



# **Politics of participatory wildlife management in Enduimet WMA, Tanzania**

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MSc Thesis in Development Studies

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## **DECLARATION**

I, Maya Yulistiani Minwary, declare that this thesis is the result of my research, investigations, and findings. Sources of information other than our own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Date:

Signature:



*For my mother who has given me precious and unconditional physical, emotional, financial and spiritual support;*

*For my older brothers who taught me to be tough;*

*For my friends who shared many tears, laughter and enlightening moments with me,*

*I thank you for making me the person I am today.*



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# *Table of contents*

List of Figures and Tables .....	xi
List of Acronyms .....	xii
Part I. The Introduction to the thesis .....	1
1.0 Introduction .....	1
1.1 THE MYTH OF PRISTINE AFRICAN WILDERNESS .....	1
1.2 COMMUNITY-BASED CONSERVATION STRATEGY FOR WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT IN TANZANIA .....	1
1.3 STUDY OBJECTIVES .....	2
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS .....	3
2.0 <i>Background</i> .....	4
2.1 HISTORY OF CONSERVATION POLICY IN TANZANIA: THE INFLUENCE OF COLONIAL ATTITUDES. ....	4
2.2 POST-COLONIAL TANZANIA.....	4
2.3 POLITICAL ECOLOGY.....	5
2.4 GLOBAL INTERESTS .....	6
2.5 CONSERVATION AND PASTORALISM.....	7
2.6 THE PURPOSE OF WMAS .....	8
2.7 WMAS AND PASTORALISTS .....	9
2.8 INCONSISTENT POLICIES AND CUMBERSOME REGULATIONS .....	10
3.0 <i>Conclusion</i> .....	13
<i>References</i> .....	14
Part II. The Article.....	17
I. INTRODUCTION .....	18
WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREAS AS AN EXAMPLE OF CBNRM .....	19
II. POWER AND “PARTICIPATION” .....	20
POWER IN CBNRM .....	20
PARTICIPATION.....	22
A SHIFT IN PARADIGM.....	23
III. CONTEXT OF THE STUDY: A BRIEF HISTORY OF ENDUIMET WMA.....	25
IV. METHODS.....	27
V. CASE STUDY: ENDUIMET DIVISION .....	28
ECOLOGY OF STUDY AREA .....	28
POPULATION AND LAND USE .....	30
WILDLIFE AS AN INCOME SOURCE: CONSUMPTIVE VS. NON-CONSUMPTIVE TOURISM .....	32
VI. FINDINGS & DISCUSSIONS .....	34
TURNING A CONCEPT INTO REALITY: IT’S NOT REALLY THAT EASY .....	34
PARTICIPATION IN ENDUIMET WMA.....	34
BENEFIT AND LOSS.....	36
TINGA TINGA VILLAGE VS. ELEPHANTS.....	40
BENEFIT SHARING .....	43
SINYA’S BATTLE .....	45
FEELINGS ABOUT ENDUIMET WMA.....	48
DISCUSSION .....	49
VII. CONCLUSION.....	51
VII. REFERENCES.....	53
Appendix: Questionnaire guide for Bomas/Household Interviews.....	58

## *List of Figures and Tables*

Figure 1: Twelve basic steps in the formation of a WMA (Adapted from Nelson 2007) .....	12
Figure 2: Map of Enduimet Division and surrounding areas (Adapted from Trench et al. 2009) .....	26
Figure 3: Map of Resource Management Zones and Longido GCA (Adapted from Nelson 2005) .....	29
Figure 4: Proposed distribution of revenue.....	44
Table 1: Levels of participation (Adapted from Mannigel 2008 and Pretty et al. 1995).....	23
Table 2: Overview from fieldwork of past and present active safari companies operating in the nine villages (non-exhaustive) .....	32

## *List of Acronyms*

AA	Authorized Association
AWF	African Wildlife Foundation
CBC	Community-based conservation
CBNRM	Community-based natural resource management
CBO	Community-Based Organization
CWM	Community wildlife management
DGO	District Game Officer
EDWM	Enduimet Wildlife management area
GCA	Game Controlled Area
GMT	Gane & Marshall Tanzania
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft Für Technische Zusammenarbeit
MCF	Malignant Cattharal Fever
MKUKUTA	National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty
MNRT	Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism
NARCO	National Ranching Company
NP	National Park
PA	Protected Area
TTC	Tanzanian Travel Company
VEO	Village Executive Officer
WMA	Wildlife Management Area

# **Part I. The Introduction to the thesis**

## ***1.0 Introduction***

### ***1.1 THE MYTH OF PRISTINE AFRICAN WILDERNESS***

The popular perception of African wilderness as untouched beauty has been challenged over the years. Research within political ecology has revealed much of that view has been the result of Western ideology of nature imposed on the South and perpetuated by conservation policies (Neumann 1997; Robbins 2004b). Tanzania's extensive network of national parks (NPs), game reserves and other protected areas (PAs) exist because of conservation strategies established during colonial era by the German and British regimes and continued later by international organizations (Mkumbukwa 2008; Neumann 2000; Neumann 1998). The creation and development of many of these protected areas resulted in the forced eviction of local people (Brockington & Igoe 2006; Chatty & Colchester 2002; Homewood & Randall 2008). Consequently, the government of Tanzania implemented buffer-zone areas and community-based conservation (CBC) programs to address the criticism that its conservation policies violated people's rights to access natural resources for food and livelihood sources (Leader-Williams et al. 1996). This has been part of the shift from fortress to community conservation that has taken place internationally.

### ***1.2 COMMUNITY-BASED CONSERVATION STRATEGY FOR WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT IN TANZANIA***

Unlike past conservation efforts CBC programs strive to incorporate the needs and concerns of local community in some sense. For conservationists, the key to effectively conserve wildlife outside of PAs is to involve communities and provide local economic benefits as an incentive, although it did not necessarily mean introducing participatory processes (Nelson et al. 2009). Buffer-zone strategies at one extreme attempt to carefully monitor and limit traditional human activities such as collection of medicinal plants and firewood (Primack 2006); on the other side is the integration of sustainable natural resource use and biodiversity conservation in rural areas (Western & Wright 1994).

In 1998, the government of Tanzania officially recognized the necessity for “ the establishment of a new category of PA known as WMA, where local people will have full

mandate of managing and benefiting from their conservation efforts, through community-based conservation programmes” (MNRT 1998:31). WMAs would thus provide communities with the enticement of employment opportunities, easier access to natural resources<sup>1</sup> and economic profit from business ventures through the devolvement of power and authority over wildlife. On the other hand, creating WMAs means expanding Tanzania’s conserved areas, which, according to Neumann (1997), already exceeds the combine territories of Holland, Slovakia and Switzerland.

### **1.3 STUDY OBJECTIVES**

This study examines the ways in which efforts to incorporate participatory approach to wildlife conservation in Tanzania has not fully substantiated nor generated tangible income for local communities. The objective of the research is to identify the levels of participation, influence and power of various types of actors in Tanzania’s endeavor to decentralize wildlife management through a case study of Enduimet WMA. I found Vihemäki’s (2005) study on the politics of participatory forest conservation in Tanzania very useful in providing a multifaceted structure for my analysis. Following his research questions, my investigation in participatory wildlife conservation also addresses the perception of power, participation and benefit sharing in Enduimet, such as: What is the level of participation between each actor in terms of decision making and implementation of “participatory” policies? Have the implementation of “participatory” strategies to wildlife conservation changed the power relation between the local and state actors in wildlife control, and if so how? What are the factors in the institutional and wider socio-economic context that may impede success, regarding devolving powers to local people and sharing the benefits of conservation?

### **1.4 METHODS & LIMITATIONS**

I conducted fieldwork in Enduimet Division of Longido District in the West-Kilimanjaro basin, Tanzania from, September to December 2008, where I collected primarily qualitative data through the use of semi-structured interviews of key-informants and 93 household samples. I also relied on some secondary data (mainly: Kabiri 2007; Noe 2003; Nelson 2003; Nelson 2004; Trench et al. 2009). Moreover, I carefully analyzed relevant government policies and documents.

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<sup>1</sup> Mostly access to wild animal meat for food (see Baldus 2002).

Time and costs were my biggest limitations, as well as language barriers. Being a foreigner also posed as a challenge, especially in one village where some villagers associated me as a tourist or a representative from the WMA who came “to take away their land.” Ideally, it would have been very beneficial to have more time in the field for the villagers to become used to my presence. Had I possessed more time, I would have preferred to do a much more in-depth ethnographic study to be able to see a richer picture of the power relations in Enduimet. Moreover, due to the season, it was additionally hard for me to obtain random sampling of household members and an adequate representation of women, as many were busy in the field. Therefore, it is necessary to view my results within the context of a case study.

### ***1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS***

Perusing through this thesis one might notice the divergence of structure and page quantities, particularly from other thesis found in the Department of International Environmental and Development Studies (Noragric) at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB). While most Master students at UMB write a dissertation, I decided to compose a research article. It was not my primary intention to avoid writing a lengthy manuscript; rather, I wanted to produce a high quality research paper with rigorous criteria suitable for publication, though it came at the cost of quantity. The prospect of having my study of Enduimet WMA published also enticed me to choose an article since my ambition is to make a difference in the world. It would naïve to think that what I was able to gather during my short stay in Tanzania has fully captured the complexity of the situation in Enduimet. However, by having my research published, I anticipate more than just a couple people reading my findings. Consequently, I expect other scholars to build upon my study. It is also my hope to challenge policymakers to think critically and act justly with my published research.

Because of my choice, the thesis thus comprises of two main parts, the introduction section and the article for a peer-reviewed journal. It was impossible to avoid an overlap in topic coverage between the two sections since the article is limited to a certain number of words for publication. The purpose of writing an introduction section is to give readers a more in-depth overview of historical, conceptual and theoretical information that could not appear in the article because of word limitation. The article section presents original data and analysis gathered from my field study of Enduimet Division. Nonetheless, the two sections can be read independently of each other.

## **2.0 Background**

### **2.1 HISTORY OF CONSERVATION POLICY IN TANZANIA: THE INFLUENCE OF COLONIAL ATTITUDES.**

Conservation policies in the Third World reflect the legacy of colonialism implying paternalistic attitude to the local people; much of the conservation policy and land laws in Tanzania still bear witness to the country's roots as a German and British colony. The colonial German and the British authorities assumed that the indigenous citizens of Tanzania had no ownership right over their land (Neumann 1998; Shivji 1998). In the late 1800s, the German regime implemented forest and game reserves in many parts of Tanzania and such conservation approach remained intact after the British took over (Goldstein 2005). In addition, the British regime created more conservation policies, which were built upon the German framework in a more holistic approach (Goldstein 2005; Nelson et al. 2007). For instance, whereas the German game reserves allowed subsistence hunting by the locals depending on the wildlife number, the British re-gazetted these areas as complete game reserves that totally prohibit any land use by the locals. At the same time, the creation of the game reserves gave the Governor of Tanganyika full control over land access and use (Neumann 1998). Control over access to and the benefits derived from natural resources were crucial tools to create the colonial state in Tanzania (Mkumbukwa 2008). Thus, it not only generated revenue for the state and accumulation of private interests, but it also gave way for the "assertion of the dominance of the German Kaiser and later, the British Crown, over all aspects of the territory's economy and wealth" (Neumann 1998:97). Furthermore, German-established and British-expanded PAs "represented the beginning of a process of increasing central control over wildlife use and reducing local use rights" (Nelson et al., 2007:234).

### **2.2 POST-COLONIAL TANZANIA**

Tanzania gained its independence in the 1960s. Since its days as a German and British colony, the country has attempted to reform many laws and ordinances passed by the German and British (Goldstein 2005). Nevertheless, the legacy of colonialism lingers in much of its conservation policies and land laws (Nelson et al. 2009). National Parks and Game Reserves established under the German and British regimes remain. Additionally, all lands declared public were now vested in the President in place of Governor (Shivji, 1998). According to Shivji (1998:13):

*As far as land is concerned, colonial land law, inherited virtually intact at independence, reinforced the perception among politicians and bureaucrats that all lands not occupied under granted rights of occupancy were 'public lands' at the disposal of the Presidents...Politically, his actions would be justified in terms of 'public interests', overriding developmental policies or national projects.*

Henceforth, the President, in the name of the State, can supersede any existing laws that protect customary rights of the locals. Even after decades of reform in the wildlife sector, very little has changed in terms of decentralizing authority for wildlife (Nelson et al. 2007; Nelson & Agrawal 2008; Nelson et al. 2009; Schroeder 2008; Songorwa 1999). In fact, the trend of wildlife policies in Tanzania is going in the opposite direction. According to Nelson et al. (2007), current legal measures and administrative decisions in wildlife management and policies are moving towards consolidation of centralized power and control over wildlife's economic value. With the implementation of the Wildlife Conservation Act of 1974, the state continued to restrict the locals to wildlife use and access, while merging its authority to gain greater control over commercial use of wildlife (Mkumbukwa 2008). This move toward centralization created several conflicts between user groups and the state, even though the conservation of habitats has increased once declining species such as the African Elephants (TAWIRI 2003). Baldus and Cauldwell (2004) suggest that when the state's anti-poaching laws did not adequately protect wildlife, it revealed a shortfall in PAs. This prompted a new approach to work with the local communities surrounding PAs to create more equitable and reasonable conservation policies that give communities access to wildlife usage, thus providing them with an incentive to preserve the wild animals (Baldus & Cauldwell 2004).

