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UMB Student Journal of International Environment and Development Studies
Volume 3 - 2013

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Editor's Note

Indifference is the worst form of rejection. Many students experience that academic papers that have taken weeks or months to research and write are typically shelved after grading. This often leaves students feeling their efforts are unappreciated and they wonder “What is it all for?” The *UMB Student Journal for International Environment and Development Studies* addresses those valid concerns by showcasing exemplary papers to present their highest quality papers and the topics they are passionate about for to a wider audience.

This year the *UMB Student Journal* expanded both in breadth and depth. It accepted papers from all UMB students and evolved into a more professional journal. Responsibility for the *Journal* passed from The Writing Center to Noragric students, and the Editorial Board now consists of both Writing Centre teaching assistants and students. To ensure a selection of the highest quality papers, the peer-review process was divided into a student Review Board and a teaching assistant Editorial Board. Moreover, for the first time, the *Journal* is printed and together with its online issue makes it widely accessible at UMB and for a wider audience.

The *Journal* aims to be a broad platform for all UMB students and study programs, and we are proud to present a variety of papers from six different study programs at UMB. This volume showcases topics that contribute to the interdisciplinary approach to international relations, development and environment.

Volume 3 is the result of the combined effort of many contributors, both students and staff. First of all, we want to thank Ingunn Bohmann and Fronterhelp for connecting us with the university's students and staff. Tor Arve Benjaminsen contributed with recommended papers, and Åslaug Borgan with the assistance of Berit Hopland has assisted us with design and printing of the journal. As always, our Faculty Advisor, Professor William Warner, has been indispensable with his inspiration, advice and assistance throughout the process of developing Volume 3. This year we also offer a special thanks to the Dean of Academic Affairs, Ole-Jørgen Torp, and the UMB Administration for their support, which has enabled the *UMB Student Journal* to be printed for the first time.

Lastly, this year's volume has involved more than a dozen student volunteers. All played a vital role in peer review and administration of the journal. The peer review process consisted of the Review Board that involved ten volunteers from all the Noragric study programs, which enhanced academic insight of different disciplines. They assessed the submitted papers and gave detailed recommendations to the Editorial Board, which made the final selection and offered editorial comments. A special thanks to Julie Percival and Oda Grip who assisted with the administration of the *Journal* throughout this year and to Neil Davey for selecting photos. All these volunteers have been the foundation for the first ever printed *UMB Student Journal* and is the result of their combined effort.

Editor-in-Chief

Hanna Kavli Lodberg-Holm




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Female Fighters in Northern Uganda: Ambivalence, Dread and Survival

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Abstract: War and conflict have specific gendered dimensions. However, contrary to popular understandings of women as being inherently peaceful and solely victims of war, emerging narratives reveal how women in conflict perform a plethora of tasks and roles. Female combatants destabilise the notion that women are passive participants in war. This article examines the role of females in the Lord Resistance Army in Northern Uganda, and shows the ways in which women perform multiple roles in conflict in spite of the circumscribed options.

The current conflict in Northern Uganda dates back to 1988 when Joseph Kony, an Acholi, gathered various rebel factions in the north under the banner of the Lord Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M)¹ to fight against Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) and the national army the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF). The conflict, which is often described as low-intensive in scale, has caused massive internal displacement of people in Northern Uganda. The Acholi peoples of Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader districts have borne the brunt of displacement, "representing 90 per cent of the local population forced to move by the conflict" (Angom 2011, p. 75).

The conflict is ridden with apparent contradictions and complexities. Dominant representa-

tions of the LRA in the media and human rights reports is of a "spiritual rebel group with no clear political agenda" (Vinck and Pham 2009, p. 59), which also is the "archetypal irrational, barbaric, apolitical rebel force" (Bernd and Blattman 2010, p. 12). However, Finnström (2008) argues that dominant representations of the conflict both essentialises and obscures the causes of the conflict. He emphasises that while "commentators in powerful positions legitimate and contribute to oppression in ethnic terms" (Finnström 2008, p. 107), the conflict in Northern Uganda can neither be reduced to a result of local cosmology, ethnic characteristics² nor to religious fundamentalism. According to him, whereas there are religious dimensions to the conflict, denying the political dimensions of the conflict deprives it of its context. The atrocities become a-social

¹ The LRA was initially called the Holy Spirit Movement II, after the defeat of Alice Lakwena's Holy Spirit Movement to government forces in 1987. The group then assumed various names until 1992 when it settled on its current name (see Angom 2011)

² Rhetoric of Museveni and other senior political figures – Acholi tribe attributed specific "violent" characteristics.

and LRA's political claims are "inaccessible for the outside world" (Finnström 2008, p. 118; see also Coulter 2008). The effect of such reductionist accounts, or 'Heart of darkness' imagery of barbarous and 'backward' Africans, is that they prevent comprehensive dialogue aimed at finding political solutions to the conflict. In order to begin to understand the conflict, there is an acute need to re-politicise the war.

At the same time, however, the pervasive sense of confusion and ambivalence that surrounds the conflict needs to be properly recognised. The people in Northern Uganda have been exposed to violence and harassment for some 20 years by the various warring factions. Hopwood (2011, p.13) suggests that among the local peoples "there is no widely held political or moral understanding of the [LRA] conflict", and subsequently, that that "[i]n forming a narrative of the conflict, it is not hard to understand why people struggle, and why 'interpreting the lived reality' is almost always ambivalent or contradictory". The difficulty for survivors to communicate their lived experiences relates to the level of trauma suffered on one hand, and to uncertainties of what actually took place on the other (see also Finnström 2008). The deep mistrust of the UPDF and NRM in the North, coupled with rumours about the causes of the LRA conflict, and the tension between what the rebels say³ and what they do are rich grounds for diverging narratives in the non-combatant community. However, rumouring- or radio kaba⁴ is an important form of communal source of information and a way of making sense of "living with bad surroundings" (Finnström 2008) and should not be mistaken for paranoia as such.

Moreover, the uncertainty felt by people in Northern Uganda is compounded by the fact that the LRA conflict continues "albeit not on Ugandan territory" (Hopwood 2011, p. 6). The LRA was forced out of Ugandan territory in 2002, and no abductions on Ugandan territory have been reported since 2005. While the local non-combatant communities in Northern Uganda have enjoyed relative peace since 2005, and the rebels have moved their operation to the DRC, South-Sudan and the African Central Republic, their continued existence is a cause for concern in the region. For instance, in December 2008, a month after the last peace-talks collapsed in Juba in southern Sudan in 2008, the LRA massacred 600 people in DRC in response to a coordinated attack by Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan (see Hopwood 2011; Bernd & Blattman 2010).

Finnström (2008, p. 100) proposes that, "[o]ver the years the armed struggle of the LRA/M has taken on a most violent logic of its own". He argues that the vicious circles of violence perpetuate further use of violence, and that the war has become an end in itself. The implications of this is devastating considering the rebels' strategy of abducting minors, both boys and girls, to fill their ranks in their fight against the UPDF and commit atrocities against the local civilian population. While the rebels have consistently targeted adolescent boys, abductions of young females have also been undertaken in large scale. Furthermore, whereas the LRA's "systems of recruitment, command and control" (Bernd & Blattman 2010, p. 1), besides from being rational, also have very specific gendered dimensions. As Finnström (2008, p. 190) notes, "[i]n addition to the rebels' moral and religious indoctrination, violently disseminated to all abductees, female abductees are often subjected to rape and sexual abuse". However, to only see women as sexual slaves is a gross simplification, and recent studies stress that women's roles in

3 The rebels circulated various manifestos on the ground, and are also known to deliver political speeches to non-combatants at road blocks (see Finnström 2008)

4 Radio kaba refers to the informal network of information and communication (see Finnström 2008)

armies range from supporters, dependants, to active combatants (see Annan et al. 2011; Beber and Blattmann 2009; Coulter 2008).

The need to appreciate gendered dimensions in warfare is recognised in UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which emphasises that gender considerations need to be an integral part of prevention of conflict, peace building, peace keeping and the post-conflict effort. The World Bank has also issued several communiqués on gender, conflict and development, where the aim of policy recommendations is to broaden conceptions of women in war.

This paper examines the gendered dimension of the LRA conflict in Northern Uganda. The first part of the essay looks at concepts of gender, and gender in conflict. The second part examines females' roles in the LRA, while the last part discusses female combatants in the LRA. The paper finishes with a brief discussion on the reintegration of female combatants. Due to the limited scope of this paper, whereas females also experienced violence with specific gendered dimensions from the UPDF, and were exposed to sexual crime in general due to fragmentation of social norms, the main focus will be on females in the LRA. Another limitation arising from the explicit focus on females in the LRA is that the roles of male abductees and the production of masculinities in the LRA, and the relation between males and females, are not adequately addressed here.

Gender Roles in Armed Conflict

Before going into the discussion about gender in conflict, it is important to examine how gender is conceptualised in the literature. The concept of gender is complex and contested. Furthermore, often when we speak of gender, we mean 'women'. Crudely speaking, gender refers to the social construction of biological sex, and the relationship and interaction between them. Analytically, gender can be separated from biologi-

cal sex or physical characteristics. However, in practice, where human biology ends and social appropriation starts is impossible to ascertain. Though gender is grounded in biological sex and physical properties, gender is highly social, cultural and located within a historical context of meaning and power. Moreover, gender is not just learnt and appropriated, but also negotiated and contested. As such, gender is not a stable category, but gendered identities exist on a spectrum, and are continually changing. In addition, it is important to recognise the self is subject to, and constituted by, the multiple intersections of gender, age, class, race, ethnicity and sexuality. Zarkov emphasises that,

Gender is an organizing principle of social life that affects different levels of social reality, not only individual people. The level of individual (subjective) identities (of which we accept, or resist and negotiate identification with specific notions of femininity and masculinity) is only one of the levels on which gender operates. (cited in Bouta et al. 2005, p. 3).

Gender is produced and reproduced on multiple levels, "the level of institutions and organizations producing specific masculinities and femininities, and at the same time being the product of gender" (Zarkov as cited in Bouta et al. 2005, p. 3).

The conventional understanding of the military as an institution is that it not only prizes male characteristics in warfare, but that it also produces and reproduce violent masculinities. This conventional understanding aligns masculinities and war. In contrast, women are seen as inherently peaceful and in relation to war necessarily identified as victims. Coulter (2008, p. 55) maintains that, "research on 'women and war' focuses on women whether as inherently more peaceful or merely as victims, and often unwittingly reproduces in 'war-affected women' a corresponding lack of 'agency'". Similarly, Chua et al. (2000, p. 821) argue that "much work which focuses on the Third World either operates with a conception of women as beings without agency,

or does not analyse the roles played by women in both the public and private domains”. However, personal narrations of lived experiences, and also increasingly survey data, show that women often are active participants in war: war has serious structural constraints on people’s options, but nonetheless “women make choices, possess critical perspectives, and organize in these situations” (Annan et al. 2009, p. 2). Female combatants in particular seriously question and destabilise notions of women as passive victims and inherently peaceful.

Johnson-Sirleaf and Rhen (2002) argue that violence towards women in conflict are compounded versions of violence experienced by women in times of peace; while violence and discrimination against women escalate during conflict, this is a perpetuation of a structural problem of gendered inequality and discrimination present also in peace-times. It follows from this that different women experience war and violence differently. However, Bouta et al. (2005) emphasise that gender-based and sexual violence often become accepted practices during conflict, and that this often persists after the conflict as well.

War and conflict have specific gendered dimensions. While some violence is directed against women because they are women, not all women are victims all of the time (Coulter 2008). Moreover, in conflict victims can also be instigators and/or perpetrators (and *vice versa*). This is specifically the case with female combatants where “one can talk about the violence *of* women ... one often finds violence *against* women as well” (Coulter 2008, p. 57). To recognise this gives more scope for examining how women’s agency and room for manoeuvring play out before, during and after conflict. It also destabilises the victim/perpetrator dichotomy. As pointed out above, war is situated within a social and historical context and is not a-social as such. Moreover, “gender roles adapt individuals in war roles, and

war roles provide the context within which individuals are socialized into gender roles” (Bouta et al. 2005, p. 4). Conflict might represent a rupture of continuity with regards to gender roles or reproduce already dominant gender norms, but “to transcend what is considered acceptable feminine and masculine behaviour in times of war and conflict can be costly” (Coulter 2008, p. 57).

The LRA: Gendered Perspectives

When the LRA emerged in 1988 it “commanded little public support” and this resulted in “looting homes for supplies and abducting youth to serve as fighters, servants and ‘wives’” (Annan et al. 2009, p. 4). The intensity of LRA’s activity has varied. In 1988, when the LRA first appeared on the scene, the conflict was low-scale. However, this changed in 1993, and 1994, when the Sudanese government allegedly supported the LRA with both territory on which to build basis in South Sudan, and also supplied the rebels with weapons. This led to an upscale in activity, and “[a]bduction from 1995 to 2004 was large-scale and widespread, with 60,000 to 80,000 youth taken into LRA ranks” (Annan et al. 2009, p. 4; see also Beber and Blattman 2009).

