures become commodities. With the new paradigm with people *as part of* nature,

instead of people *outside of* nature, it is not only nature that is seen as a valuable resource, but the cultural aspects of humans in it as well. This can lead to a commoditisation of both nature and culture, and might impede development in the sense that conservation aims to preserve the status quo (West et al. 2006).

4.2.3 Decentralization, devolution and deconcentration of power

Political decentralization processes have happened in many African countries since the 1990s, following pressure from donor countries and organizations, especially bilateral development aid which focused on economic liberalization and structural adjustment programs. These neo-liberal strategies sought development (mainly macro-economic growth) through downsizing of the government, privatization and decentralization.

There has been a tendency in discourse regarding community based conservation or community based natural resource management to confuse decentralization with devolution of power (Murphree 2000). Decentralization policies in Tanzania in the 1980s transferred responsibilities to the district and village levels, but they failed to devolve any considerable power over the management of natural resources. The same is the case with the WMA concept; communities (Authorized Associations) are, when gazetted, vested with *management rights*, i.e. responsibilities only, and not real *ownership* over the resource or the benefits accrued from it. This is partly a matter of economic costs versus benefits, since the guidelines and regulations are unclear with respects to the benefits to be obtained, and it also depends on successful contracts with investors. In Twatwatwa there has not been any potential investors, although there have been applications for two hunting blocks at other locations in the District (just outside of Mikumi National Park)[64]. More important however, is the political risk involved (Haller et al. 2008). In a District such as Kilosa, where the issue of secure access to land is one of the most important and pressing issues for the livelihoods of the people, village communities are not willing to risk anything which could jeopardize their ownership to the land. This can be seen as one of the major reasons behind the failure of the WMA approach in Kilosa District, and perhaps in Tanzania generally.

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[64] Interview with District Game Officer (DGO) and District Natural Resources Officer (DNRO), Kilosa District Council, 20.10.08.

As Murphree (2001, 7) puts it:

> "Devolution is an approach that faces strong and entrenched opposition. The state, its private sector allies and its bureaucracies have their own appropriative interests in local resources and the state is loath to legitimate local jurisdictions in ways that diminish their ability to claim the benefits of these resources. States, even when they grasp the importance of local management and stewardship, thus prefer decentralization to devolution. This tendency, more than any other factor, is responsible for the failure of programmes ostensibly designed to create local natural resource management jurisdictions."

4.2.4 The history of anti-pastoralist policies in Tanzania

Since independence there has been an anti-pastoral political climate in Tanzania. Strategies to "modernize" the Maasai people were initiated already under colonial rule, with for instance the 5 year Maasai Development Plan (MDP) which was started in 1951, "a project which served to facilitate, justify and consolidate the expansion of state control into numerous realms of Maasai life" (Hodgson 2001, page). Projects aimed at agricultural modernization in the country (such as the large-scale *Ujamaa* and villagization operations in the 1960s and 1970s) have marginalized pastoralists and 'sedentarization' strategies have followed perceptions of pastoralists as "unproductive (they do not contribute to national economies), unorganized (they 'roam around'), and environmentally destructive (they cause overgrazing and desertification)" (Benjaminsen et al. 2009, 424).

Furthermore, conservation policies during colonial control started with the designation of large areas of land set aside for protection of nature. In many of these areas who were perceived as "untouched", pastoralists were in majority, because of the nature of pastoral production which does not leave a visible trace in the landscape, in contrast to farming activities.

These anti-pastoral policies can be seen as one cause behind conflicts between farmers and herders: The shrinking opportunities and threats to their livelihoods have rendered pastoralists without other options than turning to violence (Benjaminsen et al. 2009). At the same time, pastoralists have the capacity to bribe officials in case of disputes between farmers and herders, and this enhances the problems further and causes the neglecting of the rights of farmers as well who are affected by the violence, and tragically experience loss of lives and assets.

The history of anti-pastoralism in Tanzania, and evictions of the Maasai from conservation areas have made the Maasai skeptical, understandably, towards government policies, and especially towards conservation in many ways. In my fieldwork in the village of Twatwatwa I experienced this skepticism first-hand in the mentioned village meeting.