### **2.3 POLITICAL ECOLOGY**

Political ecology seeks to explore the human-environment interactions by understanding relationships between populations, geography, ecosystems, wildlife decline, climate change, and so forth. It accepts the idea that these relations are not neutral free, and politics, especially the political economy, is central in determining people's perception and understanding of nature and environmental issues (Robbins 2004b). Blaikie and Brookfield's (1987) work in land degradation gave prominence to the links between social perceptions, the political economy and environmental problems such as "degradation." Their research showed that degradation is perceptual and socially defined (Blaikie & Brookfield 1987).

In the management of natural resources, political ecology acknowledges that the political agenda of actors and the wider socio-economic context affect the way choices are made surrounding the use and preservation of certain resources (citation). Sustainable use of natural resources, for example, is not entirely driven by pure ecological reasons, but is influenced by uneven power relations (Brown 1998). By analyzing the power relationships among actors in the way decisions are made about natural resource management and how its benefits are shared, the political ecology approach can shed light on social dynamics affecting conservation (Berkes 2004). Previous research within the field of political ecology has illustrated the various problems within “fortress-based” conservation policies, while more recent scholarships have shown challenges also within community-based conservation.

#### **2.4 GLOBAL INTERESTS**

If colonialism left its mark on the traditional conservation policy of Tanzania, so have powerful global interests in the conservation of biodiversity. The political ecology approach to conservation and wildlife management has unveiled the powerful hegemony of international interests in conservation and environmental issues. In their book *Nature Unbound* (2008:149), Brockington, Duffy and Igoe argue:

*Put simply, wildlife conservation is generally funded by the global north, by individuals, companies and foundations. International conservation see themselves as vehicles for redistributing wealth to the poor areas...Their values and practices are often inspired by western and northern models of nature, and introduced where these values are alien and often unwelcome.*

Western ideology of nature has pervaded the world’s agenda to preserve biodiversity and promote “sustainability”, though at the cost of disabling local systems of livelihood and socio-political arrangements (Robbins 2004). Although NGOs differ from multinational corporations who seek to gain profit, Sachedina (2008) argues that international NGOs are still transnational organizations that dependent on donor and government funding. This raises concern about the relationship between conservation NGOs, donor and state. Critics argue that conservation NGOs have become too close to their donors and corporate influences, and less accountable to the local people (Brockington et al. 2008).

Some transnational NGOs have created rigid conservation institutions that are no longer open toward local concerns (see Chapin 2004). Adams and Hutton’s (2007) research on

protected areas (PAs) for the preservation of biodiversity illustrates that most PAs — supported by international NGOs and donor governments — are still framed around ecological and financial terms. This excludes any consideration of the social and political context of the area. Since “wilderness” is the goal of most PAs, indigenous people were removed from their land without much consideration on the effect the removal had on their life and livelihoods (Adams & Hutton 2007).

Even when an attempt is made to consider local and indigenous people, CBC programs can also be problematic. Neumann (1997) writes that the ultimate land-use conflict resolution in Serengeti National Park’s buffer zones is the eviction of people whose land usage clashed with conservation as proposed by the German organization Deutsche Gesellschaft Für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). While the presence of NGOs have been involved in Tanzania’s conservation efforts, their prominence in the country has increasingly become significant especially for CBC programs (Levine 2002). Levine (2002:1053) concludes that international NGOs could bring positive results to Tanzania as it has opened up “substantial new resources for underfunded conservation programs.” Indeed, the progress of Tanzania’s WMAs depends greatly on the support it receives from facilitating NGOs (IRA 2007); this relationship, however, may yield to asymmetrical power relations. The dependency on aid money and human resources from international conservation NGOs (e.g. African Wildlife Foundation, World Wildlife Fund) shifts the priorities of CBC programs from participation to preservation. Participatory methods can be used as a means to secure conservation efforts rather than empowering people. Igoe and Croucher’s (2007) research in the western margins of Tarangire National Park uncovered village members who were livid and extremely distrustful of AWF’s role in facilitating the nearby Burunge WMA for conservation. The village members accuse AWF and the District Game Officer of going against the community’s wish to join the WMA (Igoe & Croucher 2007). Nelson et al. (2009:306) contends, “[T]he design of WMAs was almost entirely driven by wildlife management and conservation interests.”

## **2.5 CONSERVATION AND PASTORALISM**

Perhaps one of the earliest and most affected groups due to the restrictive conservation policies in Tanzania are the pastoralists. Pastoralists generally depend on a broad range of land to herd livestock, as herding is their primary source of income. Prejudice against their nomadic lifestyle has brought about policies that limit their livelihood (Homewood & Rodgers 1991). When the

British created the Serengeti National Park, they were hoping that the Maasai would be enticed to leave the Park by provision of water elsewhere. When that did not happen, “the Trustees of the Serengeti National Park increasingly came to the conclusion that the Park must be protected from the Maasai. They put into effect more restrictive measures creating apprehensions among the Maasai residents” (Shivji & Kapinga 1998:39). As the borders of the Park were redrawn to create the Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA), the Maasai relinquished all claims to the new established conservation area, but they would still be permitted to follow or modify their traditional way of life subject to only control of hunting (Shivji & Kapinga 1998).

After the region’s independence, international conservationists pressed to make the NCA exclusive to wildlife (Lissu 2000). One method is prohibiting cultivation. The Maasai living in NCA had practiced small-scale cultivation, primarily in the form of small plots for food and dry-season dietary supplements (Homewood & Rodgers 1991). The belief that cultivation in the NCA would cause extensive cultivation of a fragile area compelled the new, independent government of Tanzania to ban cultivation in the NCA, even though studies have shown the Maasai is not and never have been interested in extensive cultivation (Shivji & Kapinga, 1998). Such restrictive conservation policy have had adverse affect on the Maasai’s livelihood including a 50% decrease in the number of cattle per capita, a reduction in milk consumption and a decline in cash earning (Neumann, 1998).

## **2.6 THE PURPOSE OF WMAS**

WMAs came at a time when discussions about conservation deemed that PAs and NPs were not enough to protect biodiversity loss (Leader-Williams et al. 1996). The premise behind WMAs, as developed by Planning and Assessment for Wildlife Management (PAWM), is to reduce human-wildlife conflicts, improve attitudes toward wildlife, and generate revenues from wildlife utilizations that would be brought back to the local communities and provide them with economic incentive to preserve biodiversity (MNRT 1998; MNRT 2003; Nelson et al. 2009). According to a USAID (2001) report to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT) for the preparation of the WMA Regulations Tanzanian, WMAs have the potential to solve wildlife management problems in that:

*They give people an alternative to the destructive use of land by making wildlife a valuable resource. Wildlife is in fact an economically and ecologically sound land*

*use in much of the Game Controlled Areas and Open Areas. (Mabugu & Mugoya, 2001:8)*

The same report, nonetheless, found that much of the revenue generated from conservation was not directed back to the local communities since much of the money gets lost in “bureaucratic attrition,” failing to engender decision-making in the local level (Mabugu & Mugoya 2001:1).

The creation of WMAs have not always been a true community-driven process, but determined by a handful of transnational conservation organizations, where the benefits only go to some village elites (Igoe & Croucher 2007; Nelson 2007; Sacchedina 2008). Early donor-funded community-based wildlife management (CWM) projects in Tanzania shaped much of the present WMA concept, even though the projects were not carried out in pastoralist areas (Nelson et al. 2009). Using CWM projects from other African countries such as Kenya and Namibia as a model, the main goal of community-wildlife schemes seem to be tied to giving local communities surrounding NPs and PAs access to game meat for subsistence (Leader-Williams et al. 1996). Thus, much discussion of benefits for communities is centered on allocating bushmeat quotas to local residents, which is not relevant in pastoralist communities since they do not traditionally eat wild animals (Nelson et al. 2009). Access to key grazing site was rarely taken into consideration as lands were set aside for conservation purposes. Maasai’s in Loliondo District continue to be skeptical of most conservation efforts since past endeavours only managed to restrict their grazing rights further (Sachedina 2008).

## **2.7 WMAs AND PASTORALISTS**

### ***Case study of the Maasai in Longido***

Despite not having been included in the initial planning stages, some Maasai communities are becoming the focus of CBC and WMA programs. Many Maasai families are venturing into conservation efforts to diversify their income portfolio, especially in Northern Tanzania where NPs and Game Reserves in the area have limited people’s access to key grazing lands and natural resources (Homewood & Randall 2008; Homewood et al. 2009; McCabe 2003). The Maasai pastoralists living in Longido (where Enduimet WMA<sup>2</sup> is located) have an increasingly vulnerable pastoral livelihood as conservation policies—as well as large-scale privatization of

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<sup>2</sup> Enduimet WMA is one of the 16 pilot WMA projects in Tanzania, and consequently where I conducted my field research.

Maasailand in commercial and conservation purposes—have created a constraint for Maasai families to choose pastoralism as a viable livelihood option (Trench et al. 2009). In terms of profit from conservation efforts, not all members of pastoralists share the benefits equally. Livestock remain the primary source of wealth, in spite of diversification efforts by Maasai pastoralists (Homewood et al. 2009). According to Trench et al. (2009), despite the high earnings associated with conservation in certain Longido communities (cf. Honey 2008; Nelson 2005), incomes generated from the commercialization of conservation (e.g. community-based tourism ventures) are rapidly concentrated in fewer hands. Moreover, two-thirds of Longido household cultivate out of necessity, while some harvest; yet, both yield low returns due to drought and crop raiding by wildlife (Trench et al., 2009). The presence of Enduimet WMA within Longido has not yet brought significant income to the households who are a part of the WMA. Instead, the Resource Management Zone Plan the WMA Regulations mandate has established restrictions on grazing and cultivation in the WMA area to as low as 400 cattle a day during dry season (see Enduimet RMZP 2005). Ironically, while WMAs are present as a way for pastoralists to diversify their income sources with increasingly vulnerable livelihood, setting aside village land for conservation could mean people will lose access to resources that they depend on for basic livelihood strategies (Homewood et al. 2006).

## ***2.8 INCONSISTENT POLICIES AND CUMBERSOME REGULATIONS***

Part of the reasons why WMAs have not been truly participatory is that much of Tanzania's laws and regulations are often contradictory, which means what is enforced and enacted in one sector of the government can conflict with another (Igoe & Croucher, 2007). The inconsistencies between land and wildlife usage make WMAs almost pointless. For instance, under the 1999 Village Land Act, communities have statutory rights to land but not wildlife as according to the Wildlife Conservation Act of 1974 or the subsequent wildlife policies and regulations that supersede the Act of 1974. Conflicts over local jurisdiction of WMAs have surfaced (Nelson 2005; Honey 2008; Sachedina 2008). Many local villages are venturing into safari tourism for diversification of their livelihood. According to Nelson et al. (2007), the salient part of this business enterprise is that villages make mutual negotiations with private operators as to what kind of tourism scheme will take place. Some of these communities prefer to lease their land to private operators for game-viewing tourism. However, when a village decides to go into a non-consumptive tourism venture such as game viewing, it may conflict

with hunting tourism. For example, it is hard for game-viewing tourists to take pictures of safari wildlife when the animals become wary of hunters and hunting vehicles. Thus, communities that prefer game-viewing tourism do not want hunting to continue in the area. The Village Land Act gives authority of such land use decisions to the villages rather than the national government. The Wildlife Conservation (Tourist Hunting) Regulation of 2000, however, is in direct discord with that stipulation of the Village Act. The Tourist Hunting Regulations prohibit game-viewing tourism within a hunting block or within any wildlife protected area, without the written permission of the Director of Wildlife, even though most game controlled<sup>3</sup> and open-block areas are located on village lands. Therefore, while the Director of Wildlife does not have the power to regulate non-consumptive uses of wildlife in WMAs, he still has the authority to withdraw or revoke any investment agreement.

### ***Too many rules, too little resources***

Turning village lands to WMAs involves long and cumbersome steps that requires vast amount of time and resources (Nelson 2007). Communities must meet four criteria to be considered a WMA. It must have: considerable, accessible resources that are ecologically viable, whilst having significant economic value and belong to one or more villages (MNRT 2003). Then communities must follow twelve steps<sup>4</sup> as presented on figure 1. It begins with the village assembly's agreement to form a WMA based on the recommendation of the Village Council. After creating a Community Based Organization (CBO), villages must register its CBO, then create Strategic and Land Use plans subjected to Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). The CBO must then apply to the Director of Wildlife for Authorized Association (AA) status before it can apply for user rights to wildlife in the land, without which it cannot conduct business. Finally, the CBO/AA must have another EIA for all business investments it decides to have.

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<sup>3</sup> Game Controlled Areas (GCAs) is an area of land previously gazetted to forbid all hunting, though communities are allowed to reside within the area (Baldus & Cauldwell 2004). Previously, it made no restrictions on other forms of land use, but with the new Wildlife Conservation Act of 2008, grazing is also prohibited without the permission from the Director of Wildlife.

<sup>4</sup> The Reference Manual for Implementing Guidelines for the Designation and Management of Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) in Tanzania (2003) illustrates 7 steps, but I have taken the liberty to adopt Nelson's (2007) illustration since it breaks the steps downs more comprehensibly.