The civilian population in Northern Uganda has suffered violence at the hands of both the LRA and the UPDF. With increases in rebel violence, Acholi women in particular are vulnerable and exposed to sexual violence. Whereas the LRA has had strict rules against civilian rape, the Ugandan army has been reported to mass rape female non-combatants, and in some instances also male non-combatants (see Bennet et al. 1995; Finnström 2008). With regards to the sexual violence committed by the LRA, Annan et al. (2009, p. 1) emphasise that women are “sexually abused, but almost always exclusively within the confines of a forced marriage to a rebel commander”. They claim that, unlike in Sierra Leone where the use of gang-rape was used to enforce group discipline, widespread “rape outside these

forced relationships is rare” (ibid) in Northern Uganda⁵.

The LRA’s ‘roving groups’⁶ would abduct indiscriminately, and the screening processes would be undertaken after when the rebels had retreated to their camps⁷. According to Beber and Blattmanthe,

LRA raiding parties commonly abducted all able-bodied members of a household to carry looted goods, but were often under explicit instructions from Kony to release children under 11 and adults older than their mid-20s, once the loot was delivered safely. (2001, p. 14).

Males were twice as likely to be abducted than females, and boys around 14 were specifically targeted. When abducting females the LRA would divide them into “prepubescent girls, young adolescents, and those thought to have had prior sexual relationships” (Annan et al. 2009, p. 7). Annan et al. findings suggest that physical appearance had some impact on how rebels would chose which females to keep. The other characteristic that was valued by the rebels were females’ education level: more educated girls had less chance of being set free. According to Sabina, a 36-year old who was abducted by rebels in 1988, the youngest girls “aged 13 downwards were not forced into sexual union” (Bennet et al. 1995, p. 97), but used to carry out domestic chores until they were considered sexually mature. Girls that were thought to have been sexually active before were often released by the rebels.

Young adolescent girls from around 14

years-old and older were often forced into union with older male rebels. Within the confines of these forced marriages females were exposed to sexual abuse and rape, and half of the women forcedly married bore children. Annan et al. (2009) maintain that these unions were regulated directly from the top leadership in the LRA – orders for abduction of females to serve as wives coming directly from Kony himself – and that females were ‘given’ as rewards to rebels of higher ranks. In short, women were part of a remunerative system, where high-ranking rebels could take girls for themselves or distribute them to rebels of lower ranks as they saw fit. High ranking rebels generally had multiple wives, and “[w]hen girls of about 14 were abducted, the [rebel] leaders would want to take such a girl for a partner even if he were aged” (Bennett et al. 1995, p. 97). Beber and Blattman (2010) propose that one of the reasons why LRA prefer younger girls is that young girls were not as likely to try and escape, and that they are more susceptible to indoctrination. Another reason, which fits with the strict enforcement of sexual discipline in the LRA, was that young girls were less likely to have been exposed to HIV/AIDS, which is ravaging the region.

However, while the “LRA systematically used slavery and physical violence within ‘forced marriages’” (Annan et al. 2009, p. 1), simply referring to these relations as ‘sexual slavery’ is a gross simplification. Finnström (2008, p. 191) proposes that “the effort to control women’s productive labour – as porters, farmers cleaners, launderers, tailors, and sex workers – became an asset transfer in civil war”. He emphasises that insurgencies and rebel wars in Africa are closely connected to the rebels’ capability to cultivate the land. Whereas the LRA engaged in looting of food-stuffs and crops from non-combatant civilians, the rebels also needed to build and sustain a network of ‘workers’ to carry out mundane tasks necessary for their survival in the bush. Women

5 The study conducted by Annan et al. (2009) show that 93.5% of forced wives had been sexually abused or raped, 6.9% never married abductees reported that they had been sexually abused or raped, in contrast to 1.7% of non-abductees.

6 Mobile commandoes of about 10-15 rebels would conduct raids for weeks at the time (see Annan et al. 2009; Beber and Blattman 2010)

7 When the LRA was forced out of Ugandan territory and into Sudan, this considerably increased the distances and obstacles that abductees set free and escapees had to transcend to return home.

with the rebel forces filled various agricultural roles, collected water and firewood. The more educated females reported that they filled more technical occupations, like “nursing, midwifery, radio communication, record-keeping and logistical support” (Annan et al. 2009, p. 8).

The violence with which the LRA abducted youth had a great effect on how females view the different “options” they have. Coulter (2008) highlights that survival and fear are key in understanding why women stay with rebels, and also why some engage in battle. Other reasons relate to anger or even resignation. The initiation processes were heinously violent. Buckler (cited in Hopwood 2011, p. 13) underlines that such excessive use of violence rips individuals from their social context thereby severing or suspending the sense of self and humanity:

A sense of autobiographical rupture may be expected given the experiences of the victims, subjected to treatment designed to obliterate identity and to reduce the opportunities for choices and responsibility to zero.

Although Buckler is talking about the relation between the Holocaust and war crimes, the same mechanisms of trauma are created by the LRA’s initiation processes of abducted youth in Northern Uganda. As Annan et al. similarly observe, roughly

A quarter [of both males and females] were forced to beat, cut, or murder other abductees, civilians, or even family members in order to bind them to the group, reduce their fear of killing, and to discourage disobedience. (2009, p. 9).

The killing of kin and close friends increases the probability of rejection by the community in cases of escape. In addition, the LRA would use threats of violence against families of abductees, and misinform about repercussion of being caught by government forces to instill fear and to discourage escape. As Beber and Blattman (2010, p. 23) note, “threatening and inflicting

pain is a rational and optimal strategy for motivating people who are poor in the sense of having bad alternatives”.

One coping mechanism in conflict relates to the relative protection of becoming a ‘camp follower’. Women reported that in this way one could avoid being raped by multiple men and gain access to food and other privileges. Similarly in the LRA some of the females that were in forced marriages expressed that one were more entitled as a wife than not. There is a great variation in the narratives concerning the relations between the rebel husbands and wives, with some reporting harsh conditions and abusive men while others again express that they were treated relatively well by their bush husbands. It is important to recognise that not all male rebels were abusive, and male rebels were also subject to forced abductions, gross violations, and circumscribed choices.

Coulter (2008, p. 61), when discussing women fighters in the various warring factions in Sierra Leone, argues that some women seek to control their own fate by climbing in the rebel hierarchy as fighters: while many of the women had been abducted and sexually abused and suffered multiple humiliations, the transition to fighter “altered their position in the rebel hierarchy, which in a sense empowered them and rendered them some authority in the trajectory of their lives, however illusory”. Aretxaga (1997) calls this a ‘choiceless decision’. In the next section I will discuss female combatants in the LRA.

Female Combat Roles in the LRA

Annan et al. (2011, p. 9) note that females “were principally recruited not to become fighters, but to become wives and mothers” in the LRA, and that there are no accurate estimates on how many women were active combatants in the LRA. Moreover, they argue that the majority of the women were not ‘regular fighters’, but females who had been with the rebels for some weeks

typically received some form of military training whether for defensive purposes or to engage in insurgencies. However, the women who reported fighting as their primary role, also reported the same level of violence as the male combatants. Some of the abducted women are known to have risen through the rebel hierarchy, and female combatants are described as the bravest and most skilled military commanders (Annan et al. 2009; Finnström 2009; Coulter 2008).

However, female combatants are often understood to be more violent and malicious than male combatants. Finnström (2008, p. 191) argues that this is a consequence of female combatants subverting traditional gender norms: “female fighters more than male fighters have sidestepped society’s conventional gender hierarchy, and thus their actions are seen to be more sensational, epitomizing the worst in women”. However, Coulter (2008) proposes an alternative explanation for why female combatants are seen as more ferocious. She argues that, as in “Sierra Leonean traditional culture, women are not believed to be inherently peaceful” and female combatants reconfirmed women’s “wild and unpredictable nature” (Coulter 2008, p. 65). As such, for Coulter, it was not “necessarily female combatants” transgression of gender roles that was ‘shocking’ but how female combatants reproduce “traditional discourses on femininity” (Coulter 2008, p. 65). Similarly in Uganda, Acholi women of childbearing age are seen as unpredictable and dangerous. Finnström (2008) describes how young newlywed women, in particular, are treated warily as their loyalties have not been fully ascertained. Only when a woman bears a child is she fully integrated into the patrilocal family. I suggest, then, as with female combatants in Sierra Leone, females engaging in violent conflict in Northern Uganda reconfirm the local cosmology of women as wild and treacherous.

In Northern Uganda most female and male ab-

ductees returned home (Beber and Blattmann 2010). Most returnees managed to escape on their own, while others were rescued by the UDFP. A lot of policy effort was initially directed at former abductees. The reason being that fully understanding gendered dimensions in warfare has implications for reintegration processes and stability in post-conflict situations. While gender concerns “drove policy-making at the global-level, donor funding at the country level, and program design on the ground” (Annan et al. 2009, p. 1), the scope of these interventions focused on females as victims. However, recent studies on post-conflict reintegration of former rebel abductees in Northern Uganda suggests that, contrary to conventional and ‘pessimistic’ understandings, females have reintegrated surprisingly well (see Annan et al. 2009; Annan et al. 2011; Beber and Blattman 2010). This holds true for female combatants, and to a large degree also for female abductees returning with children. These studies also show that while demobilisation and reintegration of combatants are key in creating stability after conflict, differences in health, education and economic opportunities in Northern Uganda is a structural problem where “females in general are more disadvantaged than males” (Annan et al. 2009, p. 21). As such, a successful post-conflict strategy must not only focus on disarmament for females, but also “increase access to education and livelihoods for all females” (Annan et al. 2009, p. 22). As a returned female abductee with a child advised parents of girls returning,

Take good care of her. It is not the end of her life. She should forget what happened. Be a good example for her. She is still surviving. She should not see this as the end of her life. She can still continue. (Annan et al. 2009, p. 22).

As the remarkable quote shows, though women’s resilience is tested severely in conflict, people will always strive for a better life and there is hope for the future.

Conclusion

The LRA has exposed tens of thousands of females to sexual abuse and horrific violence. However conceptualising women as mere victims is wrong and reductionist. As this paper shows, despite circumscribed choices, women perform multiple roles in conflict. At present, Uganda is in a 'seemingly atypical transitional justice process' (Hopwood 2011, p. 6). The LRA is still operational in central Africa, and 800 abductees are assumed to remain with Kony. In spite of the promises made in the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP), there are few indications that the government has changed its attitude towards the northern region. Finnström (2008) emphasises that the people of Northern Uganda are increasingly experiencing marginalisation and poverty. Rebels feed on this discon-

tent with the effect that their political manifestos become "more meaningful". In spite of this, since the collapse of the Juba Final Peace Agreement in 2008 no political solution seems to be on the horizon. Rather, a highly successful viral campaign – Kony 2012 - seen by more than 90 million worldwide is pushing for a military solution. As the conflict receives renewed attention it is crucial to remember that the civilian population, and in particular women, are exposed to violence in conflict.

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Photo: Neil Davey

Energy Efficiency Trumps Renewable Energy Production in Norway

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ABSTRACT: Although renewable energy provides an alternative to the fossil-based economy, the first logical step towards true sustainability comes with reducing energy use overall. As sustainability will require functioning ecosystems, the effects of renewable energy and transmission grids are compared with reducing electricity use in Bergen, Norway. This paper demonstrates how, in the short run, energy efficiency of existing households may preserve ecosystems where renewable energy fragments them.

As climate change threatens ecosystem balance, sustainable energy emerges as the key to ensure a habitable planet. To achieve sustainability, the European Union (EU) aims to reduce energy consumption and increase renewable energy production (EU 2009). Norway is obliged to meet these goals; however, its focus is primarily on building new renewable energy facilities (OED 2012). Technologies such as wind and hydropower receive market-based subsidies, with more than 800 energy projects waiting approval (NVE 2012). Although these renewables are deemed environmentally friendly, their facilities are not, because dam and windmill construction have adverse environmental effects (Abassi & Abassi 2012). Moreover, large-scale transmission grids degrade, if not destroy, ecosystems (Makarieva et al. 2008). However, ensuring preservation of ecosystems is possible by addressing the alternative – reducing energy consumption. Alternative

policies to reduce consumption through energy efficient buildings will preserve ecosystems; renewable energy construction fragments ecosystems at best, and destroys them at worst.

Ecosystems provide vital services, such as regulating the atmosphere and cycling water (MEA 2003). Water cycling depends on wind and vegetation; winds bring ocean moisture to forests that maintain freshwater on land, which again supports terrestrial, aquatic and atmospheric processes (Makarieva et al. 2008). Norway's proposed renewable energy facilities disrupt these life-sustaining processes, in part by generating land use changes (Rygg 2012). For ecosystems to function, they must be left intact. Considering that undamaged ecosystems in Norway are primarily depleted by energy projects (Nyvoll 2011), disturbance will be further accelerated as current policies expand renewable energy. Unfortunately, renewable energy attempts

to mitigate climate change under the pretext of conserving resources when evidence shows that renewable development destroys them. Sustainability can only be reached by preserving ecosystem services, this mandates consuming less electricity.

Norway can reach the EU-aims without having to expand renewable energy facilities at all, by simply consuming less electricity through an increase in energy efficient buildings (Ibenholt & Fiksen 2011). As Norway has the world's highest electricity consumption per capita (SSB, 2008), such achievements will require government initiatives (Sovacool 2009). During the winter-consumption prices peak, since many of Norway's households are poorly insulated and are heated using electrical units (SSB 2008). The Norwegian Government should improve energy efficiency in buildings by increasing insulation to reduce space heating (Lechtenböhmer & Schüring 2011). It is possible to reduce energy costs without decreasing standards of living by upgrading to energy efficient buildings. From a technical point of view, reducing electricity consumption will alleviate strain on the transmission grids (Halvorsen 2012). Transmission grids connect regions, and since energy efficient buildings require less electricity, ecosystems are protected from fragmentation. Recently constructed transmission grids through pristine Hardangerfjord illustrate this relationship. The grids were constructed to secure Bergen's electricity supply, of which poorly insulated buildings are the largest consumer (BKK 2011). Upgrading buildings could reduce electricity demand, render transmission grids unnecessary, and consequently preserve ecosystems in the Hardangerfjord.