Another source of their skepticism can be traced to the recent evictions of pastoralists in the name of wetlands conservation. Livestock keepers are frequently blamed for causing damages to the environment in the public discourse of Tanzania and beyond, and have even been blamed for causing the current power shortage in Tanzania, through livestock grazing in the catchment area of Mtera dam, while the water shortage is probably to a larger degree caused by rice cultivation upstream of the dam (Benjaminsen et al. 2009). In March 2006, the Government of Tanzania issued an eviction order to the pastoralists from the Ihefu area in the Usangu wetlands in Mbeya in the central-western part of Tanzania[65]. Two months later a full-scale military operation took place including regular police, anti poaching units and game wardens who evicted hundreds of pastoralists with over 300 000 cattle (Benjaminsen et al. 2009). The livestock keepers were forced to leave their homes and were not provided with any relocation area. It was first after intensive lobbying from civil society and human rights groups that the government offered the evictees alternative resettlement in the Lindi and Coastal regions, in the southeastern part of Tanzania, many hundreds of miles away. Sufficient transport for their livestock was not provided, thus incurring extra costs for the pastoralists. On top of that they were incurred fees at several road posts on the way, where at one point they had to pay up to Tshs. 300 000 (about USD 300) per vehicle carrying livestock[66]. In total the livestock owners who were forcefully evicted from their own homes had to pay Tshs. 14 450 000, and about 1 500 cattle were impounded (Benjaminsen et al. 2009; Benjaminsen et al. forthcoming). People who participated in the focus group discussion in Twatwatwa expressed sincere worry that something similar would happen to them. After the actual discussion was over, where they had expressed their worry that my research had hidden intentions, two young Maasai came over to me and told what they had heard about the evictions in Ihefu. They said they had heard that people who could

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[65] Hakiardhi/Land Rights Research and Resources Institute (LRRRI): "Pastoralists Survival Still At Stake… Here is a Sad Story of Their Ruthless Eviction from Usangu Basin in Mbeya Tanzania". http://www.hakiardhi.org/HA-Docs/PATORALISTS%20SURVIVAL%20STILL%20AT%20STAKE.pdf Accessed: March 30th, 2009.

[66] Hakiardhi/Land Rights Research and Resources Institute (LRRRI): "Pastoralists Survival Still At Stake… Here is a Sad Story of Their Ruthless Eviction from Usangu Basin in Mbeya Tanzania". http://www.hakiardhi.org/HA-Docs/PATORALISTS%20SURVIVAL%20STILL%20AT%20STAKE.pdf. Accessed: March 30th, 2009.

not afford transport for their livestock simply had to walk the whole distance to the designated relocation areas in Lindi, that livestock had died on the way or upon arrival from illnesses, and that even people had lost their lives in the process[67].

5 Conclusions

5.1 Summary of findings

Actually, none of the villages in the study area want the WMA as it was proposed. Of course, all of them agreed to the idea behind it in principle, but: Twatwatwa villagers are cautious about giving other villages rights to share the resources on their land, and generally afraid of losing land rights; Mbwade joined the Twatwatwa WMA in the belief that they could establish their own WMA eventually; Rudewa Mbuyuni did actually not approve of the proposed WMA, because the majority of the villagers opposed it. Still it was established, which says a lot about the decision making and participation aspect of the process. Msowero agreed to it at the time, but now, after recent conflicts between pastoralists and farmers, leadership and the participants in the focus group discussions were very negative to cooperate with Twatwatwa (the Maasai).

None of the village leadership or previous leadership (leaders at the time of establishment) had specific knowledge about how much they would benefit from the program, or how benefits would be shared between the different villages, or between village council, District Council and central government.

This shows that the decision to establish a WMA was taken centrally and involved very little participation from the villagers who were to be affected by the program. Even the CBC officer in the Wildlife Division said that"the initial decision to establish WMAs was probably imposed on the villages"[68].

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[67] Focus group discussion/village meeting, Parakuyo, Twatwatwa village, 16.10.08. It is unknown where they had this information from.
[68] Interview, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, Dar es Salaam, 11.12.08.

We have seen various outcomes of the WMA process in Tanzania. A few have been somewhat successful, but there are also terrible stories of "community-based" conservation ending up with forced resettlement, imposition of rules and basically the government setting up new regimes for controlling land at the expense of the rural villagers who depend completely on the resources therein for their livelihoods (see f.ex. Brockington 2004).

5.2   The critical importance of understanding power structures

As we have seen, the narrative concerning community-based development talks about decentralization strategies, and the importance of participation of local communities. However, when projects fail, there seem to be little questioning of the concepts itself ('decentralization', 'participation', 'communities'), but a focus on technical solutions or that people in the 'communities' are not enabled to 'participate' and that capacity building and education is the answer. However, while these technical and practical aspects undoubtedly also play an important role, the strong focus on these masks the underlying power relations which provides larger hinders to success. In order to understand the discrepancies between policy and practice, it is necessary to go beyond narrow case study descriptions and undertake deeper analyses of where decision making power is situated and which outcomes this has for the future of community development and conservation.