**Twelve basic steps in the formation of a WMA**

1. Village Assembly agrees to form WMA based on Village Council recommendations.
2. Villages form a CBO and register it at Ministry of Home Affairs
3. CBO prepares a Strategic Plan
4. Villages prepare Land Use Plans, which must be surveyed and registered
5. Land use plans are subjected to EIA
6. Villages prepare by-laws to support the land use plans
7. CBO prepares a Resource Management Zone Plan
8. CBO applies to Director of Wildlife for AA status
9. CBO/AA applies for user rights
10. CBO/AA applies to the Director for a hunting block\*
11. CBO/AA enters into investment agreements
12. Investments in WMAs are subjected to EIA

\* This step would only apply if the CBO/AA wants to carry out tourist hunting in the WMA

**Figure 1: Twelve basic steps in the formation of a WMA (Adapted from Nelson 2007)**

Rural communities whom are targeted for WMA implementation do not have the financial, nor human resources needed for a successful completion of all steps. Therefore, as ordered by the WMA Regulations (2003:35), NGOs must play an important role in providing facilitation for the initiation and establishment of WMAs, sensitizing communities to form WMAs, facilitate the creation of CBOs and supporting villages to prepare Land-Use Plans.

Following all the steps can take years to achieve even with the help of an active NGO facilitating communities through the process. In Enduimet WMA, for example, it took the community 10 years since its first conception in 1997 before it received its AA status and User Rights in 2007. The community still has not yet generated a significant income from the WMA (Kabiri 2007; Trench et al. 2009).

### **3.0 Conclusion**

Tanzania has come a long way since it was a German and British colony at the turn of the last century. Nevertheless, the legacy of colonialism remains strong in regards to global interest of nature and conservation policies. Northern Tanzania has a vast amount of conserved land for National Parks and Game Reserves. A political ecology analysis of the region's conservation policy shows that conservation efforts are inherently political. Conservation attempts in Tanzania still use a control, fortress-based approach where the locals are either evicted or restricted from continuing their traditional way of livelihood such as in the case of the Maasai pastoralists. It is against this background that the roles of various actors and their political agenda become central in understanding how community-based natural resource and wildlife management is performed in Tanzania. Even when villagers live outside of a National Park, the conservation policy of the Park can still have an adverse affect on their livelihood since most policies do not consider the complexity communities or the socio-political context. CBC was introduced as a way for the government to address criticism that its conservation policies were hegemonic and control-driven. Still, much needs to be worked out even in CBC since there seems to be a lack of coherency between national policy and the promise of poverty relief.

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## Part II. The Article

### **The Politics of Wildlife Management in Enduimet WMA, Tanzania**

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#### **Abstract**

Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) seems like the perfect solution to the problems exacerbated by environmental degradation and resource scarcity that ostensibly afflict developing countries. In practice, however, CBNRM exhibits difficulties in substantiating the benefits it promises. Though it remains a prominent policy goal to countries receiving foreign aid, there is growing research criticizing CBNRM's failure to deliver. In Tanzania, Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) have become a popular venture for CBNRM and community-based development. This article explores the ways in which efforts to incorporate participatory approach to wildlife conservation in Tanzania has not fully substantiated through a case study of Enduimet WMA. Utilizing qualitative data obtained from the field, the research shows how power relationships in Enduimet WMA and the wider socio-economic policies influence people's participation in the management of wildlife and their perception of benefits. Participation amongst village members in Enduimet remains low, while benefits from wildlife are rarely observed on the household level. In conclusion, it is difficult to see how the communities in Enduimet Division will be empowered in a proactive way when current wildlife policies redirect power and benefit back to the central government.

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

Theoretically, community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) seems like the perfect win-win solution to the problems exacerbated by environmental degradation and resource scarcity that ostensibly afflict developing countries. Whether it comes from the participatory management of forests, bee-hives or wildlife, development and poverty eradication happen because of the sustainable management of these natural resources. It is no wonder that within the past 20 years, CBNRM paradigms have pervaded much of the development strategies of many countries in the Third World. In sub-Saharan Africa alone, most CBNRM efforts are within the context of providing rural development and poverty relief, in addition to preserving the natural environment (Blaikie 2006; Igoe & Croucher 2007; Nelson & Agrawal 2008). At the heart of CBNRM rhetoric is the assumption that indigenous people and communities directly connected to natural resources would have the suited knowledge to foster sustainable resource use (Armitage 2005). Blaikie (2006) contends that the theoretical benefits of CBNRM are perceived as powerful because the simple, pro-poor, pro-environment narrative appeals to people's emotion, and consequently the goals of many multi-lateral, bilateral and non-governmental organizations.

In practice, however, CBNRM exhibits difficulties in substantiating the benefits it promises. Though it remains a prominent policy goal to countries receiving foreign aid, there is growing research criticizing CBNRM's failure to deliver (Leach et al. 1999). Approaches to participatory and sustainable management of resources can be hard to implement as many CBNRM programs fail to recognize the heterogeneity of communities (Agrawal & Gibson 1999; Songorwa 1999). Rather, CBNRM endeavors fall into the trend of mapping and territorializing community lands, while privatizing natural resources without recognizing the ramifications that such deeds can disrupt reciprocal relationships between and among communities (Hodgson & Schroeder 2002). Ribot et al. (2006) found that decentralizing efforts may be used by the state government to limit the kinds of powers transferred all whilst serving the central government's agenda. In some cases, communities are not more empowered than before implementation of CBNRM efforts (Kellert et al. 2000; Twyman 2000).

The lack of congruency between CBNRM theory and performance has been largely blamed on its inability to engender genuine participation amongst the local people, making

CBNRM's promise to devolve power a farce and producing reforms only on papers (Ribot 2004). Therefore, where incentives to retain control over natural resources are high (whether the reasons are political, monetary or both), central actors will tend to cling to that power (cf. Nelson & Agrawal 2008). This paradox is represented by the current situation of community-based conservation (CBC) practices in Tanzania.

### ***WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREAS AS AN EXAMPLE OF CBNRM***

In the past decade, Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) have become a popular venture for community-based development and conservation in Tanzania, where tourism accounts for 15% of the total value of Tanzania's economy (Honey 2008). Hypothetically, what makes WMAs different from previous conservation efforts in Tanzania is that through community management and conservation of wildlife, most of the revenue is supposed to channel back to the local people. The main purpose of WMAs, much like other community-based wildlife conservation efforts, is to conserve wildlife alongside generating tangible economic and financial benefits through the tourism sector (Mkumbukwa 2008). In addition to linking conservation and poverty alleviation, WMAs would presumably empower people by increasing community participation and strengthening local governance, since it gives the people ownership and legal authority to manage and make decisions about their natural resources. Therefore, much like CBNRM in theory, WMAs present "a scenario in which there are many winners and no apparent losers. Investment opportunities increase and the Tanzanian economy grows" (Igoe & Croucher 2007:537).

During my research in the West-Kilimanjaro basin, I found a different reality. Not everyone has come out the winner in Tanzania's conservation effort, even with the shift from "fortress-based" to "community-based" paradigm. This article explores the ways in which efforts to incorporate participatory approach to wildlife conservation in Tanzania has not fully substantiated through a case study of Enduimet WMA. I focus on the history of the establishment of CBC schemes in Enduimet, as well as identifying the levels of participation, influence and power of various types of actors. I found Vihemäki's (2005) study on the politics of participatory forest conservation in Tanzania very useful in providing a multifaceted structure for my analysis. Following his research questions, my investigation in participatory wildlife conservation also addresses the perception of power, participation and benefit sharing in Enduimet, such as: What is the level of participation between each actor in terms of decision

making and implementation of “participatory” policies? Have the implementation of “participatory” strategies to wildlife conservation changed the power relation between the local and state actors in wildlife control, and if so how? What are the factors in the institutional and wider socio-economic context that may impede success, regarding devolving powers to local people and sharing the benefits of conservation? I will begin by reviewing scholarships in power relation theories within a CBNRM/CBC context. A detailed description of my study will follow. Subsequently, I will analyze the research findings with a discussion of the power relationships created in the “participatory” management of wildlife in Enduimet, the challenges and constraints for a true decentralization of power over wildlife, as well as equitable benefit sharing amongst the different actors involved. The result of the research raises serious questions about the nature of community-based conservation in Tanzania and the re-centralization direction the state is heading toward.

## **II. POWER AND “PARTICIPATION”**

### ***POWER IN CBNRM***

“The concept of power,” Raik et al. (2008) argues, “[I]s central to understanding the processes and structures associated with decentralization of natural resource governance.” Their analysis of power in natural resource management reveals that several dimensions of power exist in CBNRM and CBC models through the process of “participation”, “democratization”, “decentralization” and “empowerment” (Raik et al. 2008). Drawing on previous studies of power and power relations, Raik et al. (2008) explain the first dimension of power is represented by the notion of coercion, that is when A gets B to do something he or she would not otherwise do. They argue that power as a coercion prevails in many discussions of natural resource management (Raik et al. 2008). The second dimension gives A leverage where A can constrain the action or possible action of B through A’s control over active decision making or conscious exclusion of certain issues. Seeing power as coercion or constraint, however, does not adequately address the social-structural aspect of human relations and interests. Both views are agent-centered where power is possessed by individuals and shows that individuals can possess power, but it does not explain how the individuals’ social relations may influence their ability to wield power (Raik et al. 2008). The third dimension of power is less observable but understands that power is shaped by the dynamics of social structure and agent, which interact and depend

on one another in the production of consent and norms (Raik et al. 2008). As Lukes (2005) argues the third dimension of power is real and operates in many direct and indirect ways, and it is most effective when least accessible to surveillance. Thus, “[p]ower can be at work, inducing compliance by influencing desires and beliefs, without being ‘intelligent and intentional’” (Lukes 2005:136).

In a CBNRM context, the way different groups of actors have access to and use certain resources depends on the social structures that influence their set of consent and norms. Power materializes in the interaction of different actors in managing the use of natural resource. People’s compliance on the laws, rules and regulations govern and limit the actions of each player (Vihemäki 2005). Power is thus relational and “the result of the working of multiple, intertwined institutions” (Nuijten 2005:1). Nuijten (2005) calls the structural form of power relations “force fields”, which are molded by the access to and use of particular resources. As Schiffer (2007) contends, power then is not measured directly, but indirectly using indicators; for example, the allotment of material capitals and verbal and non-verbal expression of power in social settings.

Although definitions and models of CBNRM vary, the fundamental idea behind communal management and conservation of natural resources is to involve and empower local and often indigenous community members and their respective institutions by decentralizing power and authority from central/state government (Kellert et al. 2000). Local communities would thereby gain more access to natural resources and the way it is utilized and conserved (Leach et al. 1999). In a way, CBNRM is an interdisciplinary approach whereby local and traditional knowledge is not only recognized, but also employed in sustainable natural resource management (Berkes 2004). In turn, participation of the community and the use of their indigenous knowledge in the management of natural resources would yield to better socio-economic and ecological benefits (Pound et al. 2003).

Similarly, CBC methods are based on the notion that natural resource preservation are best administered by the local communities who can improve their economic well-being from the sustainable management of conservation areas, thereby making conservation meaningful to the people (Western & Wright 1994). The CBC approach came out of the growing criticism that the fortress-based “fences and fines” method has historically marginalized local people for the sake of preserving “wilderness” (Neumann 1998). The political ecology view of fortress-based

conservation stipulates that preserving the “pristine environment” was a means by which officials and global interests could control resources (Robbins 2004a). Here, we see the traditional sense of power as something individuals possess and others do not. If power were used as coercion by placing it in a few hands, then empowering the very people that were previously powerless would mean a radical shift in natural resource and conservation paradigms. As Western and Wright (2003:6) contend, CBC method “reverses top-down, center-driven conservation by focusing on the people who bear the cost of conservation.”

### ***PARTICIPATION***

Participation became the primary agenda for reversing such top-down conservation approach. Tyler (2006) advocates participatory approaches as the “building blocks” of CBNRM research. Programs like Zimbabwe’s Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) was commended for being a successful predecessor to other Community-Based Wildlife (CBW) approaches that incorporate community participation in wildlife management (Child 1995). The concept of “participation” in natural resource management, however, varies widely in interpretation and implementation.

Mannigel (2008) describes two predominant perspectives for participatory approaches in conservation strategies: participation as a *means* and participation as an *end*. In the former, participatory strategies are used to ensure sustainable changes in management, while the latter sees participation as essential for equity and empowerment (Mannigel 2008). When participation is used as a means, involving people becomes a way to acquire their support for conservation endeavor (Wells & Brandon 1993). Yet, such view presumes that local people, state actors and conservation organizations all share the same expectations in both participation and conservation goals, which may lead local people to think that participation is another means to extend central power (Goodwin 1998). Although the two views are not always easy to distinguish, participation as an end seeks participatory strategies because it leads to empowerment (Mannigel 2008).

Levels of participation can be delineated along a continuum (see Table 1). The levels indicate an increasing degree for meaningful participation. Nonetheless, participatory strategies are not static and can move along the continuum.