When one region consumes less electricity the market price decreases, motivating other regions to consume more. Economists call this the "rebound effect" (Gottron as cited in Brennan

2010); the market will balance out after changes to supply or demand have been made. Electricity will always be in demand, whether it is for space heating or for trains, meaning that total energy consumption will remain stable. Although models can easily demonstrate such market-effects, they present a limited view.

By definition, market-models cannot assign monetary value to negative environmental effects, or, in economic terms, negative externalities. In this case the demand for energy, supplied by fossil fuel and renewable energy causes negative externalities such as climate change and ecosystem degradation. The supply and demand of energy is certainly accounted for in the market-model, which is why policies can and should target reforms to reduce demand.

Expanding the supply of renewable energy to mitigate climate change follows the notion that growth from exploiting resources is inevitable. Now is the time to eliminate the core problem: excessive, destructive energy use. Norway can show that welfare and economic growth need not mean high-energy consumption (Jess 2010), and thus play a crucial role towards achieving sustainability.

To conclude, sustainability cannot be reached solely through renewable energy, as it poses an unprecedented threat to the natural environment. At the same time societies must reduce fossil fuel consumption and change their energy systems. In short, reducing energy use by making buildings more energy efficient is sustainable and protects ecosystems. This reduction requires government initiatives, and subsidies for energy efficient buildings in Norway which will be efficacious with regard to European goals. Norway should opt for a robust and sustainable energy system. Failing to reconsider energy consumption hinders such achievements.

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Photo: Henriette Wathne Gelink

A Peace Nation with Corpses in the Cargo

Norwegian involvement in the transatlantic slave trade and early colonialism

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ABSTRACT: From the second half of the 17th century to the beginning of the 19th century, ships from Denmark-Norway transported approximately 85,000 African slaves across the Atlantic Ocean. Another 15,000 slaves were sold from the Danish-Norwegian forts on the Gold Coast (Ghana) and shipped over by others. The article argues that the state formations of early modern Europe looked substantially different from today's sovereign nation-states. Relationships between state and non-state actors were blurry and intertwined, and additionally, the nation had a smaller role as a subject of loyalty and identification than it has today. A distinction between the terms 'state' and 'nation' must therefore be drawn in this context. Although the Norwegian nation did not have its own nation-state, it was indeed involved in the slave trade and early colonialism. Norwegians participated on all levels, from deck boys and captains, to governors and admirals. Norwegian self-perceptions and visions of history must therefore be questioned and common myths debunked.

KEYWORDS: colonial history, colonialism, transatlantic slave trade, mercantile companies, composite states, sovereignty, Danish Empire, Denmark-Norway, Ghana, Norway

Introduction

Denmark and Norway share a long history as slave traders and colonizers in Africa, the Caribbean and India (Jensen 2009), however this topic is very little discussed. It is a commonly held view that because Norway itself was a colonized and suppressed nation under Denmark, it could not possibly have colonized others. We frequently read claims such as, "Norway has no significant history of slave trade, colonial activity or other forms of repression" (Hammer 2012). The

former minister of education Øystein Djupedal once said: "Norway does not represent colonial history [...] I like to see Norway as a western and modern democracy, with a history as 'peripheral and poor colony' – to push it a little bit to extremes" (2006, cited in; Jensen 2009).

Norway's self-image is often constructed around the concept of being "the odd country" (*annerledeslandet*). This term was introduced into the debate prior to the referendum on European Union membership in 1994, when it was

argued that Norwegian political values such as social egalitarianism and global solidarity were best maintained with Norway remaining outside the union. Since then, the term has been adopted into daily language and portrays Norway as a country with no history of imperial ambitions or colonial links. As Smith-Simonsen has pointed out, this concept “projects an idea of innocence that has great political value and that has been an important instrument in the construction of the country’s profile both inside and outside” (2011).

Norwegian historians have largely neglected this past, even though it was as Norwegian as it was Danish. Several of the academics who have looked into this history have contributed to conceal Norway’s participation by “conveniently” labelling the whole matter as Danish, and performed by Danes. Leif Svalesen, who discovered the wreck of the slave ship *Fredensborg* off the Norwegian coast in 1974, was one of those who worked tirelessly to spread knowledge about this little-known history. In the prologue to Svalesen’s book, *The Slave Ship Fredensborg*, UNESCO gives credit to Norway for the way the country confronted “the more obscure aspects of its history” (Svalesen 2000, p. 7). However, this history has since proven to be difficult to acknowledge and is therefore most often “forgotten” (Leira et al. 2012).

The claim that Norway does not have a colonial past, often cited as a reason and an advantage for the country’s peace work, is a recurring one (Leira 2007). The fact that Norwegians were early colonizers, and that they were in fact deeply involved in the transatlantic slave trade, is easily ignored, under-communicated and forgotten. Indeed, the grand myth of Norway as a “peace nation” of do-gooders without a colonial past is alive and well (for examples, see: Flemmen 2010; Harbo 2005; Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009; Skjevesland 2004; Støre 2007; Støre 2009; Tørres 2007; Vollebæk 2003).

As Norway approaches the 200-year anniversary celebration of its 1814 constitution and

its separation from Denmark, it is important, indeed crucial, to bring renewed attention to Norway’s involvement in the slave trade. The first version of the Norwegian Constitution of 1814, which will be celebrated in 2014, did not include a prohibition on slavery or slave trade. However, it continued to deny Jews access to the Kingdom (Stortinget 2013). Around 100,000 Africans were sold as slaves and shipped across the Atlantic Ocean by citizens of the Danish Empire. This corresponds to about 2% of the total transatlantic slave trade between the 1660s and 1802 (Gøbel 2011). What was Norway’s role in the slave trade and early colonization during the personal union with Denmark?

This article will argue that the state formations of early modern Europe looked substantially different from today’s national-sovereign states. Relationships between state and non-state actors were blurry and intertwined, and additionally the nation had a smaller role as a subject of loyalty and identification than it has today. The paper will therefore argue that we must draw a distinction between the terms ‘state’ and ‘nation’ when we look back into our history. Although the Norwegian nation did not have its own nation-state, it did participate in slave trade and colonization. Therefore, while it is correct in legal terms to claim that the contemporary Norwegian state – as a legal entity – did not participate and thus does not have any responsibility for the slave trade or colonization, the slave trade was in fact a multinational enterprise both inside and outside the Danish Empire, where the Norwegian nation was involved at all levels.

The composite state

Sovereignty is an idea that must be understood at one and the same time as the idea of supreme authority of the state and the idea of politically and legally independent, geographically separate states (Jackson 2007). As Weber (1995) argues, however, it is unsatisfactory to treat state sovereignty as a settled matter. Sovereignty has both

spatial and temporal dimensions, which means that the concept of sovereignty is constantly being modified and redefined through political practice. As Elliott (1992, p.51) states,

If sixteenth-century Europe was a Europe of composite states, coexisting with a myriad of smaller territorial and jurisdictional units... its history needs to be assessed from this standpoint rather than from that of the society of unitary national states that it was later to become.

It is therefore incorrect to draw strong parallels between the medieval kingdom of Norway, which fell more or less by chance into the hands of the Oldenburg monarch of Denmark in the late middle ages, and the contemporary Norwegian state.

Terms, names and labels are important linguistic tools, and it is important to find suitable terms so as not to cause unintended confusion over exactly what we mean. Here the paper use the term, ‘the Danish Empire’. Many medieval kingdoms consisted of heterogeneous populations and often non-contiguous territories (Jackson 2007). The political landscape of early modern Europe was also dominated by these “composite states” and “dynastic conglomerations” (Nexon 2009, p. 67). The state formations in Europe were dynastic-imperial, which means that dynasts used to join together composite polities through conquest, marriage and inheritance. Each part, however, tended to retain its identity and many of its distinct institutions. Overall, the dynasts controlled their holdings through a variety of local intermediaries. “Reason of dynasty, rather than contemporary notions of reason of state, drove international-political competition” (Nexon 2009, p. 68).

This was also the case in the Danish Empire, officially named the ‘Danish Monarchy’, or the ‘Oldenburg Monarchy’ – named after the North German dynasty that has occupied the Danish throne since 1448. Contemporary Danish scholars such as Østergaard (2002) refer to

this realm only as ‘Denmark’. He claims that, “to the extent that this entity is remembered at all, it is known by such politically correct terms as ‘the Dual Monarchy’, ‘Denmark-Norway’, or ‘the Twin Kingdom’. However, these polite terms are so imprecise as to be misleading.” He is right because until 1814 the name ‘Denmark’ referred to a type of composite state that was typical in early modern Europe. The problem is, however, that today we also have a state named Denmark, and this may cause serious confusion; the modern state of Denmark looks completely different from the composite state (i.e. the Danish Empire) of 1814, 1658 or 1537.

Professor Per O. Hernæs is the only academic who has written a doctoral dissertation on the Danish-Norwegian activities in West Africa, and is the Scandinavian who has done by far the most research on the slave trade and the colonies on the Gold Coast. He has criticised Danish historiography of “Danophilia”, which he sees as a type of ethnocentrism or Danish eurocentrist tendency in the analysis of the history of the Gold Coast (Hernæs 1985). However, in his effort to direct more attention to African perspectives, he has fallen into “Danophilia” himself. In his main work – *Slaves, Danes, and African Coast Society: The Danish Slave Trade from West Africa and Afro-Danish Relations on the Eighteenth Century Gold Coast* (Hernæs 1998a) – which is based on his doctoral dissertation from 1995, he barely mentions the term ‘Denmark-Norway’ and the Norwegian participation. Easily, one could get the impression that the whole enterprise was ‘Danish’, conducted by ‘Danes’. Fortunately, he uses terms that also include Norway in other work (e.g. Hernæs 1998b), but still his use of terminology is inconsistent (see Hernæs 2006; Hernæs 2009). Some of the students he has supervised have adopted the Danish labels “for the convenience”, but without discussing what is hidden behind these simplistic terms (Berg 1997; Mørk 2008). The advantage of the ‘Dan-

ish' terminology is that it is short and simple. Simplification, however, is not necessary helpful when it comes to clarifying the complexity of the early modern Danish Empire. It is also problematic to label the whole population of the Danish Empire as 'Danish' in this context, as it conceals the fact that people of other nationalities within (and outside) the empire participated in the enterprise. Although it is less elegant, building the discourse around the term 'the Danish Empire', rather than a 'Denmark' that is by no means the same Denmark as we have today, would be more accurate and hopefully cause less confusion.

Norway's place in the Danish Empire

As Richard McKenney notes, "the accidents of inheritance shaped the power blocs of Europe" (Nexon 2009, p. 6). That was exactly what happened with Norway after a series of instances where the king did not produce an heir to the throne. In 1450 the Norwegian crown ended up, more or less by coincidence, in the hands of Christian I, the first regent of the Oldenburg dynasty. Around 80 years later, the Norwegian council of the realm was dissolved after a dramatic power struggle during the reformation. Although the Kingdom of Norway continued to exist by name and in official terms, Norway became part of the Danish Empire under the Danish king and Norwegians were integrated into the Danish state. To characterise this as colonisation, however, is misleading.

In 1660, after the loss of the (now Swedish) territories of Skåne, Halland, Blekinge, Bohuslen, Herjedalen and Gotland in 1658, King Frederick III became the absolute ruler of the Kingdoms of Denmark and Norway, in addition to the Duchies of Slesvig and Holstein. The latter was part of the Holy Roman Empire, and as Duke of Holstein the Danish king was formally a subordinate to the German-Roman emperor – something that of course further complicated the constitutional situation (Østergård 2002). The

territories of Iceland, Greenland and the Faroe Islands were originally affiliated with Norway, but during the 17th and 18th centuries, they came under the direct rule of Copenhagen. In addition, the empire consisted of the so-called tropical colonies in India (Tranquebar and Fredriksnagore), the Caribbean (St. Croix, St. John and St. Thomas) and West Africa; all in all more than thirty forts, trading lodges and plantations on the Gold Coast (DeCorse 1993). Thus, Denmark, or more precisely the capital Copenhagen, was the leading component of a conglomerate state and an empire, of which there were many during the early modern period.

Compared with the wealthy, densely populated German provinces in the southern part of the empire, Norway was sparsely populated and perceived as far away from the centre of power in Copenhagen. Nevertheless, many Norwegians made leaps up the hierarchy. By the mid-1500s, Kristoffer Trondsen Rustung, a Norwegian privateer, had been appointed admiral of the Danish-Norwegian fleet. Erik Ottesen Orning, Henrik Bjelke and Cort Adeler are further examples of those who reached the top rank of admirals and general-admirals (Oset 2010; Rein & Berg 2012). Other Norwegians were given positions as senior government officials and became the king's most trusted advisors. Christian Colbjørnsen, from Romerike outside Oslo, became one of the most influential people in the administration of the Danish Empire in the 1790s, when he was appointed Secretary-General of the Danish chancery in Copenhagen (Sprauten 2012). Niels Rosenkrantz, the son of a Norwegian officer, is perhaps the most striking example. In 1810 he became foreign minister of Denmark-Norway and it was he who had to carry out the politics that led to the dissolution of Denmark-Norway in 1814 (Bregnsbo & Jensen 2004).