5.3   Prospects of community based conservation in Tanzania and beyond

In our times, where there is a growing consensus that the community based way of doing conservation, namely by combining the goals of conservation of natural resources with community development, have largely not been successful in reaching either of the goals. Therefore, a return to the "old" ways of conservation is emerging, proven by rising numbers of establishment of new Protected Areas, for example such as the recent establishment of protected wetland areas in Tanzania. In addition, the recent threat by the United Nations' Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to take the Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA) off of the World Heritage List, where it has been since 1979 under natural criteria, because of "[i]ncreased human activities not compatible with conservation interests within the

NCA and its legendary crater located in northern Tanzania"[69], is also likely to contribute towards stricter protection. The Ngorongoro Conservation Area is also on the 'Tentative List' for being inscribed as a World Heritage under cultural criteria, which means it is a candidate for being inscribed on the World Heritage List under cultural criteria as well (since it applied for this January 28th 2009), based on the justification that "NCA is the only site in the world with high concentration of wildlife that lives in harmony with human communities of diverse cultural values. The multiple land use systems in this area is one of the earliest to be established around the world as a means of reconciling human development and natural resources conservation."[70] However, when even this prime example for combining the two goals is threatened, this might fuel the discourse which argues that a return to stricter measures of conservation is necessary. This however, will have severe consequences for local people who have borne the costs of both strict conservationist and community based conservation discourses for a long time already. As Igoe (2007, 241) argues; there is "a pressing need for the institutionalization of independent reporting and structures of oversight and accountability at all levels of international conservation". This study seeks to contribute towards this agenda, because only in reporting from the reality of community based conservation can the illusions of community based conservation be countered.

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[69]Ihucha, Adam: 'Ngorongoro on Unesco's axing list?', Guardian Tanzania (IPP Media), May 4th, 2009 (http://kurayangu.com/ipp/guardian/2009/05/04/135957.html, accessed May 12th, 2009).
[70] UNESCO: World Heritage Tentative Lists: Ngorongoro Conservation Area (renomination under cultural criteria) (http://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/5420/, accessed May 12th, 2009.

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
Appendices

Appendix 1: Original sketch map of Twatwatwa Pilot WMA

Source: Natural Resources Office, Kilosa District Council

Appendix 2: Original sketch map of major wildlife migration routes, Kilosa District

Source: Natural Resources Office, Kilosa District Council

Appendix 3: Checklists for key informants

1.0 Village leaders

1.1. Village Assembly's role in decision making process of establishing the WMA

1.2. Information made available prior to establishment of the WMA

1.3. Knowledge about process of application for WMA

1.4. Extent of cooperation with the other villages in the WMA

1.5. Type of training received

1.6. Reasons for breakdown of the implementation process

1.7. Whether the WMA was wanted by the village members (why/why not)

1.8. Whether and how the WMA would benefit the village (why/why not)

1.9. Whether or not the WMA would be feasible (why/why not)

1.10.   Future prospects for establishing a WMA

1.11.   How benefits would be shared between local and central levels of government and between villages

1.12.   Main challenges in the implementation process

1.13.   Communication between village and district level authorities

2.0 Village natural resource committee members

2.1. What kind of training received

2.2. Knowledge about the process of establishing a WMA

2.3. Knowledge about how benefits would be shared

2.4. Knowledge about reasons for breakdown of the implementation process

2.5. General experiences with conservation of natural resources

3.0 District natural resource staff

3.1. Role in establishing and implementing the WMA

3.2. Reasons for the breakdown of the implementation process

3.3. Wildlife resources in the area

3.4. Poaching control

3.5. External funding and facilitation

3.6. Planned activities for wildlife management

3.7. Future prospects for implementation of WMA

4.0 Ward leaders

4.1 Role in establishing and implementing the WMA

5.0 Wildlife Division staff

5.1. Decision making process WMA

5.2. Implementation process WMA

5.3. Problems in the implementation process

5.4. Prospects for future implementation of WMA

5.5. Reasons for introducing a new National Wildlife Policy

5.6. Reasons for the return to a more centralized form of wildlife conservation, i.e. the New Non-Consumptive Tourism regulations and the proposed Wildlife Act, 2008.