	<b>Local stakeholder</b>	<b>Institution</b>
<b>1.</b>	Nominal (almost no interaction)	<i>Minimal</i>
<b>2.</b>	Passive	<i>Informing</i>
<b>3.</b>	Informing	<i>Information seeking</i>
<b>4.</b>	Giving options (interaction)	<i>Actively consulting</i>
<b>5.</b>	<i>Active functional</i>	<i>Negotiating</i>
<b>6.</b>	<i>Interactive</i>	<i>Sharing authority</i>
<b>7.</b>	<i>Taking responsibility (self-mobilization)</i>	Transferring authority

**\*Bold - decision maker**

**Table 1: Levels of participation (Adapted from Mannigel 2008 and Pretty et al. 1995)**

Like power, institutional structures and social relations shape participation in local communities. It is therefore linked to the power relations in a given social surrounding, though (McDougall & Braun 2003). Cassidy’s (2001) research in Botswana demonstrates that women’s access to and control over resources depend on their social position in the family and community. Natural resource management participation amongst women in decision-making is limited since in some Botswana communities, it is considered the men’s role to decide (Cassidy 2001).

### **A SHIFT IN PARADIGM**

In Tanzania, the shift in paradigm gained legitimacy in 1998 with the introduction of the Wildlife Policy. The Policy gives merit to the CBC approach to wildlife preservation and management. It also notes the importance of recognizing women’s role in “the conservation of natural resources and the need for them to participate and benefit from the conservation of the resources” (MNRT 1998:19). Thus came about the idea of Wildlife Management Areas whereby local communities, including women—a user-group traditionally excluded in decision making processes (Upadhyay 2005)—would receive tangible income from setting aside land in their village for the purpose of preservation and protection of wildlife. The introduction of WMAs in Tanzania, however, did not mean an introduction of “participatory” approaches to areas already under protection (e.g. national parks, game reserves and the Ngorongoro Conservation Area). Rather, WMAs grew out of the recognition that protected areas (PAs) were inadequate for the protection of species and the need to introduce conservation to lands outside of PAs, many of

which happens to be village lands. Therefore, by including the people who lived in the village lands and usually burden the cost of human-wildlife conflict, they would receive economic incentive to help conserve species (Leader-Williams et al. 1996)<sup>5</sup>.

Indeed, in Tanzania, poverty relief and national growth are directly linked to the sustainable use of its natural resources as reflected in the country's National Development Vision 2025 and the 2005 National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA). The MKUKUTA recognizes that "the present use of natural resources is unsustainable...This precipitates poverty by eroding sources of livelihoods and destroying environment" (URT 2005:12). In contrast, sustainable exploitation of Tanzania's natural resources must come through proper policies that promote the encouragement of community participation in finding, designing and implementing ways to protect natural resources and the environment (URT 2005). About 15 of the 108 targets in the MKUKUTA are directly linked to environmental concerns (IRA 2007). For instance, one way Tanzania would accelerate GDP growth rate to attain a rate of 6-8% per annum by 2010 is through reducing environmental damage, while improving production and productivity in fisheries, forestry, tourism and so forth (URT 2005: Goal 2.1.4).

Yet, in a country where over 28% of its land has been set aside as conservation area<sup>6</sup>, Tanzania remains in the bottom list of the Human Poverty Index (HPI-1)<sup>7</sup> despite years of promise by NGOs and state officials that its people would finally benefit from conservation<sup>8</sup>. Goldman (2003) argues that CBC efforts in Tanzania remain a top-down approach where the local people are the passive recipients of wildlife benefits (cf. Kaswamila & Songorwa 2009). If CBNRM and CBC strategies are supposed to be the key alternative to the "old" way of natural resource management and conservation in Tanzania, why are some of the very people the program is supposed to benefit rejecting the idea of CBNRM and CBC? Why do they see CBC

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<sup>5</sup> In 1994, IUCN held a workshop on Community-Based Conservation, where the ethos of the meeting linked community inclusion to benefits and incentives for local people to conserve wildlife outside of PAs since PAs were ecologically inadequate for the protection of species.

<sup>6</sup> Estimates of how much of Tanzania's conserved land varies from 25% to 50%, especially with the introduction of new Wildlife Act of 2009, banning grazing from GCAs, which almost entirely fall on village lands.

<sup>7</sup> The 2006 Human Poverty Index (HPI-1) ranks Tanzania 98th among 135 developing countries for which the index has been calculated ([http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/2008/countries/country\\_fact\\_sheets/cty\\_fs\\_TZA.html](http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/2008/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_TZA.html)) Accessed 23 April 2009.

<sup>8</sup> The former Director of Wildlife Emmanuel Severe even presented a paper entitled "Community Tourism, Gateway to Poverty Reduction" at the International Institute for Peace through Tourism's (IIPT) 2<sup>nd</sup> African Conference in 2003.


methods as constraining and (most importantly for the purpose of this article) not at all empowering? Instead, the trend in natural resource management in Tanzania is redirecting power and benefit to the state, while narrative in community participation and empowering the local people continue (Nelson & Agrawal 2008; Nelson et al. 2009; TNRF 2008a). Here, I now turn the attention to a case study of Enduimet Wildlife Management Area (WMA).

### **III. CONTEXT OF THE STUDY: A BRIEF HISTORY OF ENDUIMET WMA**

Since wild animals are not confined only to protected areas and national parks, human-wildlife interactions and conflicts are inevitable. The West-Kilimanjaro Longido (WKL) area serves as an important extension for the Amboseli ecosystem; however, the Tanzanian part of the ecosystem falls entirely on village lands. Poole and Reuling (2007) survey of the WKL area found a drastic decline of the wildlife population caused primarily by bushmeat poaching. Barnett's (2000) study of wild meat utilization observes 67.9% of people in Kilimanjaro as illegally obtaining bush meat with lower income groups as the main bushmeat consumers because bushmeat is economical compared to other meats.

Consequently, the excessive bushmeat poaching, as well as the high cross-border wildlife interaction from Kenya to Tanzania, have made the WKL region a prime target to be included in one of the 16 pilot WMA projects in Tanzania. The original plan for a WMA in the WKL area was visualized in 1997 after a wildlife survey of WKL and stakeholder workshops documented the prevalent bush meat poaching (IRA 2007; Nelson 2007).

One outcome of this plan was Enduimet WMA, which initially included eight villages from Enduimet Division: Sinya, Tinga Tinga, Ngereiyani (from Tinga Tinga Ward), and Elerai, Ol Molog, Lerangwa, Kitendeni, Irkaswa (from Ol Molog Ward). The ninth village, Kamwanga from Ol Molog Ward, was annexed after the leaders petitioned their exclusion (Kabiri 2007). It was not until the release of the WMA Regulations in December 2002 that Enduimet WMA was legally formed (Nelson 2007). By 2003, when implementation of Enduimet WMA officially began, African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) was selected to be the facilitating NGO. In 2004, Enduimet division legally formed a Community-Based Organization (CBO) beginning its first journey into an established WMA. In 2007, it was officially gazetted as a WMA.



**Figure 2: Map of Enduimet Division and surrounding areas (Adapted from Trench et al. 2009)**

Since its conception, Enduimet WMA area reverted back to consisting of only eight villages from the Division. As I will elaborate in the findings section, Sinya refuses to join the WMA because its members remain suspicious of the WMA and they fear losing authority over wildlife tourism and its benefits. Previously, Sinya had made as much as \$40,000 a year from tourism ventures in their village (Honey 2008). The eight other villages moved on with the WMA process, despite lacking the village with the richest wildlife resources. Currently, Enduimet WMA has received its Authorized Association (AA) status and user rights. However, the CBO (a legal entity in the creation of a WMA) must apply to the Wildlife Director for a hunting block if it wants the right to conduct tourist hunting. It also still needs to enter into

investment agreement(s), which are subjected to an EIA (environmental impact assessment). The CBO has set out a bid for its office to be built in Ol Molog village.

#### **IV. METHODS**

I conducted my fieldwork in all nine villages of Enduimet Division during September to December 2008. I collected qualitative data from the field, mainly through the use of semi-structured in-depth interviews with key-informants, including village leaders, district leaders, game scouts, NGO representatives who were (or are) active in the process of facilitating Enduimet WMA, safari companies who conduct business in Enduimet, and a representative from the Ministry of Tourism and Natural Resources in Arusha. I recorded some of these interviews and later transcribed them. For household interviews, I used a short questionnaire as an interview guide and asked probing questions to follow up on people's answers. The questionnaires consisted of four main topics: demography, perceived participation, perceived benefits, as well as people's attitudes toward conservation and Enduimet WMA. I obtained a total of 93 household interviews from four of the nine villages in the Division: Ol Molog, Kitendeni, Elerai and Tinga Tinga. No random sampling method was used due to time and budget constraints. Alternatively, I used a snow-ball sampling method for my key-informant interviews, while a convenient sampling method was more suited for the household interviews since I came during one of the rainy seasons where people were either gone with their cattle or busy planting their *shambas* (farms).

The villages where I conducted household interviews were chosen because of their "uniqueness" to Enduimet. I chose Ol Molog and Elerai, primarily because both had experiences with community-based tourism operated by prominent safari companies<sup>9</sup>. I chose Tinga Tinga because little study has been done in the area in comparison to its neighbor Sinya and Kitendeni because of its proximity to the corridor<sup>10</sup>. Some interviews were conducted in English, but most in Kimaa and Kiswahili where I used a translator. All interviews gathered were typed, manually coded and organized based on emergent dominant topics. Furthermore, I carefully analyzed relevant government policies as they greatly influence and shape actor's view of tourism,

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<sup>9</sup> Hoopoe Safari who operates in Ol Molog won the 2004 Condé Nast Traveler's Ecotourism Award for Best Operator in the World "for their continued and outstanding community-based Ecotourism partnerships across East Africa and specifically Northern Tanzania" (Arusha Times 2004).

<sup>10</sup> I am aware that the majority of the corridor lies within Irkaswa village (see Noe 2003). However, Kabiri (2007) had already written an insightful dissertation about the village and its relation to Enduimet WMA.

benefits, power and participation in community wildlife management. I also relied on some secondary data of previous studies conducted in the area (mainly: Kabiri 2007; Noe 2003; Nelson 2003; Nelson 2004; Trench et al. 2009). Finally, I used content analysis for documents gathered from village offices and those officially released by government officials, safari companies and facilitating NGOs.

## **V. CASE STUDY: ENDUIMET DIVISION**

### ***ECOLOGY OF STUDY AREA***


The WMA in Enduimet encompasses 128,179 ha of land, of which 86% has been set aside as a WMA and demarcated by beacons (IRA 2007). The WMA lies near the Tanzania-Kenya border and falls within Longido District<sup>11</sup>. Longido is surrounded by some of East-Africa's most renowned conservation areas including Amboseli National Reserve, Ngorongoro Crater, Kilimanjaro and Arusha National Parks (Trench et al. 2009). Subsequently, Enduimet WMA and its District serve as an important trans-national migratory route and dispersal areas for many faunas including the African elephant (Muruthi & Frohardt 2006). One of the main routes for wildlife is the Olkunonoi-Kitendeni Wildlife Corridor Zone, which mainly links Amboseli National Park to Kilimanjaro National Park. It remains the only corridor that connects the Kilimanjaro ecosystem to additional ecosystems after other corridors to Tsavo West National Park, Arusha National Park, Meru forest and Mkomazi Game Reserve have been blocked (Noe 2003). Land use changes in the villages that fall in the corridor as well as the ones surrounding it has led to the corridor decreasing from 21 km<sup>2</sup> in 1952 to 5 km<sup>2</sup> in 2001 (Noe 2003).

The semi-arid climate and low rain fall throughout the West-Kilimanjaro basin is the result of the Mountain's rain shadow. Although rainfall and temperatures vary between and within Enduimet Division, precipitation is limited to 300-600 mm annually (Poole & Reuling 1997). The region has two rainy seasons, which lasts from November to December and March to May with the driest period from August to October (Muruthi & Frohardt 2006). Vegetation is typical of semi-arid East African Savannah. It is primarily comprised of mixed Acacia woodlands, including *Acacia-Commiphora* brushland, *Acacia tortilis* savannah and *Sporobolus* short grass plains (Birdlife International 2008).

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<sup>11</sup> Formerly, it was under Monduli District.

Figure 3: Map of Resource Management Zones and Longido GCA (Adapted from Nelson 2005)



Wildlife is abundant, especially in the Longido Game Controlled Area (GCA)<sup>12</sup>, Ngasurai plains and Kitendeni Corridor. Enduimet WMA has a significant elephant population since the animals use the region as a migratory route from Amboseli to Mount Kilimanjaro. The Longido GCA, which overlaps with village lands in Enduimet, serves as an important migratory route for Palearctic birds, including raptors and storks (BirdLife International 2008). Some 400 bird species have been recorded in the Longido GCA alone (BirdLife International 2008). Additionally, the Enduimet area attracts wildebeest, zebra and Thomson’s gazelle during wet seasons as these wild animals use the area for dispersal and calving grounds particularly on the Ngasurai plains in Tinga Tinga Ward (WWG 2002). Other mammal species present include

<sup>12</sup> Game Controlled Areas (GCAs) is an area of land previously gazetted to forbid all hunting, though communities are allowed to reside within the area (Balduis & Cauldwell 2004). Previously, it made no restrictions on other forms of land use, but with the new Wildlife Conservation Act of 2008, grazing is also prohibited without the permission from the Director of Wildlife.

cheetah, leopard, Gerenuk, Lesser kudu, fringe-eared oryx, striped hyenas and the endemic Kilimanjaro mouse shrew<sup>13</sup> (Grimshaw et al. 1995).