Subjects of loyalty and identification

The historian Sverre Bagge has studied the na-

tional features found in medieval Norway. He argues that medieval Norway was not a “modern nation state” (Bagge 1995), but what he calls a “modified version of the traditional authoritarian state with some national features”. He concludes “there is no unilinear development from the ‘dynastic’ or ‘authoritarian’ to the national state”. In the early modern period, he points out, the distance increased between state and nation: “The ruling elite would be even more inclined than in the Middle Ages to insist on the king, the dynasty and the state, rather than the people or the nation, as the subject of loyalty and identification”. This is something that must be acknowledged in order to gain an understanding of how the Danish Empire, and other empires, worked.

In this context, it is also interesting to look at the Copenhagen administration’s attitude towards tax collection. Despite heavy tax pressure on Norwegian farmers, which increased during the 1600s, the burden on Danish farmers was far heavier still. The state’s friendlier attitude towards Norwegian farmers is probably connected to the importance of having a loyal Norwegian peasant militia during the period of absolute rule (Dyrvik 1999). This is just one illustration of how ‘nations’ had a far lower status as a subject of loyalty and identification in this period. The Norwegian peasants were, of course, dissatisfied with the tax burden. However, their anger was not directed against the king in Copenhagen, but rather against the local officials, who the peasants regarded as exploiters. This was expressed through two major peasant rebellions in Bergen (1765) and in Agder (1786-87).

As Østergård (2002) points out, the fleet was the “military, technological and political backbone” of the Danish Empire, manned first and foremost by fishermen from Norway and the islands in the Northern Atlantic. At times, the fleet also had strong components from other nations, especially from the Netherlands. According to the naval historian Olav Bergersen, in

1679 the officer corps consisted of 217 officers, of whom 31% were Dutch, 27% Norwegian and 19% Danish. In 1709, about 15,000 men were enrolled in the common fleet, of whom approximately two thirds were Norwegian (Bergersen 1953 as cited in Rein & Berg 2012). Likewise, many Norwegians also joined other states’ navies as sailors and soldiers, thereby participating in the realisation of these state’s colonial ambitions. In their micro-historical article, Lottum and Sogner (2006, p. 393) give one example of the many ordinary Norwegians who went into Dutch service. In 1664, Magnus Andresen was one of the crew on ‘*Het Geloof*’, and helped to reconquer some fortresses on the Gold Coast. Consequently, we can see that the nation was not the primary subject of loyalty in the early modern era.

The mercantile companies

In the early modern era we find a blurry divide between state and non-state actors and their exercise of violence. According to Janice Thomson’s (1994) influential analytical framework, it is possible to distinguish between eight different types of violence, characterized by particular combinations of ownership, allocation and decision-making authority. Such a framework could be a useful tool for analysis; however, it is inadequate when confronted with empirical variations (Barkawi 2010; Eisenträger 2011; Leira & Carvalho 2010). In early modern Europe, the borders between what was private and public means were extremely blurred, while alliances and loyalties were shifting.

A good example of the blurred line of demarcation between private and state activities is the mercantile companies that were established in the early 1600s. These were granted full sovereign powers, and in addition to the economic privileges of a trade monopoly, they could “raise an army or a navy, build forts, make treaties, make war, govern their fellow nationals, and

coin their own money” (Thomson 1994, p. 35). Governors appointed by the companies headed the outposts of the companies, and officers originally sent by the king were to follow the governor’s orders. This was also the case with the companies that were established in the Danish Empire (Feldbæk & Justesen 1980).

By 1616, the Danish East India Company had been founded with the primary purpose of establishing direct trade with Indian products between merchants within the Danish Empire and India. This was to prevent the profit from the trade ending up in the hands of foreign merchants, i.e. merchants outside the Danish Empire (here we see how unsatisfactory it is to talk about ‘foreign’ and ‘national’ in an early modern European context). The company was organized as a corporation. The royal family bought shares, and tried to pressure the nobility into doing the same. Additionally, burghers from Denmark, Norway and the duchies invested in the company. The king granted the company relief on import tax, and furthermore made ships and seafarers available at the state’s expense. In 1618, an expedition consisting of two company ships and three naval ships set sail and started the journey towards India, which they reached two years later. On the east coast they managed to strike a deal with one of the local rulers and acquired the Danish Empire’s first tropical colony - Tranquebar. It stayed under the Empire’s control for more than 200 years, until 1845 (Bregnsbo & Jensen 2004, p. 126).

Other parts of the world were also objects of the Danish Empire’s attention. On the western coast of Africa, we find a territory that would be named Danish Guinea and the Gold Coast, today known as Ghana. Immigrants from Holland were the first people to take the initiative to establish footholds on the Gold Coast to secure the trade of valuable goods such as gold, ivory, palm oil and slaves. Because of the restrictions caused by monopoly of the trading company in

Holland, these men could not make the most of their talent and experience at home. Instead, they sought to do so in the Danish Empire’s service. In 1625, Johan de Willum headed a consortium that sought permission to sail and trade in West India, Brazil, Virginia and Guinea. It seems, however, that this project was never achieved, and nor were several subsequent initiatives.

However, in 1650, the Africa Company, based in Glückstadt by the river Elbe, was commissioned to sail to the Gold Coast. In 1659 the company successfully gained a foothold on the Gold Coast by conquering fortresses belonging to competing European powers, and building new ones, which could only be built after obtaining permission from and paying a fee to local rulers. However, the company still had to fight Dutch and Swedish competitors, with whom the king had a hostile relationship back in Europe. The Glückstadt Company proved to be unprofitable, and in 1672 its possessions were transferred to King Christian V, who in turn passed them on to the newly established West India-Guinea Company in 1674 (Bregnsbo & Jensen 2004, p. 127; Feldbæk & Justesen 1980, p. 334; Jensen et al. 1983, p. 83).

The fortresses on the West African coast were enclaves of Danish-Norwegian sovereignty, continuously contested by both European and local powers. When the Europeans came to establish forts and trading posts, and later plantations, they entered into rental agreements with the local kings for using the land. The rent was paid as gifts to the kings, who were in the most part pleased to have the Europeans there. After all, the Europeans were trading partners who brought attractive goods, such as textiles and weapons, from Europe. The African kings and the Europeans also gained mutual benefits by creating alliances (Feldbæk & Justesen 1980; Mørk 2008).

The Gold Coast’s distant location meant that people were isolated from news about de-

velopments back in Europe for long stretches of time, and this could from time to time give somewhat peculiar results. Periods of war and peace in Europe did not correspond with the situation in West Africa. During the 1658 war with Sweden, for instance, the Dutch helped the Danish-Norwegian forces back in Europe. However, this did not stop them from trying to force the representatives of the Danish Empire out of their Guinea outposts at the same time. At a later point, the commanders of the English and Danish-Norwegian forts continued to eat and drink together, while their fellow countrymen were fighting each other in Europe (DeCorse 1993).

Transatlantic slave trade

The Danish Empire also acquired colonies in West India. Trade with the region had already been established during the rule of King Christian IV, but it was in 1672 that an expedition sent by the West India-Guinea Company first took the island of St. Thomas into its possession. The island, which had a good natural harbour, was intended as a stronghold for the company's ships and a trading post from which slaves could be sold and distributed to plantations on the Caribbean islands, North and South America. Additionally, the Company claimed the island of St. Jan, which the Empire seized in 1718, and then in 1733 the island of St. Croix was bought from France (DeCorse 1993).

Between 1670 and 1807, the majority of transatlantic voyages (around 3,000) went back and forth between Denmark and the West Indian Islands. About 260 ships received sea passes to sail the triangular route from Europe via the Gold Coast to West India. Additionally, vessels that originated from the Danish West Indies and sailed directly back and forth between the islands and Africa made some 80 trips. Ships from the Danish Empire transported approximately 85,000 African slaves across the Atlantic Ocean. Another 15,000 slaves were sold from

the Danish-Norwegian forts on the Gold Coast and transported on ships sailing under other flags. The voyage from Africa to the West Indies usually took three months, while the whole triangular circuit would normally take one and a half years. The death rate on these voyages was around 15% (Svalesen 2000, p. 9).

The slave trade had been carried out for centuries by merchants from North Africa and the Middle East, and was therefore nothing new when the Europeans started their trade. In the following we will see how Norwegians participated in this multinational enterprise.

Norwegians participating on all levels

Some people who nowadays Norwegians consider national icons and heroes were among those who participated in the colonisation and the slave trade on all levels: from deck boys to admirals, and from investors to governors. In 1673, when the pinnace "Cornelia" from Bergen became the first Danish-Norwegian ship to transport slaves from West Africa to St. Thomas in the Caribbean, the main shareholders were Mrs. Pedersen, the widow of the deceased customs officer Peder Pedersen, and the merchant Jørgen Thormøhlen (Fossen 1978, p. 45). Part of Bergen city (Møhlenpris) is now named after Thormøhlen.

In 1707, the then 15-year-old Peter Johansen Wessel, later known as the naval hero Tordenskjold, went into the service of the West India-Guinea Company. His first voyage was on the slave ship *Christianus Quintus*, as a deck boy. The destination was Fort Christiansborg on the African west coast, and thereafter St. Thomas in West India. 447 slaves were taken on board, of which 406 survived the crossing of the Atlantic (Andersen 2006, p. 30-44).

The famous author Ludvig Holberg, who is also a Norwegian and Danish national icon, owned shares with a value of 600 rigsdaler in the West India Company (Andersen 2006). Another

Norwegian investor was admiral Cort Sivertsen Adeler. In the 1660s he had been a keen promoter of the East India Company, and in 1671 he was one of the main investors (i.e. one of those who had invested over 1000 rigsdaler in the West India Company), and became one of the chief members of the business (Westergaard 1917, p. 35). In today's terms, we might say that he was a member of the board of directors. On February 6, 1675, he obtained a sea pass for his vessel, "Den forgyldte ørn", and a month later the governor of Norway, Ulrich Fredrik Gyldenløve, obtained a sea pass for his ship "Friderich". The captain on board was Børge Anderson from Oslo.

Among those who acted as colonial governors and commanders on the Gold Coast fortresses for periods during the 17th and 18th centuries were at least nine Norwegians, namely Andreas Jacobsen, Mattias Hansen, Andreas Willumsen, Søren Schjelderup, Enevold Nielsen Boris, Andreas Riegelsen Bjørn, Christian Fleischer, Niels Lathr, and Johan Christopher Richelieu (Justesen & Manley 2005, p. 370; Larsen 1940; Nagel 2012). In a micro-historical contribution, Hernæs (2002) has also directed attention to one of the common Norwegians who served as a soldier on the slave fortress Christiansborg, Cornelius Pettersøn from Bergen.

On the other side of the Atlantic we also find Norwegians, such as the plantation owner Engebret Hesselberg. He became an official on St. Croix in 1755, and moved on to St. Jan in 1757, where he became infamous for the merciless methods he used to crush slave rebellions (Den store danske 2012).

Norwegian participation in slavery could also be seen back home in Norway. Several wealthy people acquired African slaves, whom they allowed to be painted in the corner of the family portrait in order to show their 'exclusivity'. The best-known case is that of Christian Hansen Ernst, who was the page of the governor

of Norway, Ulrik Fredrik Gyldenløve, at the end of the 17th century, and later became postmaster in the port city of Kragerø. The story of Adam, "the negro slave", who lived in the household of the merchant Hans Herlofsson in Arendal in the late 1700s, has also become a legend in this small town (Sætra 2002).

Although there is no complete list, by conducting a search of the 1801 census, one can find Vilhelmine, "the serf negress of the lady of the house", on the farm Guthus in Hedmark county (Digitalarkivet.no 2012d). In the household of Christian Stabel in Bergen, two young men by the name Jonas Liendreg and Niels Olsen are registered with the occupations of "page and negro" (Digitalarkivet.no 2012a). In another coastal town, Mandal, we find 22-year-old Alexander, who is registered as merchant Giertsen's "negro and servant" (Digitalarkivet.no 2012b). Norway's leading businessman of the time, Bernt Anker, also acquired a black servant: Soliman (Digitalarkivet.no 2012c). He was baptised in the church of Akershus Castle in 1786 and given the name Christian. This "extraordinary act" was reported as headline news in *Norske Intelligenz-Sedler*, the national newspaper (1786). One of Christian Soliman's godfathers was Bernt Anker's cousin Peter, the governor of the colony of Tranquebar in India. Peter's brother Carsten Anker was director of the Danish-Asian Company for 19 years. Both of them had prominent roles in the Norwegian struggle for independence in 1814, and are considered to be among Norway's 'founding fathers'.

1814 – the beginning of the end

Although the Danish Empire handled the trade of around 100,000 African slaves across the Atlantic, the enterprise in Africa never really took off. Until the second half of the 18th century, the European settlements were limited to 60 fortresses and trading lodges, which lay scattered along the Gold Coast. Six fortresses were

in the possession of the Danish Empire. These were very small communities, typically consisting of men from various ethnic backgrounds. In 1672, for example, the entire Danish-Norwegian contingent on the coast consisted of eight men at Fort Fredriksborg, three at Osu and two at Cape Coast. In 1679, Fort Christiansborg, later the headquarters of Denmark-Norway in West Africa, was manned by one Danish commander, a Greek assistant and 40 slaves (DeCorse 1993). Even later, the permanent Danish-Norwegian communities consisted of no more than a few dozen people (Nørregaard 1966).