### **POPULATION AND LAND USE**

Enduimet Division has a population of approximately 17,000 people with a total of 2,615 households in Ol Molog Ward and 1,060 households in Tinga Tinga wards (Tanzania Sensa 2002). The dominant ethnic group is the Ilkisongo Maasai, but on the more heavily cultivated lands, the area also includes a large number of WaArusha, WaChagga, WaPare and WaMeru (Trench et al. 2009; Kabiri 2007). Land use is thereby dominated by pastoralism, although most people in Enduimet practice a combination of agriculture and livestock herding. Itinerant cultivators also lease land from the local Maasai for farming (Kabiri 2007). Cultivation in Enduimet WMA is growing as community members feel the pressure to diversify their income and as non-Maasai immigrate to the area; this has been part of a general trend in many African pastoralist societies (Homewood & Randall 2008; Homewood et al. 2009).

With the establishment of the WMA, four proposed management zones would regulate land use in Enduimet: Olkunonoi-Kitendeni Wildlife Corridor Zone, Ronjoo Zone, Embarnati Zone and Elatia Zone (see figure 3)<sup>14</sup>. The purpose of the zoning scheme is to designate “where various management strategies will best resolve existing problems facing the objectives by defining what can and cannot be done in different lands of area of the EWMA” (RMPZ 2005:19).

The Olkunonoi-Kitendeni Wildlife Corridor Zone strengthens the already demarcated boundary for wildlife conservation and from further encroachments by people wanting to settle or cultivate the corridor (Noe 2003). Therefore, no agriculture, camps sites, hotels nor any other forms of human settlements are allowed. Additionally, mining, hunting, tree felling and charcoal burning are all prohibited. The Resource Managing Zone Plan (2005) alludes to the threat of overgrazing in the corridor, thus has limited grazing and use of watering points to only 2000 cattle per day. Some of the other activities that are allowed but only to a limited degree include the collection of dead wood, beekeeping to not more than 20,000 bee-hives, nature trail to only one loop and game viewing restricted on the Irkaswa-Kitendeni main road.

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<sup>13</sup> *Crocidura monax*.

<sup>14</sup> As mandated by the 2003 Wildlife Conservation (Wildlife Management Areas) Regulations, each community with a WMA must create a resource management zone plan.

The Ronjoo Zone constitutes 80% of Enduimet WMA, where the majority of economic and tourism activities shall take place. The main idea behind the Ronjoo Zone is to develop tourism activities that would make the WMA self-financing and be able to generate revenue for the local people, as well as conserving “outstanding resources and values” contained in this zone (RMZP 2005:22). The area contains forest reserves, wetlands, corridor for wildlife migrating from Amboseli, Arusha and Kilimanjaro National Parks, crucial grazing land, salt lick and water holes for livestock. Again, agriculture and human settlements will not be allowed, although land in the zone will be allocated for four permanent tented camps (some of which already exists in the area as discussed later). Mining, off-road driving, tree felling, charcoal burning and horse racing are also all prohibited. Grazing in the zone is limited to only 400 cattle per day during the dry season and up to 120,000 cattle per day during the wet season. The RMZP intends to allow hunting from July to December per hunting license.

The Embarnati Zone encompasses areas within the WMA that include human settlements, mainly in the Tinga Tinga Ward. The idea is to develop cultural tourism, while the rationale for the zone is to limit resource usage to guarantee “sustainable human development, [reduce] threats of development on Enduimet resources, safe guarding the interests of indigenous residents and sharing knowledge of local residents with EWMA in managing natural resources” (RMZP 2005:24). Mining, hunting, off road driving, tree felling, animal capture, campsites, hotels and lodges will all be prohibited. Grazing in the zone is limited to 125,000 cattle, 200,000 goats, 100,000 sheep and 3,000 donkeys. Agriculture is limited to bean, maize and wheat and fishing to 5,000 kg per annum.

The zoning scheme includes additional areas that are outside of Enduimet WMA through the Elatia Zone plan. The zone includes Olalarashi and Ogrulului Group Ranches in Kenya, TALIRO and NARCO farms in West Kilimanjaro<sup>15</sup>, Longido, Kimikouwa and Engikaret villages. The reason for including these areas was to address existing conflicts between Enduimet WMA and the adjacent neighbors as the area acts as dispersal areas for wildlife (RMZP 2005). No specific guidelines regarding land usage was created for the zone, but the main goal for including Elatia Zone is to have awareness raising programs to secure wildlife migratory corridors.

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<sup>15</sup> TALIRO is the Tanzania Livestock Research Organization, which owns a research hub in West Kilimanjaro near Tinga Tinga, and NARCO is a parastatal ranching company established in the 1970s with several ranches throughout the country. NARCO West Kilimanjaro is currently undergoing privatization.

In spite of the zoning regulations, spatial, geographical and ecological factors already somewhat limit land uses in Enduimet (cf. Trench et al. 2009). The people of Sinya, for example, do not practice cultivation; their land is too arid for any farming attempts. While Ol Molog receives more rain and has the best climate for agriculture. Although the other seven villages practice small-scale agriculture, farming activities are mostly concentrated on the higher western slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro as the land has more agro-ecological viability. Crop raiding by wildlife poses as huge constraint to farming, as this paper will discuss in later sections. Furthermore, livestock herding in Maasai pastoral societies is bounded by such ecological factors as the Malignant Catarrhal Fever (MCF). The lethal disease is contracted from wildebeest placentas; therefore, Maasai pastoralists would usually avoid wildebeest calving grounds (Homewood & Randall 2008).

***WILDLIFE AS AN INCOME SOURCE: CONSUMPTIVE VS. NON-CONSUMPTIVE TOURISM***

In addition to livestock herding and farming, consumptive and non-consumptive wildlife tourism is gaining prominence in Enduimet, particularly as another means to diversify income — a growing trend for many African pastoral families (Homewood & Randall 2008; McCabe 2003). During my research, I discovered that at least six of the nine villages in Enduimet have (or had) business enterprises with safari companies (see Table 2).

<b>Ward</b>	<b>Village</b>	<b>Operating safari companies</b>
<b>Tinga Tinga</b>	<b>Sinya</b>	Kibo Tours Ltd./Tanganyika Wilderness Camp Northern Hunting Co. Hatari Lodge
	<b>Tinga Tinga</b>	African Environmental Gane & Marshall Tanzania (GMT)/Tanzanian Travel Co. (TTC)
	<b>Ngriyani</b>	Old Nyika Safari (Hunting)
<b>Ol Molog</b>	<b>Ol Molog</b>	Hoopoe Safari Hatari Lodge Ndarakwai Ranch
	<b>Elerai</b>	Tanganyika Wilderness Camp
	<b>Lerangwa</b>	Snow Cap Ltd.
	<b>Kitendeni</b>	-
	<b>Irkaswa</b>	-
	<b>Kanwanga</b>	-

**Table 2: Overview from fieldwork of past and present active safari companies operating in the nine villages (non-exhaustive)**

Some of these safari operators have engaged the villages in community-based tourism, a sort of ecotourism venture, where they paid fees directly to the village for rights to access the area with their clients. The operators used to pay a lease fee, a “bed-night” fee<sup>16</sup>, and/or provided funds for community development projects such as water pipes and school dormitories. The contribution of money and development projects differed from village to village, depending on the type of tourism conducted. Hunting tourism, for example, usually yielded the most amount of money to the state, but not to the local communities (Baldus & Cauldwell 2004). Because hunting blocks fall under the legal jurisdiction of the state, tourist-hunting operators are only required to pay fees to the central government. It is up to the discretion of the Wildlife Director to channel some percentage of the money back to the district government who then decides how to distribute the money to the villages. On the other hand, non-consumptive, game-viewing operators would usually pay the fees directly to the villages; such was the case in Sinya. Nelson (2004) found that Sinya, through its contract stipulating a \$20 “bed-night” fee, expanded its village income from below 5 million TSh in 1999/2000 to almost 20 million TSh in 2003 from game-viewing tourism. The contract Sinya had with Kibo Safaris guaranteed the village 30 million TSh per annum (Honey 2008). Through the tourism money, Sinya was able to fund community development projects such as the construction of a primary school (Trench et al. 2009). Consequently, villages usually preferred striking similar deals with safari companies who operate non-consumptive ecotourism since the villages could gain more revenue through such ventures (IRA 2007).

Against this backdrop, a community-based, participatory approach to wildlife conservation and tourism (such as the non-consumptive deal Sinya had) gave villages in Enduimet Division the potential to earn a viable amount of revenue on the village—if not individual—level. In theory, communities would be empowered by its ability to capture incomes from tourism directly by striking private deals, turning the old, top-down power structures that pervaded past conservation endeavors upside down (Hodgson & Schroeder 2002). Villages acquired the profits directly and it provided additional income for community-level projects. Nonetheless, the proliferation of profits “has threatened the powers of the

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<sup>16</sup> A “bed-night” fee was the payment made by the safari company of each guest that stayed overnight. Before the introduction of the Non-consumptive Wildlife Utilization Regulations in September 2007, Tanzania had no set cost for non-consumptive tourism activities and the money could go directly to the village where the safari companies operated (see Nelson 2004).

Wildlife Division (which granted the original leases), and most particularly the revenue it regularly receives from hunting fees” (Hodgson & Schroeder 2002:92).

## **VI. FINDINGS & DISCUSSIONS**

### ***TURNING A CONCEPT INTO REALITY: IT’S NOT REALLY THAT EASY***

As a community-based wildlife venture, Enduimet WMA has the potential to earn villages a substantial income, whilst empowering the locals through participatory methods. Nonetheless, the process of turning Enduimet Division into a WMA has not been smooth. The Division is comprised of nine villages, but assembling all nine villages to be one WMA has proven to be difficult. Kamwanga was originally excluded since it had no significant uncultivated land suitable enough for wildlife habitat to contribute to the WMA (Kabiri 2007). The leaders of Kamwanga maintain that their village was included in the original plan, but the leaders of the other villages persuaded the Wildlife Division to exclude them<sup>17</sup>. After stating grievances regarding the exclusion in a letter to the Chair of the Board of WMA, Kamwanga shortly became a member of Enduimet WMA. Ol Molog and Sinya hesitated to join the WMA, with the latter still being unwilling to join the project. In Irkaswa, there was strong division amongst those for the WMA and those against it particularly because of conflict caused by people wanting to settle in the Kitendeni corridor<sup>18</sup> (cf. Kabiri 2007). The village members and leaders in Elerai and Tinga Tinga initially received the WMA positively, but many at the household level are now rejecting the project as they claim it provides no significant benefit.

### ***PARTICIPATION IN ENDUIMET WMA***

Although in theory, WMAs are supposed to bring about active participation in the conservation of wildlife, in reality, participation amongst Enduimet village members is poor. Of the 93 respondents, 21 said they had been involved in the establishment of Enduimet WMA. When probed further as to how they have been involved, 9 respondents mentioned their position as leaders in the community (e.g. church leader, village leader, game scout). One person who answered positively even expressed his hope in becoming a leader in the WMA. Other respondents mentioned that they were involved by going to the public meetings. Interestingly, one respondent who felt he was involved because he went to the public meetings conveyed his

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<sup>17</sup> Recorded interview, MM, SM, RA and LS, Kamwanga, 13 November 2008.

<sup>18</sup> Recorded interview, MK, VEO, Irkaswa, 13 November 2008.

opinion that “the leaders are the ones who made the decision to establish the WMA.” He continued to say:

*The leaders are willing, chosen to go to the office to be given good instructions about the WMA, but they did not pass it down to us. The leaders would have informed the people before giving the piece of land (for the WMA). There is where I don't understand completely, what they want to do with the land.*<sup>19</sup>

The respondent believed that he participated in the public meetings, but when it came to knowledge and making decisions about the WMA, the leaders had the authority. This belief was commonly shared amongst those who did not think they were involved in the establishment of Enduimet WMA. They named community leaders (n=31) or the government (n=6) as the main decision makers. One of the reasons why community members might feel unengaged in the creation of the WMA is the lack of communication between the leaders and community members. To facilitate the WMA, AWF and the District Game Officer (DGO) usually disseminate information through seminars and meetings for village leaders and CBO members who, in return, are supposed to channel the information back to their respective communities. Community members, however, complained that their leaders do not always bring back the information as they are supposed to do. Yet, village leaders whom I interviewed believed participation amongst their communities was adequate if not good. When asked to estimate the attendance rate for Tinga Tinga village, the Village Executive Officer (VEO) approximated 80% of his member currently attends the public meetings<sup>20</sup>. In Kitendeni and Lerangwa, the leaders felt there was “no problems with the villagers, they are just waiting for the benefits to come”<sup>21</sup>.

The VEO of Irkaswa, though, acknowledge the problem of his community member's lack of understanding about the WMA. He blamed it on the sub-village chairmen who are supposed to gather people to go to the periodic village public meetings about the WMA<sup>22</sup>. AWF too recognized the problem and began a new campaign to make CBO members more accountable to sharing the information with the community<sup>23</sup>. At the time of fieldwork, plans were underway to compel village leaders to invite CBO members to each public meeting and

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<sup>19</sup> Respondent 82, Male, Tinga Tinga.

<sup>20</sup> Interview, GM, VEO, Tinga Tinga, 18 November 2008.

<sup>21</sup> Interview, ML, VEO and KO, Sub-Village Chairman, Lerangwa, 11 November 2008.

<sup>22</sup> Recorded interview, MK, VEO, Irkaswa, 13 November 2008.

<sup>23</sup> Interview, JL, AWF Facilitator for Enduimet WMA, Arusha, 26 November 2008.

send a report back to AWF about what updates the members have given to their represented communities.

Village meetings are indeed central to the creation and planning of Enduimet WMA. Community members identified public meetings, which differ from village to village on the frequency, as the main way they receive information regarding Enduimet WMA. They may participate by going to the meetings, but what is noteworthy is that village members recalled village leaders and AWF speaking in the meetings and telling them that the community had already joined the WMA. “They didn’t give us the opportunity to say let us agree; we already joined,” one man said. “I wanted them to come to us so we can give our opinion, teach about the WMA, how to start it and how we can benefit”<sup>24</sup>.

Several other community members also expressed that when they heard about the WMA, the community had already joined it. Nonetheless, village members do not see this entirely as a negative matter. Some thought that the benefit the WMA promised is sufficient to warrant its establishment on village lands. “When I heard that we would benefit from wildlife, I agreed to accept the WMA so I had no concerns and felt no need to express it,” one respondent said<sup>25</sup>. Participation then is passive with community members inertly receiving the WMA in the background without significantly contributing to the decision making process.

### ***BENEFIT AND LOSS***

Another major hurdle for CBC in Enduimet is the issue of benefit and benefit sharing. In regards to wildlife and wildlife tourism, only 18 of the 93 household respondents viewed a personal benefit from wildlife on the household level. The majority of these respondents (n=13)<sup>26</sup> were from Elerai where TWC operates. I asked, “Does your household currently benefit from wildlife? Why or why not?” The respondents from Elerai who said “yes” mentioned development projects (e.g. classroom buildings and educational scholarships were the most common answers) and monetary profits from tourists buying beads and taking pictures of their *bomas*<sup>27</sup> as the main source of benefits of wildlife on the household level. Similarly, those in Tinga Tinga who answered “yes” (n=4) also cite development projects and tourists visits to their personal *bomas* as benefits. One village member from Tinga Tinga thought he had benefited

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<sup>24</sup> Respondent 64, male, Elerai.

<sup>25</sup> Respondent 4, male, Ol Molog.

<sup>26</sup> The use of “n” in this article refers to “number”.

<sup>27</sup> A *boma* refers to a cluster of buildings for the extended family inside an enclosure usually a hedge of thorns.

from wildlife on the household level through the education he gained. He told me he was attending a wildlife college in Kenya where he was learning how to conduct tourism business. The only respondent in Ol Molog who stated that he had benefited from wildlife on the household level said this occurred through the money he received as a game scout (about 50,000 TSH/month)<sup>28</sup>.

Interestingly, some of the people in Ol Molog and Tinga Tinga who responded “no” in regards to receiving benefits from wildlife on the household level affirmed positively in a later question about benefiting personally from the presence of safari operators. When asked, “Do you personally benefit from the presence of Hoopoe Safari/TTC?” Five respondents from Ol Molog answered “yes” and 4 of them cited monetary benefit from temporary employment as tour guides in the field or guards in the camp. The other respondent, a widow, mentioned that her son received a scholarship from Hoopoe for his secondary education. In Tinga Tinga, out of the 9 village members who answered, “yes” to this question, 4 had said, “no” to the question about wildlife benefit on the household level. The 4 respondents considered temporary employment through TTC as a personal gain. Benefits gained from employment are biased for males. I found no female respondents who has or have been employed by one of the safari operators in Enduimet. At Kambi Ya Tembo, the Manager acknowledged that there were no women employees from the local village working for the camp<sup>29</sup>. At the same time, women suffer the most burdens from wildlife damage since they are usually the ones attending the *shambas*. While members in Ol Molog and Tinga Tinga did not necessarily associate individual benefits from wildlife with tourism, members of Elerai Village either cited the same answers to both questions or specifically mentioned, “Yes, for the reasons I have already mentioned earlier.”

Kitendeni has not yet had experience with wildlife tourism, so it was not surprising that all respondents answered “no” to the question regarding wildlife benefit on the household level<sup>30</sup>. What is noteworthy is that when I asked if the village received benefit from wildlife, several respondents (n=9) answered “yes,” citing monetary payment from the WMA to the

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<sup>28</sup> Ironically, other game scouts I came across in the other villages claimed they are not paid regularly, or did not see the money as a significant source of income to be considered a benefit to their household.

<sup>29</sup> Kambi Ya Tembo is the name of the camp in Elerai that is operated by Tanganyika Wilderness Camp (TWC), an offshoot of Kibo Safaris. Interview, SJ, Kambi Ya Tembo Camp Manager, Elerai, 11 November 2008.

<sup>30</sup> The question regarding benefit from the presence of safari operators was irrelevant, so it was omitted from the questionnaires given to Kitendeni village members.

village. As one respondent said, “Yes, we are already receiving money from the WMA and it has been used to repair our cattle troughs in July of this year”<sup>31</sup>.

Kitendeni, as with all the other seven villages in Enduimet WMA, had received 2.3 million TSh from the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT). According to the District Game Officer of Longido, the money came from the hunting block<sup>32</sup>. I could not get an answer from an official at the MNRT to confirm why the money was given to these eight villages, but several village leaders and members seemed to have attributed the money to the WMA. The attribution is important; for the villages that have not had business investors (such as Kitendeni and Kamwanga), the 2.3 million TSh seems to be significant enough to be seen as a benefit from wildlife, at least on the community level. As the village leaders in Kamwanga told me:

*Within this short period of time since the WMA started to operate, we have started to see the benefit from it because already we have received some amount of money, 2.3 million and this amount, this money we are using it to build classrooms for the teacher’s house. So after there is when we have started to see the benefits, more benefits than how it was before.*<sup>33</sup>

The village leaders of Kamwanga believed the benefit would alleviate some of the wildlife-human conflicts in the village, particularly crop raiding. They lamented about the challenge they face as leaders; if their neighbors in Kenya receive compensation when wildlife raid crops, injure or kill someone, why do they not receive the same treatment from their government?

The leaders of Kamwanga were not the only ones to raise questions about the human-wildlife conflict and the way it is handled by the government. Some village members in Enduimet are expecting the WMA to provide a compensation scheme for the damages they suffer because of wildlife. Nevertheless, an effective compensation system may be hard to implement as the 1998 Wildlife Policy made it clear that the government of Tanzania “does not intend to introduce a compensation scheme for wildlife damages” (MNRT 1998:3.3.12). Even with the new Wildlife Conservation Act of 2008, a plan for compensation remains ambiguous, if not absent. The Act stipulates that the Minister may provide “consolation to a person or groups

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<sup>31</sup> Respondent 41, male, Kitendeni.

<sup>32</sup> Interview, SL, Longido, 25 November 2008.

<sup>33</sup> The village leaders had told me that before the WMA, the only money they received from tourism was when tourists would sleep at one of the school buildings before heading to Mt. Kilimanjaro. They did not consider the payment to be significant. Recorded interview, MM, SM, RA and LS, Kamwanga 13 November 2008.

of persons who have suffered loss of life, crops or injury caused by dangerous animals. Provided that the amount so offered shall not, under whatever circumstances, be considered a right or be construed as compensation” (URT 2009:49).

Community members might see benefit from wildlife and/or tourism, especially on the community level, nonetheless, over 50% of the household respondents (n=57) still view wildlife contributing more in personal losses rather than gains. The two most common damages declared by the village members were *shamba* damage (crop raiding) and livestock killing (predation, injury and diseases). Village members in Elerai mentioned that elephants have killed at least 2 people from their village since 2007, while in Tinga Tinga, 2 people stated that elephants have killed family members. One Kitendeni respondent, in particular, informed me that an elephant had seriously injured him. The man was trying to chase away the elephant from his *shamba* but it retaliated. According to the man, his hospital bill amounted to approximately 400,000 TSh. He has also lost 7 goats that were eaten by hyenas and wildcats. He asked me: “When an animal gets killed, we see the *askari* (police) looking for the poachers, but when a person gets killed or hurt, why don’t we see them?”<sup>34</sup>

When I inquired some of my respondents about how they deal with such wildlife problems under the WMA, the most common answer was to call upon the game scouts or try and chase the wild animals away by themselves since killing wildlife could mean jail time. Village members, however, were not satisfied by this solution since it does not seem to alleviate *shamba* damage or livestock killing. Plus, chasing wildlife away is a dangerous task. One village member who shared the sentiment said to me:

*Before and up until now, we guarded our shambas and scared the wild animals away with a torch. We are not allowed to kill the wildlife and I don’t see the logic behind that. It’s like not allowing us to kill mosquitoes even if they can cause malaria. When the wildlife disturbs us, we ask the government for help. Sometimes the response is nothing. We call them and they don’t do anything.*<sup>35</sup>

The lack of an adequate solution to the human-wildlife problem in Enduimet has made community members feel disregarded by their own government. This attitude was widely shared

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<sup>34</sup> Respondent 57, male, Kitendeni.

<sup>35</sup> Respondent 73, male, Kitendeni.

in Tinga Tinga where the human-wildlife conflict has intensified with the increase of the elephant populations and fears about land alienation, especially with the creation of the WMA.

### ***TINGA TINGA VILLAGE VS. ELEPHANTS***

Tinga Tinga is an agro-pastoralist community, but unlike its agro-pastoralist neighbors, village members in Tinga Tinga are not able to cultivate as much due to drought and wildlife damage (Trench et al. 2009). Its higher, fertile lands have been leased out by the state to outside investors (Trench et al. 2009). The creation of Ndarakwai Ranch <sup>36</sup>, which lies next to Tinga Tinga, has increased elephant activity in the area, since the elephants stay in the Ranch and raid crops in Tinga Tinga at night (Trench et al. 2009). Village members recounted how they no longer harvest because elephants completely finish their crops. One woman said:

*The government takes care of the elephants, but they damage my crops and the government doesn't do anything to help me. That shows I'm not important like those wild animals. They are more important than me. So, now we are still in poverty. We work hard and cultivate, but the elephants finish our labor, and we remain poor.*<sup>37</sup>

The VEO of Tinga Tinga showed me a village document indicating destroyed and damaged area caused by elephants in 2006<sup>38</sup>. According to the document, approximately 300 acres was cultivated in 2006, but the harvest was zero.

Village members remain skeptical about creating another reserve such as the WMA. Even if tourism will increase, some respondents did not see it as a positive matter. More tourists will equal more protection for the wildlife and yet village members feel the government has done nothing to help with the human-wildlife conflict. When village leaders informed the villagers of Tinga Tinga about WMA, some members claimed that the WMA promised to bring more benefit and protection from wildlife. I was informed by one of my respondents that:

*The WMA promised to protect our shambas. Now we are suffering from the burden of farming. We cultivate, but have no harvest. What we fear is that the WMA will only protect the wildlife—that the WMA will give away a piece of our land for the animals. We will be stopped from going there. We think that we have been rejected*

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<sup>36</sup> The 11,000 acres of land where the Ranch lies is owned by Tanzanian Breweries and has been leased to Tanganyika Films and Safari Outfitters who uses the Ranch as a wildlife reserve and a permanent tented lodge.

<sup>37</sup> Respondent 79, female, Tinga Tinga.

<sup>38</sup> Interview, GM, VEO, Tinga Tinga, 18 November 2008.

*by the government. Now we are free to go there, but in the future, I think we will be stopped.*<sup>39</sup>

Clouds of distrust and resentment toward Enduimet WMA have also brought about fears of land alienation. The threat for Maasai communities is not new since past conservation efforts in the Serengeti, Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA) and Mkomazi Game Reserve, to name a few, have meant forceful evictions or severe restrictions of daily activities (Brockington 2002; Neumann 2000; Shivji & Kapinga 1998). Although expulsion, prohibition of grazing or collection of firewood in Enduimet WMA have not been documented, anxiety about it is still present especially in Tinga Tinga where the majority of household respondents (16 out of 19) directly told me they have fears and doubts regarding the establishment of a WMA. In Ol Molog, Kitendeni and Elerai, household respondents alluded to or directly expressed their worries about land alienation, particularly when community members see beacons being placed in their land. They see the beacons as a sure sign that the land set aside for WMA will one day be taken away from them. A female respondent conveyed her feelings about the beacons:

*I was aware that beacons were placed in our land. It is meant for us to recognize where the boundary for wildlife is. We hate it; we are no longer getting enough area to graze our cattle. We are allowed to go there now, but I'm afraid that one day we can be told not to go there.*<sup>40</sup>

Fear of land alienation and a lack of understanding about the beacons have led to the vandalism of WMA beacons in Enduimet (Sacchedina 2008; Nelson 2007). When I asked some of my respondents why they thought they would be prevented from grazing or collecting firewood if they were still allowed to go beyond the beacons they retorted that the WMA has not fully operated yet so for now they can still go in the area. In Tinga Tinga, several people cite Ndarakwai Ranch as an example of what could happen under the WMA. As one village member said:

*I fear that we will not be allowed to graze in the WMA land. I know because all the companies here have been given a piece of land and we are not allowed to go there, to graze and collect firewood. For example, we are no longer allowed to take our*

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<sup>39</sup> Respondent 77, female, Tinga Tinga.

<sup>40</sup> Respondent 51, female, Kitendeni.