During the first 140 years of its presence on the Gold Coast, the Danish Empire showed little interest in acquiring more land than the fortresses and their immediate surroundings. The main activity was trading gold, spices and slaves to be sold in the colonies on the other side of the ocean. This changed towards the end of the 18th century, when Dr. Paul Erdmann Isert suggested establishing plantations on the Gold Coast, thus sparing the slaves from the ordeal of crossing the Atlantic. Ernst Schimmelmann, Minister of Finance of Denmark-Norway and plantation-owner in West India, also supported the initiative of establishing colonies on the Gold Coast. Isert returned to West Africa in 1788 to start acquiring land for the colony (Jeppesen 1966, p. 50-51). Before returning, however, he published a book about his earlier journeys to the Gold Coast and West India, which is now considered the most important Danish contribution to the contemporary slavery debate. Isert's engagement, combined with the intellectual pressures of the time, was what led Schimmelmann to become an opponent of slavery. In 1792, for both humanitarian and economic reasons, Schimmelmann used his central role in the Danish Empire to push for the abolition of the transatlantic export of slaves from the Danish-Norwegian part of the Gold Coast and their import to the Danish-Norwegian West Indies. The king's edict took effect in 1803,

but this slavery was allowed to continue in West India up until 1848 (Svalesen 2000).

A good indication of the Norwegians' important role in the Danish Empire's colonial adventure is that when the empire lost its naval fleet in 1807, and Norway in 1814, it also lost its ability to exercise sovereignty over its territories on the Gold Coast. With the state bankrupt, Denmark gave up its colonial ambitions in Africa. During the congress of Vienna, Denmark's Norwegian foreign minister Niels Rosenkrantz attempted to sell Guinea to England, without success. In 1818 the Danish government tried to sell it again, this time to the United States, which was looking for a suitable place to establish a state for liberated slaves. This, however, resulted in the establishment of Liberia in 1822. Later, Sweden tried to trade the West Indian island of Saint Barthelémy for the Danish forts on the Gold Coast in order to use them as a place to deport criminals, but Denmark was not interested in this deal. Finally, in 1850, the Danish territories in Africa were sold to Great Britain for the modest sum of 10,000 pounds. The islands in West India remained Danish for some years, but were eventually sold to the U.S. in 1917 (Jensen et al. 1983; Nørregaard 1966, p. 297).

Even after 1814, Norwegians continued to be active in colonial enterprises, with various degrees of support from the state (for some recent examples, see: Godøy 2010; Kjerland 2002; Kjerland 2010). Towards the end of both world wars Norwegian diplomats spoke up for making advances in order to acquire colonies in the tropics. For example the Norwegian ambassador in Moscow sent a letter to the Norwegian minister of foreign affairs in London in December 1944, writing that

“The Norwegian people deserves to gain this chance of blossoming out on its own ground under warmer latitudes than in the immediate proximity of the polar circles and would surely be as fit as any other culture nation to bring development and fortunate conditions

among the population in those parts of the world that until now has lived under primitive and out-dated conditions” (cited in Neumann & Leira 2005, p. 223).

Conclusion

The state in early modern Europe looked completely different to the states of today. The Danish Empire was one of the many conglomerate states and empires of the time. Norway had an important place in this empire, among others because of its indispensable contribution to the fleet. The Danish Empire’s loss of Norway in 1814 marked the beginning of the end of the Empire’s colonial ambitions. In conclusion, the Norwegian nation was deeply involved in the transatlantic slave trade and the early colonization efforts in Africa, even though Norway was not yet a sovereign nation-state. Throughout this article we have seen many examples of Norwegians who participated in the slave trade and colonisation on various levels, from the political, cultural and economical elites of Norway to the common seaman. It is peculiar how a man can be a Norwegian hero when doing likeable things, while being hushed up or labelled as Danish when his activities are not too pleasant. Norwegian politicians must stop making the claim that Norway did not par-

ticipate in the slave trade and colonization. As Christine Smith-Simonsen said, “Norwegians were, and are not, that different from everyone else, just as good and just as bad” (2011). Norwegians must be brave enough to acknowledge the darker sides of their nation’s history, and not just label the parts they do not like as “Danish”. The celebration of the 1814 constitution and Norway’s national sovereignty in 2014 would be an excellent opportunity to give this history renewed attention.

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Growing Pains: Political Ecology - History and Future

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Abstract: Political ecology is a relatively new field intersecting both the natural and social sciences. The foundation of political ecology is cultural ecology and ecological analysis, and the core idea is that the relationship between humans and nature is constructed in a political context. This paper will briefly explain the origins of political ecology since its introduction in the mid-twentieth century. The contemporary focus on global warming makes political ecology highly relevant to understand both the causes and consequences of climate change. This paper will also discuss some of the criticism directed at political ecology, and argue that the flaws pointed to by critics are simply growing pains for the new field, which is more relevant than ever.

No environmental change is without political meaning. The circumstances that lead to a change, the consequences of the change, the history of the people causing the change or affected by it, are all interlinked. This intersection is covered by the relatively new field of political ecology. The core of political ecology is where agriculture, land tenure, health, development, international law, history and the physical and social sciences meet. However, two theoretical approaches have been most influential in the formation of political ecology - political economy and ecological analysis (Greenberg and Park 1994). Political ecology “contextualizes environmental change in political economy” (Robbins 2012, p. 88). There is growing consensus that this approach to the relationship between the physical environment and human society is highly relevant. One simply cannot “deny the political roots of all environmental knowledge” (Robbins 2012, p. 98), refer-

ring to a constructionist perspective, one of the foundations of political ecology. This paper will: introduce the political ecologist approach, explain its origin, discourse and relevance and address criticisms against this approach. To conclude, this paper argues that although political ecology has some growing pains, the approach is relevant both for the present and the future.

The Journal of Political Ecology defines its field as

[expanding] ecological concepts to respond to this inclusion of cultural and political ecology within an analysis of ecosystems that are significantly, but not always entirely, socially constructed. (Greenberg and Park 1994, p. 1).

This definition embodies some of the core values in political ecology. Firstly, a constructionist approach is fundamental in political ecology. This entails the perspective that “nature is culture” - that nature today is humanised, contrary to the

nature/culture dualist approach dominant before the 1970s and that “reality is produced discursively” (Biersack 2006). Secondly, the focus on power relations also separated political ecology from the “apolitical” cultural ecologist approach of the 1950s and 1960s. This apolitical approach was only concerned with human adaptation to their environment, “without attending to the structures of inequality that mediated human-environment relations” (Friedman as cited in Biersack 2006, p. 3). Lastly, political ecology aims to merge the global perspective of political economy and the local perspective in ecology found before the 1970s. It is an approach that looks at a “chain of explanations” (Blaike and Brookfield as cited in Robbins 2012), how situations are interlinked from the local, to the national to the global level, due to the “growing awareness of the integration of local societies into colonial and post-colonial global market economies” (Walker 2005, p. 74).

Since its introduction in the mid-twentieth century, the political ecologist approach has developed and taken several directions, especially over the last 15-20 years. Political ecology went through a phase known as the “structuralist phase” in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Much of the focus was on detailed ecological analysis combined with economic dependency theory; this structuralist approach was criticised by some scholars who claimed there was too little emphasis on politics (Walker 2005). Thus, from the mid-1990s, political ecology was “politicised”, taking into account political interests, conflicts and socially constructed values to become the current political ecology (Bryant 1991). This latter approach has also been criticised (as elaborated below) but no doubt has it been necessary in the growing international consensus on sustainable development and environmental conservation.

An obvious strength to political ecology, especially when it comes to policy-making, is the departure from the dualist world where human society and “nature” are independent and analysed separately. Studying the relationship be-

tween social and political institutions and the environment will lead political ecologists to find environmentally sustainable solutions where people live - such as in cities, factories and farms (Robbins et al. 2010). This is in contrast to a more traditional conservation-oriented perspective. Political ecology then offers a more optimistic mindset than that of neo-Malthusians, for example, a piece of land cultivated by humans is not “lost” in an environmental or ecological sense. Political ecology also has the benefit of diversity. As it embodies a range of fields and approaches, applies both normative and empirical analysis, qualitative and quantitative methods, and different time-scales and size-scales, political ecologists will potentially give a thorough and accurate view of the “big picture”. However, this diversity can also lead to an incoherent and fragmented political ecology lacking credibility.

After around 40 years, political ecology is “still in its infancy” (Walker 2005, p. 73). This means there are some growing pains. Intersecting a variety of fields, both from social and physical sciences, it is difficult to define the limits of political ecology. Spanning and growing in so many directions can compromise the efficiency of the field, and the lack of clarity might undermine related fields, such as geography, traditional ecology or even gender studies. Because of the eclecticism in political ecology, an author might ask “how do gender roles affect deforestation patterns?”. The question is a textbook example of political ecology, incorporating distribution of power in relation to the environment, but what basis does the author have to make an assumption there is a connection between gender roles and deforestation? False premises will lead to false explanations, or even lead to true connections being overlooked. Or, in the words of Andrew Vadya and Bradley Walters in their aptly named article “Against Political Ecology”:

It is important to distinguish fields or sub fields on the basis of what is to be explained, and contrary to the practice of political ecologists not

on the basis of *a priori* judgments, theories or biases about what will do the explaining. (1999, p.167)

This approach of combining sciences and fields is a challenge for any political ecologist. A fundamental idea in political ecology is the one of social construction, to be critical to mainstream definitions and discourses. Thus, a political ecologist must be careful not to be biased by his or her own discourse, but instead critically analyse each situation from many perspectives, without assuming the answer in advance. More focus on the politics of environmental change is undoubtedly progress, but many answers can still be found in the traditional sciences such as ecology, geography and biology, and these disciplines must be embedded in political ecology.

Another criticism of political ecology is the absence of ecology in political ecology (Walker 2005). It has been argued that political ecology has become an “over correction” to the lack of focus on the “political dimension of human/environment relationships” (Durham as cited in Vayda and Walters 1999, p. 168) that dominated before the 1960s and 1970s, and the structuralist approach in the 1980s. Some argue that political ecology is simply the “social science of environmental *politics*” (Walker 2005, p. 73). This does not mean that all political ecology is without ecology, but as a booming approach to environmental issues, it is important to define what political ecology is and what

a study of environmental politics is. Walker, a political ecologist himself, also raises the question of what this means for the sub-discipline related to political ecology, human/environment issues in geography, and their future (Walker 2005).

Not all political ecology is free of ecology, biology or geography and in fact some of the criticism might be premature (Walker 2005). Political ecology has not yet grown into its full shape or definition, which can explain the incoherence and problem with boundaries. However, the shifting course of political ecology from apolitical to political is not necessarily a weakness of the field. This dynamic allows the field to be constantly remade, criticised both from within and outside and to remain relevant and contemporary, reflecting the times in which it operates. Some of the criticism aimed at political ecology can also be directed at any field – any scientist, regardless of his or her field can be blinded by their own discourse. As human impact on the environment becomes more apparent, political ecology offers useful tools of analysing what powers lie behind the impact. By studying human relations of power as interdependent with environmental change, the approach is highly relevant in the age of globalisation and global warming. Above all, political ecology offers a critical perspective on the persistent power relations that affect, if not determine, climate change.

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Energy Policies in the European Union: Convergence or Divergence?

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Abstract: Since the 1990s, national governments in the European Union (EU) have pursued different policies in order to secure energy supply. As member states pursue different agendas and strategies, EU energy policies are said to diverge. Recently, however, the EU has taken up a leadership role in tackling climate change, and stimulated cooperation in energy issues among its member states. As energy policies in the EU may be converging, the EU can potentially set an example for the United States, China and India. This paper examines these two seemingly contradictory developments, and shows how they are related to ongoing power struggles between different actors inside and outside the EU. It remains to be seen whether or not the EU will succeed in achieving full integration and convergence in energy policies.

Introduction


The topic of supply security has been a central concern of the European Union since the 1990s, and various policies have been developed to guarantee energy security. The change in the energy world order and the need for supply securing instruments have led the EU member states to pursue different foreign policies concerning different key players (Youngs 2011). In addition, as Skodvin et al. (2010) suggest, for a number of reasons, national governments are delaying the process of EU energy policy integration. Therefore, EU energy policies are thought to diverge as member states pursue different agendas and strategies. Recent developments, however, sug-

gest the opposite. The European Union steps into a new era, where environmental issues are employed as a means to strengthen the cooperation between member states. The EU is pursuing a common energy policy in order to become more strongly integrated economically (Birchfield & Duffield 2011). Thus, energy policies in the EU are seen to converge, allowing the EU to take up a new global leadership role in tackling climate change (Oberthür & Kelly 2008). This paper will address the direction the member states are taking in regard to energy policies: i.e., whether the EU energy policy developments are characterised by convergence or divergence.

Energy policies in the european union

Energy security and divergence

Access to affordable, secure energy is one of the challenges of energy policy in the EU. In order to deal with this challenge, the EU wants to build a common energy market with free competition. Free competition means that consumers can choose energy products freely and that energy suppliers can offer their products and services across borders, without meeting any barriers (Eikeland 2011, p. 15). However, since energy demand grows high and supply is limited, energy security is a sensitive topic, as implied by the following graph:



Graph 1: Energy production and consumption in the EU-27 (Source: www.europa.eu)

The gap between energy production and consumption in the EU-27 is big, and not likely to be reduced significantly in the near future. In order to fill in the gap, and to be independent in energy issues, member governments act unilaterally, or seek bilateral energy agreements with outside actors. Youngs (2011, p. 54) has observed these complex “pipeline politics”, in which EU member states signed agreements with other countries, and supported the construction of different gas pipelines. Table 1 suggests two different pat-

terns. The first pattern is that one nation, such as Italy, seeks agreements with different partners. The second one is that some nations seek agreements with one single partner, such as with Russia.

The first pattern suggests that some member governments are reluctant to participate in a European common energy market or common energy policies. In their search for energy diversity and supply securing, they proceed into a different direction. The second pattern suggests another story: that of outside players who do not want to have a strong integrated Union. With abundant gas supplies,

Russia has constantly intervened in regional politics in order to secure energy demand. For instance, in 2008, Russia invaded Georgia and threatened the existence of the Nabucco pipeline. It urged five transit states in Europe to sign a legislative intergovernmental agreement in July 2009 (Youngs

2011, p. 56). After the invasion, in January 2009, Russia cut off its gas supply to 18 countries in Europe (mostly in the Southeastern region) for 13 days by bringing its transmission to Ukraine to a halt (Pirani et al. 2009). This disruption has accelerated the process of gas transit diversification from Russia to Europe through the Nord Stream, South Stream, and other pipeline projects.

Table 1: Gas pipeline projects between EU countries and neighbouring countries.

Pipeline projects	EU supporters	Partners
Nabucco	Bulgaria, Italy, Austria, Greece, Hungaria, Romania	Turkey, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Egypt.
Nord Stream	France, Germany, Sweden, Finland	Russia, Poland
South Stream	Bulgaria, Italy, Slovenia, Croatia	Russia, Serbia
Trans-Saharan	Italy, Spain	Nigeria, Niger, Algeria

Inside the EU, energy issues are subject to continuous intergovernmental negotiation (Moravcsik 1993). Intergovernmental power competition is strategic interaction between member states, in which they try to get more benefits and gains from regional policy negotiations. Different countries develop different energy strategies: for instance, Germany is a leader in renewable energy, France continues with nuclear power, and the UK wants to unbundle the market in gas and electricity.

From the beginning of European integration in the 1950s, the UK had little interest in the Union. In the 1970s, Britain was rich in oil and coal resources, which allowed the country to be self-sufficient. Moreover, in order to assure demand for its own energy products, Britain blocked any control of the EU over the oil market and North Sea resources (McGowan 2011, p. 197). It also opposed any attempt of the Commission to reach an energy agreement among member states in this period. In the 1980s, however, the UK's position had shifted: from being an opponent, to becoming a wholehearted supporter of European energy policy integration, particularly with regard to the unbundling policy in the electricity and gas market. Unbundling the market means that market forces decide energy prices and competition brings more choice to energy consumers. The UK needed a new strategy because of domestic growing energy consumption, especially in electricity and gas. In addition to the high demand anticipation, the country also faced a drop in production capacity, especially in coal. The UK now strives for a competitive market, with reasonable gas and electricity prices, through supporting the

Directorate General for Competition and Gas, and Electricity Directives (Eikeland 2011 p. 18). In response to this strategy, however, Germany, France, and many of the Eastern European countries decided not to unbundle ownership, not to abolish monopolies, and not to support the privatization of some state-owned companies in the gas and electricity industry.

As the biggest energy consumer in the EU, without many energy sources of its own, Germany must constantly seek for solutions and strategies to secure its energy supply. Internationally, the government signed a bilateral agreement with Russia in establishing a pipeline project in the North Sea, supported German energy companies to expand abroad and compete internationally (Duffield & Westphal 2011, p. 179). Domestically, the country tries to constrain energy consumption by energy efficiency and emission reduction. It also develops renewable sources, and is far ahead of the EU in Research and Development in solar and wind power. Within the region, Germany resists market liberalization suggested by the Commission and the UK, and opposes an EU internal market in gas and electricity. Moreover, Germany is an opponent of France in nuclear power issues. By planning to close down completely all nuclear plants in 2022 (Duffield & Westphal 2011, p. 174), Germany has shown its uncompromising attitude toward nuclear energy source.

Being relatively poor in natural resources, France had to generate a new energy source to supply the growing energy consumption caused by its industrial development. Nuclear power came to be seen as a viable alternative after the

oil crisis in 1973, and rapidly became a main energy source. Nowadays, it accounts for 40% of the total energy production of the country (Mérinet 2011, p. 147). In order to avoid energy dependence, France gives many privileges to its national nuclear energy companies, despite the health risks and strong objection of neighbouring countries. Furthermore, the French government argues that generating electricity from nuclear power has comparatively low costs, ensures a stable price in the long term, and does not generate CO₂ emission. In France, it is very difficult for outside companies to compete with the national electricity state company, the EDF (Électricité de France S.A.), because of the low costs of generating nuclear energy. It is also not easy for foreign companies to open a new nuclear plant in France, due to French regulated tariffs (Mérinet 2011, p. 160). The result is that competitors cannot raise their market shares, while consumers, both in France and elsewhere in the EU, cannot choose freely. This protectionist policy can also explain why France opposes the Gas and Electricity Directives, and the market liberalization package in the EU.

In sum, the European Union constitutes a big market, in terms of energy, and its demand is increasing. National diverged interests and preferences in dealing with energy security will probably continue to be dominant in the coming years. As a result of growing energy consumption, as well as the political desire for national autonomy, there will be a diversity of players, and a divergence of policies in the energy market.

Climate change and convergence

In response to diverged national strategic movements, the EU government wants to control different bilateral agreements made by its member states, and tries to strengthen cooperation within the region in order to take on a new leadership role in the world. For this, it needs to find effective policy tools, which can satisfy different interests, and develop regional integration in the

energy market. This paper will now move on to discuss the other perspective: that the EU's energy policies are actually converging, rather than diverting. Thus, the paper will examine whether or not a common EU energy market and policy is taking shape.

Bennett (1991, p. 218) suggests and defines three main kinds of policy convergence. The first is "convergence in policy goals". Policy makers in the EU, for example, are aware of climate change problems and set up a common policy for dealing with environmental problems. The second is "convergence in policy content", which is "defined as statutes, administrative rules, regulations court decisions and so on". The EU institutions in Brussels are an example of this kind. The third is "convergence in policy instruments". It means that policy makers use common tools to manage policy, the EU Emission Trading System is a good example.

In 1991, the IPPC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) launched the first scientific report about possible climate change. This led to the establishment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Negative environmental impacts of the supply and consumption of energy, especially fossil fuels, has since been a concern in the EU. However, during the last decade of the 20th century, the Commission's main objective was to push through the market unbundling package of gas and electricity. In the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the majority of the Council voted for environmental regulations, but fiscal measures, such as tax, were not included (J. B. Skjærseth, personal communication, 19 November 2012). In 1995, the EU published its Energy White Paper, which addressed two issues: first, energy competitiveness and supply security, and second, climate change and environmental improvement. The White Paper of 1997 later mentioned renewable energy as a solution for energy challenges in the EU. However, it is important to note that the EU made no legislative frame or

binding targets during this period. From 2000, there has been a significant change in the EU's energy politics. EU leaders have not only made efforts to build a single energy market, but also tried to achieve their environmental targets. "A more integrated approach to energy policy" has replaced previous dispersed efforts (Duffield & Birchfield 2011 p.5).

There are several reasons that make the European Union, with its different member governments and diverged interests, begin to pursue one single goal – tackling climate change. In his paper in, Bennett (1991) mentioned policy emulation as a first cause for policy convergence. Emulation is different from diffusion and has its main characteristic "the utilization of evidence about a programme or programmes from overseas and a drawing of lessons from that experience" (p. 221). Therefore, policy emulation is a result of learning from other institutions. This is quite evident in the process of addressing environmental problems of fossil fuel uses and Green House Gas (GHGs) emission in the EU. The Maastricht Treaty and Energy White Paper were the results of learning about the Climate Change issue from IPCC and UNFCCC.

What is noteworthy about this response is the EU's active role, which Oberthür and Kelly (2008) refer to as "EU leadership". The leadership role has urged the EU government and its member states to coordinate their views and speak with one voice about this issue. In the 1990s, a working group was established in Brussels to represent the EU Council and member states in international negotiations. In addition, a flexible system, including "lead negotiators" and "issue leaders", was also set up in 2004 in order to improve the negotiation effectiveness. This system helped the EU achieve "a remarkable degree of coherence as an actor in international climate policy" (Oberthür and Kelly 2008, p. 38).

One other cause of convergence, mentioned by Bennett (1991, p. 226), is the efforts made by "international regimes" to harmonize policy.

International regimes, which are intergovernmental organizations such as the EU, play an important role in helping member governments avoid policy discrepancies. With its "institutional triangle" structure – the European Commission, the Council of the EU, and The European Parliament – the EU has a critical role in shaping the integration of its member states (Birchfield 2011, p. 244). Birchfield writes that the Commission, as an active actor in initiating policy, has redefined the energy issue and coupled effectively energy policy with environmental policy by giving birth to those directives in the 1990s (p. 246). Once the Council and Parliament of the EU approve a common policy, all Commissioners have to support this policy, despite possible opposition by their own national governments.

From the 2000s onwards, the EU structure also shows an interesting convergence driver, as suggested by Bennett: "convergence through Elite Networking and Policy Communities" (1991, p. 224). The Barroso Commission I (2004-2009) and Barroso Commission II (2010-2014) have had more than 470 proposals approved by European leaders. Many of these proposals address new energy and climate change policies. Under the leadership of Mr. Barroso, the Commission has used "soft law", and facilitated trust by providing highly relevant information. Especially, it has acted "as a focal point of many sectoral networks" to coordinate member states and push forward the European integration (Braun 2009, p. 444-445). On 10 December 2012, at his speech to receive the Nobel Peace Prize Award on behalf of the EU in Oslo, Mr. Barroso confirmed one more time the Union's leadership "in the fight against climate change" and addressed the commitment to work for an "even closer Union" (Van Rompuy & Barroso 2012).

The climate change concern has materialized as the so-called "20-20-20 targets" in the EU. According to these targets, at least 20% reduction below the 1990s level of greenhouse gas emissions should be achieved by 2020, in ad-


dition to 20% reduction in primary energy use through energy efficiency. The third target is a 20% increase in the proportion of renewable energy in the EU energy consumption. In order to achieve these ambitious targets, the EU has created a platform for policy instruments convergence by setting up four Directives on Energy (European Commission, 2012).

First, since the EU-ETS Directive (Directive on Emission Trading System) was adapted in 2003, a functioning market where industries and companies in the EU can trade emissions has been established. In this market, the EU has established a carbon price, and a cap and trade system covering 11,000 industrial installations (J. B. Skjærseth, personal communication, 21 November 2012). The cap and trade system is based on the principle that companies get a fixed amount of carbon emission allowances. Those who emit more than this fixed amount have to buy allowances, and those who emit less than the allowed level can sell their surplus allowances to others. According to Wetterstad (2011, p. 95), the EU-ETS has contributed to cognitive change among corporate leaders, made them more aware of the consequences of climate change, and to some extent, motivated them to become greener investors.

Second, when it comes gas and electricity, as I have analyzed in the first part of this paper, concerns for national energy security have constrained market opening and liberation. However, in March 2011, the EU implemented the third package of the Gas and Electricity Directives. The third package comprises three market unbundling models: Ownership Unbundling (OU), Independent System Operator (ISO) and Independent Transmission Operator (ITO). If an OU is accepted in a member state, grids of gas and electricity will be available for suppliers and producers. No company can use their majority share or voting right to block the grids. Some EU companies have unfastened their transmission

assets (for instance, in Germany, E.ON and Vattenfall Europe in electricity, RWE and E.ON in gas). The ISO model allows companies to own physical networks, but they have to let another independent company operate, maintain, and invest in their networks. The ITO model allows a supply company to own and operate its network, but an affiliate will manage this network independently. These models prevent monopoly strategies and attempts at local market protection. Member states are forced to comply with the unbundling rules and the three models by 3 March 2013 (European Union, 2011).

Third, the Energy Efficiency Directive promotes a combination of technological improvements and emission trading methods. By using energy efficiently, companies, industries and countries can achieve not only the target of reduction in primary energy use, but also the targets of GHGs emission reduction and innovative technology. In addition, they also have incentives to sell their surplus emission allowances if they emit less than the allowed quota. For this reason, almost all member states are pursuing this target, which potentially leads to unity and policy convergence in the EU. Oberthür and Kelly (2008, p. 43) optimistically argue that improving energy efficiency can reinforce energy security and serves the climate change agenda. At the corporate level, moreover, many international companies quickly apply innovative technology to increase their energy efficiency. Statoil of Norway is an example. This company operates in fossil fuel industry, has high GHGs emission, and is likely affected by all three targets. Nevertheless, Statoil realizes that energy efficiency can be an opportunity to reduce emission. The following figure shows the company's strategic response to climate change regulations and the role of more efficient technologies.