*cattle in Peter's land (Ndarakwai Ranch)<sup>41</sup>. Before he came, I took my cattle there to graze. We are still allowed to take our cattle (in WMA) area, but I know they will take authority there and ban us from going in the area.<sup>42</sup>*

Members of Tinga Tinga also experienced land alienation from the presence of the state owned National Ranching Company (NARCO) bordering their village. NARCO was created in the 1970s with the support from IDA/World Bank for commercial ranching. The West Kilimanjaro NARCO Ranch, however, has been inactive in its commercial production of livestock and people began to settle and cultivate in the area. In 2003, AWF took interest in the site for conservation purposes but had to wait until a legal case involving local squatters was settled (AWF 2007). AWF helped to facilitate an out-of-court settlement where the people would agree to relinquish their claim to the land in exchange for being included as stakeholders and beneficiaries of the ranch (AWF 2007). During the end of my fieldwork, AWF had managed to acquire two of the 12 blocks within the West Kilimanjaro Ranch. AWF plans to reopen the land for wildlife corridor; subsequently cultivation and permanent settlement would not be allowed within the ranch<sup>43</sup>.

Due to past experiences, Tinga Tinga members felt more insecure about land tenure. Community members had asked the CBO chairman, who resides in Tinga Tinga, to place a shield next to the beacons. The shield would show a picture of a Morani (Maasai) Warrior holding a spear with a cow next to him. Household respondents told me this shield was to remind people that when the WMA fully operates, community members should still be allowed to graze and collect firewood in the area. "We wanted the shield to be used as our guidance that we could regard in case of a conflict in the WMA land," a woman told me. "The chairman of the CBO went to the office and was supposed to bring our idea, but he came back with things that were missing. He didn't bring the idea of the shield to the office, so we have doubts about the area given."<sup>44</sup>

With the new Wildlife Conservation Act of 2008, people's apprehension about land alienation may intensify, since, under the new Act, grazing will be prohibited in GCAs unless the Director of Wildlife gives written consent to do otherwise. As mentioned, Longido GCA

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<sup>41</sup> Ndarakwai Ranch is owned by Peter Jones, a British National who leased the land in 1994/1995 from Tanzania Breweries (cf. Trench et al. 2009).

<sup>42</sup> Respondent 8, female, Tinga Tinga.

<sup>43</sup> Interview, JL, AWF Facilitator of Enduimet WMA, Arusha, 26 November 2007.

<sup>44</sup> Respondent 79, female, Tinga Tinga.

overlaps village land and Enduimet WMA. At this time, it is not yet clear how the new act will affect the RZMP of the WMA or the livelihoods of the people living in Enduimet Division.

One respondent posed a challenge to the government's idea of reducing poverty through the WMA:

*There are those who are for the WMA who say that WMA is good and it is going to reduce poverty in the village through community investment and development. For us, I doubt that the WMA will reduce poverty as they claim it would do. We are pastoralists and we are not poor. We consider wealth in terms of the number of livestock we own, the number of children we have, and if we can feed them. The way I see it is that the WMA will impoverish us instead. If we are not allowed to take our cattle and goats there to graze, how can that reduce poverty? In the meanwhile, we are also cultivating to feed our family. The number of wildlife will increase because they will be protected within the WMA area, so we will incur more shamba damage and no one will compensate us for those damages. So, what are we going to benefit from wildlife? I think in the end we are going to end up poor instead because of the WMA...Yes we have benefit, but not in such. Although we get tourists to visit our bomas and give us money, in addition to Kibo's contribution to community development projects such as school buildings, you cannot say that's the benefit we should have from wildlife. That's why most of us don't really know the advantage or disadvantage of WMAs. We don't know if we are going to benefit from the WMA or not. The way I see it is that the WMA is going to have a disadvantage and we will be regretting because it's already there.<sup>45</sup>*

### **BENEFIT SHARING**

Even with the release of the Wildlife Conservation Act of 2008, benefit sharing remains confusing and ambivalent. The Act still does not clarify how communities are to share benefits only that it “shall comply with guidelines issued by the Government from time to time and shall adhere to mechanism of equitable distribution of costs and benefits” (URT 2009:28). The current guideline under the WMA Regulations of 2002 only stipulates that safari operators must pay the central government and the CBO on behalf of the WMA (MNRT 2003). Both Act and Regulations do not define what equitable distribution means or what percentage will be given to the CBO or the MNRT (cf. Nelson 2007).


In 2007, the state proposed a new set of regulations for non-consumptive utilization of wildlife to standardize fees along the same lines as hunting revenues. The 2007 Non-

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<sup>45</sup> Respondent 92, male, Elerai.

consumptive Wildlife Utilization Regulations declare all non-consumptive tourism operations in village lands — including game-drive, photography and walking safaris — illegal without the permission of the Director of Wildlife (URT 2008). The Regulations were met with serious challenges from the local communities since it gives the Director of Wildlife exclusive power over wildlife utilization in village lands. In some ways, the state used community imperfections against them. A representative from the Wildlife Division in Arusha maintains that the 2007 Non-consumptive Regulations were set up to assure funds would not be misappropriated or embezzled by village leaders and safari operators who, he contends, have not been transparent regarding revenue collection and expenditure <sup>46</sup>.

The Wildlife Division tried to incorporate “participatory” methods in the establishment of its wildlife conservation regulations by inviting stakeholders to a two-day meeting at the Impala Hotel in Arusha in April 2008. The meeting was a forum for dialogue between the Wildlife Division, WMA Authorized Associations, village and district representatives and the



**Figure 4: Proposed distribution of revenue**

<sup>46</sup> Interview, SO, Acting Assistant Director of Wildlife Division, Arusha, 27 November 2008.

tourism industry on such regulations. In terms of benefit sharing, what was proposed is that 35% of the fees go to the main government, while 65% go back to the local government, which is distributed to both the District Council and the local communities (see Figure 4), resulting in only 40% of the fees end up with the local communities (TNRF 2008b).

In spite of the meeting, at the time of fieldwork, revenue sharing of wildlife utilization remained unclear. Safari operators have interpreted the new regulations as implying higher fees that must all go to the MNRT. In Enduimet WMA, all tour operators have stopped paying fees to the villages since 1<sup>st</sup> July 2008; now payment of fees must go through the MNRT. Some tour operators feel that the new fees are too costly for them to continue operating in local villages<sup>47</sup>. Additionally, the new fee structure has caused confusion amongst the villages, as many are not clear as to why they have stopped receiving money even though safari companies continue to operate tourism activities on their land. In some ways, it has strained relationships between the community members and safari operators.

### ***SINYA'S BATTLE***

Sinya's community members have long been in a power battle over monetary and control issues in regards to the management of wildlife in their village. As Sinya's land is rich with wildlife, several high-end tour companies began operating in the village as early as the mid 1990's (Trench et al. 2009). In 2001, Sinya went into a formal deal with Kibo Tours Safaris, though a branch of Kibo called Tanganyika Wilderness Camps (TWC) ran operations. As previously noted, the deal earned the village significant revenue, which funded a majority of development projects such as school dormitories that would otherwise be funded through local taxes levied on the households (Honey 2008; Nelson 2003; Nelson 2004; Trench et al. 2009). Sinya found itself having greater control over their local resources through their ventures with safari companies since the village was able to capture a greater part of the revenue generated from wildlife (Honey 2008). At the same time, the Wildlife Division granted Northern Hunting Ltd. access to the Longido GCA of which it overlaps with Sinya's land (Nelson 2005). The money Northern Hunting pays to lease what is essentially Sinya's land<sup>48</sup> went to the MNRT department, since, by law, concession fees for hunting activities went directly to the Wildlife Division (URT 2000). The revenue returned to villages was at the sole discretion of the Director

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<sup>47</sup> Interview, SD, Owner of Tanzania Travel Co., Ltd. (TTC), Arusha, 27 November 2008.

<sup>48</sup> That is, according to the Village Land Act of 1999 which grants jurisdiction of land use to village lands.

of Wildlife who would usually channel the income to the district government. Northern Hunting did provide funds for development projects such as the construction of two teacher houses and diesel fuel for a boarding school<sup>49</sup>.

The overlap between the Longido GCA and Sinya land (see figure 3) became the source of one of the major conflicts in Sinya. In 2005, TWC found itself in a legal battle with Northern Hunting Company who leases the Longido GCA where TWC had their permanent tented campsite called Kambi Ya Tembo. The Tanzanian court sided with Northern Hunting and forced TWC to relocate to Elerai (Sachedina 2008). As a result, TWC started paying “bed-night” fees to Elerai and Sinya’s village income fell drastically (Trench et al. 2009). However, according to TWC’s Administrative Officer who deals with village fee payments, the company continued to pay Sinya \$20 per visitor for operating their game drive on their land (until 1<sup>st</sup> July 2008)<sup>50</sup>.

The justification of ruling in favor of Northern Hunting came from the Wildlife Conservation (Tourist Hunting) Regulations of 2000, which prohibit game-viewing tourism within a hunting block or within any wildlife protected area without the written permission of the Director of Wildlife. The Tourist Hunting Regulation strengthen the authority and power of the Director of Wildlife since, as mandated by section 41 of the Wildlife Act of 1974, the person already has the legal ability to declare an open area to be a game-controlled area, as well as the right to grant hunting licenses in game reserves and game controlled area, and issue grazing permit in game reserves (Nshala 1999). Moreover, the Director of Wildlife retains the authority to withdraw or revoke any investment agreements a village might have with a tour operator. Thus, rather than empowering the local people, the Hunting Regulation of 2000 redirects power back to the central government via the Director of Wildlife.

Sachedina (2008) reports that, “(v)illagers in Sinya felt disempowered, losing control of their revenue source and land tenure which seemingly contradicted the goals of the WMA framework and Wildlife Policy.” Nonetheless, in July 2002, villagers in Sinya tried to reiterate their claim to wildlife by harassing a Northern Hunting client who happened to be the American Ambassador to Tanzania and his hunting crew (Mbaria 2002). The incident caused an

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<sup>49</sup> Recorded interview, MJ, VEO, Sinya, 14 November 2008.

<sup>50</sup> Interview, OK, Administrative Officer to TWC, Arusha, 24 November 2008.

international controversy when police officers came as a consequence and allegedly beat Kibo's camp employees and two clients of Spanish nationality (Mbaria 2002).

Accordingly, Sinya members remain suspicious of the government's attempt to establish wildlife conservation in their land. Many view the WMA as another attempt by the government to increase control over wildlife investments, weaken village authority over hunting block allocation and forcing the village to share wildlife revenue with the other eight villages (Kabiri 2006; Trench et al. 2009). As the Village Executive Officer told me:

*[Among] the villages found in Enduimet Division, there are 9, among these 9 villages Sinya never engages in cultivation; we are pastoralists. But all the other villages are agro-pastoralists and they engage more in cultivation. So it means that if we join this WMA, we are not going to benefit because we rely more on the benefits we get from wildlife and this benefit also it will be divided to all these 8 villages. So, it means that we are going to get a mince benefit from this wildlife, and all the other villages will benefit on our behalf.*<sup>51</sup>

Relations between TWC and Sinya became strained after the tour operator moved to Elerai. What has complicated the situation further is the introduction of the Non-consumptive Wildlife Regulations that lawfully mandate all fees go to the MNRT. After 1 July 2008, Sinya stopped receiving any sort of revenue from TWC, even though it continues to use Sinya's land for game-drives. As far as the TWC's Administrative Officer was concerned, the company would not be paying both the villages and central government, especially when he considered the new fees were higher than what they had paid to Elerai and Sinya<sup>52</sup>. The villagers in Sinya are not clear about the new regulations and feel that both the government and TWC is not giving the village what is due to them. According to the VEO of Sinya "they (TWC) are still coming and for us, we don't know who is benefiting from that money. Because when they come, they are paying money and maybe the government is taking that money, but for us we are no longer benefiting"<sup>53</sup>.

During my fieldwork, I noted two conspicuous incidents where villagers attempted to display their power and authority over the wildlife resource in their land, despite receiving

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<sup>51</sup> Recorded interview, MJ, VEO, Sinya 14 November 2008.

<sup>52</sup> Interview, OK, TWC Administrative Officer, Arusha, 24 November 2008.

<sup>53</sup> Recorded interview, VEO, Sinya 14 November 2008.

several blows by government regulations. Kambi ya Tembo's Camp Manager called Sinya into a meeting because of complaints that their young boys were grazing livestock too close to the campsite in Elerai; the jingling of cattle and goat bells disturbed guests at night. About a month later after the public meeting, the Camp Manager assured me that all conflicts with Sinya was minimal and otherwise had been resolved<sup>54</sup>. However, a couple of days later when I interviewed the VEO of Sinya, we were met by the Longido District Officer in Command who came with a couple of armed guards to investigate threats made by Sinya village members. Apparently, the village members were accused of blocking a TWC vehicle that was full of tourists from conducting their game-drive session in Sinya's land<sup>55</sup>.

### ***FEELINGS ABOUT ENDUIMET WMA***

If people's perceptions of participation, benefit and benefit sharing differed widely amongst different actors, so does their discernment of wildlife conservation and attitudes toward Enduimet WMA. I asked the household respondents if they thought conserving wildlife was important and why or why not, 63 respondents thought it was important to conserve wildlife, while 30 said it was not important. Those who thought it was important to preserve wildlife linked it to the benefit or potential benefit wildlife could bring, while the people who did not think it was important to conserve wildlife did not view wildlife as bringing profit; rather, more protection on wildlife would bring more conflict. Consequently, the majority of respondents (n=19) who thought it was not important to conserve wildlife were from Tinga Tinga where elephant destruction has been disastrous for the community.