Graph 2: Statoil's response to New Policies in Climate Change (Source: Statoil, 2012)

Last but not least, when it comes to renewable energy sources (RES), most member states have been moving fast since the 1990s. Germany is now ahead in Europe in RES installed capacity per capita (EurObserv'ER, 2012). There is also a high growth in RES production in many member states (Nilsson, 2011), including the UK, Italy, Spain, and Sweden. By improving renewable energy capacity, countries are also less dependent on energy import, and therefore, can enhance their national energy security. Nilsson (2011, p.119) also added that “the Commission has been successful in pushing Member States toward promotion of renewable energy as a policy objective”.

When observing the four directives, it becomes clear that member states and integrated corporations respond actively and positively to the EU's directives, leading to a common policy in energy and climate change. International players, such as the IPCC and the UN, also want to support the Union in achieving its targets of tackling climate change. A strong EU, which can fulfill its “leadership by example” in international climate policy, would be a good motivation for other actors, especially the US, China, and India – the three biggest GHGs emitters of the world – to follow a similar path. In fact, there are some positive changes in China. The country has announced seven pilot areas for the carbon trading system ETS in 2011. These cities

and provinces are Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Shenzhen, Guangdong and Hubei. They are establishing the infrastructure to start trading in 2013 and 2014 (Scotney et al. 2012, p.11). The US is also undergoing change, thanks to Shale gas. In 2011, they cut 8% of their GHGs emission (G. Bang, personal communication, 28 November 2012). Some developments in the carbon trading system at the state level, in California for example, are expected to create a spillover effect in the rest of the country.

Nevertheless, it seems a bit too optimistic to think that the world is moving towards a bright future, and climate change targets will be soon achieved. The EU still has a long way to go to reduce the “credibility gap” between official commitment and practical fulfillment at the level of individual member states (Oberthür & Kelly 2008, p. 39). In addition, achieving climate change targets through energy policy is not sufficient for solving the problem of climate change, and linking climate change with energy policy will not address all the issues and problems related to energy. However, the EU is on the right track and needs time to further develop its energy policy instruments, especially with regard to fiscal instruments such as tax and subsidies. And there is hope, not only for the EU's citizens, but also the whole world, if the EU takes on a leadership role in tackling climate change.

Conclusion

Energy policies in the European Union are complicated and diverse. There are a wide variety of actors involved, not only from inside the region, but also from other parts of the world. As shown throughout this paper, energy policies in the European Union are characterised by both divergence and convergence. Which path is stronger in a particular period depends on the moves and negotiations of the EU's internal players. The EU will need to develop suitable strategies, create effective energy policy instruments at the

legislation stage, and assure high compliance at the implementing stage. The Barroso Commission II (2010-2014) still has a lot to do, such as proposing regulations and getting approval for their policies. The issue of EU energy policies is by no means clear-cut: for the time being, debates and power struggles between different actors continue, giving rise to contradictory developments. Whether the EU succeeds in achieving full convergence, and establishing a single common energy policy, remains to be seen.

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Photo: Hanna Kavli Lodberg-Holm

No-Till: A Tool Against Climate Change

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Abstract: Ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions have been discussed for years. Agriculture is one of the major industries to emit such gases. This paper reveals and describes how agriculture can reduce the emission of carbon dioxide (CO₂) thereby minimizing negative effects on the climate. No tilling between crops leads to sequestration of carbon in the soil, reducing emission to the atmosphere. The practice also reduces the use of fossil fuels, since ploughing is no longer needed. Using a no-tillage practice is one of the ways greenhouse emissions from agriculture can be reduced, to become more climate-friendly.

Agriculture is responsible for one-third of the global greenhouse gas emissions (Gattinger et al. 2011), which directly affects the climate. Tilling practices can be used as an approach to decrease the environmental damage agriculture causes. Traditional farms use conventional tillage where the fields are plowed each season. Alternatively, no-tillage is when more than 30 percent of the field is covered, and the field is not harvested between crops.

Many gases released into the atmosphere are harmful for the climate. CO₂ is the major greenhouse gas causing global warming (Lacis et al. 2010). Unlike many other greenhouse gases, CO₂ does not condense and therefore accumulates in the atmosphere. CO₂ is the gas most emitted by human activities, so reducing carbon dioxide emissions is especially important. No-tillage systems are a tool for minimizing climate change because they reduce CO₂ emissions through carbon sequestration and reduce the

need for fossil fuels.

Carbon sequestration is defined as the process where atmospheric carbon is absorbed by materials like the soil (OECD 2012). Soil organic carbon (SOC) is the term used to describe the carbon in the soil. The ability to store CO₂ in materials will reduce the amount of gas in the atmosphere, and thereby reduce the negative impact on the climate. Tilling exposes the soil to air and sun. This exposure causes soil carbon to oxidize, resulting in the production of CO₂. If no-tillage is practiced, less soil is exposed to the elements. This will result in the soil storing more carbon, so less CO₂ is produced. The amount of carbon sequestered is related to the amount of soil that is able to store organic carbon. The SOC storage effect is finite; after a time SOC concentration will decrease at a steady state. This equilibrium will be reached after approximately 40 years (West & Marland 2002) Nevertheless, a conversion from conventional tillage to no-till-

age will result in increased carbon sequestration.

No-tillage does not only sequester carbon, it also reduces the amount of fossil fuel used in agriculture. The farm machinery involved in traditional farming emits 158 million tonnes of CO₂ per year (Bellarby et al. 2008). Ploughing using the moldboard plow emits the most CO₂ of all farm machinery, with 26.75 kg of carbon emission per hectare. This is 10 kg carbon per hectare more than the highest impact farm operation in agriculture; harvest with a combine (West & Marland 2002). Greenhouse gas emissions can be decreased by converting to no-till systems, which will reduce energy use in agriculture. The use of machinery to till the soil not only burns fossil-fuel (which is stored carbon in itself) but it also emits CO₂ into the atmosphere. Farm machinery is not the only part of agriculture emitting CO₂; the application of pesticides also contributes to environmental damage.

No-tillage farming leads to an increased use of herbicides and therefore is more likely to release CO₂ to the atmosphere. Current no-tillage practices use herbicides as the only management strategy to kill weeds and pests (Huggins & Reganold 2008). Herbicides are almost completely produced from natural gas or petroleum. If you take production and transportation of herbicides into account, herbicides increase carbon emis-

sions (Lal 2004; West & Marland 2002). By using additional methods like cover crops and crop rotation, the need for herbicides will decrease. Cover crops are grown between seasons to keep the soil covered. These crops will hinder the germination of weed seed because they will not get the necessary light (Friedrich 2005). Rotating crops in the same area in sequential seasons will break pest cycles. By constantly changing crops, no weeds will be able to settle (Huggins & Reganold 2008), reducing the need for herbicides and eliminating the need to till.

As long as no-tillage is practiced, CO₂ emissions into the atmosphere will continue to decrease. This is due to the reduction of farm machinery and herbicides used when adopting crop rotations and cover crops as management strategies to tackle weeds. No-tillage will decrease the impact agriculture has on the climate, through carbon sequestration and reduction of CO₂ emission. Farmers who use environmentally friendly methods like no-tillage should receive incentives to do so. The incentive could be funding from governments, organizations or both. Funding will help farmers to make choices that are positive for both the climate and the future.

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Photo: Kristi Denby

Sugarcane Farming in the Mtibwa Valley: Power Dynamics and Drivers in Water Access and Management

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ABSTRACT: This article examines how the various stakeholders in Mtibwa Valley (Mvomero District, Tanzania) access water in the Wami sub-basin. It also considers the extent to which the formal system (which is based on the Integrated Water Resource Management [IWRM] model) ensures efficiency, equity and sustainability at the ground level. Water access and management in Mtibwa is asymmetrical, and demonstrates the failings of the IWRM blueprint approach in the Tanzanian Water Policy of 2002, and Water Act of 2009. Drawing on Foucauldian notions of power in knowledge, the study concludes that the formal legal water system drastically favours large-scale commercial interests in access to water and land. Moreover, the case study suggests that questions of hydraulic property relations remain largely uncontested precisely because the national narratives in Tanzania focus on private interests as drivers of development.

Water in Tanzania was traditionally viewed as a gift from God to which all people had free and easy access. Water management evolved according to various community needs and values, and this variability resulted in water management systems that worked sustainably in each community, resulting in customary traditions that are still present today. With German (and later British) colonisation, new water

management and formal control systems were introduced, in which water rights were invested in by the Crown. In effect, this meant that the local population no longer had any formal rights to water in Tanganyika. The system continued after independence in 1961, and the Water Utilisation Act of 1974 upheld that all water rights were to be vested in the presidency of the United Republic (Komakech, et al. 2011). As

such, while the water services remained publicly owned in the immediate post-independence era, formal water rights were not extended to the population at large.

The late 1970s and 1980s saw increasing public deficits and subsequent international pressure for Tanzania to transition towards a neoliberal economy (Hyden and Karlstrom 1993). In accordance with the following Structural Adjustment Programs, water policy and legal frameworks were altered to implement a “formal blanket taxation system on all Tanzanian water users” (Van Koppen, et al. 2004, p. 6). More specifically, the quick transition from a stagnant water administrative system that was focussed on large scale users, to a blanket taxation system, was prompted by a 1995/96 World Bank and DANIDA-funded Rapid Water Resources Assessment report (Van Koppen et al. 2004, p.7). The World Bank model for water management introduced the current economic rationale for water use in Tanzania, and there was a sharp increase in both commercial and domestic water usage fees. However, while this move aimed to provide safe, freshwater access to the majority of the population, only 50% of the rural population and 70% of the urban population had such access by 2002 (Madulu 2005). Due to the inadequate results of the previous water policies, the international donor community again pushed for further water reforms in Tanzania, and in 2002 the new Water Policy came into force.

The 2002 Water Policy and the subsequent 2009 Water Act incorporate the concept of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM)¹, which aims to decentralise water management and increase stakeholder participation. IWRM

principles include efficient allocation, equal access and representation, as well as sustainable management systems (Ngana et al. 2010). However, Biswas (2004) argues that IWRM is so vague that it can be translated and manipulated to favour one principle over another. Another issue in Tanzania relates to how the formal water policies fail to acknowledge customary water management practices. This is problematic as the dynamic nature of water in Tanzania makes it subject to a plethora of different legal and normative systems at the local level (Komakech et al. 2011). This legal pluralism has resulted in a situation where customary law overlaps with a constantly evolving formal management system. However, while the 2002 Water Policy and 2009 Water Act aim to decentralise and increase local stakeholder participation in water management, the new water registration system has effectively exacerbated the power discrepancies it was supposed to alleviate (Komakech et al. 2011).

This article examines how the various stakeholders in Mtibwa valley (Mvomero District, Tanzania) access water in the Wami Sub-basin. It also investigates the power dynamics between small-scale farmers and Mtibwa Sugar Estate Limited (MSE). Drawing on Foucauldian notions of power in knowledge, we argue that the formal legal water system privileges a specific power position in Tanzanian politics and society, which marginalises ordinary peoples’ everyday water needs. While ‘scarcity’ as a concept is not conceptualised as a means for driving water development in the basin, it is the powerful and vested interests of large-scale and commercial stakeholders that dominate water consumption and development in Tanzania. In short, it is suggested that large-scale business interests in Tanzania are being prioritised at the expense of small-scale needs and, as such, the water stress is not only about “dwindling water levels” but also “a crisis of access to and control over scarce resources” (Mehta 2007, p. 658).

1 IWRM is based on the four 1992 Dublin Principles: (1) Freshwater is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, development and the environment, (2) Water development and management should be based on a participatory approach, involving users, planners and policymakers at all levels, (3) Women play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of water, and (4) Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognised as an economic good.

The first part of this essay introduces the background of the Wami Sub-basin and MSE. The second part comprises the analysis of the case, while the third part links the case to the larger theoretical discussion of water management in Tanzania. Data collection for the project was conducted during August to September 2012 in the Mtibwa Valley, by the authors. Semi-structured interviews were conducted in nine villages² surrounding the MSE, involving a mix of genders and socio-economic levels. In addition, we met with several MSE employees, the Mtibwa Outgrowers Association, the Wami/Ruvu Basin Executive Officer and Environmental Engineer, and local government officials. Due to the limited scope of this assignment we will not touch upon the traditional water management practices in the area, and we do not explicitly investigate the ramifications of donor influence on water management.

Background: The Wami Sub-basin and Mtibwa Sugar Estate Limited

The Wami River is one of the major rivers draining from the Eastern Arc Mountain range in south-eastern Kenya and eastern Tanzania. The river runs south-eastward from the mountain range through “dense forests, across fertile agricultural plains and through grassland savannahs along its course to the Indian Ocean” (Ngana et al. 2010, p. 2). The Wami Sub-basin covers an area of approximately 43,000 km², and has a population of 1.8 million people. The Wami/Ruvu Basin Water Office (WRBWO), which was established in 2002, maintains that the “Wami sub-basin remains relatively intact from an ecological perspective” (Ngana et al. 2010, p. 2), however this is changing rapidly.

MSE is the only large-scale manufacturing industry in the Wami Sub-basin, and the estate relies on the Wami River and its tributaries for its water needs. MSE was established by the Tanza-

nian government, who then entered into a business relationship with surrounding small-scale³ outgrower sugar cane farmers in 1962. MSE remained under sole public ownership until sugar distribution was liberalised in 1992. Liberalisation resulted in increased international competition which put increased pressure on national sugar production and distribution. In 1997, the Tanzanian government decided to initiate full privatisation of the sugar industry in the bid to attract private capital, increase efficiency and acquire new technologies. Accordingly, all five major sugar factories in Tanzania were privatised, including MSE (Magongo 2008).

MSE has doubled its production since privatisation (Msuya and Ashimogo 2005), and is currently expanding both cane cultivation area and factory production capacity. According to MSE management, Tanzania is currently unable to supply enough sugar for its domestic market, and that there are strong incentives for expansion. In 2002, MSE acquired the previously state owned Dakawa Ranch⁴ for expansion. Currently, 2400 hectares of this land have been developed for sugar cane production, and another 4000 hectares of sugarcane is being prepared for cultivation. A key driver in the latter expansion is the construction of two large storage dams that will trap floodwater on the plains in the rainy season to allow the MSE to irrigate during the dry season. If the rains do not fill the dams, then the Ranch claims to have the right to draw water from the Wami River to make up for any shortfall. The pace at which the MSE will expand cane and factory production greatly rests on their access to water on the Dakawa Ranch⁵.

² The village names have been taken out of the report for purposes of confidentiality. We have chosen to do this to avoid further straining of relations between villages and MSE.

³ Small-scale farmers for the sake of this paper are those cultivating on average 1-5 hectares of land; some outgrowers own up to 25 acres of sugar cane, and are considered small-scale only in relation to the MSE.

⁴ In 2002 the ranch was divided and sold, with the largest share leased for 100 years to the MSE for sugar cane cultivation (Madulu 2005).

⁵ A key figure in the current expansion has expressed that MSE will keep expanding its cane planting area according to available water in the Dakawa dams.

Currently, MSE has the only formal license to irrigate in the area. The WRBWO said that they allocate water to the sugar factory according to the available hydrological data, which can be unreliable. They also noted that MSE is applying for more water than is available, and furthermore, the company has reapplied to increase their use from 1.4 cubic metres to 2 cubic metres per second. MSE described the current water permit as being unchanged from when the company was public. In contrast, the WRBWO stated that while MSE used to have a formal permit with no limit to water access, the sugar estate must apply for temporary permits according to the new Act of 2009. MSE claimed that their permit was 2.5 cubic metres per second for irrigation, but said that they usually only get about 2.1 cubic metres. Overall there seemed to be a lack of information and clarity around water management figures and policies between MSE and WRBWO: besides from discrepancies on water allowance and extraction, WRBWO expressed that it had no prior knowledge of the construction of the Dakawa dams.

Another point of contention relates to how the water quality in the Mtibwa valley has been negatively affected by cane production. The WRBWO and several other independent reports document that a major source of water pollution is MSE: significant use of agricultural fertilisers and herbicides. This, along with dumping of excess waste molasses into surrounding waterways, has led to the deterioration of the quality of available fresh water (Madulu 2005; Ngana et al. 2010). In addition, the WRBWO states that there are “water pollution problems due to the effluent releases from treatment ponds ... when earth dams fail at Mtibwa Sugar Estate” (Ngana et al. 2010, p.14). This affects not only the health of the surrounding rural population, but also damages soil quality affecting people’s livelihoods, as most fields are flooded by local waterways during the rainy season. In sum, the MSE has a monopoly on the sugar processing market in the area, as well as owning the only

formal water permit in the valley. This gives the MSE an uncontested dominance throughout the Wami Sub-basin, which negatively affects local stakeholders’ livelihoods and access to safe water.

Water Scarcity and Domestic Access for Villages Located in the Mtibwa Valley

The Mvomero district, in which MSE resides, has an annual average rainfall of 600-2000 mm (Ngana et al. 2010). Agriculture is the main livelihood activity, with 33% of the people growing sugar cane (Magongo 2008). Most of the village water users in the valley face difficulties in accessing sufficient levels of safe and clean water, particularly during the dry season. The villages surveyed access water from surrounding rivers for domestic use, local boreholes and/or shallow hand-dug wells. Salinity and unsafe water are key challenges facing more than half of the villages interviewed. Another challenge in accessing water is poor infrastructure: pump breakdowns occur regularly; extended waiting periods for parts and repair or maintenance, and few functioning boreholes all contribute to water stress.

Two of the villages we visited had no operating boreholes or shallow wells, and locals, mostly women and children, walked for one to two hours to access water. The Maasai village next to the Dakawa Ranch use the unsafe water from MSE drainage canals for domestic use during the dry season. The Maasai also water their livestock in these canals and rivers, further contributing to the contamination of their drinking water. In one village, located downstream from MSE, effluent from waste treatment ponds and sewage from the factory had polluted the village’s water sources. Residents in this village had suffered repeated health complications and crop failure. Despite pressure from WRBWO and the local community, MSE has yet to adequately address concerns of pollution and water quality. However, in instances where villagers expressed concern

about increasing water stress, the respondents did not link the relationship between the water scarcity and MSE's water use. Although water scarcity is felt, other conflicts with the factory and between farmers and Maasai are taking precedence.

Water Policy, Water Access and Rights

All the crops of interviewed outgrowers are rain-fed. However, farmers close to the river divert water to flood their crops in times of drought. The EU funded an irrigation feasibility study for one Block Farm project⁶, and the report concluded that it is not cost-effective to build an irrigation infrastructure for the Block Farm. Without irrigated cane crops, the outgrowers feel that they have no power to compete with MSE. In 2005-2007, and again in 2009, farmers in the area experienced several droughts but expressed that nothing was done to alleviate the water shortage. People feel the leadership within the associations and cooperatives should devise a common strategy and facilitate a plan to cope with the erratic rainfall, climatic variations and seasonal water stress. On the other hand, most respondents were unaware of the Water Policy of 2002 and Water Act of 2009, and none of the villages had been visited by the WRBWO or a catchment authority. The WRBWO has previously approached the Madizini local government leaders to organise and form local water committees to supervise a World Bank program planned for the area. However, the water officers did not hold a public meeting or give the local government specific details regarding the new Policy or Act, instead focussing on water permits and sustaining/managing domestic water usage in the village.

Conversely, the Mvomero District Government has been to the majority of the villages

in the area to instruct them in the formation of domestic water committees. Under this water committee system, each borehole in the village has a group or individual responsible for collecting water fees and dealing with water disruptions and repairs. Nonetheless, people feel uninformed and not well-represented within the villages or the formal governance structures, with regards to water access and rights. The villagers generally also feel powerless when it comes to water conflict resolution mechanisms. The WRBWO emphasised the importance of water user groups for enforcement of the water policy; however no incentives are in place for water users to form these groups.

Almost all of the outgrowers interviewed admitted that the relations with the factory have greatly deteriorated since privatisation. In addition, few villages felt that they received any social benefits from the factory. Instead, outgrowers expressed a sense of helplessness due to a lack of bargaining power in relation to MSE. While most brought up the factory's formal water permit, there did not exist a consensus on how much water this allowed the factory to extract. Moreover, whereas respondents did not explicitly link water stress with MSE's excessive water use, the skewed access to water is produced by, and further exacerbates, the asymmetrical power relation between MSE and the surrounding population.

Discussion

Tanzania's public water services are increasingly being exposed to, and restructured in line with, private and commercial interests. The cost of implementing and maintaining water ventures is overburdening the public sector and under the structural adjustment regime the long-term goal is for local governance services to be decentralised and privatised (Ngana et al. 2010). This trend is being replicated across the world through the close guidance and monitoring of the World Bank and the international community at large. However, apart from the

⁶ The Block Farms are an EU-funded initiative in which groups of small-scale sugar cane farmers combine plots of neighboring land to form group plots of around 30 hectares each. In this way the farmers can increase the economics of scale under centralised management.

eloquent policy recommendations set down in the Tanzanian 2002 Water Policy and the supporting 2009 Water Act, neither the local capacities nor the financial stability needed to implement and sustain the water governance model has been generated. This is indubitably a result of the substantial “challenges of administering a water right system in a largely small-scale user environment” (Komakech et al. 2011, p. 1747). In short, the Basin Water Boards are still in different stages of the start-up phase, and the implementation of the Water Policy of 2002 and Water Act of 2009 are far from progressing as projected. For instance, none of the nine Water Basin Offices are financially self-sustained; the Wami/Ruvu Basin Office reports that, to date, it finances 30-40% of its operational costs through water user fees, and the shortfall is financed by the Ministry of Water. This compromises the staff capacity and the programme activity on the ground, which is evident in the Wami Sub-basin in the striking lack of knowledge among water users and local government officials, but also in the way the Mvomero District Office is implementing hamlet water committees (instead of concentrating on sensitising villagers about the 2002 Water Policy and 2009 Water Act). The disjointed and overlapping nature of implementation of water management from different state agencies is an example of how the current method of blueprint thinking is disconnected from reality on the ground.

Though the WRBWO maintains that the financial viability of its operation will improve in the coming years through increased water user rates and fee collection, the current strategy for achieving this is first and foremost to increase revenues from large-scale players. This strategy is intrinsically related to the difficulties in achieving adequate participation among various stakeholders under one comprehensive system. As Saravanan et al. (2002) emphasise, “[t]here is an overwhelming assumption that all stakeholders can be easily identified, and integrated under newly created institutional structures for

possible agreeable solutions” (Saravanan et al. 2009, pp.79). Far from this, though, they maintain that the competition between stakeholders and the asymmetrical power relations will only deepen through skewed registration of water users in the basins:

selective involvement of direct and easily identifiable stakeholders in various watershed programmes only legitimises the existing resource use pattern, depriving the poor and creating conflicts (Saravanan, 2002, as cited in Saravanan et al. 2009, p. 79).

MSE is driving water development in the Mtibwa valley. As the dominant and, effectively, singular player in irrigation development in the area, they occupy a position of privilege. This has what Komakech et al. call the power to “shape the environment to suit their needs” (Komakech et al. 2011, p. 1749). The WRBWO allocates licenses on a first-come first-served basis, and the staff is currently estimating the exact hydrological allocation limits due to a lack of concrete data about water levels in the Sub-basin. In interviews, the WRBWO firmly stated that “any water development requires a license”. This has serious consequences for subsequent claims in the basin. As the sole irrigator with water rights in the area, and with current cultivation and irrigation expansions in progress, the amount of available water for other unregistered users in the region can only decrease. The changes in water infrastructure also affect the property relations of the water basin. As theorised by Coward (1986), and later by Van Koppen (2008), “hydraulic property relation creation” has significant implications for how water management and responses are shaped in the future. For instance, the water registration system, though symbolic in essence, has real and physical consequences when stakeholders act to change the hydraulic infrastructure like MSE is doing in the Wami Sub-basin with their irrigation expansion and dam construction. The changes are based more on the operational needs of the expanding sugar

estate than on the hydraulic and ecological reality in the Wami Sub-basin. The market rationale that underlines the water policy also masks the anthropogenic factors that are causing water stress in the valley and is, moreover, undermining average people's future water security.

While the valley is identified as a high-potential area for irrigation, and water resources are described as abundant, the water resources are also "highly variable and unpredictable over seasons and years" (Van Koppen et al. 2004, p. 3). Moreover, though one of the IWRM guiding principles is equity in water management, the reality is that the practical implementation of the water policy favours large-scale users; the MSE are able to "[mobilise] financial, institutional and technical resources to harness the abundance of water resources for development" (ibid). In contrast, small-scale farmers lack all of the above capacities to access water for irrigation, and given the considerable expansion for sugar cane cultivation undertaken on the MSE, the unequal access to water can only increase in the future. The fact that the MSE is represented on the Wami/Ruvu Basin Water Board exacerbates the asymmetrical power relations: the estate is both directly represented, unlike other water users, and has exclusive access to water development in the basin.

Conclusion

Water access and management in Mtibwa is asymmetrical, demonstrating the failings of the IWRM blueprint approach in the Tanzanian Water Policy of 2002 and Water Act of 2009. Although there is a formal system for water access, which is supposed to ensure efficiency, equity and sustainability, what is actually occurring at the ground level is that large-scale operators are dominating the water development in the basin; as Komakech et al. maintain: "the state initiated [...] water use registration process and obligatory water rights for all users

[and this] has created large power differentials and contested claims." (Komakech et al. 2011, p. 1749). Moreover, the issue of water scarcity is reduced to questions of supply for commercial purposes, which shifts the focus towards technical solutions, rather than community participation and equitable water distribution. This is exemplified in the Mtibwa Valley with the expansion of MSE and the dam projects, which will disrupt water availability downstream of the dams and increase competition in access to water and land. A consequence is that small-scale farmers and the Maasai are engaged in conflicts with each other and with MSE. Additionally, the stilted flow of information from policy makers down through to local communities reflects the unequal power dynamics and the lack of transparency in Mtibwa Valley. This is problematic, as unequal power relations are masked by discourses of economic development. In this way, one conflates the systemic inequality in decision making processes and access to water. Hence, "[w]hile the new water rights system fits the relatively better-off minority to some extent, it is an anomaly for Tanzania's majority of poor water users" (Van Koppen et al. 2004, p. vii).

Although our research indicated that the primary concerns of the small-scale farmers did not revolve around water access and management (but centred on sugar cane prices and market access), we believe that water will inevitably become a highly contested issue as its availability as a natural resource diminishes with the increased development of MSE. Combined with the growing impacts of climate change, deforestation, and the demands of a growing population, the Dakawa Ranch expansion by the MSE will inevitably bring the issue of water access and governance to the forefront of both local concerns and larger socio-political agendas.

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