In Tinga Tinga, I also observed the strongest opposition against Enduimet WMA. I asked, "How would you feel if Enduimet WMA was abolished?" Subsequently, I requested the respondents to regard their feelings from: Not very happy, not happy, neutral, happy or very happy. I received the most "very happy" answers from Tinga Tinga members, including two people who said they would celebrate. One elaborated further saying:

*We would celebrate because of the problems we are getting from the WMA. The tourists come without seeing wildlife, so it is better to kill the wild animals because we don't know what else to do with them.*<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Interview, SJ, Kambi Ya Tembo Camp Manager, Elerai, 11 November 2008.

<sup>55</sup> Interview, HW, Longido District Officer Commanding, Sinya, 14 November 2008.

<sup>56</sup> Respondent 90, female, Tinga Tinga.

The women believed tourists came not for the wildlife, but to see Maasai culture, so there was no need to keep the wild animals. On the other hand, respondents from Tinga Tinga as well as the other three villages who expressed they would not be happy or not very happy at the notion of Enduimet WMA being abolished believed stopping the WMA would also terminate current or prospective benefits.

### ***DISCUSSION***

If past conservation efforts failed because it excluded any consideration of the local people, a community-based approach that involves, empowers and benefits local people should bring about a more positive result. The government of Tanzania promised “the establishment of a new category of PA known as WMA, where local people will have full mandate of managing and benefiting from their conservation efforts, through community-based conservation programmes” (MNRT, 1998:31). In fact, when Enduimet WMA received user rights status in August 2007, the *Arusha Times* heralded the event on its front page saying, “Villages granted total authority over wildlife: Investors uneasy about business prospect” (Nkwame 2007). The article went on to explain how, with their newfound authority, Enduimet WMA residents can enter into any contract with foreign investors and local firms, while having the power “to terminate game hunting and tourism business operations currently being undertaken” (Nkwame 2007). Despite the sanguine prediction, the article failed to realize that all business ventures are still subject to the approval of the Director of Wildlife. User rights granted to villages are only three years long and these villages still do not have sole control of the wildlife. More than 10 years since the government made the initial promise to devolve power over wildlife, local people have not seen much change in the control and management of what is essentially the government’s animals.

Although CBOs have some authority to conduct business, ultimate decisions regarding land use and wildlife management nonetheless remain in the hands of the Wildlife Director. Rather than creating reforms, new rules and regulations only reassert the state’s ultimate power in the management of wildlife. Needless to say, it also returns most benefit to the central government. Ribot et al. (2006) calls such attempts by the state as ways to create reforms on paper, but in reality undermine the real transfer of power. Central government strategically does this by limiting the types of power transferred and selecting (or creating in the case of WMAs in

Tanzania, creating) local institutions that serve and answer to central interests (Ribot et al. 2006).

As illustrated in the case of Enduimet, the government's transfer of power was limited to a few groups of people. Participation from Enduimet community members was thereby limited to those in leadership positions, such as CBO members. As the body of authority in WMA management, the CBO has the ability to make the initial decision regarding which company(ies) can operate in the WMA. However, this makes the CBO more accountable to the Director of Wildlife who makes the final decision about business ventures in Enduimet. As the villagers complained, CBO members were not providing feedback to the community regarding important information about the WMAs. For a real devolvement of power, the CBO must be accountable to the people and their needs and interests (Ribot et al. 2006).

In terms of power in participation, Twyman (2000:330) contends that passive participatory approach may actually lead to a situation “where people are reluctant to question or refute government help for fear of losing any benefits that they may accrue, yet are powerless to actually change the way in which that help is directed.” As presented in the previous section, people in Enduimet Division who did not want the WMA to be abolished felt so because they did not want the promised benefits to be revoked. This may be the outcome of an approach that remains top-down, though, rhetorically, WMAs are supposed to actively involve local people in the decision making process.

“Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have—that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires?” Lukes (2005:27) asks in his book. In general, attitudes toward conservation from community members are neutral if not positive for the benefit; although at the same time many recognize the threat it brings to land and livelihood security. Village members have passively complied with their leaders placing beacons and setting land aside for conservation mainly because of the WMAs promise of significant benefits in the form of foreign exchange, employment and development projects. At the same time, it will be easy for the state to acquire the desires of the community to benefit if the community can only do so through WMAs.

On the other hand, village-operator agreements such as the ones made in several villages in Enduimet gave communities more stakes in the ownership of wildlife. As exemplified by Sinya, who had the most successful ventures with non-consumptive tourism in Enduimet, power

relations between safari operators and community was shifted, at least for a while. Whereas before, Sinya members had no say or legal rights to determine who can hunt in their land, the deal Sinya had with TWC and other non-consumptive operators gave the community authority to decide which companies can operate in the village. The additional village provided more community development projects. Perhaps it is through this newfound ability to manage wildlife that Sinya's member did not passively accept the WMA as the other communities in Enduimet. When the government tried to re-shift the power relations back to a vertical structure, Sinya tried to defy the state's iron hand on wildlife by refusing to join the WMA and continuing to operate tourism on their land as long as they could legally do so.

Sinya's battle over wildlife control also reveals an important factor in the wider socio-economic context of Tanzania: the high value of wildlife. Nelson and Agrawal (2008:563-564) argue that "where the value of wildlife on community lands is high but is captured by central actors...devolutionary reforms are less likely to occur." In 2001, the Wildlife Division earned an estimated \$10.5 million in profits from game hunting (Baldus & Cauldwell 2004). Since the state is the sole proprietor of wildlife and main beneficiary of hunting concessions (commercial hunting is the WD's main source of revenue), devolution of control over game controlled area remains uncertain.

Additionally, non-consumptive tourism is gaining prominence. Villages like Sinya and Ololosokwan in Loliondo District were able to capture figures in the \$40,000 to \$60,000 range per annum (Nelson 2005). Consequently the central government introduced the Non-Consumptive Regulations, that, similar to the fees posed for tourist hunting, will have to be paid through the MNRT first before it could be trickled back to the communities.

## **VII. CONCLUSION**

Enduimet WMA has not shifted much of the traditional "coercive" power structures and "constraining" power relations between the central government, village leaders and community members. Much of the "participatory" policies in creating and facilitating the WMA have remained a mirage rather than a reality. Community members continue to burden the cost of wildlife, while their attitudes toward conservation and Enduimet WMA are ambivalent. This, in turn, marred some relationships between local people, village leaders and the state creating another challenge for a true "people-centered" participation. Complicating the situation further

are the contradictory rules and regulations implemented by the state, which, after 20 some years of using the CBNRM's "participatory" discourse, have only managed to redirect the goal of decentralization back to the central government in Dar es Salaam.

Honey (2008) claims that in Tanzania, national parks and protected areas are the center stage for rural social movements, legal contests and political battles in the scramble to cash in on "African Eden." Unfortunately, in the rush to claim a stake in wildlife tourism creates clear winners and losers (Honey 2008). Enduimet WMA has yet to generate a significant income for the villagers. Poaching in Enduimet has been reduced, but communities continue to bear the burden for wildlife and conservation. Some members even viewed wildlife conservation as exacerbating poverty and vulnerability instead of providing benefits and relief. Whereas previously some villages of the Enduimet Division were able to acquire middling revenues from wildlife tourism, the new non-consumptive tourism regulations that went into effect 1<sup>st</sup> July 2008 requires the money go directly to the central government. Moreover, since there are many actors involved in the operation of Enduimet WMA, their many interests create a tug-of-war in the supposed community-based management of wildlife creating confusion, resentment and distrust on the part of local community members.

Instead of enacting laws and regulations that progressively empower local people to be involved in important decisions about land and natural resource usage, the government of Tanzania has passed laws and regulations that does the opposite of devolving power and providing communities with tangible benefits. It is difficult to see how the communities in Enduimet Division will be empowered in a proactive way if they: 1. Can no longer strike a private deal with safari operators; 2. Can no longer receive money directly from any tourism ventures; and 3. Are continuously disregarded in terms of actual needs (e.g. land for grazing). Tangible benefits that will develop rural communities as promised by conservation reforms remain questionable. As one village member complained, "The leaders are getting the cake, but don't know how to feed the people."<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Respondent 74, male, Tinga Tinga.

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**Appendix: Questionnaire guide for Bomas/Household Interviews**

**A. Background Information**

Respondent/Questionnaire No: \_\_\_\_\_ Date of interview: \_\_\_\_\_ Village: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ward: \_\_\_\_\_ Division: \_\_\_\_\_ District: \_\_\_\_\_ Region: \_\_\_\_\_

**B. Socio-Economic Characteristics of Respondent**

1. Sex: (a) Male (b) Female
2. Age set: (a) 18-30 (b) 31-50 (c) 51-60 (d) above 60
3. Ethnic group: (a) Wamaasai (b) Wameru (c) Wapare (d) Warangi (e) Wanyiramba  
(f) Wambulu (g) Wairaqw (h) Other (specify):
4. Marital Status: (a) Single (b) Married (c) Divorced (d) Separated (e)  
Widow/Widower
5. Relation to the household/boma: (a) Head (b) Spouse (c) Brother/Sister (d) Child  
(e) Grandchild (f) In-law (g) Other (specify):
6. Place of origin/birth: (a) In this village (b) Out of this village
7. How long have you lived in this village? \_\_\_\_\_
8. Level of education: (a) No formal (b) Adult education classes (c) Basic Primary  
(d) Secondary (Form 1-4/5-6) (e) Diploma (f) Vocational Training (h) University  
(i) Other (specify):
9. Occupation: (a) Peasant/Farmer (b) Livestock keeper/pastoralist (c) Formal employed  
(d) Casual labor/worker (e) Small business (f) Business on natural resources  
(g) Agro-pastoralist (h) Other (specify): \_\_\_\_\_
10. Household/boma composition (how many persons are there in your household/bomas?)

Age (years)	Female	Male	Total
≤ 15			
16-35			
36-45			
46-55			
56-65			
> 65			

**C: The History of the establishment of CBC and Enduimet WMA**

11. Are you aware of Enduimet WMA?

1. YES 2. NO 3. DON'T KNOW

12. Did you receive any information about the establishment of Enduimet WMA?

1. YES 2. NO 3. DON'T KNOW

(i) If YES what kinds of information did you receive?

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13. Were you involved in the establishment of Enduimet WMA?

1. YES 2. NO 3. DON'T KNOW

(i) If YES how were you involved and why did you get involved?

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(ii) If NO, do you know who was involved in the decision making process of establishing Enduimet WMA?

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14. Do you have any concerns regarding the establishment of a community-based conservation and tourism, such as Enduimet WMA? 1. YES 2. NO 3. DON'T KNOW

(i) If YES, What kinds of concerns do you have?

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15. Did you receive any opportunities to express your opinions and concerns about Enduimet WMA? 1. YES 2. NO 3. DON'T KNOW

(i) If YES, What kinds of opportunities did you receive?

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16. Do you feel that Enduimet WMA is part of the community?

1. YES 2. NO 3. DON'T KNOW

(i) Why/Why not?

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**D: Interactions with Wildlife**

17. Is there wildlife in your village area?

1. YES 2. NO 3. DON'T KNOW

18. Have you experienced shamba damage caused by wildlife?

1. YES 2. NO 3. DON'T KNOW

(i) If YES, please give an estimate of acreage lost.

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19. Other damage(s) caused by wildlife (circle all that applies):

1. Loss of grazing 2. Human injuries 3. Livestock kills 4. Increased askari labor  
5. Others (specify): \_\_\_\_\_

(i) Please give an estimate cost.

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20. Is there tourism in this area?

1. YES 2. NO 3. DON'T KNOW

21. Were you consulted about the tourism project when it started?

1. YES 2. NO 3. DON'T KNOW

22. Can you remember when the program started? \_\_\_\_\_

23. Does your household currently benefit from wildlife? 1. YES 2. NO 3. DON'T KNOW

(i) Why/Why not? (Include Direct vs. indirect benefits)?

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24. Does the village receive benefit from wildlife? 1. YES 2. NO 3. DON'T KNOW

(i) Why/Why not? (Include Direct vs. indirect benefits)?

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25. Is there a negative impact of tourism in this area? 1. YES 2. NO 3. DON'T KNOW

(i) If YES, what?

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26. Do you, personally, benefit from the presence of (XX Safari Company)?

1. YES 2. NO 3. DON'T KNOW

(i) Why/Why not & how (Include direct/indirect benefits)?

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27. Does the village benefit from the presence of (XX Safari Company)?

1. YES 2. NO 3. DON'T KNOW

(i) Why/Why not & how?

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28. On the whole, does wildlife contribute more in losses or gains per year to you personally?

1. Loss 2. Gain 3. Both

(i) How?

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29. Are you aware of any other community-based conservation/Tourism in your area?

1. YES (specify) 2. NO 3. DON'T KNOW

30. How much do you pay in school fees per year? \_\_\_\_\_

### **E: Ecological Observation**

31. Are there more or fewer wildlife in your area more than 10 years ago?

1. MORE 2. LESS 3. DON'T KNOW

32. It is important to conserve wildlife in your village area?

1. YES 2. NO 3. DON'T KNOW

i. Why/Why not?

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33. How would you feel if Enduimet WMA was abolished?

1. Very Happy 2. Happy 3. Neutral 4. Not happy 5. Not very happy

i. Reasons for your answer?

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